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Summary of chang	ye: <mark>ૠ</mark>	The main change is in the "Link layer requirements" chapter. The proposal is to remove the questions and write some summary of the state of the art. The requirements are removed as SA3 is not in charge of this issue, but it corresponds to IEEE instead						sal is to he			
Consequences if not approved:	æ	TS 33	3.234 will	contain s	ome cha	pters r	not co	mpleted			
Clauses affected:	æ	4.2.5									
Other specs affected:	<b></b>	Y N X X X	Test spe	ore specifi ecification ecification	S	*					
Other comments:	$\mathbf{x}$										

#### \*\*\* BEGIN SET OF CHANGES \*\*\*

## 2 References

The following documents contain provisions, which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.
- [1] 3GPP TR 22.934: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Feasibility study on 3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) interworking".
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- [3] IETF RTC 3748: "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)".
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- [10] ETSI TS 101 761-2 v1.2.1C: "Broadband Radio Access Networks (BRAN); HIPERLAN Type 2; Data Link Control (DLC) layer; Part 2: Radio Link Control (RLC) sublayer".
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- [12] ETSI TR 101 683 v1.1.1: "Broadband Radio Access Networks (BRAN); HIPERLAN Type 2; System Overview".

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	and System Aspects; 3GPP system to Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) Interworking; System Description".
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[16]	RFC 1421, February 1993: "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part I: Message Encryption and Authentication Procedures".
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[18]	3GPP TS 23.003: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Numbering, addressing and identification".
[19]	IEEE P802.1X/D11 June 2001: "Standards for Local Area and Metropolitan Area Networks: Standard for Port Based Network Access Control".
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### \*\*\* END SET OF CHANGES \*\*\*

#### \*\*\* BEGIN SET OF CHANGES \*\*\*

### 4.2.5 Link layer security requirements

Editors note: This section is FFS, LS (S3-030167) sent to SA2 group on 1) the need for requiring 802.11i in TS 23.234. SA2 to explain the impact (if any) a change of technology from 802.11i to WPA would have on the standardisation work. 2) SA2 to study the architectural impacts of implementing protection on Wa interface 3) SA2 to Investigate the importance of specifying specific WLAN technologies to be used for the WLAN access network.

Most WLAN technologies provide (optional) link-layer protection of user data. Since the wireless link is likely to be the most vulnerable in the entire system, 3GPP-WLAN interworking should take advantage of the link layer security provided by WLAN technologies. The native link-layer protection can also prevent against certain IP-layer attacks.

In order to set the bar for allowed WLAN protocols, 3GPP should define requirements on link layer security. The existing and work-in-progress WLAN standards can then be evaluated based on these requirements.

Areas in which requirements should be defined are desirable are:

- Confidentiality and integrity protection of user data;
- Protection of signalling;
- Key distribution, key freshness validation and key ageing.

These requirements are out of scope of 3GPP. IEEE has defined the security requirements and features for the link layer in WLAN access networks, see ref. [6]. Other WLAN access technologies are not excluded to be used although not described here.

#### 4.2.5.1 Confidentiality and integrity protection of user data

- Can user data be sent in the clear or is some kind of protection required?
- Is it enough to integrity protect user data or should it be encrypted as well?
- How strong must the WLAN security protocols be? Compare e.g. WEP, TKIP and CCMP in the case of 802.11 WLAN.

#### 4.2.5.2 Protection of signalling

What implications on 3GPP WLAN security does it have if the WLAN control signalling is unprotected? (Currently 802.11 management frames are not protected by 802.11i).

# 4.2.5.3 Key distribution, key freshness validation and key ageing

- Can encryption keys generated during EAP authentication be used directly as encryption keys for the link layer or must there be a handshake between UE and AP to e.g. ensure freshness? (Like the 4 way handshake of 802.11i).
- What are the security implications of not having a UE AP key handshake?

\*\*\* END SET OF CHANGES \*\*\*