3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-96 - 2019-08-26 to 2019-08-30, Wroclaw
meeting id: S3-96 (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
S3‑192500 | Agenda | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192501 | Report from last SA3 meeting/s | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192502 | SA3 Work Plan | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192503 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192504 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192505 | Wireline Access Security requirements | BBF | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192506 | LS on Broadcast of Location Assistance Data for NR | S2-1908104 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192507 | Reply LS to Reply LS on protection of PC5-RRC messages for sidelink unicast communication | S2-1908229 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192508 | Reply LS on RRC Connection Re-Establishment for CP for NB-IoT connected to 5GC | S2-1908553 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192509 | Reply LS on DL-only UE-based positioning | S2-1908624 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192510 | Reply LS on Mobile-terminated Early Data Transmission | S2-1908629 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192511 | Reply LS on authentication of group of IoT devices | S2-1908632 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192512 | LS on withdrawal of TS 103 383 “Smart Cards; Embedded UICC; Requirements Specification” | ETSI TC SCP | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192513 | LS on SG11 activities related to improvement of the SS7 security including for digital financial services | ITU-T SG11 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192514 | Reply LS on Nudr Sensitive Data Protection | SP-190581 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192515 | draftTR33.xxx Storage of sensitive credentials in 5G systems v0.0.1 | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192516 | Reply LS on ETSI Plugtest standards issues | S6-191525 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192517 | Issues with encryption of satellite backhaul | TNO, Avanti, iDirect, University of Surrey, SES | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192518 | Conclusion for KI#4 | KPN, Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192519 | Clarifications for Protected MCData | Airbus DS SLC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192520 | TCG progress report | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192521 | Corrections for TR 33.835 | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192522 | 33.836 - solution #1 update | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192523 | TR 33.836 - update for solution #2 | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192524 | TR 33.836 - solution #3 update | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192525 | TR 33.836 solution #4 update | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192526 | TR 33.819 - DH based solution for CAG ID privacy | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192527 | TR 33.819 - hash based solution for CAG ID privacy | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192528 | TR 33.813 - update for solution #11 | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192529 | TR 33.819 - Update for solution 9 | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192530 | Corrections for Definitions and Abbreviations clauses | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192531 | Resolving EN in 33855 6.18 N9 NDS/IP | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192532 | New KI for TR 33.835 - roaming environment | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192533 | LS from TC SmartM2M STF547 to 3GPP SA1 Cc SA3 | ETSI TC SmartM2M | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192534 | LS on the call for proposals for an internationally agreed Vehicular Multimedia Architecture | ITU-T FG-VM | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192535 | 256 bit radio interface algorithm performance | ETSI SAGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192536 | Proposal to solve ED notes in solution#4: Zero-overhead user plane integrity protection on the link layer | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192537 | New KI for TR 33.835 – environments where a UICC, or a SIM card, is not available to subscribers | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192538 | Proposal for editor's note in FS_CIoT_sec_5G solution #15 | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192539 | New KI for TR 33.835 – browser environment | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192540 | Correction of text on access authentication for untrusted access | BlackBerry UK Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192541 | TR 33.848 Annex - Administration of Virtualisation | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192542 | TR 33.848 Annex - Virtualisation Security Questions | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192543 | TR 33.848 Clarifications for Section 4 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192544 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 1 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192545 | TR 33.848 Security Requirements for Key Issue 3 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192546 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 4 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192547 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 5 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192548 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 6 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192549 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 7 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192550 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 8 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192551 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 9 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192552 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 10 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192553 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 11 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192554 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 12 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192555 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 13 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192556 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 14 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192557 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 15 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192558 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 16 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192559 | TR 33.848 Security Requirements for Key Issue 17 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192560 | TR 33.848 Security Requirements for Key Issue 18 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192561 | TR 33.848 Security Requirements for Key Issue 19 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192562 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 21 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192563 | NAS Count values in the mapped EPS security context in 5GS to EPS change | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192564 | Resolving Editor’s Notes and adding conclusion to solution #20 | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192565 | conclusion for KI #9 | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192566 | conclusion for KI #15 | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192567 | Editorial corrections for eV2X SI TR 33.836 v0.3.0 | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192568 | terminology alignment on groupcast | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192569 | new KI on privacy protection for broadcast | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192570 | new solution on privacy protection for broadcast and groupcast | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192571 | new solution on privacy protection for unicast | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192572 | new KI on increasing robustness and reliability in L2 ID update procedure | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192573 | new solution on increasing robustness and reliability in L2 ID update procedure | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192574 | new KI on minimizing the impact of privacy protection mechanism in the application layer communication | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192575 | new solution on minimizing the impact of privacy protection mechanism in the application layer communication | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192576 | Editorial corrections for SCAS UDM TS 33.514 v0.5.0 | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192577 | Security for non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192578 | General NDS/IP SEG support for non-SBA interfaces | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192579 | Minor corrections to 33163 | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192580 | Minor corrections to 33163 | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192581 | Add a new Annex for the authentication of non-5GC NAS capable devices in WWC | CableLabs, Charter Communications, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Ericsson, Comcast, Rogers Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192582 | Discussion paper on MT EDT LS from SA2 | Nokia, Nokia Shangahi Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192583 | Addressing EN in PARLOS Evaluation clause 7.2.3 | Nokia, Nokia Shangahi Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192584 | Update to Solution 8 protecting NSSAI in AS layer | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192585 | FBS add text to evaluation clause 6.7.3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192586 | Summary of updates to S3-192276 from last meeting | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192587 | Definition of authentication subscription data and update to UDM requirement | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192588 | Requirement on UDR | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192589 | Missing UDR description in alignment with 29.505 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192590 | Update on ARPF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192591 | Adding Nudr service | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192592 | Security for non-public networks - update to S3-192453 | Qualcomm, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192593 | Endorsement of CR on Non-public network security | Qualcomm, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192594 | TR33.819 update as baseline - editorial | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192595 | Adding intro to 33.819 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192596 | TSC update | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192597 | TSC key issue on time synchronization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192598 | Secure device identity creation for UEs in SNPNs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Perspecta Labs, Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192599 | Key issue on Secure device identity creation for constrained devices | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Perspecta Labs, Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192600 | Way forward on CVD and research | CableLabs, BT, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192601 | Living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192602 | Living Document: New Annex for the SEPP in TR 33.926 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192603 | Living Document: New Annex for the NRF in TR 33.926 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192604 | Reply LS on Wireline Access Security Requirements | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192605 | New WID on Security aspects of enhancements to the Service-Based 5G System Architecture | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192606 | eSBA: pCR to update Solution #21 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192607 | eSBA: pCR to update Evaluation of Solution #21 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192608 | eSBA: pCR to update Evaluation of Solution #26 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192609 | eSBA: pCR to update Evaluation of Solution #16 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192610 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #20 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192611 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #26 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192612 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #22 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192613 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #29 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192614 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #23 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192615 | Discussion on registration with AMF re-allocation | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192616 | Discussion on Identity Request with AMF re-allocation | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192617 | Security for registration with AMF re-allocation | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192618 | LS on registration and identity request issues with AMF re-allocation | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192619 | Security solution for CAG | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192620 | Assessment and evaluation of solution #9 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192621 | Structure RAND for authentication | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192622 | Handling of Sync failure | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192623 | Conclusion on linkability issues | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192624 | Correcting references | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192625 | Removing editor notes | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192626 | Adding abbreviation | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192627 | Solution on privacy protection of NSSAI | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192628 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #24 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192629 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #27 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192630 | Discussion on the handling of native non-current 5G NAS security context after an inter-system change from S1 mode to N1 mode in idle mode | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192631 | Correction of handling of 5G security contexts during EPS to 5GS idle mode mobility | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192632 | Add missing message flow for Procedure for steering of UE | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192633 | Security solution for UE to avoid connecting to the false base station during a handover procedure | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192634 | eV2X: New solution for Security for eV2X unicast messages over PC5 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192635 | Categorization of the test cases and other editorial corrections | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192636 | WID of 5GFBS | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192637 | Conclusin of key issue#2 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192638 | Update for Solution#7 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192639 | Evaluation for solution#14 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192640 | 5G paging security issue caused by false base station | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192641 | solution for new key issue of 5G paging security issue caused by false base station | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192642 | Protection of UeapabilityInformation | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192643 | Update of Solution#11 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192644 | Meeting minutes of 5GFBS July conference call on July 18th | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192645 | Meeting minutes of 5GFBS August conference call on August 8th | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192646 | Discussion on 5G UE privacy when connecting to EPC | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192647 | Update to Key issue#5 in UP IP | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192648 | Solution to key issue#5 in UP IP | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192649 | Update to Key issue#5 in eV2X | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192650 | EAP-AKA privacy enhancement in non-3GPP access to EPS | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192651 | Proposal for Key Issue#1 Conclusion | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192652 | Additional Critical Assets and Threats to PGW Annex R16 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192653 | Additional Critical Assets and Threats to PGW Annex R15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192654 | Adding Threat References to PGW Test Cases R15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192655 | Discussion Document on how to use BEST as a bearer for services and as a means to provide multiple secure channels over 1 bearer | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192656 | pCR to TR33.935 - Addition of Diffie - Helman Key agreements section | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192657 | Threat analysis on misplacement of encrypted IE in JSON object by IPX | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192658 | Test Case: No misplacement of encrypted IE in JSON object by IPX | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192659 | pCR to 33.853 - addition of solution for LTE | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192660 | Add the missing expected format of evidence | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192661 | WID for LTE normative work for UPIP | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192662 | CR to 33.401 - Addition of User Plane Integrity Protection | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192663 | 33.846: mitigation against linkability attack | THALES | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192664 | Discussion on the conclusion of AKMA architecture and authentication procedures | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192665 | IAB-node: terminology change | THALES, ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192666 | Update to TR33.xxx Storage of Secure Parameters in a 5G system - addition of content to section 4 | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192667 | Update to TR33.xxx Storage of Secure Parameters in a 5G system - addition of content to section 5 | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192668 | Removing references of TS 103 383 in TS 35.231 | Orange | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192669 | Removing references of TS 103 383 in TS 35.231 | Orange | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192670 | Update to TR33.xxx Storage of Secure Parameters in a 5G system - addition of KI - Long term key leakage | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192671 | Removing references of TS 103 383 in TS 35.231 | Orange | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192672 | Removing references of TS 103 383 in TS 35.231 | Orange | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192673 | Update to TR33.xxx Storage of Secure Parameters in a 5G system - addition of KI - discovery of correct privacy service | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192674 | Conclusion on AKMA architecture and authentication procedure | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192675 | Discussion on the conclusion of AKMA architecture and authentication procedures | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192676 | Complete the Evaluation for Solution #4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192677 | Conclusion on AKMA architecture and authentication procedure | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192678 | Conclusion on Key Issue #4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192679 | Key issue to mitigate the SUPI guessing attacks | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192680 | Key issue to mitigate the SUPI guessing attacks | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192681 | A Solution for Key Isssue#2.1 and key issue #4.1 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192682 | Description of issue of security context transfer following the handover from EPS to 5GS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192683 | Security context transfer following the handover from EPS to 5GS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192684 | New solution for linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192685 | Resolving the ENs in solution #5 | Huawei, Hisilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192686 | Conclusion on KI#5 of TR 33.809 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192687 | Update of solution #15 in TR 33.855 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192688 | Dealing with the EN of solution #19 in TR33.855 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192689 | New solution for authorization within a NF Set in the roaming scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192690 | Solution for CAG ID protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192691 | Resolving the EN in AKMA push, and adding the evaluation | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192692 | Key issue on the authenticaiton result storage in the UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192693 | Resolving the ENs in Solution #25 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192694 | eSBA: new solution for NF service consumer verification during service access authorization in indirect communication scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192695 | New KI: Key issue on UP security policy handling for PC5 and Uu interface | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192696 | UDM critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192697 | Editorial change on TS 33.514 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192698 | AUSF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192699 | Editorial change on TS 33.516 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192700 | Editorial changes on SEPP critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192701 | Editorial change on TS 33.517 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192702 | Adding NRF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192703 | Editorial change on TS 33.518 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192704 | Adding NEF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192705 | Adding critical assets and threats for general NFs to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192706 | Update of living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192707 | Clarification on test cases in TR 33.117 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192708 | Clarification on the topology hiding in SBI | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192709 | Claification on UE context transfer in registration with AMF reallocation via direct NAS reroute | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192710 | Solving registration failure in registration procedure with AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon, CAICT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192711 | Discussing registration failure in registration procedure with AMF reallocation | Huawei, Hisilicon, CAICT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192712 | Adding SMF critical assets and threats to TS 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192713 | Editorial change on TS 33.515 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192714 | Adding AMF critical assets and threats to TS 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192715 | Adding UPF critical assets and threats to TS 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192716 | Editorial change on TS 33.513 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192717 | Changes on handover from 5GS to EPS over N26 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192718 | Adding evalution to solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192719 | Conclusions to KI #3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192720 | Addressing EN in solution 6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192721 | Adding evalution to solution 6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192722 | Addressing ENs in solution 8 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192723 | Conclusions to KI #6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192724 | Amendment to eNS WID | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192725 | Conclusions to KI #4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192726 | Slice-specific authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192727 | Solution on Cross-RAT PC5 control authorization indication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192728 | Resolving the Editor's note for Solution 5 in TR 33.853 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192729 | Resolve EN "signaling details of how the UE hands over to false base station | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192730 | Resolve the second and third EN in Solution #6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192731 | Solution#4: resolving EN network verification of the hashes of MIB/SIBs | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192732 | Solution#4: Resolving EN Impact on UE power consumption | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192733 | Solution #4: Details on the hash algorithm used for MIB/SIB hashes. | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192734 | Address EN in solution #1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192735 | Enabling UE to detect FBS | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192736 | preventing the UE from reselecting to the false base station | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192737 | Avoiding UE from Suffering More MitM Attacks by Handover | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192738 | Evaluation of solution #6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192739 | LS to RAN2 on FBS detection | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192740 | Conclustion for Key issue #3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192741 | V2X Group Key Provisioning | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192742 | Removal of Editor’s Notes of solution #5 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192743 | Update of Solution #15 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192744 | New Key Issue on Rejected S-NSSAI Revokation | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192745 | Solution on Slice Authentication Revokation | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192746 | User ID privacy | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192747 | Clarification in Solution 12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192748 | The solution to protect MIB/SIB information | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192749 | Key issue on removal of USIM card in IAB node | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192750 | Proposed solution on protecting the SQN during a re-synchronisation procedure in AKA | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192751 | conclusion on KI#4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192752 | mitigate the linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192753 | Implicite AKMA authenticaiton procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192754 | Address two Editor’s Note of solution 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192755 | Address two Editor’s Note of solution 6 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192756 | Address an Editor’s Note and add evaluation for solution 7 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192757 | Add evaluation for solution 8 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192758 | Add conclusion for KI#2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192759 | completing TR 33807 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192760 | skeleton of 5WWC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192761 | Update testcase of 4.2.4.1.1.2 and 4.2.4.1.1.3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192762 | Update test cases for 4.3.2.3,4.3.2.4, and 4.3.2.5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192763 | Update requirements and test cases for gNB SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192764 | Update requirements and test cases for eNB SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192765 | Completeing 33825 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192766 | draftCR for URLLC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192767 | Discussion on security of MSG2 MT-EDT solution | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192768 | Reply LS on Security of MT-EDT | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192769 | Address EN in key issue 13 and solution 20 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192770 | Conclusion for Key Issue #13 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192771 | Address EN in solution 21 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192772 | Conclusion for Key Issue #11 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192773 | Address EN in solution 19 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192774 | Discussion on Mitigation of DDoS attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192775 | Security handling in Control Plane User Data for Control Plane Optimization for 5GS CIoT | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192776 | Protection of Non-IP Data Delivery (NIDD) interfaces | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192777 | Clarification for Secondary Authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192778 | Wayforward for TR 33.809 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192779 | Discussion on Conclusion for Protection of RRC Reject message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192780 | Address EN in solution 16 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192781 | Conclusion for Key Issue #1 for RRC Reject | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192782 | LS to RAN2 on Protection of RRC Reject Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192783 | Update on Protection of RRC Resume Request message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192784 | Conclusion for Key Issue #1 for RRC Resume Request Protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192785 | Solution for Protection of NAS Reject Message | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192786 | Conclusion for Key Issue #1 for NAS Reject | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192787 | Solution for Avoiding UE connecting to False Base Station during Conditional Handover | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192788 | Resovle Editor's notes in Solution for Key freshness in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192789 | Mitigate DDoS Attack on RAN based on RAN coordination | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192790 | conclusion on KI#5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192791 | conclusion on KI#2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192792 | Discussion on the procedure of secondary authentication | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192793 | Modification of the message name in the key derivation during handover | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192794 | Adjust the proceudure of GPSI and IP/MAC notification | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192795 | Conclusion for KI#7 and KI#8 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192796 | Removal of EN in Solution #7 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192797 | Conclusion on KI#15 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192798 | Conclusion on KI#9 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192799 | Editorial changes to Solution #7 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192800 | Evaluation of Solution #7 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192801 | New Solution for a UE connected to 5GC indicating its support of UP IP over eUTRA | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192802 | Update of Solution #23 (Token-based authorization for Scenario D using stateless SeCoP) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192803 | Update of Solution #24 (Token-based authorization for Scenario C using stateless SeCoP) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192804 | Evaluation for Solution #23 (Token-based authorization for Scenario D using stateless SeCoP) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192805 | Evaluation for Solution #24 (Token-based authorization for Scenario C using stateless SeCoP) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192806 | Conclusion of Key Issue #22 (Authorization of NF service access in indirect communication) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192807 | New solution: Telescopic FQDN for the SeCoP | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192808 | New solution: Token-based authorization for NF Sets / NF Service Sets by existing methods | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192809 | Conclusion of Key Issue #24 (Service access authorization within a NF Set or a NF Service Set) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192810 | Conclusion of Key Issue #26: Protection of N9 interface | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192811 | Update of Key issue #26: Protection of N9 interface | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192812 | Conclusion of Key Issue #28: Service access authorization in the delegated "Subscribe-Notify" scenarios | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192813 | Conclusion of Key Issue #20: Protection of SeCoP interfaces | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192814 | Conclusion of Key Issue #21: Secure message transport via the SeCoP | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192815 | New solution: Authorization between Network Functions in Scenario D | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192816 | Conclusion of Key Issue #23: NF to NF authentication and authorization in Indirect communication | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192817 | New Solution: resource level authorization using access tokens | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192818 | UP Gateway deployments | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192819 | ARPF Deployment models | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192820 | Security Parameter Storage | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192821 | Privacy Aspects of ARPF deployment | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192822 | Draft CR as a living baseline for 5GS LCS normative work | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192823 | Test cases referring to TS 33.117 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192824 | Test cases referring to TS 33.117 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192825 | IAB: Assumptions related to key hierarchy in IAB architecture in 5G | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192826 | KI #2.3: security threats and potential requirements | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192827 | New solution: secure recovery from backhaul-RLF | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192828 | New WID on security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192829 | Modification of solution#1 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192830 | New WID on security aspect of network analytic services | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192831 | Discussion on study on user plane security termination point in 5GC | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192832 | Adding gap analysis into clause 4.3.1 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192833 | Correction to test case requirement reference | L.M. Ericsson Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192834 | Adding contents into clause 4.4 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192835 | Adding contents into clause 4.5 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192836 | Resolving editor’s note and adding example of role instantiation into clause 4.6 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192837 | Adding contents into clause 4.7 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192838 | Adding contents into clause 4.8 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192839 | Adding contents into clause 4.8 | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192840 | Adding writing process overview into clause 5.1 | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192841 | Adding the description of the parts in SCAS documents and ToE into clause 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192842 | Adding the description of Generic Vitualized Network Product model of type 1 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192843 | Adding the description for generic virtualized network product model of type 2 | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192844 | Adding the description for generic virtualized network product model of type 3 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192845 | Adding SPD for virtualized network products into clause 5.2.3 | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192846 | Adding Generic assets and threats of GVNP for type 2 into clause 5.2.3.3 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192847 | Adding Generic assets and threats of GVNP for type 3 into clause 5.2.3.4 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192848 | Adding evaluation to Solution 7 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192849 | Discussion on AUSF role | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192850 | Draft LS on AUSF role | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192851 | Conclusion on KI#6 | Ericsson, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192852 | Reference syntax updates | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192853 | Conclusion on key issue #2 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192854 | Evaluation of solution #6 | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192855 | Evaluation of solution#1 | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192856 | Evaluations of solution #7- #12 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192857 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on Mobile-terminated Early Data Transmission | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192858 | Disucssion on security of MT-EDT | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192859 | New WID on Authentication and Key Management for Applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192860 | Resolving EN in 33855 6.18 N9 NDS/IP | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192861 | Security of RRC UE capability transfer procedure in EPS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192862 | Security of RRC UE capability transfer procedure in 5GS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192863 | Way forward - KI#1 Proposal#1 UE caps | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, LG Electronics, Samsung, Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192864 | Way forward - KI#1 Proposal#2 RRC reject | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, LG Electronics, Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192865 | Way forward - KI#1 Proposal#3 RRC Resume | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, LG Electronics, Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192866 | Way forward - KI#2 Proposal#4 SI protection | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, AT&T, NIST, CATT, China Unicom, Apple, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192867 | Way forward - KI#3 Proposal#5 False RBS detection | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192868 | Way forward - KI#3 Proposal#6 False RBS handover | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, LG Electronics, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192869 | Way forward - KI#4 Proposal#7 SON poisoining | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, LG Electronics | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192870 | Way forward - KI#5 Proposal#8 Auth replay | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, LG Electronics, Samsung, Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192871 | Way forward - KI#6 Proposal#9 radio jamming | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, LG Electronics, Apple, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192872 | Way forward - KI#7 Proposal#10 MitM | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, LG Electronics, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192873 | Introduction to URLLC services | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192874 | Retaining AS security keys for redundant data transmission in user plane | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192875 | Redundant paths using Dual Connectivity for URLLC services - introduction | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192876 | Redundant paths using Dual Connectivity for URLLC services – security keys derivation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192877 | Redundant paths using Dual Connectivity for URLLC services - security policy aspects | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192878 | Redundant paths using Dual Connectivity for URLLC services – UP security activation status | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192879 | New KI: Security of session anchor keys in case the long-term key is leaked | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192880 | New Solution:EAP-AKA´ PFS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192881 | New solution: Integrating GBA to 5GC | Ericsson, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192882 | New conclusions for GBA in 5GC | Ericsson, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192883 | Work item on integrating GBA to 5GC | Ericsson, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192884 | Evaluation of solution 13 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192885 | Solution #15 updates including evaluation update | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192886 | Conclusion for AKMA architecture and authentication | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192887 | Discussion about AMF re-allocation and slicing | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192888 | AMF re-allocation and slicing | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192889 | LS on AMF reallocation between Network Slices | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192890 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #2 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192891 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192892 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192893 | Conclusion on KI#5 | Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192894 | Conclusion on KI#4 | Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192895 | Evaluation to Sol#4 | Ericsson, Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192896 | Conclusion on KI#2 | Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated, Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192897 | CIOT: New solution for UP IP in PDCP to protect UL EDT data in Msg3 | Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192898 | CIOT: New solution for protection of NAS Redirection message | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192899 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #5 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192900 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #8 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192901 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #13 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192902 | Resolving Editor’s Note in Solution #1 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192903 | SID on Rel16 onwards Storage of Secure Parameters in a 5G system | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192904 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #17 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192905 | Conclusion to Key Issue #5 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192906 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #18 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192907 | New WID on Security aspects of SEAL | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192908 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #20 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192909 | New WID on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192910 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #21 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192911 | Requirement on authorization of IAB Node | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192912 | Solution for authorization of IAB Node | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192913 | P-CR: Editorial cleanup of editor's notes | Sprint Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192914 | Evaluation of solution #2.1 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192915 | Evaluation of solution #3.1 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192916 | New KI: Botnet threats caused from improper CIOT device usage | NIST, ATT, SPRINT, CABLE LABS, CISCO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192917 | Conclusion to Key Issue#2.1 on authentication and authorization of the IAB Node | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192918 | Adding K5GSRVCC as a possible input key to derive IKSRVCC and CKSRVCC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192919 | Update of Authentication Enhancements WID | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192920 | Proposed re-wording of the requirement in key issue #4.1 in TR 33.846 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192921 | Using MACS to provide freshness for the protection of SQN during a re-synchronisation procedure in AKA | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192922 | Draft CR for SRVCC 5G to UTRAN | China Unicom, Qualcomm Incoporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192923 | Correction to figure in draft CR for 5G to UTRAN CS SRVCC | Qualcomm Incorporated, China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192924 | Some proposed editorial changes to NPN draft CR | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192925 | Proposed conclusion to key issue 6.3 on modifying the CAG list | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192926 | Adding modification of CAG list security to the draft CR | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192927 | SUCI privacy for SNPN | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192928 | Solution for the privacy protection of CAG ID using NAS signalling | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192929 | Discussion on leaving AMF relocation solutions to after Rel-15 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192930 | Discussion on possible solutions to AMF relocation issues | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192931 | Resolving editor’s notes on solution #10 in TR 33.813 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192932 | Proposed solution for deriving PC5 layer keys based on higher layer keys | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192933 | Minutes of SA3/CT4 call on Nudr sensitive data protection | SA3 Vice-chair (Qualcomm Incorporated) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192934 | Discusson on SA2 LS for MT EDT | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192935 | Reply LS on MT EDT | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192936 | Alternative shared key based MIB/SIB protection | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192937 | Evaluation against MitM false base station attacks | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192938 | Evaluation of the shared key based MIB/SIB protection | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192939 | Evaluation of Solution 20: RRC Reestablishment in RLF | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192940 | Issues of resetting NAS COUNT values in 5G to 4G mobility | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192941 | NAS Count values in the mapped EPS security context in 5GS to EPS change | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192942 | Skeleton of URLLC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192943 | A solution to providing some network authorisation in PARLOS | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192944 | Proposed conclusion on providing some network authorisation in PARLOS | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192945 | Security aspects of RLOS | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192946 | On the requirements for 256-bit algorithms | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192947 | Aligning KAUSF storage at the UE with SoR and UPU procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192948 | New Solution for botnet threats caused by improper CIOT device usage | NIST, ATT, SPRINT, CABLE LABS, CISCO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192949 | Resolving EN on New and Last serving gNB interactions | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192950 | Solution for Resumecause protection | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192951 | Updates to Solution#7 on obtaining accurate clock information | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192952 | Deletion of EN on Location update reject in Solution#7 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192953 | Conclusion to Key Issue #6.1 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192954 | New solution for CAG ID privacy | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192955 | Security procedures for CAPIF-7/7e reference points | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192956 | Security procedures for CAPIF-3e/4e/5e reference points | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192957 | Manufacture Usage Description Discussion | NIST, ATT, SPRINT, CABLE LABS, CISCO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192958 | Categorization of the Key Issues | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192959 | DraftCR - Proposed skeleton for supporting 5G CIoT | Ericsson, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192960 | New Solution for botnet threats caused by improper CIOT device usage | NIST, ATT, Sprint, Cable Labs, Cisco | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192961 | DraftCR-Control Plane Optimization for CIoT in 5G | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192962 | P-CR: Proposed conclusion for PARLOS | Sprint Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192963 | Algorithm Negotiation | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192964 | P-CR: Proposed recommendations for PARLOS | Sprint Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192965 | pCR to 33.815 clarifying requirements on Parlos | DOCOMO Communications Lab. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192966 | Proposed presentation cover sheet for PARLOS 33.815 | Sprint Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192967 | Clarification in Solution 12 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192968 | The solution to protect MIB/SIB information | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192969 | Key issue on removal of USIM card in IAB node | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192970 | Proposed solution on protecting the SQN during a re-synchronisation procedure in AKA | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192971 | conclusion on KI#4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192972 | mitigate the linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192973 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 22 was S3-191857 | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192974 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 23 was S3-191858 | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192975 | Virtualisation Study Key Issue 24 was S3-191859 | BT plc | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192976 | Comments on S3-192824 | Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192977 | Reply LS on authentication of group of IoT devices | S1-192816 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192978 | Agenda | WG Chairman | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192979 | Correction of text on access authentication for untrusted access | BlackBerry UK Limited | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192980 | Reply to: 256 bit radio interface algorithm performance | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192981 | Reply LS on Wireline Access Security Requirements | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192982 | Removing references of TS 103 383 in TS 35.231 | Orange | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192983 | Removing references of TS 103 383 in TS 35.231 | Orange | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192984 | Removing references of TS 103 383 in TS 35.231 | Orange | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192985 | Removing references of TS 103 383 in TS 35.231 | Orange | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192986 | Reply to: LS on withdrawal of TS 103 383 “Smart Cards; Embedded UICC; Requirements Specification” | Orange | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192987 | Definition of authentication subscription data and update to UDM requirement | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192988 | Missing UDR description in alignment with 29.505 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192989 | Update on ARPF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192990 | Correcting references | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192991 | Removing editor notes | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192992 | Adjust the proceudure of GPSI and IP/MAC notification | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192993 | Clarification for Secondary Authentication | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192994 | WID of 5GFBS | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192995 | EAP-AKA privacy enhancement in non-3GPP access to EPS | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192996 | Notes of the offline session on AMF relocation | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192997 | Correction of handling of 5G security contexts during EPS to 5GS idle mode mobility | Intel Deutschland GmbH,Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192998 | Security context transfer following the handover from EPS to 5GS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑192999 | Changes on handover from 5GS to EPS over N26 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193000 | General NDS/IP SEG support for non-SBA interfaces | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193001 | Test cases referring to TS 33.117 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193002 | Test cases referring to TS 33.117 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193003 | Editorial corrections on the threat references of some test cases | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193004 | Update requirements and test cases for gNB SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193005 | Adding AMF critical assets and threats to TS 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193006 | Adding UPF critical assets and threats to TS 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193007 | Draft TS 33.514 | NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193008 | UDM critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193009 | Cover sheet TS 33.512 for approval | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193010 | Cover sheet TS 33.513 for approval | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193011 | Cover sheet TS 33.514 for approval | NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193012 | Adding SMF critical assets and threats to TS 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193013 | Editorial change on TS 33.515 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193014 | Draft TS 33.515 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193015 | Cover sheet TS 33.515 for approval | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193016 | AUSF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193017 | Draft TS 33.516 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193018 | Cover sheet TS 33.516 for approval | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193019 | Draft TS 33.517 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193020 | Adding NRF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193021 | Clarifications for Protected MCData | Airbus DS SLC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193022 | Draft TS 33.518 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193023 | Cover sheet draft TS 33.518 for approval | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193024 | Draft TS 33.513 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193025 | Adding abbreviation | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193026 | Draft TS 33.519 | ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193027 | Adding NEF critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193028 | Cover sheet TS 33.519 for approval | ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193029 | Addition of general SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 | Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193030 | Adding critical assets and threats for general NFs to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193031 | Additional Critical Assets and Threats to PGW Annex R15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193032 | Additional Critical Assets and Threats to PGW Annex R14 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193033 | Additional Critical Assets and Threats to PGW Annex R16 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193034 | Adding Threat References to PGW Test Cases R14 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193035 | Adding Threat References to PGW Test Cases R15 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193036 | Clarification on test cases in TR 33.117 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193037 | Clarification on test cases in TS 33.117 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193038 | Clarification on test cases in TS 33.117 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193039 | Update testcase of 4.2.4.1.1.2 and 4.2.4.1.1.3 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193040 | Update testcase of 4.2.4.1.1.2 and 4.2.4.1.1.3 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193041 | Update requirements and test cases for eNB SCAS | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193042 | Update requirements and test cases for eNB SCAS | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193043 | Algorithm Negotiation | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193044 | Correction to figure in draft CR for 5G to UTRAN CS SRVCC | Qualcomm Incorporated, China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193045 | Draft CR for SRVCC 5G to UTRAN | China Unicom, Qualcomm Incoporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193046 | Security for SRVCC 5G to UTRAN CS | Qualcomm,China Unicom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193047 | Adding K5GSRVCC as a possible input key to derive IKSRVCC and CKSRVCC | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193048 | draftCR for URLLC | Huawei, Hisilicon, Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193049 | Security for non-public networks - update to S3-192453 | Qualcomm, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193050 | SUCI privacy for SNPN | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193051 | Security for non-public networks | Qualcomm Incorporated, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193052 | DraftCR - Proposed skeleton for supporting 5G CIoT | Ericsson, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193053 | skeleton of 5WWC | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193054 | Add a new Annex for the authentication of non-5GC NAS capable devices in WWC | CableLabs, Charter Communications, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Ericsson, Comcast, Rogers Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193055 | New WID on Security aspects of enhancements to the Service-Based 5G System Architecture | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193056 | New WID on security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193057 | SID on Storage of Secure Parameters in a 5G system | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193058 | Claification on UE context transfer in registration with AMF reallocation via direct NAS reroute | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193059 | Reply to: Reply LS on Mobile-terminated Early Data Transmission | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193060 | Add missing message flow for Procedure for steering of UE | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193061 | Minor corrections to 33163 | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193062 | Minor corrections to 33163 | Juniper Networks | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193063 | Notes on the evening session on SIV | BT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193064 | eSBA: pCR to update Evaluation of Solution #16 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193065 | Draft TR 33.855 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193066 | Evaluation for Solution #23 (Token-based authorization for Scenario D using stateless SeCoP) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193067 | Update of Solution #24 (Token-based authorization for Scenario C using stateless SeCoP) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193068 | Evaluation for Solution #24 (Token-based authorization for Scenario C using stateless SeCoP) | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193069 | eSBA: new solution for NF service consumer verification during service access authorization in indirect communication scenario | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193070 | Conclusion of Key Issue #22 (Authorization of NF service access in indirect communication) | Ericsson,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193071 | New WID on Security aspects of SEAL | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193072 | Analysis of SEAL | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193073 | New WID on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193074 | Security of RRC UE capability transfer procedure in EPS | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193075 | New solution: Telescopic FQDN for the SeCoP | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193076 | LS to CT4 on ESPA using indirect communication | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193077 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #20 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193078 | Conclusion of Key Issue #21: Secure message transport via the SeCoP | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193079 | New solution: Token-based authorization for NF Sets / NF Service Sets by existing methods | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193080 | LS to SA2 on ESPA NF sets | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193081 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #26 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193082 | UP Gateway deployments | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193083 | Discussion on UDR related contributions | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193084 | LS on security asepcts of AMF re-alocation procedure | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193085 | Threat analysis on misplacement of encrypted IE in JSON object by IPX | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193086 | Test Case: No misplacement of encrypted IE in JSON object by IPX | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193087 | Draft TS 33.512 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193088 | TR 33.848 Annex - Administration of Virtualisation | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193089 | TR 33.848 Annex - Virtualisation Security Questions | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193090 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 1 | NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193091 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #2 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193092 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193093 | TR 33.848 Security Threats and Requirements for Key Issue 5 | NCSC,Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193094 | Threats and Requirements for Key Issue #5 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,NCSC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193095 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #27 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193096 | LS to SA2 on UP gateway function | Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193097 | Update of solution #15 in TR 33.855 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193098 | New Solution: resource level authorization using access tokens | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193099 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #29 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193100 | Resolving the ENs in Solution #25 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193101 | New KI: Botnet threats caused from improper CIOT device usage | NIST, ATT, SPRINT, CABLE LABS, CISCO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193102 | Address EN in key issue 13 and solution 20 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193103 | Draft TR 33.861 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193104 | Evaluation to Sol#4 | Ericsson, Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193105 | Address EN in solution 19 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193106 | Mitigate DDoS Attack on RAN based on RAN coordination | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193107 | CIOT: New solution for protection of NAS Redirection message | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193108 | Conclusion for Key Issue #13 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193109 | Address two Editor’s Note of solution 4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193110 | Draft TR 33.807 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193111 | Evaluation of Solution #7 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193112 | Add conclusion for KI#2 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193113 | Draft TR 33.815 | Sprint | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193114 | A solution to providing some network authorisation in PARLOS | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193115 | pCR to 33.815 clarifying requirements on Parlos | DOCOMO Communications Lab. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193116 | Proposed conclusion on providing some network authorisation in PARLOS | Qualcomm Incorporated,Spring | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193117 | P-CR: Proposed recommendations for PARLOS | Sprint Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193118 | Addressing EN in PARLOS Evaluation clause 7.2.3 | Nokia, Nokia Shangahi Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193119 | Draft TR 33.813 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193120 | Addressing EN in solution 6 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193121 | Adding evaluation to Solution 7 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193122 | Update to Solution 8 protecting NSSAI in AS layer | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193123 | Resolving editor’s notes on solution #10 in TR 33.813 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193124 | TR 33.813 - update for solution #11 | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193125 | Solution on privacy protection of NSSAI | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193126 | LS on AUSF role | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193127 | Complete the Evaluation for Solution #4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193128 | Draft TR 33.814 | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193129 | Cover sheet TR 33.814 for approval | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193130 | Draft TR 33.825 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193131 | Cover sheet 33.825 for approval | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193132 | Draft TR 33.819 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193133 | TSC key issue on time synchronization | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193134 | Conclusion to Key Issue #6.1 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193135 | TR 33.819 - DH based solution for CAG ID privacy | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193136 | TR 33.819 - hash based solution for CAG ID privacy | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193137 | LS on link layer ID update | NEC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193138 | Living Document: New Annex for the SEPP in TR 33.926 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193139 | Adding SEPP critical assets and threats to TR 33.926 | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193140 | Way forward - KI#2 Proposal#4 SI protection | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, AT&T, NIST, CATT, China Unicom, Apple, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193141 | Solution for CAG ID protection | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193142 | LS on sending CAG-ID in NAS signalling | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193143 | Update to Key issue#5 in UP IP | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193144 | pCR to 33.853 - addition of solution for LTE | Vodafone España SA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193145 | Resolving the Editor's note for Solution 5 in TR 33.853 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193146 | New Solution for a UE connected to 5GC indicating its support of UP IP over eUTRA | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193147 | Draft TR 33.853 | Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193148 | IAB-node: terminology change | THALES, ORANGE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193149 | Draft TR 33.824 | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193150 | IAB: Assumptions related to key hierarchy in IAB architecture in 5G | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193151 | Requirement on authorization of IAB Node | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193152 | Solution for authorization of IAB Node | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193153 | KI #2.3: security threats and potential requirements | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193154 | 33.836 - solution #1 update | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193155 | TR 33.836 - update for solution #2 | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193156 | Draft TR 33.836 | LG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193157 | TR 33.836 - solution #3 update | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193158 | TR 33.836 solution #4 update | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193159 | new solution on privacy protection for unicast | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193160 | eV2X: New solution for Security for eV2X unicast messages over PC5 | Intel Deutschland GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193161 | Proposed solution for deriving PC5 layer keys based on higher layer keys | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193162 | new KI on privacy protection for broadcast | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193163 | V2X Group Key Provisioning | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193164 | new KI on minimizing the impact of privacy protection mechanism in the application layer communication | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193165 | new solution on minimizing the impact of privacy protection mechanism in the application layer communication | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193166 | New KI: Key issue on UP security policy handling for PC5 and Uu interface | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193167 | terminology alignment on groupcast | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193168 | Draft TR 33.835 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193169 | Solution #15 updates including evaluation update | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193170 | Conclusion on AKMA architecture and authentication procedure | China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193171 | Resovle Editor's notes in Solution for Key freshness in AKMA | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193172 | New KI for TR 33.835 - roaming environment | InterDigital Communications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193173 | Way forward - KI#1 Proposal#1 UE caps | Ericsson, Nokia, Vodafone, Deutsche Telekom AG, CableLabs, LG Electronics, Samsung, Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193174 | eSBA: Add conclusion on KI #23 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bel,Ericssonl | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193175 | LS to RAN2 on FBS detection | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193176 | Draft TR 33.809 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193177 | Cover sheet for TR 33.835 information | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193178 | New WID on Authentication and Key Management for Applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193179 | Cover sheet TR 33.807 for approval | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193180 | Draft TR 33.818 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193181 | Adding contents into clause 4.8 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193182 | Adding the description of the parts in SCAS documents and ToE into clause 5.2.1 and 5.2.2 | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193183 | Adding the description of Generic Vitualized Network Product model of type 1 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193184 | Adding the description for generic virtualized network product model of type 2 | China Mobile M2M Company Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193185 | Draft TR 33.848 | BT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193186 | Update of Authentication Enhancements SID | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193187 | Key issue on the authenticaiton result storage in the UDM | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193188 | Draft TR 33.846 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193189 | Handling of Sync failure | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193190 | A Solution for Key Isssue#2.1 and key issue #4.1 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193191 | mitigate the linkability attack | Huawei, Hisilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193192 | Conclusion on KI#15 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193193 | Key issue on Secure network credentials creation for constrained devices | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Perspecta Labs, Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193194 | Notes of the second offline session on AMF relocation | NTT-Docomo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193195 | Draft LS on security asepcts of AMF re-alocation procedure | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193196 | Draft LS on security asepcts of AMF re-alocation procedure | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193197 | LS on security asepcts of AMF re-alocation procedure | Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193198 | Cover sheet TS 33.517 for approval | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193199 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193200 | Work item on integrating GBA to 5GC | Ericsson, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193201 | New Key Issue on Rejected S-NSSAI Revokation | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193202 | Work Plan input from Rapporteurs | MCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑193203 | SA3 meeting calendar | MCC | imported from 3GU |
page generated from database: 2024-04-22 07:58:53