3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #37 Sophia-Antipolis, France, 21-25 February 2005

Tdoc **#050062**

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		PSEUDO-CHANGE REQU	ESI		
æ		33.978 CR CRNum #rev - #	Current vers	^{ion:} 1.0.0 ^第	
For HELP on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the # symbols.					
Proposed change affects: UICC apps ME Radio Access Network Core Network					
Title:	Ħ	Clarification of IMPI/IMPU relationship			
Source:	ж	Ericsson			
Work item code:	: #	Early IMS	Date: 🔀	14/02/2005	
Category:	Ħ		Release: 🕱	Release-6	
outegory.	00	Use one of the following categories:		the following releases:	
		<i>F</i> (correction)	Ph2	(GSM Phase 2)	
		A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)	R96	(Release 1996)	
		B (addition of feature),	R97	(Release 1997)	
		C (functional modification of feature)	R98	(Release 1998)	
		D (editorial modification)	R99	(Release 1999)	
		Detailed explanations of the above categories can	Rel-4	(Release 4)	
		be found in 3GPP TR 21.900.	Rel-5	(Release 5)	
			Rel-6	(Release 6)	
			Rel-7	(Release 7)	
Reason for change: # Unclear text on how IMPI and IMPU are related to each other when early IMS					

Reason for change: 🕯	Unclear text on how IMPI and IMPU are related to each other when early IMS and full IMS co-exist.				
Summary of change:	Clarify that early IMS and full IMS can share the same IMPU. Note that limitation related to early IMS is not changed.				
Consequences if	End-user cannot use the same public identity to register from early IMS (e.g.				
not approved:	using GPRS access) and full IMS (e.g. using fixed access) at the same time.				
Clauses affected:	f				
	YN				
Other specs	f Other core specifications				
affected:	Test specifications				
	O&M Specifications				
Other comments:	e la				

***** Begin of Change ****

6 Specification

6.1 Overview

The early IMS security solution works by creating a secure binding in the HSS between the public/private user identity (SIP-level identity) and the IP address currently allocated to the user at the GPRS level (bearer/network level identity). Therefore, IMS level signaling, and especially the IMS identities claimed by a user, can be connected securely to the PS domain bearer level security context.

The GGSN, terminates each user's PDP context and has assurance that the IMSI used within this PDP context is authenticated. The GGSN shall provide the user's IP address, IMSI and MSISDN to a RADIUS server in the HSS over the Gi interface when a PDP context is activated towards the IMS system. The HSS has a binding between the IMSI and/or MSISDN and the IMPI and IMPU(s), and is therefore able to store the currently assigned IP address from the GGSN against the user's IMPI and/or IMPU(s). The precise way of the handling of these identities in the HSS is outside the scope of standardization. The GGSN informs the HSS when the PDP context is deactivated/modified so that the stored IP address can be updated in the HSS. When the S-CSCF receives a SIP registration request or any subsequent requests for a given IMPU, it checks that the IP address in the SIP header (verified by the network) matches the IP address that was stored against that subscriber's IMPU in the HSS.

The mechanism assumes that the GGSN does not allow a UE to successfully transmit an IP packet with a source IP address that is different to the one assigned during PDP context activation. In other words, the GGSN must prevent "source IP spoofing". The mechanism also assumes that the P-CSCF checks that the source IP address in the SIP header is the same as the source IP address in the IP header received from the UE (the assumption here, as well as for the full security solution, is that no NAT is present between the GGSN and the P-CSCF).

The mechanism prevents an attacker from using his own IP address in the IP header but spoofing someone else's IMS identity or IP address in the SIP header, so that he pays for GPRS level charges, but not for IMS level charges. The mechanism also prevents an attacker spoofing the address in the IP header so that he does not pay for GPRS charges. It therefore counters the threat scenarios given in clause 5 above.

The mechanism assumes that only one contact IP address is associated with one IMPI. Furthermore, the mechanism supports the case that there may be several IMPUs associated with one IMPI, but one IMPU is associated with only one IMPI. Note, however, that early IMS and full IMS are able to share the same IMPU, and consequently the shared IMPU may be associated with more than one IMPI.

In early IMS the IMS user authentication is performed by linking the IMS registration (based on an IMPI) to a PDP context (based on an authenticated IMSI). The mechanism here assumes that there is a one-to-one relationship between the IMSI for bearer access and the IMPI for IMS access.

For the purposes of this present document, an APN, which is used for IMS services, is called an IMS APN. An IMS APN may be also used for non-IMS services. The mechanism described in this present document further adds a restriction that there is only one APN for accessing IMS for a PLMN and that all active PDP contexts, for a single UE, associated with that IMS APN use the same IP address at any given time.

In the following we use the terms P-CSCF and S-CSCF in a general sense to refer to components of an early IMS system. We note however that early IMS solutions may not have the same functionality split between SIP entities as defined in TS 23.228 [3]. Therefore, the requirements imposed on the SIP/IP core are specified in such a way that they are independent of the functionality split between SIP entities as far as possible. While the exact functionality split of the SIP/IP core may be left open, it is important that any changes to the Cx interface towards the HSS and changes to the interface towards the UE are standardised for vendor interoperability reasons.

***** End of Change ****