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CHANGE REQUEST									
æ	33.246 CR	8 <mark>006</mark>	жrev	1	ж (Current versi	^{on:} 6	.0.0	æ
For HELP on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the $\frac{3}{10}$ symbols.									
Proposed change affects: UICC apps MEX Radio Access Network Core Network X									
Title:	Traffic protecti	on combinations							
Source:	¥ SA WG3								
Work item code.	<mark>೫ MBMS</mark>					Date: Ж	27/09/	2004	
Category:	 F (correction A (correspondent) B (addition C (function D (editorial 	nds to a correction of feature), al modification of fe modification) tions of the above	n in an ear eature)			R96 R97 R98 R99 Rel-4 Rel-5 Rel-6	Rel-6 he follov (GSM Pi (Release (Release (Release (Release (Release (Release	hase 2) = 1996) = 1997) = 1998) = 1998) = 1999) = 4) = 5) = 6)	ases:

Reason for change: #	To clarify the allowed combinations of confidentiality and integrity protection				
Summary of change: ₩	 The current text in 5.3 specifying the combinations of confidentiality and integrity protection for MBMS are unclear and are also contradictory with the requirements in annex C. The allowed combinations in the protection of the traffic for MBMS service are clarified: no protection confidentiality protection and integrity protection confidentiality protection only integrity protection only 				
Consequences if 🛛 🕷	The allowed combinations of confidentiality and integrity protections remains				
not approved:	unclear.				
Clauses affected: #	5.3				
Other specs # affected:	Y N X Other core specifications X Test specifications X O&M Specifications				
Other comments: 🛛 🕱					

5.3 Protection of the transmitted traffic

The traffic for a particular MBMS service may require some protection depending on the sensitivity of the data being transmitted (e.g. it is possible that the data being transmitted by the MBMS service is actually protected by the DRM security method and hence requires no additional protection). If tThis protection is required, it will be either confidentiality or just confidentiality only or integrity only. The protection is applied end-to-end between the BM-SC and the UEs and will be based on a symmetric key shared between the BM-SC and the UEs that are currently accessing the service. The actual method of protection specified may vary depending on the type of data being transmitted, e.g. media streaming application or file download.

NOTE: When MBMS data is received over a point-to-point MBMS radio bearer, it would be ciphered between the BM-SC and UE and may also ciphered over the radio interface. This "double ciphering" is unnecessary from a security point of view and hence the decision of whether or not to apply radio interface ciphering to a point-to-point MBMS radio bearer is outside the scope of this specification.