**3GPP TSG-SA Meeting #88-eSP-200538\_Rev6**

**30 June – 3 July 2020, electronic meeting**

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| *CR-Form-v12.0* |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** |
|  |
|  | **33.501** | **CR** | **00852** | **rev** |  | **Current version:** | **16.2.0** |  |
|  |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME | **x** | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network |  |

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| ***Title:***  | CR to 33.501 - Update to User Plane Integrity Protection |
|  |  |
| ***Source to WG:*** |  |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | Deutsche Telekom AG, T-Mobile US, Telecom Italia, AT&T, Vodafone, Siemens |
|  |  |
| ***Work item code:*** | TEI16 |  | ***Date:*** | 2020-07-01 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Category:*** | C |  | ***Release:*** | Rel-16 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:****F*** *(correction)****A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)****B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)****D*** *(editorial modification)*Detailed explanations of the above categories canbe found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | *Use one of the following releases:Rel-8 (Release 8)Rel-9 (Release 9)Rel-10 (Release 10)Rel-11 (Release 11)…Rel-15 (Release 15)Rel-16 (Release 16)Rel-17 (Release 17)Rel-18 (Release 18)* |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | Updates to the User Plane Integrity Protection requirements following new advice from the GSMA regarding attacks based on the lack of User Plane Integrity Protection in 5G and the adverse impacts that these attacks may have. |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | In Section 5.2.3 - Update the text to explicitly include the UE’s maximum supported data rate |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | Security of user plane data may be compromised |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | 5.2.3 |
|  |  |
|  | **Y** | **N** |  |  |
| ***Other specs*** | **x** |  |  Other core specifications  | TS 23.501, TS 24.501, TS 38.300 |
| ***affected:*** |  | **x** |  Test specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***(show related CRs)*** |  | **x** |  O&M Specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
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| ***Other comments:*** |  |
|  |  |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** | Rev1: remove the second change, clean up cover page and add additional source companies |

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Change Begin \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

### 5.2.3 User data and signalling data integrity

The UE shall support integrity protection and replay protection of user data between the UE and the gNB. The UE shall support integrity protection of user data at any data rate, up to and including, the highest data rate supported by the UE.

The UE shall activate integrity protection of user data based on the indication sent by the gNB.

The UE shall support integrity protection and replay protection of RRC and NAS-signalling.

The UE shall implement the following integrity protection algorithms:

NIA0, 128-NIA1, 128-NIA2 as defined in Annex D of the present document.

The UE may implement the following integrity protection algorithm:

128-NIA3 as defined in Annex D of the present document.

The UE shall implement the integrity algorithms as specified in TS 33.401 [10] if it supports E-UTRA connected to 5GC.

Integrity protection of the user data between the UE and the gNB is optional to use.

NOTE: Integrity protection of user plane adds the overhead of the packet size and increases the processing load both in the UE and the gNB.

Integrity protection of the RRC-signalling, and NAS-signalling is mandatory to use, except in the following cases:

All NAS signalling messages except those explicitly listed in TS 24.501 [35] as exceptions shall be integrity-protected.

All RRC signalling messages except those explicitly listed in TS 38.331 [22] as exceptions shall be integrity-protected with an integrity protection algorithm different from NIA0, except for unauthenticated emergency calls.

The UE shall implement NIA0 for integrity protection of NAS and RRC signalling. NIA0 is only allowed for unauthenticated emergency session as specified in clause 10.2.2.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Change End \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*