Tdoc TP-000017

Technical Specification Group Terminals Meeting #7, Madrid, Spain, 13-15 March 2000

Source: T3

Title: Change Requests to TS 21.111 "USIM and IC card requirements"

Agenda item: 5.3.3

Document for: Approval

This document contains one change request to TS 21.111 v3.0.1 agreed by T3.

T3 Doc	Spec	CR	Rv	Cat	Rel	Subject
T3-000095	21.111	002		F		Alignment with 33.102 regarding the data integrity of signalling elements and user identity confidentiality

3GPP TSG-T3 #13 Tokyo, Japan, 21.-24. 2. 2000

help.doc

Document **T3-000095**

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Clauses affected: 5.5, 5.6											
Other specs affected:	O M B	Other 3G core specifications Other GSM core specifications MS test specifications BSS test specifications O&M specifications → List of CRs:									
Other comments:											

<---- double-click here for help and instructions on how to create a CR.

[7]	GSM 11.11: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Specification of the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) interface".
[8]	GSM 11.12 (ETS 300 641): "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2); Specification of the 3 Volt Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) interface".
[9]	GSM 11.14: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Specification of the SIM Application Toolkit for the Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) interface".
[10]	GSM 11.18: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Specification of the 1.8 Volt Subscriber Identity Module - Mobile Equipment (SIM - ME) interface".

2.2 Informative references

- [20] GSM 02.48: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Security Mechanisms for the SIM application toolkit; Stage 1".
- [21] GSM 03.48: "Digital cellular telecommunications system (Phase 2+); Security Mechanisms for the SIM application toolkit; Stage 2".

3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations

3G TS 33.102: "3G security: Security Architecture".

3.1 Definitions

[11]

For the purposes of the present document, the following definitions apply:

UICC: A removable IC card containing a USIM.

USIM: A 3GPP application on an IC card.

3.2 Symbols

Vpp Programming voltage

3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

ADN	Abbreviated Dialling Number
ATR	Answer To Reset
DF	Dedicated File
EF	Elementary File
FFS	For Further Study
ICC	Integrated Circuit Card
IK	Integrity Key
IMUI	International Mobile User Identity
<u>IMSI</u>	International Mobile Subscriber Identity
ME	Mobile Equipment
MF	Master File
PIN	Personal Identification Number
DDC	D . 1 1D . C1

PIN Personal Identification Number
PPS Protocol and Parameter Selection
SIM Subscriber Identity Module
UIA 3GPP Integrity Algorithm

USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module

5 Security Requirements

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5.3 User data stored in ME

Subject to the exception below, all user related information transferred into the ME during network operations shall be deleted from the ME after removal of the UICC, deselection of the USIM, deactivation of the ME, or following an electrical reset of the UICC. [This includes any data that was transferred to the ME by SIM Application Toolkit commands. FFS]

User related security codes such as PIN and Unblock PIN may only be stored by the ME during the procedures involving such a code and shall be discarded by the ME immediately after completion of the procedure.

Optionally, an ME may retain some less security-critical data at UICC removal, USIM deselection or ME switch-off. Such data are SMS, ADN/SSC, FDN/SSC, LND. These data, when stored in the ME, shall only be readable/retrievable if the same USIM is reactivated (as determined by the MUIMSI. If the MUIMSI is retained in the ME for this purpose, it shall be stored securely and shall not be able to be read out.

5.4 Authentication

A means shall be specified to mutually authenticate the USIM and the network by showing knowledge of a secret key K which is shared between and available only to the USIM and in the user's Home Environment. The method is composed of a challenge/response protocol identical to the GSM user authentication and key establishment protocol combined with a sequence number-based one-pass protocol for network authentication.

5.5 Data integrity of signalling elements

Some signalling information elements are considered sensitive and must be integrity protected. An integrity function shall be applied on certain signalling information elements transmitted between the ME and the network.

The 3GPP Integrity Algorithm (UIA) shall be implemented in the USIM.

The <u>3GPP Integrity Algorithm</u> (UIA) <u>shall be is</u> used with an Integrity Key (IK) to compute a message authentication code for a given message. The setting of IK is triggered by the authentication procedure. <u>IK shall be stored on the USIM.</u>

5.6 User identity confidentiality

A mechanism shall be specified to provide user identity confidentiality by means of a temporary identity. If a temporary identity is not available in the serving network, a means of encrypting the permanent user identity (<u>IMSI</u>)IMUI) with a group key may be used. The requirement for this mechanism is still under study by TSG-SA-WG3.