3GPP TDocs (written contributions) at meeting
Meeting: S3-107-e - 2022-05-16 to 2022-05-20, Online
meeting id: S3-107-e (click id for more info on this meeting)Click on the Tdoc to open its file.
TDoc | Title | Source | Remarks |
---|---|---|---|
S3‑220600 | CR on Modernization of the Integrity & Encryption Algorithms between UE and P-CSFC | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220601 | DP on Post-Quantum Secure Subscription Concealed Identifier | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220602 | New KI on Post-Quantum Secure Subscription Concealed Identifier | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220603 | DP on Modernization of the Integrity & Encryption Algorithms between UE and P-CSFC (for SIP Sessions). | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220604 | Report from last SA | WG Chair | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220605 | Meeting notes from SA3 leadership | WG Chair | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220606 | Process and agenda for SA3#107e | WG Chair | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220607 | Meeting calendar | WG Chair | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220608 | LS to 3GPP CT4 on Identification of source PLMN-ID in SBA | GSMA | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220609 | LS on new parameters for SOR | C1-214118 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220610 | Reply LS on User Controlled PLMN Selector with Access Technology in Control plane solution for steering of roaming in 5GS | S1-220187 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220611 | LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure | C1-221747 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220612 | Reply LS on UE capabilities indication in UPU | C1-223177 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220613 | LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | C3-221735 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220614 | Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | S6-220976 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220615 | Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | S2-2203426 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220616 | LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | S2-2203253 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220617 | Reply LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | C3-222487 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220618 | Reply LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | C4-222436 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220619 | LS on Clarification on MBS Security Context (MSK/MTK) Definitions | C4-222303 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220620 | LS on Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method | C4-222306 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220621 | LS on 3GPP TS 29.244 | BBF | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220622 | Reply LS on NTN specific User Consent | R2-2201754 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220623 | LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R2-2201881 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220624 | LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R2-2202057 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220625 | Reply LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R3-222861 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220626 | LS on UE location in connected mode in NTN | R2-2204257 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220627 | Reply LS on LTE User Plane Integrity Protection | R2-2203663 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220628 | LS on EPS fallback enhancements | R2-2204236 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220629 | Reply LS on EPS fallback enhancements | S2-2203590 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220630 | Reply LS on User Plane Integrity Protection for eUTRA connected to EPC | R3-222610 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220631 | Reply LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | C1-222100 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220632 | Reply LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | R3-222858 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220633 | LS Response to LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | S2-2201333 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220634 | LS on V2X PC5 link for unicast communication with null security algorithm | R5-222035 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220635 | Reply LS on reply to SA6 about new SID on Application Enablement for Data Integrity Verification Service in IOT | S1-220185 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220636 | Reply LS on secondary authentication for multicast PDU session | S2-2201311 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220637 | Reply LS to GSMA OPG on Further Operator Platform Group questions following SDO Workshop | SP-220346 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220638 | Reply LS on Further GSMA OPAG questions following SDO Workshop | S2-2201721 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220639 | LS reply on RAN2 agreements for paging with service indication | S2-2201838 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220640 | Reply to LS on new reference point name for the interface between PKMF and UDM in 5G ProSe | S2-2203018 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220641 | LS on MINT functionality for Disaster Roaming | S5-222575 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220642 | Reply LS to ETSI MEC on MEC Federation and interest to collaborate | S6-220931 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220643 | CR on Modernization of the Integrity & Encryption Algorithms between UE and P-CSFC | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220644 | New KI on Post-Quantum Secure Subscription Concealed Identifier | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220645 | DP on Post-Quantum Secure Subscription Concealed Identifier | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220646 | DP on Modernization of the Integrity & Encryption Algorithms between UE and P-CSFC (for SIP Sessions). | Deutsche Telekom AG | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220647 | LS on ETSI Plugtest #6 Observation 10.1.11 | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220648 | LS on new parameters for SOR | C1-214118 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220649 | Reply LS on User Controlled PLMN Selector with Access Technology in Control plane solution for steering of roaming in 5GS | S1-220187 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220650 | LS on the impact of MSK update on MBS multicast session update procedure | C1-221747 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220651 | Reply LS on UE capabilities indication in UPU | C1-223177 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220652 | LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | C3-221735 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220653 | Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | S6-220976 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220654 | Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | S2-2203426 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220655 | LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | S2-2203253 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220656 | Reply LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | C3-222487 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220657 | Reply LS on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | C4-222436 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220658 | LS on Clarification on MBS Security Context (MSK/MTK) Definitions | C4-222303 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220659 | LS on Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method | C4-222306 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220660 | LS on 3GPP TS 29.244 | BBF | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220661 | Reply LS on NTN specific User Consent | R2-2201754 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220662 | LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R2-2201881 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220663 | LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R2-2202057 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220664 | Reply LS on UE location during initial access in NTN | R3-222861 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220665 | LS on UE location in connected mode in NTN | R2-2204257 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220666 | Reply LS on LTE User Plane Integrity Protection | R2-2203663 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220667 | LS on EPS fallback enhancements | R2-2204236 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220668 | Reply LS on EPS fallback enhancements | S2-2203590 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220669 | Reply LS on User Plane Integrity Protection for eUTRA connected to EPC | R3-222610 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220670 | Reply LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | C1-222100 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220671 | Reply LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | R3-222858 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220672 | LS Response to LS on UE providing Location Information for NB-IoT | S2-2201333 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220673 | LS on V2X PC5 link for unicast communication with null security algorithm | R5-222035 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220674 | Reply LS on reply to SA6 about new SID on Application Enablement for Data Integrity Verification Service in IOT | S1-220185 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220675 | Reply LS on secondary authentication for multicast PDU session | S2-2201311 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220676 | Reply LS to GSMA OPG on Further Operator Platform Group questions following SDO Workshop | SP-220346 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220677 | Reply LS on Further GSMA OPAG questions following SDO Workshop | S2-2201721 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220678 | LS reply on RAN2 agreements for paging with service indication | S2-2201838 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220679 | Reply to LS on new reference point name for the interface between PKMF and UDM in 5G ProSe | S2-2203018 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220680 | LS on MINT functionality for Disaster Roaming | S5-222575 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220681 | Reply LS to ETSI MEC on MEC Federation and interest to collaborate | S6-220931 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220682 | LS on Inter-PLMN Handover of VoLTE calls and idle mode mobility of IMS sessions | S3i220244 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220683 | TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220684 | Meeting calendar | WG Chair | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220685 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220686 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220687 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220688 | Clarifications to secondary authentication for UE onboarding | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220689 | New test case for confidentiality, integrity and replay protection between AAnF and AUSF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220690 | New threat for confidentiality, integrity and replay between AAnF and AUSF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220691 | New test case for confidentiality, integrity and replay protection between AF/NEF and AAnF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220692 | New threat for confidentiality, integrity and replay between AAnF and AF/NEF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220693 | Aligning text for AKMA procedure | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220694 | Clarification on anonymization api | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220695 | UPU procedure alignment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220696 | UPU procedure alignment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220697 | LS reply on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220698 | NSWO alignment with SA2 specs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220699 | LS reply on High-reliability requirement of UAV | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220700 | High-reliability requirement of UAV | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220701 | New content for Terms clause on key properties of privacy | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220702 | TR 33.870 – Informative Annex A | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220703 | New key issue on TMGI Privacy | InterDigital, Inc., Convida | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220704 | New key issue on PIN ID Privacy | InterDigital, Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220705 | Evaluation of Solution #5 | Johns Hopkins University APL, US National Security Agency, CableLabs, InterDigital, AT&T, CISA ECD | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220706 | Clarify relationship between KAUSF, KAUSF_P and 5G PRUK | China Telecomunication Corp. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220707 | Clarify the necessity of refreshing 5G PRUK during CP-based Security Procedure | China Telecomunication Corp. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220708 | New KI on Home network triggered primary authentication | China Telecomunication Corp. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220709 | New SID on Personal IoT Networks Security Aspects | vivo, Apple, ZTE, Xiaomi, CATT, OPPO, China Unicom, China Telecom, CableLabs, InterDigital, LGE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Motorola mobility, Philips | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220710 | Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.1.1 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220711 | Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.1.7 of sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220712 | Addressing the editor’s note in 6.27.2.2.1of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220713 | Addressing the editor’s note #1 in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220714 | Addressing the editor’s note #2 in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220715 | Removing incorrect texts in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220716 | Removing redundant texts in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol# | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220717 | Removing unrelated texts in 6.27.2.2.4 of Sol#27 | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220718 | LS out on authenticity and replay protection of system information | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom, Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220719 | New SID: Study on SNAAPP securitY | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220720 | Key issue on Security for data and analytics exchange in roaming | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220721 | Key issue on Security for AIML model storage | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220722 | Key issue on Security for AIML model sharing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220723 | Key issue on Anomalous NF behaviour detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220724 | Clarification on separate handling of N32-c and N32-f | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Mavenir, Lenovo, Deutsche Telekom, NCSC, Xiaomi, BT, AT&T, Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220725 | Clarification on separate handling of N32-c and N32-f | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Mavenir, Lenovo, Deutsche Telekom, NCSC, Xiaomi, BT, AT&T, Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220726 | Clarification on separate handling of N32-c and N32-f | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Mavenir, Lenovo, Deutsche Telekom, NCSC, Xiaomi, BT, AT&T, Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220727 | Security improvements of N32 connection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220728 | Authorization of N32-f connection establishment with TLS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220729 | Authorization of N32-f connection establishment with TLS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220730 | Resolution EN authorization method negotiation per KI7-Sol9 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220731 | Resolving EN on authorization between SCPs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220732 | New sol. for KI7 on authorization mechanism negotiation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220733 | Conclusion on authorization method negotiation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220734 | Update Security procedure over CP with using PRUK ID in DCR | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd.,, Samsung, LG Electronics, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson, Verizon Wireless, MITRE, Convida Wireless LLC, Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220735 | 5GPRUK/5GPRUK ID Storage Options and Way Forward | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220736 | PAnF supported services discussion | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220737 | Update Security procedure over CP with using PRUK ID in DCR (alt#2) | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220738 | New KI on Topology Hiding in Data and Analytics Exchange | China Telecommunications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220739 | Adding a test case for gNB in TS 33.511 clause 4.2.2.1.4 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220740 | New KI on authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group | China Telecommunications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220741 | Adding AAnF critical assets and threats to TS 33.926 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220742 | Adding Network product class description for the AAnF to TS 33.926. | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220743 | AKMA subscription asynchronization_Test_Case | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220744 | Add some context about 5G PRUK ID reject cases in the clause 6.3.3.3.2 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220745 | Clarification on AUSF instance store in UDM | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220746 | Remove the EN in the clause 6.3.3.2.2 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220747 | Update the clause 6.3.3.3.3 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220748 | Update the clause 7.4.2 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220749 | Correction on clause F.2.1 in TS 33.926-R16 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220750 | Correction on clause F.2.1 in TS 33.926-R17 mirror | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220751 | Update the test case in TS 33.216 clause 4.2.2.1.10 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220752 | Correct AAnF service in clause 6.3 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220753 | NF selects AAnF in clause 6.7 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220754 | Key issue on authorization in multi-path transmission for UE-to-Network Relay scenario | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220755 | Key issue on authorization in the UE-to-UE relay scenario | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220756 | Key issue on Integrity and confidentiality of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220757 | Key issue on Privacy of information over the UE-to-UE Relay | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220758 | Key issue on Support direct communication path switching between PC5 and Uu | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220759 | New solution on key issue SUPI length disclosed by SUCI. | China Southern Power Grid Co., Ltd, ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220760 | Discussion paper on AKMA application context removal. | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220761 | Discussion paper on AKMA interworking | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220762 | New KI on AKMA interworking | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220763 | Key issue on security of EAS Discovery Procedure with EASDF | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220764 | Revised SID on AKMA phase2 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220765 | Adding authorization for delegated discovery | China Telecommunications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220766 | Adding authorization for delegated discovery(mirror) | China Telecommunications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220767 | Adding AAnF critical assets and threats to TS 33.926 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220768 | Adding Network product class description for the AAnF to TS 33.926 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220769 | Supplement to generic virtualised network product model | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220770 | Clarification on the description about AAnF | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220771 | draft_TR_33.738- skeleton for eNA security ph3 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220772 | Scope of TR 33.738 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220773 | Overview of TR 33.738 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220774 | KI on Protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220775 | Proposal to add overview in clause 4 Generic Virtulizated Network Product(GVNP) class | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220776 | Proposal to add clause 4.2 Minimum set of functions defining the GVNP class | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220777 | Proposal to add introduction in clause 4.3 Generic virtualized network product model | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220778 | Proposal to add GVNP model of type 1 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220779 | Proposal to add GVNP model of type 2 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220780 | Proposal to add GVNP model of type 3 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220781 | adding overview and Scope of a SECAM SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220782 | adding Scope of SECAM evaluation and accreditation for 3GPP virtualized network products | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220783 | adding the contents of chapters 4.5 to 4.7 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220784 | adding the contents of chapters 4.8 to 4.10 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220785 | adding content to clause 5.1 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220786 | Adding description about general content of SCAS document and ToE to clause 5.2 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220787 | adding description about SPD to clause 5.2 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220788 | adding description about methodology of security requirements to clause 5.2 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220789 | adding description about improvement of SCAS and new potential security requirements to clause 5.3 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220790 | adding description about basic vulnerability testing requirements for GVNP to clause 5.4 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220791 | New SID on Study on XR Security | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220792 | Update to solution #25 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220793 | Evaluation of solution #4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220794 | Conclusion for KI#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220795 | KI#2 update - threats and requirements | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220796 | New solution for part 1 of KI#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220797 | New solution for part 2 of KI#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220798 | Conclusion for part 2 of KI#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220799 | Address EN on alignment to SA2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220800 | Address EN on AF Authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220801 | Discussion on Rel-18 study for network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, CATT, CAICT, China Mobile, China Unicom, InterDigital, NEC, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220802 | New SID: Rel-18 study for network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, CATT, CAICT, China Mobile, China Unicom, InterDigital, NEC, Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220803 | Address EN on UAV ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220804 | Address EN on UAV re-auth | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220805 | Issue of NSSAA in multiple registration | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220806 | Include SN ID in NSSAA procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220807 | AAnF sending GPSI to internal AKMA AF | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220808 | Skeleton for TS33.537(SCAS for AAnF) | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220809 | Scope of TS 33.537 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220810 | Skeleton for TR 33.737(AKMA ph2) | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220811 | Scope of TR 33.737 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220812 | Architectural Asumptions in TR 33.737 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220813 | Key issue of AKMA roaming | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220814 | Key issue of introducing application proxy into AKMA | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220815 | EN resolution for Secondary Authentication for Remote UE with L3 U2N relay without N3IWF(Alt1) | LG Electronics Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220816 | EN resolution for Secondary Authentication for Remote UE with L3 U2N relay without N3IWF(Alt2) | LG Electronics Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220817 | Revocation_ReAuth for Secondary Authentication for Remote UE | LG Electronics Inc. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220818 | Summary for Non-Seamless WLAN offload authentication in 5GS | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220819 | A use case of HONTRA in SoR protection service suspension | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220820 | A Key issue in SoR protection service suspension | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220821 | A use case of HONTRA in UPU protection service suspension | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220822 | A Key issue in UPU protection service suspension | LG Electronics France | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220823 | New KI for security of certificate update | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220824 | New KI for Security protection of certificate enrolment | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220825 | Integrity protection of DCR message | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220826 | Clarification on the privacy protection of DCR | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220827 | Delete of CP based solution | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220828 | Delete of Secondary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220829 | Address EN of secondary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220830 | Add a new clause for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay with N3IWF support | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220831 | Skeleton of HNTRA | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220832 | Scope of HNTRA | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220833 | Adding a usecase of interworking from EPS to 5G | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220834 | KI on Scalability of the home triggered primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220835 | Adding a usecase of Kakma refresh | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220836 | KI on Signalling overhead | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220837 | Format of anonymous SUCI | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220838 | LS on anonymous SUCI | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220839 | Modfiy Scope of TS 33.527 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220840 | Modfiy Scope of TR 33.936 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220841 | Modfiy Scope of TS 33.927 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220842 | Adding UDM Services for SUCI deconceal and authorization information retrieval | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220843 | Remote UE Identity provisioning in UE-to-Network Relay communication security procedure over user plane | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220844 | Remote UE authorization check in UE-to-Network Relay communication security procedure over control plane | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220845 | Resolving the EN on the needs and usage of 5GPRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220846 | Format of 5GPRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220847 | Clarification on restricted discovery procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220848 | Clarification on the security of L2 U2NW | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220849 | Rel-16 Add clarifications to unicast procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220850 | Key derivation related clarification in CP-based UE-to-Network relay procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220851 | Add subclause about the restricted discovery for UE-to-Network relay | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220852 | Terminology alignment for 5G ProSe Remote UE specific authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220853 | New WID on Security aspects of 5G Isolated operation for public safety (IOPS) | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220854 | Discussion paper on 5G IOPS | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220855 | Clarification | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220856 | New SID on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services Phase 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220857 | New SID on security enhancements for 5GC LoCation Services Phase 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220858 | Removing the Editor’s Note and add clarifications in the security mechanisms for MBS | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220859 | Clarifications on the control-plane and user-plane procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220860 | Enhancement for service announcement | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220861 | Alignment with RAN2 for LTE UP IP | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220862 | Address EN for LTE UP IP | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220863 | Address Ens for NPN | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220864 | Address EN for UC3S | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220865 | Clarification on Enforcement Point for User Consent | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220866 | Update for solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220867 | New SID on Enhancement of User Consent for 3GPP Services | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220868 | Clarification on KAUSF_P | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220869 | Clarification on PRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220870 | Clarifications on the multicast security context handling in session creation procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220871 | Reply LS on security architecture for 5G multicast-broadcast services | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220872 | Reply LS on the Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220873 | Rel-17 Add clarifications to unicast procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220874 | Security capability negotiation during unicast establishment after restricted discovery | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220875 | Delete Use Case on Finding the right NF instance are serving the UE | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220876 | Delete Threat Analysis on Finding the right NF instance are serving the UE | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220877 | new KI on Authentication and Authorization when EHE in a VPLMN | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220878 | New KI on Security for DNS server IP address | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220879 | Disucssion on security aspect of EPS fallback enhancements in Rel-17 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220880 | LS to RAN2 on EPS fallback enhancements | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220881 | Clarification on the description of PRUK | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220882 | Clarification on the secondary authentication procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220883 | Update general clause for secondary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220884 | Discussion paper on security enhancements for 5GC LoCation Services Phase 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220885 | 33.926-Clarifications of the scope of OAM functions in the GNP model | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220886 | 33.926-Rewrite the 5G MnF GNP model | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220887 | 33.926-Add new assets to the OAM functions | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220888 | 33.926-Add a new threat | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220889 | 33.526 - update clause 4.2.3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220890 | 33.526 - update clause 4.2.4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220891 | 33.526 - update clause 4.2.5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220892 | Adding a usecase of SoR Counter Wrap around | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220893 | Living document for MnF SCAS: draftCR to TR 33.926 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220894 | Discussion for key storage and derivation in UE-to-Network security procedure over Control Plane | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220895 | New SID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220896 | Discussion on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220897 | New KI AKMA Kaf refresh | OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220898 | Adding evaluation for Sol#6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220899 | New solution Security procedure of KAF refresh-MAC | OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220900 | New solution Security procedure of KAF refresh-Counter | OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220901 | Key issue on AKMA Roaming Scenario | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220902 | KI on AP function introduction | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220903 | Key issue on KAF refresh without primary reauthentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220904 | Key issue on HN triggering primary reauthentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220905 | Reauthentication during the handover | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220906 | New solution Security procedure of KAF-Nonce | OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220907 | New KI Edge algorithm selection | OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220908 | New solution Authentication algorithm selection in EDGE | OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220909 | New solution Authentication algorithm selection among EEC, ECS, and EES | OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220910 | Rapporteur update to TR 33.875 | Nokia | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220911 | New key issue on SUPI length disclosed by SUCI | Ericsson, Apple, AT&T, Cable Labs, China Southern Power Grid Co, Convida Wireless LLC, Intel, Interdigital, Johns Hopkins University APL, Lenovo, LGE, Mavenir, MITRE, NCSC, Oppo, Phillips, Samsung, Telefonica, US NIST, US NSA, Verizon Wireless, Xiaomi, ZT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220912 | Definition of Anonymous SUCI | Ericsson, Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220913 | UDM interaction for Anonymous SUCI | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220914 | Removing Editor’s note on using only null-scheme SUCI | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220915 | Anonymous SUCI for onboarding | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220916 | Clarification SUPI privacy for NPN | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220917 | Updates to 33.434 for CoAP usage | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220918 | [DRAFT] Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220919 | A new key issue for single automated certificate management protocol and procedures | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220920 | A new key issue for the relation between NF lifecycle and certificate lifecycle | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220921 | Editorial corrections and technical clarifications | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220922 | Clarification of access token usage in EC | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220923 | Removing EN on secondary authentication | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220924 | Update of the introduction and scope of TR 33.876 skeleton | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220925 | Key issue on Relation between NF and Certificate lifecycle management | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220926 | Key issue on Network Function instances identifiers | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220927 | Key issue on Multiple certificates to be associated with a Network Function | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220928 | Key issue on CMPv2 adoption and initial NF trust during certificate enrolment | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220929 | Key issue on Certificates revocation procedures | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220930 | Key issue on Automated certificate management for Network Slicing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220931 | Trust in SEPP deployment scenarios | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220932 | Update to KI on roaming hub | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220933 | Requirement to KI on roaming hub | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220934 | Security protocol over CP with 5G AKA to establishPC5 keys | THALES | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220935 | Editorial correction and clarification to 33.501 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220936 | Security protocol over CP with 5G ProSe security context in the USIM | THALES | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220937 | Terminology correction for security of UE onboarding | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220938 | PWS for Non-Public Networks | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220939 | Corrections and clarifications to secondary authentication during UE onboarding | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220940 | Derivation of SUPI from default UE credentials | Ericsson, CableLabs, Intel, Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220941 | Removing EN on UE being uniquely identifiable and verifiably secure | Ericsson, CableLabs, Intel, Qualcomm, Xiaomi | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220942 | Implementation correction of CR1309 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220943 | Clarification on the certificate profile for SCP and SEPP | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220944 | SEPP interconnect certificate profile | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220945 | Clarification on CN-ID when it is presented in the certificate | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220946 | Clarification on CN-ID when it is presented in the certificate | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220947 | Clarification on the format of callback URI in the NF certificate profile | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220948 | Clarification on the format of callback URI in the NF certificate profile | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220949 | Clarification on access token requests for NF Producers of a specific NF type and token-based authorization for indirect communication with delegated discovery | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220950 | Clarification on access token requests for NF Producers of a specific NF type and token-based authorization for indirect communication with delegated discovery | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220951 | SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220952 | LS on PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220953 | SEPP handling of PLMN-ID in Roaming scenarios for PLMNs supporting more than on PLMN-ID | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220954 | Clarification of SNI usage for NF clients and servers | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220955 | New KI, NRF validation of NFc for access token requests | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220956 | New SID on security aspects of enhanced support of Non-Public Networks phase 2 | Ericsson, CableLabs, InterDigital, Intel, Xiaomi, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE, China Mobile, LGE, Philips, Lenovo, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220957 | Skeleton for proposed FS_eNPN_Ph2_SEC | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220958 | Reply LS on Clarification on MBS Security Context (MSK/MTK) Definitions | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220959 | UP IP: mapping of EPS integrity algorithm to NR integrity algorithm | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220960 | Correction to Clause 5.2.1.5 UUAA Revocation | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220961 | Correction to Clause 5.2.2.4 UUAA Revocation | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220962 | Clarification to multiple registrations in different PLMNs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220963 | Clarification to multiple registrations in different PLMNs | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220964 | Resolving of EN in Clause 5.2.1.4 UUAA re-authentication procedure | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220965 | Corrections to CP based solution | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220966 | Reference point name | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220967 | Remote UE Report in UP based solution | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220968 | Rephrasing Clause 6.2.1 to emphasize that security parameters for PC5 Direct Communication are determined during Direct Discovery | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220969 | Restructure of security requirements for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220970 | Remote UE Report in CP based solution | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220971 | Discussion on UE ID privacy for Remote UE Report | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220972 | PLMN ID in Direct Security Mode Failure | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220973 | KNRP key derivation | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220974 | CR for Prose changes to TS 33.220 in Rel-17 | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220975 | Discussion for Study on Zero Trust Security | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220976 | Adding conclusions and recommendations related to KI#13 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220977 | Adding terms and abbreviations | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220978 | Adding text for the Overview clause | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220979 | Resolving the EN on CAA level ID during UUAA procedures | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220980 | Resolving the ENs related to re-authentication | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220981 | Resolving the ENs on CAA level ID during revocation | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220982 | Removing EN on USS authorisation | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220983 | Removing EN on TPAE | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220984 | Clarification on ‘high reliability’ location information | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220985 | Reply LS on Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220986 | Resolving the ENs on protection of UAS data | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220987 | New Study on security of architecture enhancement for UAV and UAM | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220988 | Proposed skeleton for TS 33.742 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220989 | Proposed scope for TS 33.742 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220990 | Discussion on how to document test cases in TS 33.742 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220991 | Discussion on Ua security protocol identifier for PSK TLS 1.3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220992 | Adding a Note about the new Ua security protocol identifier for TLS 1.3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220993 | Adding a new Ua security protocol identifier for TLS 1.3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220994 | PC5 security policy provisioning for user-plane L3 U2N relay solution | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220995 | Clarification on the PC5 link establishment for user-plane L3 U2N relay solution | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220996 | CR to ProSe TS - Address the Editor’s Notes in clause 6.3.5 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220997 | CR to ProSe TS – An update on MIC calculation for discovery message | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220998 | CR to ProSe TS – Clarification on discovery message protection | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑220999 | CR to ProSe TS – Removing an Editor’s Note in user plane based U2N procedure | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221000 | Update on 5G ProSe restricted discovery procedure for U2N relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221001 | CR to ProSe TS - Clarification on Knrp derivation for U2N relay over user plane | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221002 | Resolving Editor’s note on using only null-scheme SUCI | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221003 | pCR to TS33.503 Abbreviations update | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221004 | Study on Zero Trust Security | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Interdigital, Verizon, Cablelabs, Mavenir, Johns Hopkins University APL, LG Electronics, Telefonica, NEC, Telia Company, AT&T, Samsung, PCCW Global B.V, China Mobile, Motorola Solutions, Inc, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel, N | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221005 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 4.2 Update reference point name between 5G PKMF and UDM | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221006 | pCR to TS33.503 Wording update | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221007 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Update security requirements of UE-to-Network Relay | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221008 | Resolution of editor's note relating to anonymizing SUPI or skipping default credential identifier. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221009 | Resolution of editor's note relating to usage of SUPI as a verifiable identifier | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221010 | Resolution of editor’s note relating to exclusive use of anonymized SUCI. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221011 | Resolution of inconsistency in SUCI usage during UE onboarding. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221012 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Update security requirements of Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221013 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Remove unnecessary description from UP-based and CP-based procedures | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221014 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Clarification text for Kausf_p | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221015 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Solution for co-existence of UP and CP security options | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221016 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Update security procedure over Control Plane | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221017 | Discussion on usage of identifier during UE onboarding in SNPNs | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221018 | NSWO security revisited | Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, Vodafone | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221019 | Draft LS on NSWO security | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221020 | Resolving Editor’s Note related to UE onboarding | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221021 | Draft skeleton of TR 33.740 | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221022 | Update to clause I.2.2.2.2 for Onboarding clarifications | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221023 | New SID on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning | Xiaomi, Apple, China Mobile, CATT, Huawei, Hisilicon, InterDigital, LGE, Philips, vivo, ZTE, Lenovo, Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Telecom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221024 | New SID on Security Aspects of Satellite Access | Xiaomi, China Mobile, China Telecom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221025 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 4.2 | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221026 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 5.2.5 | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221027 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 6.1.3.2 | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221028 | 33.503: Clarifiacation on MIC Check in Open Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221029 | 33.503: General Description for ProSe U2N Relay Discovery Security | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221030 | 33.503: Add Security Requirement for ProSe U2N Relay Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221031 | 33.503: Control Plane based Security Procedure for ProSe U2N Relay Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221032 | 33.503: User Plane based Security Procedure for ProSe U2N Relay Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221033 | 33.503: Derivation of Discovery Keys for ProSe U2N Relay Discovery | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221034 | 33.503: Updates to General Security Requirements for U2N Relay Communication | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221035 | 33.503: Updates to Security Requirements for U2N Relay Communication via L3 Relay UE | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221036 | Discussion on PC5 Key Hierarchy for ProSe U2N Relay Communication | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221037 | Discussion on Security for ProSe U2N Relay Communication over User Plane | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221038 | 33.503: Update to Security Procedure over User Plane | Xiaomi Technology, China Telecom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221039 | 33.503: PRUK Derivation for ProSe U2N Relay Security over User Plane | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221040 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 6.3.4 | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221041 | Key Issue on Refresh of Long Lived Key KAUSF | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221042 | Key Issue on Security of Interworking | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221043 | New Use Case for Continuity of Steering of Roaming Service Delivery | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221044 | New Use Case for Continuity of UE Parameters Update Service Delivery | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221045 | New Use Case for Security of Interworking | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221046 | Key Issue on Trust Chain of Certificate Authority Hierarchy | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221047 | Resolving the alignment related EN for NSACF Subscription/unsubscription procedure | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221048 | Update Figure: I.2.2.2.2-1 for consistent service operation names | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221049 | Resolving the Editor’s Notes for UE onboarding in SNPNs | Xiaomi Communication, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221050 | Update Subscription and unsubscription procedure of NSACF notification service | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221051 | eNS2_Sec: Solution #1 update | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221052 | New key issue on authentication proxy architecture for AKMA | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221053 | New key issue on protecting application servers with different security requirements | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221054 | New key issue on secure AKMA application key request in AKMA supporting authentication proxy | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221055 | New key issue on secure authorization for AKMA supporting authentication proxy | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221056 | New key issue on secure identification of authentication proxy and application server in AKMA scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221057 | New key issue on AKMA application key request in home routed and local-breakout scenarios | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221058 | New key issue on Secure AAnF service request in roaming scenarios of AKMA | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221059 | New key issue on secure architecture for roaming scenarios in AKMA | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221060 | New key issue on authentication and authorization problem for the EEC hosted in the roaming UE | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221061 | Clarification on AF authorization for the NSACF notification procedure | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221062 | New SID on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NR Air Interface and NG-RAN | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221063 | LS reply on UE location in connected mode in NTN | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221064 | Reply LS on EPS fallback enhancements | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221065 | New WID on IETF OSCORE Ua* protocol profile for AKMA | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221066 | IETF OSCORE as AKMA Ua* protocol | Ericsson, DT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221067 | Extending the Ua security protocol namespace to include the AKMA OSCORE Ua* protocol | Ericsson, DT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221068 | 5G registration via trusted non-3GPP access after NSWO authentication | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221069 | New Study to enable 5G registration via trusted non-3GPP access after NSWO Authentication (FS_5GRTN3) | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221070 | Study to enable URSP rules to securely identify applications | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221071 | New Study to enable URSP rules to securely identify Applications (FS_USIA) | Lenovo, AT&T, Broadcom, CableLabs, CATT, China Mobile, China Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Intel, LG Electronics, Motorola Solutions MSI, NEC, PCCW Global B.V., Verizon, Xiaomi | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221072 | 5GFBS - Conclusion for solution#17 | Apple. Ericsson, Intel, Nokia, Deutsche Telekom, CableLabs, LGE, OPPO, Xiaomi, Huawei, NIST, Telecom Italia, AT&T | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221073 | 5GFBS - Draft LS to RAN plenary on the conlcusion of solution#17 | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221074 | 5GFBS - new WID on 5GFBS | Apple, US National Security Agency, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon, CableLabs, Intel, InterDigital, Johns Hopkins University APL, NIST, Xiaomi, OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221075 | 5GFBS - Security risk in lower layers | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221076 | CR - 33501 - Clarification on Fast re-authentication | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221077 | CR - 33501 - Clarification on the NAS COUNT for KeNB derivation | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221078 | IDPrvc - Security issue on C-RNTI | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221079 | AKMA - New key issue of introducing AP to AKMA architecture | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221080 | MEC - Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval (C3-221735) | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221081 | NTN - Reply LS on UE location in connected mode in NTN(R2-2204257) | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221082 | NTN - Reply LS on NTN specific user consent (R2-2201754) | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221083 | HN-auth-NAS based HN triggered authentication | Apple | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221084 | Detection of MitM attacks with secret paging | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221085 | Discussion on security aspects of NGRTC | Huawei,HiSilicon, Deutsche Telekom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221086 | New SID on NGRTC | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221087 | corrections on measurements flow of solution#5 | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221088 | editorial changes of ENSI | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221089 | mirror-editorial changes of ENSI | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221090 | New threat on Kausf handing | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221091 | threat modifications for token verification | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221092 | threat modifications for SEPP | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221093 | Adding a key issue of Multiple registrations | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221094 | The Scope of the FS_EDGE_Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221095 | The Skeleton of the FS_EDGE_Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221096 | Update of Solution #12 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221097 | Update of Solution #9 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221098 | Clarification on the NSWO in the UE side | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221099 | Removing the Ens on the SCP authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221100 | Clarification on IV usage on N32-f protection-R15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221101 | Clarification on IV usage on N32-f protection-R16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221102 | Clarification on IV usage on N32-f protection-R17 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221103 | Clarification on handling of the incoming N32-f message in the pSEPP side – R15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221104 | Clarification on handling of the incoming N32-f message in the pSEPP side – R16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221105 | Clarification on handling of the incoming N32-f message in the pSEPP side – R17 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221106 | Reply LS on UE location in connected mode in NTN | Nokia Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221107 | Reply LS on Reply LS on NTN specific User Consent | Nokia Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221108 | CableLabs, Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221109 | Reply LS on EPS fallback enhancements | Nokia Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221110 | Discussion on LS on EPS fallback enhancements | Nokia Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221111 | Derivation of SUPI from default UE credentials | Ericsson, CableLabs, Intel, Qualcomm, Philips | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221112 | Removing EN on UE being uniquely identifiable and verifiably secure | Ericsson, CableLabs, Intel, Qualcomm, Xiaomi, Philips | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221113 | New SID on Security and Privacy of AI/ML-based services and applications in 5G | OPPO, Apple, vivo, Inter Digital, China Mobile, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221114 | New Key Issue on UE-to-UE Relay Trust Model | OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221115 | KI#27 update - requirements | MITRE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221116 | New KI: Remote UE Security Establishment via UE-to-UE Relay | OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221117 | Need for Rel-18 study on UP security enhancement | Samsung, CableLabs, Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221118 | New SID on 5G User plane security enhancements | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221119 | [SBA] CR to update NF profile for inter-slice access | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221120 | Clarification on selected EDGE authentication method indication | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221121 | New SID on security aspects of control plane based remote provisioning in Non-Public Networks | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221122 | New Key Issue on AKMA Roaming | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221123 | New solution on AKMA Roaming | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221124 | New solution on pushing AKMA context to visited PLMN | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221125 | New Key issue on HN initiated Re-authentication | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221126 | New Solution on UDM initiated re-authentication based on AUSF request | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221127 | New solution on HN initiated re-authentication via AUSF | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221128 | New solution on UDM triggered key update procecdure based on AAnF request | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221129 | New solution on UPU based re-authentication procedure | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221130 | Editorial corrections and technical clarifications | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221131 | Verification of NSSAIs for preventing slice attack | CableLabs, Ericsson,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221132 | Discussion on security procedure during registration procedure over two different PLMN | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221133 | Checking S-NSSAI against authoritative information source | CableLabs,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221134 | Update to NAS security context procedure when UE is registering over two different PLMNs | NEC Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221135 | MBS capability exchange and delivery method | Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221136 | New KI for Authentication of PLMNs over IPX | CableLabs | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221137 | CP based security selection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital, LGE, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221138 | derive 5GPRUK based on Kausf_p | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital, LGE, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221139 | authorization of remote UE | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital, LGE, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221140 | UP based security selection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Interdigital, LGE, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221141 | Relay Discovery clarifications | Philips International B.V. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221142 | Process and agenda for SA3#107e | WG Chair | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221143 | Avoid linkage between security functions and UE Radio Access Capabilities | VODAFONE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221144 | E1 interface security requirements | VODAFONE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221145 | LS on Security architecture for 5G multicast/broadcast services | S4-220531 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221146 | Response LS on Clarifications on Nmbstf_MBCDistributionSession service | S4-220575 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221147 | LS on 3GPP TS 29.244 | BBF | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221148 | Reply LS on secondary authentication for multicast PDU session | S2-2201311 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221149 | 5G Prose questions on CP for show-of-hands | Interdigital,CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221150 | Questions of show hand on ProSe CP-based solution | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221151 | LS on authentication type and related information of MSGin5G service | C1-223957 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221152 | Reply to: LS on authentication type and related information of MSGin5G service | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221153 | LS on Clarification on MBS Security Keys | C4-223302 | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221154 | Reply to: LS on Clarification on MBS Security Keys | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221155 | Reply LS on Clarification on MBS Security Context (MSK/MTK) Definitions | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221156 | New test case for confidentiality, integrity and replay protection between AAnF and AUSF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221157 | New threat for confidentiality, integrity and replay between AAnF and AUSF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221158 | Reply LS on security architecture for 5G multicast-broadcast services | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221159 | New test case for confidentiality, integrity and replay protection between AF/NEF and AAnF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221160 | New threat for confidentiality, integrity and replay between AAnF and AF/NEF | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221161 | Reply LS on AF specific UE ID retrieval | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221162 | Reply LS on EPS fallback enhancements | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221163 | LS on handling of the modification policy in the IPX and receiving SEPP | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221164 | draft LS to SA2 on NSAC | Huawei Technologies R&D UK | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221165 | LS on TNAP mobility security aspect | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221166 | new draft TS 33.526 MnF SCAS | Huawei Technologies Sweden AB | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221167 | Living document for AAnF SCAS: draftCR to TR 33.926 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221168 | draft TS 33.537 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221169 | draft TR 33.737 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221170 | Configuration of Anonymous SUCI | Ericsson, Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221171 | 33.926-Add a new threat | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221172 | Study on Zero Trust Security | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Interdigital, Verizon, Cablelabs, Mavenir, Johns Hopkins University APL, LG Electronics, Telefonica, NEC, Telia Company, AT&T, Samsung, PCCW Global B.V, China Mobile, Motorola Solutions, Inc, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel,.. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221173 | Resolving of EN in Clause 5.2.1.4 UUAA re-authentication procedure | Lenovo, Huawei HiSilicon, Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221174 | EN resolution for Secondary Authentication for Remote UE with L3 U2N relay without N3IWF(Alt2) | LG Electronics Inc., Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221175 | Revocation_ReAuth for Secondary Authentication for Remote UE | LG Electronics Inc., Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221176 | New KI on authorization of selection of participant NWDAF instances in the Federated Learning group | China Telecommunications | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221177 | UP IP: mapping of EPS integrity algorithm to NR integrity algorithm | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221178 | Rel-18 study for network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, CATT, CAICT, China Mobile, China Unicom, InterDigital, NEC, Nokia, Deutsche Telekom, ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221179 | New SID: Study on SNAAPP securitY | NTT DOCOMO INC. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221180 | New key issue on SUPI length disclosed by SUCI | Ericsson, Apple, AT&T, Cable Labs, China Southern Power Grid Co, Convida Wireless LLC, Intel, Interdigital, Johns Hopkins University APL, Lenovo, LGE, Mavenir, MITRE, NCSC, Oppo, Phillips, Samsung, Telefonica, US NIST, US NSA, Verizon Wireless, Xiaomi, ZT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221181 | KI#2 update - threats and requirements | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221182 | Reference point name | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221183 | PLMN ID in Direct Security Mode Failure | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221184 | Conclusion for part 2 of KI#2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221185 | 5GFBS - new WID on 5GFBS | Apple, US National Security Agency, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, Huawei, Hisilicon, CableLabs, Intel, InterDigital, Johns Hopkins University APL, NIST, Xiaomi, OPPO, ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221186 | New KI Edge algorithm selection | OPPO, CMCC, vivo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221187 | draft TR 33.874 | Huawei Technologies R&D UK | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221188 | New SID on Security and Privacy of AI/ML-based services and applications in 5G | OPPO, Apple, vivo, Inter Digital, China Mobile, Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221189 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 6.1.3.2 | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221190 | KI#27 update - requirements | MITRE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221191 | New key issue on authentication and authorization problem for the EEC hosted in the roaming UE | Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221192 | Clarification on ‘high reliability’ location information | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221193 | Correction to Clause 5.2.1.5 UUAA Revocation | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221194 | Correction to Clause 5.2.2.4 UUAA Revocation | Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221195 | Resolving Editor’s Note related to UE onboarding | Lenovo, Xiaomi Communication | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221196 | Proposed skeleton for TS 33.742 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221197 | Adding text for the Overview clause | Qualcomm Incorporated, Lenovo | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221198 | Resolving the ENs on protection of UAS data | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221199 | Adding a Note about the new Ua security protocol identifier for TLS 1.3 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221200 | New Study on on Security for Phase 2 for UAS, UAV and UAM | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221201 | TS 33.742 v1.0.0 | Qualcomm Austria RFFE GmbH | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221202 | Resolving Editor’s note on using only null-scheme SUCI | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221203 | Clarification on the description about AAnF | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221204 | Key Issue on Trust Chain of Certificate Authority Hierarchy | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221205 | New Use Case for Security of Interworking | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221206 | 33.503: Updates to General Security Requirements for U2N Relay Communication | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221207 | 33.503: Updates to Security Requirements for U2N Relay Communication via L3 Relay UE | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221208 | 33.503: Updates in Clause 6.3.4 | Xiaomi Technology | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221209 | New SID on Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning | Xiaomi, Apple, China Mobile, CATT, Huawei, Hisilicon, InterDigital, LGE, Philips, vivo, ZTE, Lenovo, Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Telecom | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221210 | Corrections and clarifications to secondary authentication during UE onboarding | Ericsson, Intel | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221211 | Clarification on CN-ID when it is presented in the certificate | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221212 | Clarification on CN-ID when it is presented in the certificate | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221213 | SEPP to include and verify the source PLMN-ID | Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221214 | LS on PLMN ID used in Roaming Scenarios | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221215 | Clarification on anonymization api | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221216 | NSWO alignment with SA2 specs | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221217 | New SID on Security aspects for 5WWC Phase 2 | Nokia Solutions & Networks (I) | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221218 | Key issue on AKMA Roaming Scenario | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CMCC, Lenovo, Xiaomi, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221219 | Key issue on KAF refresh without primary reauthentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon, OPPO | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221220 | LS reply on 5G NSWO roaming aspects | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221221 | Key issue on Security for AIML model sharing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221222 | Key issue on Anomalous NF behaviour detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221223 | Key issue on Multiple certificates to be associated with a Network Function | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221224 | Key issue on Network Function instances identifiers | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221225 | Key issue on Certificates revocation procedures | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221226 | Key issue on Automated certificate management for Network Slicing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221227 | Correct AAnF service in clause 6.3 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221228 | NF selects AAnF in clause 6.7 | ZTE Corporation | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221229 | New SID on NGRTC | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221230 | threat modifications for token verification | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221231 | threat modifications for SEPP | Huawei,HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221232 | Update of Solution #12 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221233 | Clarification on the NSWO in the UE side | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221234 | Removing the Ens on the SCP authorization | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221235 | Draft TR 33.739 0.1.0 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221236 | New KI for security of certificate update | Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221237 | New KI for Security protection of NF certificate enrolment | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221238 | Add a new clause for 5G ProSe Layer-3 UE-to-Network Relay with N3IWF support | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221239 | KI on Scalability of the home triggered primary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon, China telecom, LG Electronics, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221240 | Adding a usecase of Kakma refresh | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221241 | Adding UDM Services for SUCI deconceal and authorization information retrieval | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221242 | Resolving the EN on the needs and usage of 5GPRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, LG Electronics, ChinaTelecom,Xiaomi, CATT, Samsung | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221243 | Format of 5GPRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon, ZTE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221244 | Clarification on the security of L2 U2NW | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221245 | Key derivation related clarification in CP-based UE-to-Network relay procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221246 | New SID on security enhancements for 5G multicast-broadcast services Phase 2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221247 | Removing the Editor’s Note and add clarifications in the security mechanisms for MBS | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221248 | Clarifications on the control-plane and user-plane procedures | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221249 | Enhancement for service announcement | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221250 | Update for solution 5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221251 | New SID on Enhancement of User Consent for 3GPP Services | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221252 | Clarification on PRUK ID | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221253 | Clarifications on the multicast security context handling in session creation procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221254 | Reply LS on the Indication of Network Assisted Positioning method | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221255 | Clarification on the description of PRUK | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221256 | Clarification on the secondary authentication procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221257 | Update general clause for secondary authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221258 | 33.926-Rewrite the 5G MnF GNP model | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221259 | 33.926-Add new assets to the OAM functions | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221260 | 33.926-Add a new threat | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221261 | Adding a usecase of SoR Counter Wrap around | Huawei, HiSilicon, LG Electronics France, Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221262 | Reply LS on Clarification on MBS Security Keys | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221263 | draftCR to TR 33.926 for SCAS 5G Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221264 | TR 33.741 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221265 | New SID on Personal IoT Networks Security Aspects | vivo, Apple, ZTE, Xiaomi, CATT, OPPO, China Unicom, China Telecom, CableLabs, InterDigital, LGE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, Motorola mobility, Philips, China Mobile, Qualcomm | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221266 | TR 33.809 | Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221267 | UDM interaction for Anonymous SUCI | Ericsson, Lenovo, Xiaomi | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221268 | LS reply on Reply LS on NTN specific User Consent and UE location in connected mode in NTN | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221269 | KI on Protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221270 | Draft TR 33.876 Study on Standardising Automated Certificate Management in SBA | Nokia Poland | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221271 | Remote UE Report in UP based solution | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221272 | Rephrasing Clause 6.2.1 to emphasize that security parameters for PC5 Direct Communication are determined during Direct Discovery | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221273 | Resolution of inconsistency in SUCI usage during UE onboarding. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221274 | Clarification of access token usage in EC | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221275 | Editorial corrections and technical clarifications | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221276 | New SID on the security aspects of Artificial Intelligence (AI)/Machine Learning (ML) for the NR Air Interface and NG-RAN | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221277 | A new key issue for single automated certificate management protocol and procedures | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221278 | A new key issue for the relation between NF lifecycle and certificate lifecycle | Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221279 | Draft TR 33.738 | CMCC | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221280 | TR 33.875-120 | Nokia UK | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221281 | pCR to TS33.503 Abbreviations update | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221282 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Clarification text for Kausf_p | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221283 | Clarification on N32-f connection establishment with TLS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221284 | pCR to TS33.503 Clause 6.3 Solution for co-existence of UP and CP security options | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221285 | Clarification on N32-f connection establishment with TLS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221286 | Draft TS 33.503 v0.4.0 Security Aspects of Proximity based Services (ProSe) in the 5G System (5GS) | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221287 | Update to KI on roaming hub | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, BSI | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221288 | Scope of TR 33.737 | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221289 | Key issue of introducing application proxy into AKMA | China Mobile | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221290 | TR 33.870-020 | Interdigital | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221291 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221292 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221293 | Clarifications to secondary authentication PDU Session Container | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221294 | PC5 security policy provisioning for user-plane L3 U2N relay solution | Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221295 | CR to ProSe TS - Address the Editor’s Notes in clause 6.3.5 | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221296 | CR to ProSe TS – Removing an Editor’s Note in user plane based U2N procedure | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221297 | CR to ProSe TS - Clarification on Knrp derivation for U2N relay over user plane | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221298 | Avoid linkage between security functions and UE Radio Access Capabilities | VODAFONE | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221299 | Cover page TS 33.503 | CATT | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221300 | Coversheet TR 33.874 | Huawei | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221301 | Living document for MnF SCAS: draftCR to TR 33.926 | Huawei, HiSilicon | imported from 3GU |
S3‑221302 | Update on 5G ProSe restricted discovery procedure for U2N relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | imported from 3GU |
page generated from database: 2024-07-20 12:15:34