

CHANGE REQUEST

TS 33.203 CR CRNum #rev # Current version: **5.6.0**

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Proposed change affects: UICC apps# ME Radio Access Network Core Network

Title:	# Introducing the SIP Privacy mechanism		
Source:	# Ericsson		
Work item code:	# IMS-ASEC	Date:	# 29/06/2003
Category:	# B	Release:	# Rel-6
	Use <u>one</u> of the following categories:		Use <u>one</u> of the following releases:
	F (correction)		2 (GSM Phase 2)
	A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)		R96 (Release 1996)
	B (addition of feature),		R97 (Release 1997)
	C (functional modification of feature)		R98 (Release 1998)
	D (editorial modification)		R99 (Release 1999)
	Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900 .		Rel-4 (Release 4)
			Rel-5 (Release 5)
			Rel-6 (Release 6)

Reason for change:	# There is no privacy mechanism for IMS from Stage 2 point of view for Release 5. However this mechanism exists in Stage 3 already in Release 5. This CR aims to close the gap in Release 6
Summary of change:	# Introduces relevant profiling of RFC3325 into IMS
Consequences if not approved:	# The gap between Stage 2 and Stage 3 will remain for Release 6

Clauses affected:	# 2, 5, 6		
Other specs affected:	#	#	Other core specifications # TS24.229, TS24.228
	#	#	
	#	#	
	#	#	
Other comments:	# This CR introduces the already agreed requirements in the Presence TR for Security and is directly copied from that TR with editorial changes.		

2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture".
- [2] 3GPP TS 22.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Service Requirements for the IP Multimedia Core Network".
- [3] 3GPP TS 23.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem".
- [4] 3GPP TS 21.133: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; T Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Threats and Requirements ".
- [5] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Network domain security; IP network layer security".
- [6] IETF RFC 3261 "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol".
- [7] 3GPP TS 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP specifications".
- [8] 3GPP TS 24.229: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Core Network; IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on SIP and SDP".
- [9] 3GPP TS 23.002: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, Network Architecture".
- [10] 3GPP TS 23.060: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service Description".
- [11] 3GPP TS 24.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Core Network; Signalling flows for the IP multimedia call control based on SIP and SDP".
- [12] IETF RFC 2617 (1999) "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication".
- [13] IETF RFC 2406 (1998) "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)".
- [14] IETF RFC 2401 (1998) "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol".
- [15] IETF RFC 2403 (1998) "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH".
- [16] IETF RFC 2404 (1998) "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH".
- [17] IETF RFC 3310 (2002): "HTTP Digest Authentication Using AKA". April, 2002.
- [18] IETF RFC 3041 (2001): "Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6".
- [19] IETF RFC 2402 (1998): "IP Authentication Header".
- [20] IETF RFC 2451 (1998): "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms ".

- [21] IETF RFC 3329 (2002): "Security Mechanism Agreement for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
- [22] IETF RFC 3323 (2002): "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".
- [23] IETF RFC 3325 (2002): "Private Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity within Trusted Network".

5 Security features

5.1 Secure access to IMS

5.1.1 Authentication of the subscriber and the network

Authentication between the subscriber and the network shall be performed as specified in section 6.1.

An IM-subscriber will have its subscriber profile located in the HSS in the Home Network. The subscriber profile will contain information on the subscriber that may not be revealed to an external partner, cf. [3]. At registration an S-CSCF is assigned to the subscriber by the I-CSCF. The subscriber profile will be downloaded to the S-CSCF over the Cx-reference point from the HSS (Cx-Pull). When a subscriber requests access to the IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem this S-CSCF will check, by matching the request with the subscriber profile, if the subscriber is allowed to continue with the request or not i.e. Home Control (Authorization of IM-services).

All SIP-signaling will take place over the PS-domain in the user plane i.e. IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem is essentially an overlay to the PS-domain. Hence the Visited Network will have control of all the subscribers in the PS-domain i.e. Visited Control (Authorization of bearer resources) since the Visited Network provides the subscriber with a transport service and its associated QoS.

For IM-services a new security association is required between the mobile and the IMS before access is granted to IM-services.

The mechanism for mutual authentication in UMTS is called UMTS AKA. It is a challenge response protocol and the AuC in the Home Stratum derives the challenge. A Quintet containing the challenge is sent from the Home Stratum to the Serving Network. The Quintet contains the expected response XRES and also a message authentication code MAC. The Serving Network compares the response from the UE with the XRES and if they match the UE has been authenticated. The UE calculates an expected MAC, XMAC, and compares this with the received MAC and if they match the UE has authenticated the Serving Network.

The AKA-protocol is a secure protocol developed for UMTS and the same concept/principles will be reused for the IP Multimedia Core Network Subsystem, where it is called IMS AKA.

The Home Network authenticates the subscriber at anytime via the registration or re-registration procedures.

5.1.2 Re-Authentication of the subscriber

Initial registration shall always be authenticated. It is the policy of the operator that decides when to trigger a re-authentication by the S-CSCF. Hence a re-registration might not need to be authenticated.

A SIP REGISTER message, which has not been integrity protected at the first hop, shall be considered as initial registration.

The S-CSCF shall also be able to initiate an authenticated re-registration of a user at any time, independent of previous registrations.

5.1.3 Confidentiality protection

Confidentiality protection shall not be applied to SIP signalling messages between the UE and the P-CSCF. It is recommended to offer encryption for SIP signalling at link layer i.e. between the UE and the RNC using the existing mechanisms as defined in [1].

Confidentiality between CSCFs, and between CSCFs and the HSS shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in [5].

5.1.4 Integrity protection

Integrity protection shall be applied between the UE and the P-CSCF for protecting the SIP signaling, as specified in section 6.3. The following mechanisms are provided.

1. The UE and the P-CSCF shall negotiate the integrity algorithm that shall be used for the session, as specified in chapter 7.
2. The UE and the P-CSCF shall agree on security associations, which include the integrity keys, that shall be used for the integrity protection. The mechanism is based on IMS AKA and specified in clause 6.1.
3. The UE and the P-CSCF shall both verify that the data received originates from a node, which has the agreed integrity key. This verification is also used to detect if the data has been tampered with.
4. Replay attacks and reflection attacks shall be mitigated.

Integrity protection between CSCFs, and between CSCFs and the HSS shall rely on mechanisms specified by Network Domain Security in [5].

5.2 Network topology hiding

The operational details of an operator's network are sensitive business information that operators are reluctant to share with their competitors. While there may be situations (partnerships or other business relations) where the sharing of such information is appropriate, the possibility should exist for an operator to determine whether or not the internals of its network need to be hidden.

It shall be possible to hide the network topology from other operators, which includes the hiding of the number of S-CSCFs, the capabilities of the S-CSCFs and the capability of the network.

The I-CSCF shall have the capability to encrypt the address of an S-CSCF in SIP Via, Record-Route, Route and Path headers and then decrypt the address when handling the response to a request. The P-CSCF may receive routing information that is encrypted but the P-CSCF will not have the key to decrypt this information.

The mechanism shall support the scenario that different I-CSCFs in the HN may encrypt and decrypt the address of the S-CSCFs.

5.3 SIP Privacy for IMS Networks

Note: Privacy may in many instances be equivalent with confidentiality i.e. to hide the information (using encryption and encryption keys) from all entities except those who are authorized to understand the information. The SIP Privacy for IMS Networks do not provide with such confidentiality. The purpose of the mechanism is rather to give an IMS subscriber the possibility to withhold certain identity information of the subscriber.

For SIP messages the IMS Network shall offer the following services:

- a. If the IMS subscriber originating a SIP message specifically requests that no privacy functions shall be utilised the IMS network shall route the message without applying any privacy functions
- b. The IMS network shall reject a SIP message if the IMS network cannot offer the privacy service required by the IMS subscriber originating a SIP message and if the IMS subscriber requests that the SIP message is critical.
- c. A SIP proxy that resides of the edge of the 3GPP IMS Network and receives a message (request or response) shall provide with the SIP privacy extension functionality for asserted identities.

6 Security mechanisms

6.1 Authentication and key agreement

The scheme for authentication and key agreement in the IMS is called IMS AKA. The IMS AKA achieves mutual authentication between the ISIM and the HN, cf. Figure 1. The identity used for authenticating a subscriber is the private identity, IMPI, which has the form of a NAI, cf. [3]. The HSS and the ISIM share a long-term key associated with the IMPI.

The HN shall choose the IMS AKA scheme for authenticating an IM subscriber accessing through UMTS. The security parameters e.g. keys generated by the IMS AKA scheme are transported by SIP.

The generation of the authentication vector AV that includes RAND, XRES, CK, IK and AUTN shall be done in the same way as specified in [1]. The ISIM and the HSS keep track of counters SQN_{ISIM} and SQN_{HSS} respectively. The requirements on the handling of the counters and mechanisms for sequence number management are specified in [1]. The AMF field can be used in the same way as in [1].

Furthermore a security association is established between the UE and the P-CSCF. The subscriber may have several IMPUs associated with one IMPI. These may belong to the same or different service profiles. Only one SA shall be active between the UE and the P-CSCF. This single SA shall be updated when a new successful authentication of the subscriber has occurred, cf. section 7.4.

It is the policy of the HN that decides if an authentication shall take place for the registration of different IMPUs e.g. belonging to same or different service profiles. Regarding the definition of service profiles cf. [3].

6.1.1 Authentication of an IM-subscriber

Before a user can get access to the IM services at least one IMPU needs to be registered and the IMPI authenticated in the IMS at application level. In order to get registered the UE sends a SIP REGISTER message towards the SIP registrar server i.e. the S-CSCF, cf. Figure 1, which will perform the authentication of the user. The message flows are the same regardless of whether the user has an IMPU already registered or not.




Figure 4: The IMS Authentication and Key Agreement for an unregistered IM subscriber and successful mutual authentication with no synchronization error

The detailed requirements and complete registration flows are defined in [8] and [11].

SM_n stands for SIP Message *n* and CM_m stands for Cx message *m* which has a relation to the authentication process:

SM1:
REGISTER(IMPI, IMPU)

In SM2 and SM3 the P-CSCF and the I-CSCF respectively forwards the SIP REGISTER towards the S-CSCF.

After receiving SM3, if the IMPU is not currently registered at the S-CSCF, the S-CSCF needs to set the registration flag at the HSS to initial registration pending. This is done in order to handle mobile terminated calls while the initial registration is in progress and not successfully completed. The registration flag is stored in the HSS together with the S-CSCF name and user identity, and is used to indicate whether a particular IMPU of the user is unregistered or registered at a particular S-CSCF or if the initial registration at a particular S-CSCF is pending. The registration flag is set by the S-CSCF sending a Cx-Put to the HSS. If the IMPU is currently registered, the S-CSCF shall leave the registration flag set to *registered*. At this stage the HSS has performed a check that the IMPI and the IMPU belong to the same user.

Upon receiving the SIP REGISTER the S-CSCF shall use an Authentication Vector (AV) for authenticating and agreeing a key with the user. If the S-CSCF has no valid AV then the S-CSCF shall send a request for AV(s) to the HSS in CM1 together with the number *m* of AVs wanted where *m* is at least one.

CM1:
Cx-AV-Req(IMPI, *m*)

Upon receipt of a request from the S-CSCF, the HSS sends an ordered array of *n* authentication vectors to the S-CSCF using CM2. The authentication vectors are ordered based on sequence number. Each authentication vector consists of the following components: a random number RAND, an expected response XRES, a cipher key CK, an integrity key IK and an authentication token AUTN. Each authentication vector is good for one authentication and key agreement between the S-CSCF and the IMS user.

CM2:
Cx-AV-Req-Resp(IMPI, RAND1||AUTN1||XRES1||CK1||IK1, ..., RAND_{*n*}||AUTN_{*n*}||XRES_{*n*}||CK_{*n*}||IK_{*n*})

When the S-CSCF needs to send an authentication challenge to the user, it selects the next authentication vector from the ordered array, i.e. authentication vectors in a particular S-CSCF are used on a first-in / first-out basis.

The S-CSCF sends a SIP 4xx Auth_Challenge i.e. an authentication challenge towards the UE including the challenge RAND, the authentication token AUTN in SM4. It also includes the integrity key IK and the cipher key CK for the P-CSCF. Draft-ietf-sip-digest-aka-01 [17] specifies the fields to populate corresponding parameters of authenticate challenge.

The verification of the SQN by the USIM and ISIM will cause the UE to reject an attempt by the S-CSCF to re-use a AV. Therefore no AV shall be sent more than once.

NOTE: This does not preclude the use of the normal SIP transaction layer re-transmission procedures.

SM4:
4xx Auth_Challenge(IMPI, RAND, AUTN, IK, CK)

When the P-CSCF receives SM5 it shall store the key(s) and remove that information and forward the rest of the message to the UE i.e.

SM6:
4xx Auth_Challenge(IMPI, RAND, AUTN)

Upon receiving the challenge, SM6, the UE takes the AUTN, which includes a MAC and the SQN. The UE calculates the XMAC and checks that XMAC=MAC and that the SQN is in the correct range as in [1]. If both these checks are successful the UE calculates the response, RES, puts it into the Authorization header and sends it back to the registrar in

SM7. Draft-ietf-sip-digest-aka-01 [17] specifies the fields to populate corresponding parameters of the response. It should be noted that the UE at this stage also computes the session keys CK and IK.

SM7:
REGISTER(IMPI, RES)

The P-CSCF forwards the RES in SM8 to the I-CSCF, which queries the HSS to find the address of the S-CSCF. In SM9 the I-CSCF forwards the RES to the S-CSCF.

Upon receiving SM9 containing the response, the S-CSCF retrieves the active XRES for that user and uses this to check the response sent by the UE as described in Draft-ietf-sip-digest-aka-01 [17]. If the check is successful then the user has been authenticated and the IMPU is registered in the S-CSCF. If the IMPU was not currently registered, the S-CSCF shall send a Cx-Put to update the registration-flag to *registered*. If the IMPU was currently registered the registration-flag is not altered.

It shall be possible to implicitly register IMPU(s). The implicitly registered IMPU(s) all belong to the same Service Profile. All the IMPU(s) being implicitly registered shall be delivered by the HSS to the S-CSCF and subsequently to the P-CSCF. The S-CSCF shall regard all implicitly registered IMPU(s) as registered IMPU(s).

When an IMPU has been registered this registration will be valid for some period of time. Both the UE and the S-CSCF will keep track on a timer for this purpose but the expiration time in the UE is smaller than the one in the S-CSCF in order to make it possible for the UE to be registered and reachable without interruptions. A successful registration of a previously registered IMPU (including implicitly registered IMPUs) means the expiry time of the registration is refreshed.

It should be noted that the UE initiated re-registration opens up a potential denial-of-service attack. That is, an attacker could try to register an already registered IMPU and respond with the wrong RES and in order to make the HN de-register the IMPU. For this reason a subscriber should not be de-registered if it fails an authentication. It shall be defined by the policy of the operator when successfully registered IMPU(s) are to be de-registered.

The lengths of the IMS AKA parameters are specified in chapter 6.3.7 in [1].

6.1.2 Authentication failures


6.1.2.1 User authentication failure

In this case the authentication of the user should fail at the S-CSCF due an incorrect response (received in SM9). However, if the response is incorrect, then the IK used to protect SM7 will normally be incorrect as well, which will normally cause the integrity check at the P-CSCF to fail before the response can be verified at S-CSCF. In this case SM7 is discarded by the IPsec layer at the P-CSCF.

If the integrity check passes but the response is incorrect, the message flows are identical up to and including SM9 as a successful authentication. Once the S-CSCF detects the user authentication failure it should proceed in the same way as having received SM9 in a network authentication failure (see clause 6.1.2.2).

6.1.2.2 Network authentication failure

In this section the case when the authentication of the network is not successful is specified. When the check of the MAC in the UE fails the network can not be authenticated and hence registration fails. The flow is identical as for the successful registration in 6.1.1 up to SM6.



The UE shall send a Register message towards the HN including an indication of the cause of failure in SM7. The P-CSCF and the I-CSCF forward this message to the S-CSCF.

SM7:
REGISTER(Failure = *AuthenticationFailure*, IMPI)

Upon receiving SM9, which includes the cause of authentication failure, the S-CSCF shall set the registration-flag in the HSS to *unregistered*, if the IMPU is not currently registered. To set the flag the S-CSCF sends in CM3 a Cx-Put to the HSS. If the IMPU is currently registered, the S-CSCF does not update the registration flag.

CM3:
Cx-AV-Put(IMPI, Clear S-CSCF name)

The HSS responds to CM3 with a Cx-Put-Resp in CM4.

In SM10 the S-CSCF sends a 4xx Auth_Failure towards the UE indicating that authentication has failed, no security parameters shall be included in this message.

SM10:
SIP/2.0 4xx Auth_Failure


Upon receiving SM10 the I-CSCF shall clear any registration information related to the IMPI.

6.1.2.3 Incomplete authentication

If the S-CSCF does not receive a response to an authentication within an acceptable time, it considers the authentication to have failed. If the IMPU was not already registered, the S-CSCF shall send a Cx-Put to the HSS to set the registration-flag for that IMPU to unregistered (see message CM3 in clause 6.1.2.2). If the IMPU was already registered, the S-CSCF does not change the registration-flag.

6.1.3 Synchronization failure

In this section the case of an authenticated registration with synchronization failure is described. After re-synchronization, authentication may be successfully completed, but it may also happen that in subsequent attempts other failure conditions (i.e. user authentication failure, network authentication failure) occur. In below only the case of synchronization failure with subsequent successful authentication is shown. The other cases can be derived by combination with the flows for the other failure conditions.



The flow equals the flow in 6.1.1 up to SM6. When the UE receives SM6 it detects that the SQN is out of range and sends a synchronization failure back to the S-CSCF in SM7. Draft-ietf-sip-digest-aka-01 [17] describes the fields to populate corresponding parameters of synchronization failure.

SM7:
REGISTER(Failure = *Synchronization Failure*, AUTS, IMPU)

Upon receiving the *Synchronization Failure* and the AUTS the S-CSCF sends an Av-Req to the HSS in CM3 including the required number of Avs, m.

CM3:
Cx-AV-Req(IMPI, RAND,AUTS, m)


The HSS checks the AUTS as in section 6.3.5 in [1]. After potentially updating the SQN, the HSS sends new AVs to the S-CSCF in CM4.

CM4:
Cx-AV-Req-Resp(IMPI, n,RAND₁||AUTN₁||XRES₁||CK₁||IK₁,...,RAND_n||AUTN_n||XRES_n||CK_n||IK_n)

The rest of the messages i.e. SM10-SM18 including the Cx messages are exactly the same as SM4-SM12 and the corresponding Cx messages in 6.1.1.

6.1.4 Network Initiated authentications

In order to authenticate an already registered user, the S-CSCF shall send a request to the UE to initiate a re-registration procedure. When received at the S-CSCF, the re-registration shall trigger a new IMS AKA procedure that will allow the S-CSCF to re-authenticate the user.



Both the UE and the P-CSCF shall shorten the lifetime of the old SA pair generated from the last successful authentication, so as to guarantee that the new SA pair shall be used.

The UE shall initiate the re-registration on the reception of the Authentication Required indication. In the event that the UE does not initiate the re-registration procedure after the request from the S-CSCF, the S-CSCF may decide to de-register the subscriber or re-issue an Authentication-Required.

6.1.5 Integrity protection indicator

In order to decide whether a REGISTER request from the UE needs to be authenticated, the S-CSCF needs to know about the integrity protection applied to the message. The P-CSCF attaches an indication to the REGISTER request to inform the S-CSCF that the message was integrity protected if:

- the P-CSCF receives a REGISTER containing an authentication response and the message is protected with the SA created during this authentication procedure; or
- the P-CSCF receives a REGISTER not containing an authentication response and the message is protected with the SA created by latest successful authentication (from the P-CSCF perspective).

For all other REGISTER requests the P-CSCF attaches an indication that the REGISTER request was not integrity protected or ensures that there is no indication about integrity protection in the message.

6.2 Confidentiality mechanisms

No confidentiality mechanism is provided in this specification, cf. clause 5.1.3.

6.3 Integrity mechanisms

IPsec ESP as specified in reference [13] shall provide integrity protection of SIP signalling between the UE and the P-CSCF, protecting all SIP signalling messages at the IP level. IPSec ESP general concepts on Security Policy management, Security Associations and IP traffic processing as described in reference [14] shall also be considered. ESP integrity shall be applied in transport mode between UE and P-CSCF.

The method to set up ESP security associations (SAs) during the SIP registration procedure is specified in clause 7. As a result of the registration procedure, a pair of unidirectional SAs between the UE and the P-CSCF, shared by TCP and UDP, shall be established in the P-CSCF and later in the UE. One SA is for traffic from the UE to the P-CSCF (inbound SA at the P-CSCF) and the other SA is for traffic from the P-CSCF to the UE (outbound SA at the P-CSCF).

The integrity key IK_{ESP} is the same for the two simultaneously established SAs. The integrity key IK_{ESP} is obtained from the key IK_{IM} established as a result of the AKA procedure, specified in clause 6.1, using a suitable key expansion function. This key expansion function depends on the ESP integrity algorithm and is specified in Annex I of this specification.

The integrity key expansion on the user side is done in the UE. The integrity key expansion on the network side is done in the P-CSCF.

The anti-replay service shall be enabled in the UE and the P-CSCF on all established SAs.

6.4 Hiding mechanisms

The Hiding Mechanism is optional for implementation. All I-CSCFs in the HN shall share the same encryption and decryption key K_v . If the mechanism is used and the operator policy states that the topology shall be hidden the I-CSCF shall encrypt the hiding information elements when the I-CSCF forwards SIP Request or Response messages outside the hiding network's domain. The hiding information elements are entries in SIP headers, such as Via, Record-Route, Route and Path, which contain addresses of SIP proxies in hiding network. When I-CSCF receives a SIP Request or Response message from outside the hiding network's domain, the I-CSCF shall decrypt those information elements that were encrypted by I-CSCF in this hiding network domain.

The purpose of encryption in network hiding is to protect the identities of the SIP proxies and the topology of the hiding network. Therefore, an encryption algorithm in confidentiality mode shall be used. The network hiding mechanism will not address the issues of authentication and integrity protection of SIP headers. The AES in CBC mode with 128-bit block and 128-bit key shall be used as the encryption algorithm for network hiding. In the CBC mode under a given key, if a fixed IV is used to encrypt two same plaintexts, then the ciphertext blocks will also be equal. This is undesirable for network hiding. Therefore, random IV shall be used for each encryption. The same IV is required to decrypt the information. The IV shall be included in the same SIP header that includes the encrypted information.

6.5 SIP privacy mechanisms

The SIP privacy mechanism is optional for implementation in the UA.

The UA may use the following priv-value types of the Privacy header in [22] and [23]:

1. 'none'
2. 'id'
3. 'critical'

The IMS Network shall support the following priv-value types of the Privacy header, cf [22] and [23]:

1. 'none'
2. 'id'
3. 'critical'

Note: The UA may try to use other priv-values as defined in [22] but there is no guarantee that the IMS network supports it.

The priv-value 'critical' is used by the UA when the requested privacy service is critical to the user. Hence if the IMS network cannot provide with the requested privacy service, which is critical, then the IMS network shall reject the request.