3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-95 - 2019-06-24 to 2019-06-28, Sapporo
meeting id: S3-95 (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
S3‑191800 | Agenda | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191801 | Report from last SA3 meeting/s | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191802 | SA3 Work Plan | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191803 | Report from last SA meeting | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191804 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191805 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191806 | Evaluation of Solution Solution #18 | Futurewei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191807 | Secuirty threat for RRCResumeRequest tampering. | Futurewei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191808 | Solution for protecting RRCResumeRequest against tampering | Futurewei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191809 | Draft LS to RAN2 on UECapabilitiesEnquire after AS SMC | Futurewei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191810 | Update of Solution Solution #4 | Futurewei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191811 | Evaluation of Solution #4 | Futurewei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191812 | Conclusion for KI#2 for RRC based solutions | Futurewei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191813 | Conclusion for KI#3 for RRC signaling based solutions | Futurewei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191814 | TCG progress report | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191815 | Evaluation for solution for (D)DoS attack mitigation in PNI NPN for KI#6.1 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191816 | Discussion on S-NSSAI privacy protection | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191817 | Protection of S-NSSAI transmitted in the AS layer using T-S-NSSAI | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191818 | Protection of S-NSSAI transmitted in the AS layer | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191819 | Evaluation for solution #4 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191820 | Solution for (D)DoS attack mitigation in PNI NPN | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191821 | Solution for (D)DoS attack mitigation in PNI NPN | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191822 | Solution for Privacy protection for unicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191823 | Solution for Security for eV2X unicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191824 | Solution for Security for eV2X unicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191825 | Solution for Privacy protection for unicast messages over PC5 using rekeying | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191826 | TR 33.813 - Evaluation for Solution X - S-NSSAI transmitted in the AS layer using T-S-NSSAI | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191827 | TR 33.813 - Evaluation for Solution Y - S-NSSAI transmitted in the AS layer | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191828 | TR 33.819 – KI #6.2 – Threats and Requirements | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191829 | LS on ETSI Plugtest standards Issues | C1-193601 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191830 | Reply LS on Security failure of NAS container in HO command | C1-193708 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191831 | LS on handling of native non-current 5G NAS security context after an inter-system change from S1 mode to N1 mode in idle mode | C1-193944 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191832 | Reply LS on Clarification for N32 security | C4-192467 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191833 | NGMN 5G End-to-End Architecture Framework | NGMN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191834 | Observations on standards and technical constraints from 3rd MCX remote Plugtests | ETSI CTI | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191835 | LS on RRC Connection Re-Establishment for CP for NB-IoT connected to 5GC | R2-1908264 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191836 | LS on Ciphering solution for broadcast of Assistance Data | R2-1908473 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191837 | GTP Recovery Counter & GSN node behaviour | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191838 | Reply LS on Authentication for UEs not Supporting NAS | S1-191595 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191839 | Further LS relating to “Response LS on reporting all Cell IDs in 5G” | S2-1906170 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191840 | LS reply on Nudr Sensitive Data Protection | S2-1906761 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191841 | Reply LS on Nudr Sensitive Data Protection | SP-190581 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191842 | Reply LS on Clarification request on NF authorization in UE Reachability Notification Request procedure | S2-1906636 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191843 | LS to BBF on WWC status | S2-1906821 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191844 | LS on the availability of and requesting feedback on the stable draft TR 103 582 from ETSI STF555 - "Study of use cases and communications involving IoT devices in emergency situations | ETSI SC EMTEL | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191845 | Diameter IPX Network End-to-End Security Solution | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191846 | LS on support of non-3GPP only UE and support for PEI in IMEI format | S2-1904836 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191847 | Response LS on support of non-3GPP only UE and support for PEI in IMEI format | s3i190363 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191848 | Handling of UE radio network capabilities in 4G and 5G | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191849 | Virtualisation Study Conf Call Output | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191850 | pCR Virtualisation Study Key Issue 10 Merger with Key issue 1 (was S3-191569) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191851 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 11 (was S3-191570) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191852 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 12 (was S3-191571) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191853 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 19 (was S3-191580) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191854 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 20 (was S3-191581) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191855 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 21 (was S3-191582) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191856 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 22 (was S3-191583) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191857 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 23 (was S3-191583) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191858 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 24 (was S3-191585) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191859 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 25 (was S3-191587) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191860 | [33.180] R15 - Fix hash result | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191861 | [33.180] R16 - Fix hash result (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Germany | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191862 | Moving Forward on Storing Authentication Data | Hewlett-Packard Enterprise | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191863 | Resolve EN on signaling details of how the UE hands over to false base station | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191864 | Handover Attempts failure counter | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191865 | Solution #4: Resolving EN on network verification of the hashes of MIB/SIBs | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191866 | Solution #4: Resolving EN on Impact on UE power consumption | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191867 | Solution #4: Details on the hash algorithm used for MIB/SIB hashes | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191868 | Address EN in solution #1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191869 | Enabling UE to detect FBS | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191870 | Conclusion to KI #5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191871 | Mitigate DDoS Attacks on RAN based on RAN coordination | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191872 | New KI: Sleep deprivation attacks to CIOT terminals | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191873 | A solution to protect CIOT terminals from sleep deprivation attacks | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191874 | Requirement for key issue 5 in TR 33.814 (FS_eLCS_Sec) | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191875 | New solution to key issue 5 in TR 33.814 (FS_eLCS_Sec) | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191876 | Update of Solution #6 - Use of UE Configuration Update | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191877 | Update of solution #17 - Efficient key derivation for e2e security | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191878 | AKMA solution set analysis | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191879 | Proposal for editor's note in FS_CIoT_sec_5G solution #15 | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191880 | Proposal for FS_UP_IP_Sec Key Issue #3 and 5: Zero-overhead user plane integrity protection on the link layer | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191881 | [DRAFT] LS to SA2 for Moving Forward on Storing Authentication Data | Hewlett-Packard Enterprise | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191882 | [DRAFT] LS to CT4 for Moving Forward on Storing Authentication Data | Hewlett-Packard Enterprise | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191883 | DraftCR - update Annex B to support the authentication of non-3GPP UE | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191884 | SoR-MAC-IUE verification failure handling by UDM | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191885 | Adding references, definitions and abbreviations to SCAS UDM | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191886 | Adding introduction text to SCAS UDM | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191887 | Adding content to clause 4.2.3, 4.3 and 4.4 in SCAS UDM | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191888 | New test case to SCAS UDM: SoR-MAC-IUE verification failure handling | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191889 | Discussion on AKMA overall conclusions | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191890 | Resolving Editor’s Notes and adding conclusion to solution #18 | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191891 | Resolving Editor’s Notes and adding conclusion to solution #20 | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191892 | Editorial corrections of AKMA TR 33.835 v0.4.0 | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191893 | Editorial correction of TR 33.861 | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191894 | Evaluation text for solution #5 in TR 33.825 | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191895 | New Key Issue on Identification of Multiple NPN Subscriptions | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191896 | Solution for Identification and Selection of Multiple NPN Subscriptions | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191897 | New Key Issue on separation and storage of multiple NPN credentials | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191898 | Solution for separation of multiple NPN credentials | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191899 | New solution for KI #4 | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191900 | Proposed solution to key issue 6.3 on modifying the CAG list | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191901 | Security for non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191902 | Proposed conclusion details for key issue #1.1 in TR 33.819 | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191903 | Proposed updates to the draft CR on SRVCC from 5G to UTRAN CS | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191904 | Assigning a FC value to TS 33.501 for K5GSRVCC calculation | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191905 | Adding K5GSRVCC as a possible input key to derive IKSRVCC and CKSRVCC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191906 | Revision of SRVCC WID | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191907 | Key issue on protecting the SQN during a re-synchronisation procedure in AKA | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191908 | Using MACS to provide freshness for the protection of SQN during a re-synchronisation procedure in AKA | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191909 | Evaluation of the integrity protection provided by EDT solutions #4 and #18 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191910 | Adding some details to solution #10 on protecting S-NSSAI at AS layer | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191911 | Discussion on possible solutions to AMF relocation issues | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191912 | Missing security context handling during registration procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191913 | Evaluation of solution #5: Security for redundant data transmission | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191914 | Conclusion on KI #1 for Study on the security for URLLC | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191915 | Conclusion on KI #2 for Study on the security for URLLC | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191916 | Issues of resetting NAS COUNT values in 5G to 4G mobility | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191917 | NAS Count values in the mapped EPS security context in 5GS to EPS change | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191918 | Evaluation of solution #4.1: F1 interface security for IAB | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191919 | Conclusion of KI #4.1: F1 interface security for IAB | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191920 | Solution for integrity protection of EDT | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191921 | Evaluation against MitM false base station attacks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191922 | Evaluation of the shared key based MIB/SIB protection solution | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191923 | Reply LS on handling of native non-current 5G NAS security context | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191924 | Ciphering of broadcast assistance data for UE-based positioning | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191925 | Proposed conclusion for PARLOS | Qualcomm Incorporated, Intel, Samsung, Sprint, Verizon UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191926 | pCR: Resolution of EN in Solution 2 evaluation | Qualcomm Incorporated, Intel, Samsung, Sprint, Verizon UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191927 | A key issue on forward secracy | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191928 | A solution to forward secracy | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191929 | Conclusion to KI #1 (slice authentication) | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191930 | Conclusions to KI#2 (AMF Key separation) | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191931 | Conclusions to KI#3 (NSaaS) | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191932 | Add evalution to solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191933 | Amendment to solution 6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191934 | Solution details on solution 8 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191935 | Evalution for solution 8 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191936 | Requirements on UDM/ARPF | Gemalto, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191937 | Requirement on authenticating unpublish requests | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191938 | Nokia comments on R2-1908467 reply LS to GSMA UE capability | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191939 | Nokia comments on GSMA LS on UE radio capability exchange | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191940 | Nokia comments on GSMA LS on UE radio capbility exchange | Nokia, Nokia Shangahi Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191941 | Nokia comments on R2-1908473 UE DL assistance data. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191942 | Draft reply LS on R2-1908473 UE DL assistance data. | Nokia , Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191943 | Nokia comments on R2-1908264 LS on RRC Connection Re-establishment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191944 | Way forward on Emergency solution for PARLOS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191945 | Addressing EN in solution#1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191946 | 2. Addressing EN in KI#4. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191947 | Adding text to Clause 9 Recommendations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191948 | Draft WID for normative work on eNS. | Nokia, Nokia Shangahi Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191949 | DraftCR - update Annex B to support the authentication of non-3GPP devices | CableLabs, Charter, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191950 | Evaluation to Solution 6.6 | Intel China Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191951 | Security solution for UL small data transfer in RRC Suspend and Resume with early data transmission (EDT) with legacy fall back | Intel China Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191952 | Evaluation to Security solution 4 for UL small data transfer in RRC Suspend and Resume with early data transmission (EDT) | Intel China Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191953 | Evaluation to Security solution 18 for UL small data transfer in RRC Suspend and Resume with early data transmission (EDT) | Intel China Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191954 | Clarification of NIA0 with SgNB for UE NR capability | Intel China Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191955 | Clarification on Procedure for steering of UE in VPLMN during mobility registration update | Intel China Ltd., NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191956 | Security solution for UE to avoid connecting to the false base station during a handover procedure | Intel China Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191957 | Update of key issue #2 on PC5 unicast mode | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191958 | Solution for security of V2X service authorisation | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191959 | Discussion on the reply LS for PC5 unicast groupcast security protection | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191960 | Reply LS on PC5 unicast and groupcast security protection | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191961 | Add abbreviation and correct references | Futurewei Technologies | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191962 | pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for the ciphering key management of broadcast assistance data | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191963 | Solution for anchor keys security | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191964 | Mitigation against linkability issue | Gemalto N.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191965 | pCR to TR33.814 - The solution for the ciphering key management of broadcast assistance data | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191966 | pCR to TR33.814 - The analysis of security architecture of eLCS | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191967 | pCR to TR33.814 - Conclusions for TR33.814 | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191968 | pCR to TR33.814 - Add reference for TR 33.814 | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191969 | pCR to TR33.814 - Addition of definition and abbreviation | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191970 | New SID on Study on user plane security termination point in 5GC | CATT, China Unicom, Qihoo360 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191971 | length of ARFCN-DL | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191972 | uplink NAS Count for KeNB derivation in idle mode mobility to EPS | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191973 | CAG ID privacy | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191974 | Security threats and requirements on CAG ID privacy | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191975 | Structure RAND for authentication | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191976 | Handling of Sync failure | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191977 | Modification on linkability issue1 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191978 | Conclusion on linkability issues | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191979 | uplink NAS Count for Kasme derivation in idle mode mobility to EPS | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191980 | Conclusion on Key Issue #7 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191981 | Removal of Editor’s Notes of solution #5 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191982 | Update of Solution #15 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191983 | Conclusion for Key Issue #6 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191984 | Discussion on UDM-UDR-ARPF issues | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191985 | Material related to UDM-ARPF-UDR discussion | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191986 | Definition of authentication subscription data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191987 | Removal of Editor’s Note and Addition of Evaluation | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191988 | Conclusion for Key Issue #5 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191989 | Living document for 5G_UTRAN_SEC | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191990 | New solution (SERSI - SERving network controlled SI signatures) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191991 | Conclusion on KI#3'S second requirement (reactive action) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191992 | Proposal for handling of UE radio network capabilities in 4G and 5G | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191993 | URLLC: Recommendation for KI#3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191994 | URLLC: Table with available solutions in the TR | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191995 | Recommendation to run AKA after IW HO from 4G to 5G | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191996 | Co-existence of LTKUP and PFS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191997 | New KI: Leakage of long-term key | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191998 | New solution: EAP-AKA´ PFS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑191999 | Correction of reference to draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192000 | Solution 2 evaluation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192001 | Solution 3 evaluation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192002 | Solution #15 updates including evaluation update | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192003 | Solution #13 evaluation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192004 | Security handling in registration procedure at AMF reallocation caused by slicing | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192005 | New solution: Integrating GBA to 5GC | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192006 | STRIDE diagram for the gNB | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192007 | Discussion Document on the evolution of BEST | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192008 | WID on BEST Test Specificationd for HSE and UE | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192009 | pCR to TR33.935 - Addition of Diffie - Helman Key agreements section | VODAFONE Group Plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192010 | Rename the derived key | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192011 | SRVCC keys | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192012 | key generation in MME_SRVCC | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192013 | CIoT: Update to Solution #18 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192014 | CIoT: Evaluation to Solution #18 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192015 | CIoT: Conclusion to KI#2 and KI#3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192016 | CIOT: add evaluation to solution #4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192017 | CIOT: Optional support of RRC Inactive in eMTC connected to 5GC | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192018 | CIOT: New solution for UP IP in PDCP to protect UL EDT data in Msg3 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192019 | DDoS protection based on NWDAF and Overload Control | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192020 | Conslusion for KI#5 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192021 | Conslusion for KI#4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192022 | Adding evaluation and resolving EN in Solution 7 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192023 | Discussion paper on NSSAI in AS layer protection | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192024 | Conclusion on KI#1 (bluetooth positioning) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192025 | Conclusion on KI#2 (TBS positioning) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192026 | Conclusion on KI#3 (WLAN positioning) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192027 | Resolving EN in KI#4 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192028 | Conclusion on KI#4 (privacy control) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192029 | New KI: Protection of recovery from backhaul-RLF | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192030 | New solution: Secure recovery from backhaul-RLF | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192031 | Update to solution #2.1 (Authentication and authorization of IAB Node) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192032 | New solution on authentication and authorization of IAB Node in 5G | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192033 | New solution: Token-based authorization for Scenario D using stateless SeCoP | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192034 | New solution: Token-based authorization for Scenario C using stateless SeCoP | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192035 | Correction of implementation of S3-191671 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192036 | UP IP: New key issue for UE indicating support of UP IP in NR PDCP with a ng-eNB connected to 5GC | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192037 | Corrections on IP packet forwarding | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192038 | Corrections on IP packet forwarding | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192039 | Corrections on IP packet forwarding | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192040 | Threat analysis for OAM configurator spoofing | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192041 | Living document: generic assets and threats | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192042 | STRIDE diagram for the AUSF | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192043 | Attack tree for sensitive data in AUSF | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192044 | AUSF assets and threats | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192045 | Living document: AUSF aspects in 33.926 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192046 | Requirements for credential storage in the UDR | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192047 | New WID on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192048 | Scope of a SECAM SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192049 | TR terminology | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192050 | Cleaning of 33819-040 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192051 | Headline clash in TR resolved | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192052 | Mandating time based generation of SQNs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192053 | Requirement on UDR | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192054 | Missing UDR description in alignment with 29.505 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192055 | Update on ARPF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192056 | Adding Nudr service | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192057 | LS-UDR | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192058 | NPN references in existing text | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192059 | Key issue on Secure device identity creation for constrained devices | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192060 | Secure device identity creation for UEs in SNPNs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192061 | Scope of SECAM evaluation for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192062 | Scope of SECAM evaluation for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192063 | Scope of SECAM Accreditation for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192064 | Adding roles in SECAM for 3GPP virtualized network products into clause 4.6 | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192065 | Resovle Editor's notes in Solution for Key freshness in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192066 | mitigate the linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192067 | Dicussion on security handling after voice call ends | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192068 | security handling after voice call ends | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192069 | Address EN in key issue 5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192070 | A solution to identify UEs that provides faked/altered location estimate or measurements | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192071 | Delete EN in solution12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192072 | A solution to MIB and SIB protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192073 | Clarification on length of EARFCN-DL in key derivation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192074 | KI on protection of F1-U | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192075 | KI on toplogy discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192076 | Add evualtion to solution 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192077 | Add requirement to KI#2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192078 | Add threat and requirement to KI#10 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192079 | Add requirement to KI#12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192080 | Add threat and requirement to KI#11 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192081 | Add requirement and delete EN for KI#14 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192082 | Add requirement and delete EN for KI#15 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192083 | Delete Editor's in Solution#3 and add evaluation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192084 | Delete Editor's in Solution#5 and add evaluation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192085 | Conclusion on KI#1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192086 | Conclusion on KI#14 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192087 | Solution on Line ID protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192088 | Mapping SUCI to SUPI | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192089 | Merge S3-191319 to solution 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192090 | Conclusion on KI#12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192091 | Conclusion on KI#16 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192092 | Propose fuzz tests run 100 000 times | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192093 | R15_clarification for Fuzz tests run | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192094 | R14_clarification for Fuzz tests run | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192095 | Clairication on the intention of the requirment | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192096 | R15_Mirror_Clairication on the intention of the requirment | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192097 | R14_Mirror_Clairication on the intention of the requirment | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192098 | A document is needed to show the support features | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192099 | R15_Mirror_A document is needed to show the support features | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192100 | R14_Mirror_A document is needed to show the support features | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192101 | Align account numbers in testcase with the requirement | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192102 | R15_Mirror_Align account numbers in testcase with the requirement | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192103 | R14_Mirror_Align account numbers in testcase with the requirement | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192104 | WID on Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192105 | Address EN in solution 17 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192106 | Update Solution 17 to Supplement Missing Part When Merging with S3-191389 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192107 | Add Evaluation for Solution 17 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192108 | Add Details and Evaluation for Solution 19 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192109 | Discussion Paper for Mitigation of DDoS Attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192110 | conclusion for KI#4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192111 | Key Issue for RRC Connection Re-Establishment for the control plane for NB-IoT connected to 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192112 | Solution for RRC Connection Re-Establishment for the control plane for NB-IoT connected to 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192113 | Reply LS on RRC Connection Reestablishment for CP for NB-IoT connected to 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192114 | Conclusion for KI#2 and KI#3 of frequent CIoT Ues | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192115 | Solution for Protection of NAS Redirection Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192116 | Solution for Protection of RRC Reject Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192117 | Solution for Protection of NAS Reject Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192118 | Solution for Avoiding UE connecting to False Base Station during Conditional Handover | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192119 | conclusion for key issue 3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192120 | Deleting the EN of conclusion 7.1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192121 | Deleting the EN of conclusion 7.4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192122 | conclusion for key issue 2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192123 | Remove the paragraph of Introduction | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192124 | Remove the unnecessary ENs of Key issue part | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192125 | draftCR for URLLC TS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192126 | Evaluation for solution | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192127 | Adding contents into clause 4 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192128 | Adding writing process overview into clause 5.1 | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192129 | Adding general description and ToE into clause 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192130 | Adding references, definitions and abbreviations to SCAS UDM | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192131 | New solution: Integrity Protection of packet header in the User Plane | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192132 | New solution: Integrity Protection of packet header in the User Plane | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192133 | New solution: Integrity Protection of packet header in the User Plane | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192134 | Adding introduction text to SCAS UDM | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192135 | Revisit the KAUSF desynchronization problem | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192136 | Adding content to clause 4.2.3, 4.3 and 4.4 in SCAS UDM | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192137 | Living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192138 | Addition Assets and Threats for Generic NFs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192139 | KAUSF synchronziation between the UE and AUSF | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192140 | Discussion of credential data protection | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192141 | Updating the Living Document with Threat References | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192142 | Correnction of Reference | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192143 | Living Document: New Annex for the SEPP in TR 33.926 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192144 | New solution for the linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192145 | Resolving the ENs in solution #5 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192146 | New KI: AKMA push | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192147 | New KI: KAUSF storing at UE side | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192148 | Solving registraiton failure in ilde mobility registration procedure with AMF Reallocation | China Telecom, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192149 | Evaluation to solution #9 and conclusion to KI#5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192150 | Solution for NF service consumer verification during service access authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192151 | Clarification on security context transfer during handover from S1 mode to N1 mode | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192152 | Evaluation of solution #15 in TR 33.855 - Delegated "Subscribe-Notify" interaction Authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192153 | Update of solution #19 in TR 33.855 - Authorization within a NF Set | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192154 | Issues on not removing the authentication result in the UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192155 | Removing the authentication result in the UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192156 | Description of issue of security context transfer following the handover from EPS to 5GS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192157 | Discussion on the inconsistency of eKSI in idle mode mobility from 5GS to EPS over N26 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192158 | Clarification on the eKSI in idle mode mobility from 5GS to EPS over N26 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192159 | Discussson paper on AMF reallocation | China Telecom, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192160 | Solution for AKMA push | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192161 | Removing the authentication result in the UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192162 | Changes on handover from EPS to 5GS over N26 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192163 | Completing TS 33.512 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192164 | Completing TS 33.513 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192165 | Adding UPF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192166 | Completing TS 33.514 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192167 | Adding UDM critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192168 | Adding test case for UE security policy comparison during handover | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192169 | Completing TS 33.515 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192170 | Adding SMF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192171 | Completing TS 33.516 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192172 | Adding AUSF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192173 | Completing TS 33.517 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192174 | Updating TS 33.518 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192175 | Completing TS 33.519 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192176 | Adding NEF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192177 | adding critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 for general SBA/SBI aspects | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192178 | Update of living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192179 | Addition of AMF-related Security Problem Descriptions | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192180 | Updating SEPP critical assets and threats in TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192181 | Adding a test case for charging id uniqueness | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192182 | Clarification on authentication vector generation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192183 | Meeting notes of NFV SCAS conf call | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192184 | Threat Analysis on Exposure of Confidential IEs in N32-f message | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192185 | Updating UDM with UE registration status | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192186 | Threat Analysis of Incorrect Handling for Protection Policies Mismatch by the SEPP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192187 | Meeting minutes of AKMA conference calls | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192188 | Discussion paper UE initiated PFS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192189 | Test Case: Correct Handling of Protection Policy Mismatch in the SEPP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192190 | Work Plan for moving forward AKMA | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192191 | pCR UE initiated PFS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192192 | Threat Analysis on Weak JWS Algorithm | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192193 | Editorial Changes to TR 33.835 v0.4.0 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192194 | Test Case: JWS Profile Restriction in the SEPP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192195 | TR 33.819 – KI #6.2 – Threats and Requirements | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192196 | Individual Evaluation of solution #6 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192197 | Updating TS 33.517 with the Threat Reference for the Test Case in 4.2.2.5 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192198 | Individual Evaluations of solution #7- #12 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192199 | A Solution to authentication method negotiation | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192200 | Updates on IAB Node authentication and authorization solution | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192201 | Discussion on AKMA overall evaluation methodology | China Mobile, ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192202 | Establishment of F1 security association using Shared Key | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192203 | Evaluation of Solution#1 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192204 | skeleton of clause 7- evaluation and conclusion | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192205 | Conclusion to Key Issue #5 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192206 | Resolving EN on New and Last serving gNB interactions | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192207 | Evaluation of solution#1- Introducing third party key to AKMA | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192208 | Evaluation of Solution#2 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192209 | Updates to Solution#7 on obtaining accurate clock information | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192210 | Deletion of EN on Location update reject in Solution#7 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192211 | Meeting minutes of AKMA conference call on 4th June | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192212 | Assessment of solution #7 to Annex A.3 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192213 | Security procedures for CAPIF-3e/4e/5e reference points | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192214 | Security aspects of CAPIF-7/7e reference points | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192215 | Editorial correction of CAPIF-3e/4e/5e requirements clause | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192216 | Conclusion to Key Issue #6.1 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192217 | Resolution of Editor’s note in Solution #3 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192218 | Description of issue of security context transfer following the handover from EPS to 5GS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192219 | Clarification to Initial NAS message protection | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192220 | Implicit bootstrapping using NEF as the AKMA Anchor Function | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192221 | Completing TS 33.514 | Huawei, Hisilicon, NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192222 | Resolve Editor’s Note in solution 3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192223 | WWC - Evaluation of Solution #3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192224 | WWC - Evaluation of Solution #4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192225 | WWC - Resolve Editor’s Note in solution 5 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192226 | Modification on the usage of Identity Request | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192227 | Resolve Editor’s Note in solution 6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192228 | WWC - Resolve Editor’s Note on Authentication in solution 4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192229 | pCR to 33.815 on authentication of network | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192230 | WWC - Resolve Editor’s Note on trust in solution 4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192231 | Privacy protection for non-3GPP in 33.402 | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192232 | WWC - Evaluation of Solution #5 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192233 | WWC - Add conclusion on KI #10 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192234 | WWC - Add conclusion on KI #11 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192235 | WWC - Add conclusion on KI #12 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192236 | WWC - Add conclusion on KI #12 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192237 | pCR to 33.815 on user awareness of PARLOS service | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192238 | UE capability protection | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192239 | update of Certificate based solution | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192240 | update of Key issue#7 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192241 | update of solution #2 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192242 | update of solution #14 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192243 | Meeting minutes of SA3 5GFBS conference call on June 2th | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192244 | LS on Integrity protection data rate enumeration | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192245 | UP IP data rate | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192246 | Discussion paper on resource level authorization using OAuth 2.0 access tokens | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192247 | Key Issue on resource level authorization during service access | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192248 | Privacy protection for non-3GPP in 33.402 | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192249 | pCR – Solution for resource level authorization using access tokens | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192250 | Discussion paper on policy-based authorization for indirect communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192251 | pCR on Policy based authorization for Indirect communications | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192252 | pCR on NF to SeCoP interface security in service-mesh based deployments | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192253 | Solution for Authorization of NFs within a NF Set | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192254 | pCR to 33.855 on SeCoP distribution | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192255 | pCR on removing EN in Solution #21 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192256 | pCR to 33.855 on NF authorization with SeCoP | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192257 | Comments to S3-191960 [DRAFT] LS on PC5 unicast and groupcast security protection | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192258 | pCR to 33.855 on NF authorization with SeCoP | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192259 | Authentication Data Storage in 5G UDR for Release 15 | Hewlett-Packard Enterprise | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192260 | Evaluation for solution #4 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192261 | Comments of S3-191922 | Futurewei Technologies | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192262 | Security handling in registration procedure at AMF reallocation caused by slicing | Ericsson Hungary Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192263 | New solution: Integrating GBA to 5GC | Ericsson Hungary Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192264 | LS on handling of native non-current 5G NAS security context after an inter-system change from S1 mode to N1 mode in idle mode | C1-193944 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192265 | Reply LS on Handling of UE radio network capabilities in 4G and 5G | R2-1908467 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192266 | Impersonation Attacks in 4G Networks | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192267 | LS on withdrawal of TS 103 383 “Smart Cards; Embedded UICC; Requirements Specification | ETSI TC SCP | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192268 | Reply LS on Cuiphering solution for broadcast of Assistance Data | Nokia , Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192269 | Reply to: GTP Recovery Counter & GSN node behaviour | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192270 | Reply to: Diameter IPX Network End-to-End Security Solution | KPN | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192271 | Reply to: Handling of UE radio network capabilities in 4G and 5G | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192272 | Reply to: Impersonation Attacks in 4G Networks | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192273 | Removing references in TS 33.501 of TS 103 383 | ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192274 | Privacy protection for non-3GPP in 33.402 | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192275 | Privacy protection for non-3GPP in 33.402 | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192276 | Definition of authentication subscription data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192277 | Reply to: Reply LS on Nudr Sensitive Data Protection | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192278 | Reply to: LS on support of non-3GPP only UE and support for PEI in IMEI format | BT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192279 | Reply LS on handling of native non-current 5G NAS security context | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192280 | Modification on the usage of Identity Request | Apple (UK) Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192281 | LS on registration issues in the AMF re-allocation | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192282 | Clarification to Initial NAS message protection | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192283 | DraftCR - update Annex B to support the authentication of non-3GPP devices | CableLabs, Charter, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192284 | uplink NAS Count for Kasme derivation in idle mode mobility to EPS | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192285 | Recommendation to run AKA after IW HO from 4G to 5G | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192286 | Addition of AMF-related Security Problem Descriptions | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192287 | DraftCR on Assests and threats specific to the AMF | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192288 | Completing TS 33.512 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192289 | Adding UPF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192290 | DraftCR on Aspects of the network product class UPF | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192291 | Completing TS 33.513 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192292 | Draft TS 33.513 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192293 | Draft TS 33.514 | NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192294 | Adding UDM critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192295 | DraftCR on aspects specific to the network product class UDM | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192296 | Completing TS 33.514 | Huawei, Hisilicon, NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192297 | DraftCR on Adding SMF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192298 | Adding test case for UE security policy comparison during handover | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192299 | Draft TS 33.515 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192300 | Completing TS 33.515 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192301 | Adding a test case for charging id uniqueness | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192302 | Adding AUSF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192303 | Draft TS 33.516 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192304 | Living Document: New Annex for the SEPP in TR 33.926 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192305 | Threat Analysis of Incorrect Handling for Protection Policies Mismatch by the SEPP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192306 | Test Case: Correct Handling of Protection Policy Mismatch in the SEPP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192307 | Draft TS 33.517 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192308 | Threat Analysis on Weak JWS Algorithm | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192309 | Test Case: JWS Profile Restriction in the SEPP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192310 | Threat Analysis on Exposure of Confidential IEs in N32-f message | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192311 | Completing TS 33.517 | Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192312 | Draft TS 33.518 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192313 | Adding NEF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192314 | Completing TS 33.519 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192315 | Draft TS 33.519 | ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192316 | Living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192317 | adding critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 for general SBA/SBI aspects | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192318 | Update of living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192319 | Corrections on IP packet forwarding | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192320 | Corrections on IP packet forwarding | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192321 | Living document: generic assets and threats | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192322 | R16_Carification for Fuzz tests run | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192323 | R15_clarification for Fuzz tests run | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192324 | R14_clarification for Fuzz tests run | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192325 | Clairication on the intention of the requirment | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192326 | R15_Mirror_Clairication on the intention of the requirment | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192327 | R14_Mirror_Clairication on the intention of the requirment | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192328 | Security solution for UL small data transfer in RRC Suspend and Resume with early data transmission (EDT) with legacy fall back | Intel China Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192329 | Align account numbers in testcase with the requirement | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192330 | R15_Mirror_Align account numbers in testcase with the requirement | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192331 | R14_Mirror_Align account numbers in testcase with the requirement | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192332 | Reply to: LS on ETSI Plugtest standards Issues | Motorola Solutions | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192333 | Correnction of Reference | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192334 | Requirements on UDM/ARPF | Gemalto, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192335 | Living document for 5G_UTRAN_SEC | China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192336 | Proposed updates to the draft CR on SRVCC from 5G to UTRAN CS | Qualcomm Incorporated,China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192337 | Assigning a FC value to TS 33.501 for K5GSRVCC calculation | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192338 | Adding K5GSRVCC as a possible input key to derive IKSRVCC and CKSRVCC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192339 | Security aspects of CAPIF-7/7e reference points | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192340 | Draft TR 33.819 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192341 | Solution for (D)DoS attack mitigation in PNI NPN | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192342 | Resolution of Editor’s note in Solution #3 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192343 | Security threats and requirements on CAG ID privacy | ZTE Corporation,Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192344 | Draft TR 33.825 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192345 | Remove the unnecessary ENs of Key issue part | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192346 | URLLC: Table with available solutions in the TR | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192347 | Evaluation of solution #5: Security for redundant data transmission | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192348 | Conclusion on KI #1 for Study on the security for URLLC | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Nokia,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192349 | conclusion for key issue 2 | Huawei, Hisilicon,Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192350 | A document is needed to show the support features | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192351 | R15_Mirror_A document is needed to show the support features | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192352 | R14_Mirror_A document is needed to show the support features | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192353 | Report from session on registation failures with AMF reallocation | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192354 | New WID on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192355 | WID on Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192356 | New SID on Study on user plane security termination point in 5GC | CATT, China Unicom, Qihoo360 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192357 | conclusion for key issue 3 | Huawei, Hisilicon,Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192358 | Deleting the EN of conclusion 7.4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192359 | pCR to TR33.814 - Add reference for TR 33.814 | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192360 | Draft TR 33.814 | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192361 | Add evualtion to solution 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192362 | pCR to TR33.814 - Conclusions for TR33.814 | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192363 | Addressing EN in solution#1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192364 | Draft TR 33.813 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192365 | Minutes of the SBA offline session | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192366 | Conclusion to KI #1 (slice authentication) | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192367 | Conclusions to KI#2 (AMF Key separation) | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192368 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 12 (was S3-191571) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192369 | Adding evaluation and resolving EN in Solution 7 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192370 | Evaluation to solution #9 and conclusion to KI#5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192371 | Solution details on solution 8 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192372 | Evalution for solution 8 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192373 | Adding some details to solution #10 on protecting S-NSSAI at AS layer | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192374 | Protection of S-NSSAI transmitted in the AS layer using T-S-NSSAI | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192375 | TR 33.813 - Evaluation for Solution X - S-NSSAI transmitted in the AS layer using T-S-NSSAI | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192376 | Adding text to Clause 9 Recommendations | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192377 | WID for normative work on eNS. | Nokia, Nokia Shangahi Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192378 | pCR to 33.815 on authentication of network | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192379 | pCR to 33.815 on user awareness of PARLOS service | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192380 | Way forward on Emergency solution for PARLOS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192381 | Draft TR 33.815 | Sprint | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192382 | Resolve Editor’s Note in solution 3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192383 | Delete Editor's in Solution#5 and add evaluation | Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192384 | Draft TR 33.807 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192385 | WWC - Resolve Editor’s Note on Authentication in solution 4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192386 | Removal of Editor’s Note and Addition of Evaluation | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192387 | Add threat and requirement to KI#11 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192388 | Add requirement to KI#12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192389 | WWC - Add conclusion on KI #12 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192390 | Add requirement and delete EN for KI#14 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192391 | Conclusion on KI#14 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192392 | Draft TR 33.861 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192393 | Key Issue for RRC Connection Re-Establishment for the control plane for NB-IoT connected to 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192394 | Reply LS on RRC Connection Reestablishment for CP for NB-IoT connected to 5GC | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192395 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 19 (was S3-191580) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192396 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 22 (was S3-191583) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192397 | Evaluation of Solution #4 | Futurewei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192398 | Proposal for editor's note in FS_CIoT_sec_5G solution #15 | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192399 | Add Evaluation for Solution 17 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192400 | CIoT: Update to Solution #18 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192401 | CIoT: Evaluation to Solution #18 | Ericsson,Futurewei,Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192402 | Add Details and Evaluation for Solution 19 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192403 | Draft TS 33.512 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192404 | Solution for Protection of NAS Redirection Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192405 | KI on toplogy discovery | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192406 | Draft TR 33.824 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192407 | New KI: Protection of recovery from backhaul-RLF | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192408 | Update to solution #2.1 (Authentication and authorization of IAB Node) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192409 | Report from offline discussions on 5GFBS | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192410 | Solution for Protection of RRC Reject Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192411 | Solution for Protection of NAS Reject Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192412 | Key Issue on resource level authorization during service access | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192413 | pCR on Policy based authorization for Indirect communications | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192414 | Evaluation of solution #4.1: F1 interface security for IAB | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192415 | Solution for Privacy protection for unicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192416 | Draft TR 33.836 | LG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192417 | Solution for Security for eV2X unicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192418 | Solution for Security for eV2X unicast messages over PC5 | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192419 | Solution for Privacy protection for unicast messages over PC5 using rekeying | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192420 | Update of key issue #2 on PC5 unicast mode | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192421 | Reply LS on PC5 unicast and groupcast security protection | LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192422 | Proposal for FS_UP_IP_Sec Key Issue #3 and 5: Zero-overhead user plane integrity protection on the link layer | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192423 | New solution for KI #4 | NEC Europe Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192424 | Draft TR 33.853 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192425 | UP IP: New key issue for UE indicating support of UP IP in NR PDCP with a ng-eNB connected to 5GC | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192426 | Evaluation of Solution#1 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192427 | skeleton of clause 7- evaluation and conclusion | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192428 | New KI: AKMA push | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192429 | Solution for AKMA push | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192430 | Draft TR 33.835 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192431 | Modification on linkability issue1 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192432 | Draft TR 33.846 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192433 | Key issue on protecting the SQN during a re-synchronisation procedure in AKA | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192434 | LS on Integrity protection data rate enumeration | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192435 | Draft TR 33.818 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192436 | Scope of SECAM Accreditation for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192437 | Adding roles in SECAM for 3GPP virtualized network products into clause 4.6 | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192438 | Draft TR 33.855 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192439 | New solution: Token-based authorization for Scenario D using stateless SeCoP | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192440 | New solution: Token-based authorization for Scenario C using stateless SeCoP | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192441 | Solution for NF service consumer verification during service access authorization | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192442 | Update of solution #19 in TR 33.855 - Authorization within a NF Set | Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192443 | pCR to 33.855 on SeCoP distribution | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192444 | pCR on removing EN in Solution #21 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192445 | Draft TR 33.848 | BT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192446 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 20 (was S3-191581) | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192447 | Evaluation of Solution#2 | Samsung,Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192448 | Draft TR 33.809 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192449 | Assessment of solution #7 to Annex A.3 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192450 | Solution 2 evaluation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192451 | Solution 3 evaluation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192452 | Solution for RRC Connection Re-Establishment for the control plane for NB-IoT connected to 5GC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192453 | Security for non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192454 | AMF reallocation | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192455 | New solution: Integrity Protection of packet header in the User Plane | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192456 | LS on Nudr Sensitive Data Protection | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
page generated from database: 2024-04-22 07:58:53