3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security — S3#20

16 - 19 October, 2001

Sydney, Australia

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Proposed change affects: # (U)SIM ME/UE Radio Access Network Core Network															
Title:	ж	Policy cor	n <mark>figura</mark>	tion clarifi	icatio	n									
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Work item code	: X	MAPsec									Date:	<mark>ж 0</mark>	9 Oct 20	001	
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Reason for change: #	A good security practise requires the explicit inclusion of all communication partners							
	(PLMN's) in the policy database.							
	Within Annex B (Flows) it was already described that, when a MAPsec message is							
	received and no valid entry in the SPD is found for PLMN A, then the message is discarded and an error is reported to MAP user.							
Summary of change: भ्र	Explicit configuration requirement for the SPD is included in relevant clause 5.3.							
	Network operators not aware of this will experience MAPsec network introduction							
not approved:	problems.							
Clauses affected: #	5.3							
Other specs #	Other core specifications #							
affected:	Test specifications							
	O&M Specifications							
Other comments: #								

S3-010473

5.3 Policy requirements for the MAPsec Security Policy Database (SPD)

The security policies for MAPsec key management are specified in the NE's SPD. SPD entries define which MAP operation components are protected and which MAP SAs (if any) to use to protect MAP signalling based on the PLMN of the peer NE. There can be no local security policy definitions for individual NEs. Instead, SPD entries of different NE within the same PLMN shall be identical.

Fallback to unprotected mode:

- The "fallback to unprotected mode" (enabled/disabled) shall be available to the MAP-NE before any communication towards other MAP-NEs can take place. For the receiving direction, it is sufficient to have a single parameter indicating whether fallback for incoming messages is allowed or not. For the sending direction, the information should indicate for each destination PLMN whether fallback for outgoing messages is allowed or not;
- The use of the fallback indicators is specified in Annex B;
- The security measures specified in this TS are only fully useful for a particular PLMN if it disallows fallback to unprotected mode for MAP messages received from any other PLMN.

Table of MAPsec operation components:

 The security policy database (SPD) shall contain a table of MAPsec operation components for incoming messages. This table contains operation components which have to be carried in MAPsec messages with Protection Mode 1 or 2. The use of MAPsec operation components is specified in Annex B.

Uniformity of protection profiles:

- In order to ensure full protection, a particular PLMN shall use the same protection profile for incoming MAPsec messages from all other PLMNs. In particular, full protection is not ensured when protection profile A (no protection) is used for some source PLMNs and other profiles are used for other source PLMNs.

Explicit policy configuration:

- The SPD shall contain an entry for each PLMN the MAP-NE is allowed to communicate with.

Editor's note: Some issues need to be investigated: Non-synchronised expiration times issue, mechanism to distinguish inbound/outbound SPDs ?