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| **Agenda**  | **Topic**  | **TDoc** | **Title**  | **Source**  | **Type**  | **Notes** | **Decision**  | **Replaced-by**  |
| 1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives  | S3‑240000 | Agenda  | SA WG3 Chair  | agenda  |    | agreed |  |
|    |    | S3‑240001 | Detailed agenda  | SA WG3 Chair  | agenda  |    | noted |  |
|    |    | S3‑240002 | Emeeting process  | SA WG3  | agenda  |   <CC1>Chair: official Monday, informal Tuesday, Wednesday, wind up official calls Thursday, FridayE//: good proposal, Official Monday, Tuesday informal on WednesdayE//: necessary to make comment known on email, too?Chair: take official position on Thursday and FridayAlf: taking notes, if they are incorrect, please send on email reflector the correct position.QC: not ok for Friday meeting to have decision powerChair: only for resolving contentionQC: 002 last revision should be 25 of jan, inconsistent with slide. Chair: correctQC: meeting with decision powerChair: yesAgenda agreed</CC1><end of CC1>Chair: Noamen please send list of GSMA related tdocs and maintenanceNoamen: okHuawei: some revisions are major rewrites, but not well justifiedNokia: some GSMA comments require major clarificationMitre: GSMA comments should not limit us in case we see other instances of the same.Huawei: some udates are missing references and justificationChair: please provide concrete suggestions on emailE//: ask for correct work item to be usedMirko: find WI code based on releaseHuawei: for GSMA updates, we are targtting R18, use that work itemE//: so SCAS\_Ph3?Huawei: yes, as it includes maintenance</end of CC1> | noted |  |
| 2 | Meeting Reports  |  |    |    |    |    |  |  |
| 3 | Reports and Liaisons from other Groups ( related to SCAS)  |  |    |    |    |    |  |  |
| 4 | Work areas  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1 | Maintenance(Rel-15/16/17/18) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.1 | Security Assurance | S3‑240003 | GSMA clarification: on unused software | BSI(DE) | CR | [Huawei] : request revision.[BSI] : will provide revision.<CC1>Michael presentsComments already on emailMitre: editorials</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240004 | GSMA clarification: no unused functions | BSI(DE) | CR | [Nokia] : clarification is required for terms, e.g., functions, etc.[BSI] : Nokias request refers to the baseline, not the CR itself.[Huawei] :Requires clarification.[BSI] : will provide revision.<CC1>Michael presentsComments already on emailChair: comments contentious?BSI: prefer not to revisit definitions, limit revisions to new textChair: restrict to GSMA comments, don't expand scope more than requiredBSI: in general fine, but may be some low hanging fruit in some placesChair: okE//: point 1, what was there before in this test case?BSI: trying to clarify the concept of functionE//: note 2 and 3 for making easier for tester?BSI: yesE//: addition of hardware in resultBSI: more for completenessNokia: also asking on hardware perspective, what does this mean from product perspective, when there is redundancy does this mean unplugging thingsDCM: make clear that there is documentation of the functionality, I don't see unplugging required, this contribution is clarification, more updates separate CRNokia: send update on email if requiredE//: is this addressing GSMA input?BSI: yesOppo: clarification of undocumented hardware – not mentioned by GSMA, should this be reflected back to GSMA?Chair: this would make it a big topicDCM: maybe separate hardware and software in a future description of the test caseMitre: if SA3 feels it is required, SA3 should do itChair: concrete comments in email</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240005 | GSMA clarification: no unsupported components | BSI(DE) | CR | [Nokia] : clarification is required for terms, e.g., component,[BSI] : Nokias request refers to the baseline, not the CR itself.[Huawei] :Requires clarification.[BSI] : will provide revision.CC1>Michael presentsMitre: there may be an issue with COTS hardwareBSI: vendor needs to ensure lifetime supportNokia: comments will be on emailE//: here clarifies that component list is in documentation, is that the caseDCM: does that mean SBOM?Chair: hardware not included in SBOMDCM: agree BSI: SBOM and generic description "components" on hardware side</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240006 | GSMA clarification: File system Authorization privileges | BSI(DE) | CR | [Nokia] : clarification is required for term 'authorization privilege'[BSI] : Nokias request refers to the baseline, not the CR itself.[Huawei] :Requires clarification.[BSI] : will provide revision.<CC1>Michael presentsNo comments</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240007 | Correct RRC connection reconfiguration to RRC reconfiguration | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | <CC1>Adrian presentsQC: 0031 makes technical changes, overlapping, may need to merge into 0031Discussion moved to 0031</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240008 | Test Case on Password Storage Support | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, BSI | CR | CC1>Sawros presentsMitre: shouldn't we define non broken rather than remove itNokia: easier solution Mitre: may be wrong baselinieNokia: changes are not affected by update to 18.2, will create updateChair: can this be done by Mirko?Nokia: need a revisionHuawei: not agreed in GSMA, just Nokia input?Nokia: correct not related to GSMA inputDCM: dictionary and rainbow table should be considered separate attacksMitre: not specific to Rainbow tables, about data in storage</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240009 | Test Case on No Default Content | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | [BSI] : terms, version, pre-condition, typo, evidence[Huawei] does not agree with this contribution in its current form due to the extent of changes and lack of justification. |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240010 | Test Case on No Directory Listings | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | [BSI] : terms, version, evidence, questions, typo[Huawei] does not agree with this contribution in its current form due to the extent of changes and lack of justification. |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240011 | Test Case on No Web Server Header Info | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | [BSI] : terms, version, evidence, questions, typo[Huawei] does not agree with this contribution in its current form due to the extent of changes and lack of justification. |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240012 | Test Case on No Web Server Error Pages Info | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | [BSI] : terms, version, evidence, questions, typo[Huawei] does not agree with this contribution in its current form due to the extent of changes and lack of justification. |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240013 | Test Case on No Web Server File Type Mappings | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | [BSI] : terms, version, pre-condition, evidence |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240014 | Assessment tool definition | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240015 | Discussion Paper on PCF SCAS contents | BSI(DE) | discussion |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240016 | Improving the SCAS specification way of work | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | discussion | [BSI] : clarification required for Observation 2 and 3, objection of recommendation (R2) and (R3) in this strict form[Huawei] provides comments |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240017 | Minimized kernel network functions (TC\_IP\_MULTICAST\_HANDLING) | Deutsche Telekom AG | CR | MCC made comments on the cover page (wrong WID used, no summary of the changes) and the body of the CR (missing clause header). |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240018 | No automatic launch of removable media[TC\_NO\_AUTO\_LAUNCH\_OF\_REMOVABLE\_MEDIA] | Deutsche Telekom AG | CR | [BSI] comments on header, test name, requirement name |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240019 | Syn Flood Prevention[TC\_SYN\_FLOOD\_PREVENTION] | Deutsche Telekom AG | CR | MCC made comments on the cover page (wrong WID used, no summary of the changes) and reminded that no comments on the body of the text were allowed. |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240020 | External filesystem mount restrictions(TC\_EXTERNAL\_FILE\_SYSTEM\_MOUNT\_RESTRICTIONS) | Deutsche Telekom AG | CR | [Nokia] : clarification is required for term 'suitable privilege escalation'?MCC made comments on the cover page (wrong WID used, no summary of the changes) and the body of the CR (comments need to be removed). |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240026 | Clarification of bootable memory device test | BSI(DE) | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240027 | Clarification of UP Integrity Protection test cases for eNB | BSI(DE) | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240028 | Clarification of UP IP selection and bidding down prevention of eNB | BSI(DE) | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240029 | Added parameters to NRF discovery authorization | BSI(DE) | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240030 | Added parameters to NRF discovery authorization threat reference | BSI(DE) | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240031 | ClarificationandsimplificationoftestcasesregardingUPCPandIPactivationatsplit-gNB | BSI(DE) | CR | <CC1>Michael presentsQC: deletion of "or not needed" needs to be aligned with gNB specificationQC: why is only RRC ciphering is crossed outBSI: take this offline, believe it is aligned with gNBQC: crossing out of decryption, because it is implicit?DCM: regarding "or not needed" clarify whether up to tester or two test cases.Chair: continue on 31</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240032 | ClarificationoftestcasesonuserdataIPandCPinsplit-gNB | BSI(DE) | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240033 | Removal of note in GVNP life cyle management | BSI(DE) | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240034 | Fixed typo in VNF traffic separation testcase | BSI(DE) | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240035 | Clarifications to Basic Vulnerability testcases | MITRE Corporation | CR | [Nokia] : clarification required on the duration time of the fuzzing[Huawei] finds the contribution not acceptable in its current form due to lack of justification and requires retaining only changes related to the reference document (discussed in SA3#113) for now. |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240036 | Update to the clause 4.2.2.2.2-Protection at the transport layer | Samsung | CR | [Samsung] : provides r1 |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240037 | Update to the clause 4.2.3.2.4-Protecting data and information in transfer | Samsung | CR | [Samsung] : provides r1 |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240038 | Update to the clause 4.2.3.3.2-Boot from intended memory devices only | Samsung | CR | [Samsung] : provides r1 |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240039 | Update to the clause 4.2.3.4.1.1-System functions shall not be used without successful authentication and authorization | Samsung | CR | [Samsung] : provides r1 |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240040 | Updatetotheclause4.2.3.4.3.1-PasswordStructure | Samsung | CR | [Samsung] : provides r1 |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240041 | Updates threat references to TS33.117-clauses4.2.2to4.2.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240042 | Updates threat references to TS33.117-clauses4.2.4to4.2.6 | ZTE Corporation | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240043 | Updates threat references to TS33.117-clauses4.3.2 | ZTE Corporation | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240044 | Updates threat references to TS33.117-clauses4.3.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240045 | Updates threat references to TS33.117-clauses4.3.4 to4.3.5 | ZTE Corporation | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240046 | Updates threat references to TS33.117-clause4.4.2to4.4.4 | ZTE Corporation | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240047 | Changes to 4.2.4.1.2.1 | Huawei; HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240048 | TS33.117\_Changesto4.2.4.2.2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240049 | TS33.117\_Changesto4.2.5.3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240050 | TS33.117\_Changes to 4.2.6.2.1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240051 | Changes to 4.3.2.1 | Huawei ;HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240052 | Changesto4.2.2.1.8inTS33.511 | Huawei; HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240053 | Changesto4.2.2.1.12inTS33.511 | Huawei; HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240054 | TS33.117\_Changesto4.2.2.2.2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240055 | AddcertificateenrolmenttoTS33.511 | Huawei; HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240056 | PeercertificatecheckingatgNBtoTS33.511 | Huawei; HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240057 | Add threat to certificate enrolment | Huawei; HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240058 | Add threat to peer certificate checking at gNB | Huawei; HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240059 | Test case update to TS33.511 | Huawei; HiSilicon | CR | [Nokia] : clarification required on the reduced/restricted logging[Huawei] : reply to Nokia to ask clarification on the question. |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240060 | Correction to TS33.511 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240061 | [mirror]correction to TS 33.511 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240062 | [mirror]correction to TS 33.511 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240063 | Clarificationfor4.3.4.2-33.117 | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240064 | AddclarificationstoTS33.511 | Huawei; HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240065 | AddclarificationstoTS33.511 | Huawei; HiSilicon | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240066 | Clarificationfor4.3.4.3-33.117 | Keysight Technologies UK Ltd | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240067 | Log transfer to centralized storage | Ericsson | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240068 | Growing content shall not influence system functions | Ericsson | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240069 | Processing of ICMPv4 and ICMPv6 packets | Ericsson | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240070 | Handling of IP options and extensions | Ericsson | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240071 | Editorial Updates to Section 4.3.5.1 of TS 33.117 for clarification | IIT Bombay | CR | [Nokia] : clarification required on the term 'passes', is there a separation of egress and ingress traffic possible[Huawei] comments on the changes[IIT Bombay]: Responding to clarification on the term 'passes' |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240072 | EditorialUpdatestoSection4.3.6.2ofTS33.117forclarification | IIT Bombay | CR | [Nokia] : improvement required on the HTTP methods, i.e., change to HTTP requests[Huawei] proposes changes[IIT Bombay]: responding to suggestion on changing 'HTTP methods' to 'HTTP requests' |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240073 | EditorialUpdatestoSection4.3.6.3ofTS33.117forclarification | IIT Bombay | CR |  |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240074 | EditorialUpdatestoSection4.3.6.4ofTS33.117forclarification | IIT Bombay | CR |  |  |  |
| 4.1.2 | Service Based Architecture |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.3 | Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GSProSe |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.4 | Mission Critical |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.5 | Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credentialin 5G |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.6 | Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.7 | Security AspectsofEnhancementsfor5GMulticast-BroadcastServices |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.8 | Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.9 | Security Aspects of eNPN |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.10 | Security Aspects of Enhancementof Support for Edge Computingin 5GC |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.11 | Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.12 | Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Side link Positioning |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.13 | SecurityAspectsofeNA |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.14 | ModifiedPRINSforroamingserviceprovidersin5G |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.1.15 | All other maintenance topics (not listed above) |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.2 | New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification(SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository(UDR). | S3‑240021 | SecurityAssuranceSpecification(SCAS)fortheUnifiedDataRepository(UDR) | BSI(DE) | Draft TS | <CC1>Jörg presentsOppo: is a cover needed for this?Chair: yesBSI: draft TSMirko: is ok</CC1>. |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240022 | ScopedefinitionfordraftTS33.530 | BSI(DE) | pCR | <CC1>Jörg presentsNo comments</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240023 | IntroductionfordraftTS33.530clause4 | BSI(DE) | pCR | <CC1>E//: same text as scope, look at UDM textBSI: ok, will update</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240024 | UDR-specificsecurityrequirementsandrelatedtestcasesfordraftTS33.530 | BSI(DE) | pCR | <CC1>Jörg presentsNo comments</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240025 | DiscussionoftheprotectionmechanismofthepermanentkeyleavingtheUDRenvironment. | BSI(DE) | discussion | Agreement <CC1>Jörg presentsNokia: already made a comment on email: TLS shall be used, why is it possible to have no security? On authorization security: two levels of security, what is the necessity here when data is anyway protected on first levelE//: discussion paper more on normative work, not on SCAS, TR33.845 was studying that, maybe revisit.Huawei: if 33.541 needs to be revisited is a separate discussion not test case. In case of internal interface, is it applicableBSI: yesDCM: need to ensure that internal interfaces are not externally accessibleHuawei: meaning that the interface is not exposedNokia: if the person testing is sitting in front of the UDM is not seeing the UDR interface</CC1>[Nokia] : clarification required for the part under heading 'transfer security'[Nokia] : clarification required for the part under heading 'authorization security' |  |  |
| 4.3 | NewWIDonSCASforRel-18featuresonexistingfunctions. |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 4.4 | NewWIDon5GSecurityAssuranceSpecification(SCAS)fortheShortMessageServiceFunction(SMSF). | S3‑240075 | DiscussionofDiameterinterfaceatSMSFtodefinerequirementsforSecurityAssuranceSpecificationsforSMSF | IIT Bombay | discussion | <CC1>Manjesh presentsJust discussion paperManjesh: just introducing diameter interface as an assetE//: so no new requirement, requirement already exists in specsHuawei: in general, there is no NDS IP support requirement for network productsNokia: update to R17? How is the intrerworking with LTE R17 handled now that we are on R19Huawei: no difference to other standards, as long as no new requirement is introduced</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240076 | AddannexuretoSecurityAssuranceSpecification(SCAS)threatsandcriticalassetsin3GPPnetworkproductclassesspecifictoSMSF | IIT Bombay | CR | Approval<CC1>Manjesh presentsDCM: are all network product classes new annexesOppo: okHuawei: make draft CR first as living document, then later convert to CR together with SCAS TSHuawei: is new threat on interface protection required? Already exists and sufficient, details on emailHuawei: asset and threat discussion should be separate. Currently no necessity of adding threat partMitre: is this work item allocated for R19?Huawei: this work is R19</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240077 | NewrequirementinSCASforSMSFdraftTS33.529 | IIT Bombay | pCR | <CC1>Manjesh presentsHuawei: discussion paper clarifies that three options can be used, but not all options are implemented, need to consider this in the test cases, more on email</CC1> |  |  |
|  |  | S3‑240078 | SMSFSpecificSecurityrequirementandtestcasefordraftTS33.529 | IIT Bombay | pCR | <CC1>Manjesh presentsMarcus: test case in 33.117 looks very similar, what is the difference?Manjesh: there is a note hereHuawei: SMSF is not only network product that supports diameter, there are SCAS test available, so no need for specific testChair: reference specific testHuawei: will send clause number by email</CC1>[Nokia] : clarification required on the execution steps |  |  |