3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security — S3#37 Sophia Antipolis, France 21 - 25 February 2005

	CR-Form-v7.1
CHANGE REQUEST	
[X]	33.246 CR 034
For <u>HELP</u> on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the # symbols.	
Proposed change affects: UICC apps ME X Radio Access Network Core Network ■ Core Network ■	
Title:	Storing SP payload after MSK message is verified
Source:	₩ SA WG3
Work item code:	MBMS Date: 第 10/01/2005
Category:	## Release: Release: Rel-6 Use one of the following categories:
Reason for chang	ge: It is insecure to store SP payload in ME before MSK message is verified. SP payload should be stored in ME after MSK message is verified.
Summary of char	nge: 図 Changing the corresponding description in clause 6.4.6.1.
Consequences if not approved:	The procedure of MSK message reception in ME is insecure.
Clauses affected:	: 第 6.4.6.1
Other specs affected:	Y N X Other core specifications
Other comments:	: X

*** BEGIN OF CHANGE ***

6.4.6.1 MSK MIKEY Message Reception

When the MIKEY message arrives at the ME, the processing proceeds following the steps below (basically following section 5.3 of RFC 3830 [9]).

- 1. The Extension Payload (EXT) is examined, and if it indicates an MSK delivery protected with MUK, the MUK ID is received by combining IDi and IDr.
- 2. The Timestamp Payload is checked, and the message is discarded if the counter in the Timestamp Payload is smaller or equal to the stored replay counter associated with the given MUK (the stored replay counter value is retrieved from MGV-S). To avoid issues with wrap around of the ID fields "smaller than" should be in the sense of RFC 1982 [10].
- 3. The Security Policy payload is stored temporarily in the ME if it was present.
- 4. The message is transported to MGV-F for further processing, cf clause 6.5.2.
- 5. The MGV-F replies success or failure. <u>In case of success the temporarily stored Security Policy payload is taken</u> into use. Otherwise it is deleted.

*** END OF CHANGE ***