

3GPP TSG-SA WG 3 Security - S3#20
Sydney 16-19 October 2001

S3-010465

CR-Form-v3

CHANGE REQUEST

⌘ **33.102 CR CR-Num** ⌘ rev **-** ⌘ Current version: **4.2.0** ⌘

For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.

Proposed change affects: ⌘ (U)SIM ME/UE Radio Access Network Core Network

Title:	⌘ Configurability of cipher use		
Source:	⌘ Telia		
Work item code:	⌘ Security visibility and configurability	Date:	⌘ 2001-10-04
Category:	⌘ C	Release:	⌘ REL-5
<p>Use <u>one</u> of the following categories:</p> <p>F (essential correction) A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) B (Addition of feature), C (Functional modification of feature) D (Editorial modification)</p> <p>Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900.</p>		<p>Use <u>one</u> of the following releases:</p> <p>2 (GSM Phase 2) R96 (Release 1996) R97 (Release 1997) R98 (Release 1998) R99 (Release 1999) REL-4 (Release 4) REL-5 (Release 5)</p>	

Reason for change:	⌘ The visibility and configurability features have never been accurately specified		
Summary of change:	⌘ 5.5.1 Visibility features are clarified. 5.5.2 Configurability features are clarified and the control functionality specified. 6.4.2 Editorial modification to make it clear that user can control not to accept non-ciphered calls		
Consequences if not approved:	⌘ It is not clear how to interpret and implement the features described in 5.5 (requirements, options, examples?) User control mechanism is not specified. Terminal behaviour will be undefined, causing uncertainty for the user.		

Clauses affected:	⌘ 5.5 and 6.4		
Other specs affected:	⌘ <input type="checkbox"/> Other core specifications	⌘ <input type="checkbox"/>	⌘ <input type="checkbox"/>
	<input type="checkbox"/> Test specifications		
	<input type="checkbox"/> O&M Specifications		
Other comments:	⌘ UEA0 capability bit shall be user changeable and set to 0 as default		

How to create CRs using this form:

Comprehensive information and tips about how to create CRs can be found at: http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm. Below is a brief summary:

- 1) Fill out the above form. The symbols above marked ⌘ contain pop-up help information about the field that they are closest to.
- 2) Obtain the latest version for the release of the specification to which the change is proposed. Use the MS Word "revision marks" feature (also known as "track changes") when making the changes. All 3GPP specifications can be downloaded from the 3GPP server under <ftp://www.3gpp.org/specs/> For the latest version, look for the directory name with the latest date e.g. 2000-09 contains the specifications resulting from the September 2000 TSG meetings.

5.5 Security visibility and configurability

5.5.1 Visibility

Although in general the security features should be transparent to the user, for certain events and according to the user's concern, ~~greater-some~~ user visibility of the operation of security features ~~should-shall~~ be provided. This yields to a number of features that inform the user of security-related events, ~~such as~~:

- ~~mandatory~~ indication of access network encryption: the property that the user is informed whether the confidentiality of user data is protected on the radio access link, in particular when non-ciphered calls are set-up;
- indication of the level of security: the property that the user is informed on the level of security that is provided by the visited network, in particular when a user is handed over or roams into a network with lower security level (3G → 2G) ~~This indication is optional.~~

5.5.2 Configurability

Configurability is the property that that the user can configure ~~whether~~ the use or the provision of ~~a service should depend on whether ascertain~~ security features ~~is in operation. A service can only be used if all security features, which are relevant to that service and which are required by the configurations of the user, are in operation.~~ The following configurability features ~~are suggested shall be provided~~:

- Enabling/disabling user-USIM authentication: the user should be able to control the operation of user-USIM authentication, ~~e.g., for some events, services or use.~~
- ~~—~~ Accepting/rejecting incoming ~~and outgoing~~ non-ciphered calls: the user should be able to control ~~via the MS MMI~~ whether the user accepts or rejects ~~incoming~~ non-ciphered calls;
- ~~it the terminal is in 'reject' position, and a ciphered connection can not be provided at set up time, the user should be informed of this and prompted if he wants to accept non-ciphered calls~~
- ~~—~~ Setting up or not setting up non-ciphered calls: the user should be able to control whether the user sets up connections when ciphering is not enabled by the network;
- ~~the user control for accepting/rejecting non-ciphered calls shall be preset to 'reject' in MS from manufacture and shall return automatically to 'reject' position after a ciphered call has taken place~~
- ~~Accepting/rejecting the use of certain ciphering algorithms: the user should be able to control which ciphering algorithms are acceptable for use.~~

6.4.2 Cipherng and integrity mode negotiation

When an MS wishes to establish a connection with the network, the MS shall indicate to the network in the MS/USIM Classmark which cipher and integrity algorithms the MS supports. This information itself must be integrity protected. As it is the case that the RNC does not have the integrity key IK when receiving the MS/USIM Classmark this information must be stored in the RNC. The data integrity of the classmark is performed, during the security mode set-up procedure by use of the most recently generated IK (see section 6.4.5).

The network shall compare its integrity protection capabilities and preferences, and any special requirements of the subscription of the MS, with those indicated by the MS and act according to the following rules:

- 1) If the MS and the network have no versions of the UIA algorithm in common, then the connection shall be released.
- 2) If the MS and the network have at least one version of the UIA algorithm in common, then the network shall select one of the mutually acceptable versions of the UIA algorithm for use on that connection.

The network shall compare its ciphering capabilities and preferences, ~~and any special requirements of the subscription of the MS,~~ with those indicated by the MS and act according to the following rules:

- 1) If the MS and the network have no versions of the UEA algorithm in common and the network ~~or the MS~~ is not prepared to use an unciphered connection, then the connection shall be released.
- 2) If the MS and the network have no versions of the UEA algorithm in common and ~~both the user-MS (respectively the user's HE)~~ and the network are willing to use an unciphered connection, then an unciphered connection shall be used.
- 3) If the MS and the network have at least one version of the UEA algorithm in common, then the network shall select one of the mutually acceptable versions of the UEA algorithm for use on that connection.

Because of the separate mobility management for CS and PS services, one CN domain may, independent of the other CN, establish a connection to one and the same MS. Change of ciphering and integrity mode (algorithms) at establishment of a second MS to CN connection shall not be permitted. The preferences and special requirements for the ciphering and integrity mode setting shall be common for both domains. (e.g. the order of preference of the algorithms).