**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #106-e *S3-220440***

**e-meeting, 14 - 25 February 2022** *revision of S3-22xxxx*

|  |
| --- |
| *CR-Form-v12.1* |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** |
|  |
|  | **33.847** | **CR** | **0013** | **rev** | **-**  | **Current version:** | **17.0.1** |  |
|  |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* |
|  |

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME | **X** | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network | **X** |

|  |
| --- |
|  |
| ***Title:***  | Update to conclusions of KI#5 |
|  |  |
| ***Source to WG:*** | Philips International B.V. |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 |
|  |  |
| ***Work item code:*** | FS\_5G\_ProSe\_Sec |  | ***Date:*** | 2022-02-07 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Category:*** | **B** |  | ***Release:*** | Rel-17 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:****F*** *(correction)****A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)****B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)****D*** *(editorial modification)*Detailed explanations of the above categories canbe found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | *Use one of the following releases:Rel-8 (Release 8)Rel-9 (Release 9)Rel-10 (Release 10)Rel-11 (Release 11)…Rel-15 (Release 15)Rel-16 (Release 16)Rel-17 (Release 17)Rel-18 (Release 18)* |
|  |  |
| ***Reason for change:*** | Missing conclusion on protecting against privacy attacks on Remote UE identifiers (e.g. User Info ID, PRUK ID and Relay Service Code(s)). |
|  |  |
| ***Summary of change:*** | Add conclusions to Key Issue #5 about:1. The protection of privacy sensitive parameters/identities used in Direct Communication Request, for which solution #42 can be used as a basis.
2. The protection against tracking by updating the long term identifiers during each UE-to-NW authorization request, for which some parts of solution #32 can be used.
 |
|  |  |
| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | Potential privacy attacks against Remote UEs. |
|  |  |
| ***Clauses affected:*** | 7.5 |
|  |  |
|  | **Y** | **N** |  |  |
| ***Other specs*** |  | **X** |  Other core specifications  | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***affected:*** |  | **X** |  Test specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***(show related CRs)*** |  | **X** |  O&M Specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
|  |  |
| ***Other comments:*** |  |
|  |  |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** |  |

## 7.5 Key Issue #5: Privacy protection over the UE-to-Network Relay

The following text is taken as a conclusion for the UE-to-Network Relay solution (L2, L3 with/without N3IWF):

Path switch is not included in the present document, no normative work is needed to address any privacy issue for the path switch scenario.

Solution #42 is used as a basis for normative work to protect against exposure of privacy sensitive parameters/identities used in the Direct Communication Request, such as User Info ID, PRUK ID and Relay Service Codes, in case restricted discovery is used.

To protect against long-term identifiers (e.g. User Info ID, PRUK ID and Relay Service Codes) being misused for tracking of a target Remote UE, the long-term identifiers need to be updated as part of each UE-to-NW relay authorization request to the 5GC.

NOTE 1: Steps 5a, 6 (ALTERNATIVE 1), 7 and 8 of solution #32 show an example of how this can be achieved. Further details can be worked out during normative phase.