Tdoc List

2025-11-21 15:45

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑254000 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254470  
    S3‑254002 Process for SA3#125 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
YesIt was commented that changes on agreed CRs should be clarified. Revisions should be taken when changing any of the agreed changes, to avoid clashes. Any other changes that were not clashing could be done with new CRs.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254003 Detailed agenda planning SA WG3 Chair other   No
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254470 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254000
2 Meeting Reports                      
2.1 Previous SA3 meeting report/s and SA report S3‑254001 Report from SA3#124 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
2.2 SA3-LI Report S3‑254351 Update to SA3-LI ToR SA3-LI Chair ToR Decision Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254708  
    S3‑254708 Update to SA3-LI ToR SA3-LI Chair ToR Decision Yes
YesNTT_Docomo commented that the ToR for SA3 needed to be updated as well, as it is referring to 5G systems.It was agreed to discuss this in conference calls before the next SA3 meeting.
 		agreed No   S3‑254351
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups S3‑254032 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital Communications other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254033 PQC status in TCG InterDigital Communications other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254009 LS on integrity failure R2-2507915 LS in   Yes
YesEricsson: No response is needed. Apple agreed with Nokia, Qualcomm: no security concern.
 		replied to No    
    S3‑254136 Reply LS on integrity failure ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254547  
    S3‑254225 Reply LS to RAN2 on Integrity check failure(R2-2507915) Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254547  
    S3‑254367 Reply LS on integrity failure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254547  
    S3‑254547 Reply LS on integrity failure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
YesThe Chair asked for a show of hands on the options provided. Option 1 Apple, NTT-Docomo, Ericsson, Huawei, Xiaomi, CATT, ORANGE, Vivo, ZTE Option 2 Nokia, Qualcomm, OPPO, Lenovo Against option 3: Apple
 		revised No S3‑254709 S3‑254367
    S3‑254709 Reply LS on integrity failure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254547
    S3‑254384 Reply LS on user consent for data collection at the UE for NW-side model training Xiaomi EV Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254482 Discussion on User consent for data collection at the UE for NW-side model training Ericsson, Verizon, Telecom Italia, Vodafone discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254483 Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training Ericsson, Verizon, Telecom Italia, Vodafone LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254521 [draft] Reply LS on user consent for NW-side data collection CATT LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254010 LS on Security parameter in A-IoT paging R2-2507920 LS in   Yes
YesThere was no consensus in the LS reply. ORANGE wanted to answer no consensus reached; there would be no change in the SA3 specification either.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑254226 Reply LS to RAN2 on parameters in paging message (R2-2507920) Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254232 Reply LS to RAN2 on user consent for AI/ML network data collection(R2-2506541) Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254442 [draft] Reply LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254552  
    S3‑254024 LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training R2-2506541 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑254548 Reply to: LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training NTT-Docomo LS out approval No
YesThe Chair requested a show of hands on the following statement: SA3 has the understanding that authorization for data processing inherent to providing network services is presently based on operator-subscriber arrangements, including e.g. contracts. Xiaomi, Apple,Vivo, OPPO objected to this statement. AT&T, ORANGE, Vodafone, Verizon, Telecom Italia, KPN, BT, Ericsson, Huawei, Nokia, KDDI, Thales, Charter, Lenovo, NTT-Docomo, NCSC, T-Mobile US were in favour of this statement. There was a show of hands on the following paragraph: Operators in SA3 have the understanding that authorization for data processing inherent to provide network services is presently based on operator-subscriber arrangements, including e.g. contracts. The Chair queried whether there were operators in the room supporting to the paragraph above: T-Mobile, John Hopkins, KPN, T-Mobile, Nokia, KDDI, BT, Verizon, ORANGE, Teleocm Italia, AT&T, Ericsson, Vodafone, NTT-Docomo, Charter, Thales, SK Telecom, NIST. The Chair queried what companies objected to the statement above : Apple, Vivo, Xiaomi, Google, OPPO, Samsung
 		revised No S3‑254740  
    S3‑254740 Reply to: LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training NTT-Docomo LS out approval Yes
YesThe Chair proposed to send an Ls stating the lack of consensus but this was rejected by ORANGE.
 		noted No   S3‑254548
    S3‑254127 [draft] Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training NTT DOCOMO INC. LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254135 Reply LS on user consent for data collection at the UE for NW-side model training ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254164 Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254233 DP on user consent for AI/ML network data collection Apple discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254243 Reply LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects (R2-2507933) Lenovo LS out Approval Yes
YesORANGE and Ericsson preferred this response. Ericsson proposed to have a conference call with RAN2 to dsicuss this topic. ORANGE: company positions instead of SA3 position would be the problem with the call. Ericsson: agree on the priorities first. Nokia: this LS aims to trigger an early alignment, we need to work jointly. Huawei: Evaluate whether there is a risk or not before anything. Nokia: take Interdigital paper as a basis to start discussions in SA3 (after this meeting). ORANGE: I would like to record this in an annex in the TR.
 		revised No S3‑254552  
    S3‑254552 Reply LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects (R2-2507933) Lenovo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254243
    S3‑254385 Reply LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects Xiaomi EV Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254552  
    S3‑254419 Reply LS on integrity failure Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254547  
    S3‑254452 [draft] Reply LS on User consent for data collection at the UE for NW-side model training Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254456 Reply LS on Security parameter in A-IoT paging China Mobile LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254476 Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254491 Reply LS on R2-2507915 on integrity failure OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254547  
    S3‑254023 LS on control plane CIoT with overhead reduction C1-255649 LS in   Yes
YesTdoc 494 related.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254504 Reply LS on integrity failure of AIoT NAS message Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254547  
    S3‑254531 LS on DTLS for SCTP Progress Report IETF LS in discussion Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑254025 LS on UE parameters update header security C1-253719 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑254166 Reply LS on UE parameters update header security Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254550  
    S3‑254550 Reply LS on UE parameters update header security Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254166
    S3‑254004 NESASG Doc 44_006 LS to SA3 re SCAS Improvements GSMA LS in   Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: we have a potential number of hundred change requests. Nokia replied that they wanted to see this list of changes. Huawei: dedicate an e-meeting for this, decision power. Ericsson: conference calls where this can be discussed should be arranged to avoid taking meeting time. CRs can be brought later to the February meeting. The Chair queried which option could be better for delegates. Huawei: it would be good to have merged CRs, one per SCAS specfication. Qualcomm: establish a deadline so we have time to review. NTT-Docomo: the call or e-meeting will depend on the number of contributions. The Chair proposed 21st-22nd January for the potential call/e-meeting. 14th January would be the deadline for submission. This will be chaired by NTT-Docomo.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑254015 Reply LS on Avatar Security Aspects S2-2509593 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑254551 Reply to: Reply LS on Avatar Security Aspects Ericsson LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254026 LS on handling of inventory and command collision C1-256624 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254109 Reply LS on IMS Data Channel s3i250674 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑254013 LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects R2-2507945 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑254035 LS reply on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects InterDigital Communications LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254552  
    S3‑254123 Discussion Paper on R2-2507933 LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects Nokia discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254134 Reply LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254552  
    S3‑254184 Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254185 Reply LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254552  
    S3‑254224 Reply LS to RAN2 on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects(R2-2507933) Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254552  
    S3‑254494 Adding NORDAT procedures to TS 33.401 Qualcomm Incorporated, Eutelsat Group, Iridium, Viasat, Sateliot, Novamint, Skylo, Thales, Ericsson, Nokia, Vivo, EchoStar CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254549 S3‑253524
    S3‑254549 Adding NORDAT procedures to TS 33.401 Qualcomm Incorporated, Eutelsat Group, Iridium, Viasat, Sateliot, Novamint, Skylo, Thales, Ericsson, Nokia, Vivo, EchoStar CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254494
    S3‑254267 reply LS on integrity failure Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254547  
    S3‑254420 Reply LS on Security parameter in A-IoT paging Nokia LS out Approval Yes
YesSupported by NTT-Docomo, Lenovo. A bit late after just closing Rel-19. Better for Rel-20. Alex (GSMA): this may bring bidding down attacks and false base stations in the near future. Ericsson: make authentication mandatory. Huawei: it is mandatory support already, we don't need preventing others from deploying it. Related CR in tdoc 515.
 		revised No S3‑254720  
    S3‑254720 Reply LS on Security parameter in A-IoT paging Nokia LS out Approval No
YesThe Chair asked to be minuted: there is no consensus to change the specification. For this reason the incoming LS was postponed.
 		noted No   S3‑254420
    S3‑254465 Reply LS on integrity failure CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254547  
    S3‑254012 Reply LS on AIoT Device Permanent ID Length R2-2507931 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254486 (Draft) Reply LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects OPPO LS out Approval Yes
YesORANGE: we should discuss requirements and solutions in the TR before replying to these kind of LS.
 		merged No S3‑254552  
    S3‑254016 Reply LS on Structure updates of AIoT Identifiers S2-2509655 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254017 Reply LS on USS changeover procedure S2-2509748 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254005 Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC C1-256676 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254007 Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC R1-2508096 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254008 Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC R2-2507784 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254014 Reply LS on “IETF Network Slice Application in 3GPP 5G End-to-End Network Slice” R3-257304 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254011 Reply LS on signalling feasibility of dataset and parameter sharing R2-2507929 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254018 Reply LS on specification of dataset and model parameters exchange S5-254846 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254559 Open Consultation on the Vertical Standards Relating to the EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA) ETSI TC CYBER LS in Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254006 LS on unsupported AIoT commands C1-256897 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑254019 LS on Security parameter in A-IoT paging R2-2507920 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑254020 Reply LS on USS changeover procedure S2-2509748 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4 Maintenance (Rel-19 and pre-Rel-19)                      
4.1 Work Items                      
4.1.1 All Rel-19 and pre-Rel-19 WIs S3‑254186 AIoT correction to the authentication procedures [OPPO, CATT, InterDigital], vivo, [Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Ericsson, Qualcomm] CR Approval Yes
YesChanges on changes. It needs leaning Kept it open.
 		revised No S3‑254724 S3‑253677
    S3‑254724 AIoT correction to the authentication procedures OPPO, CATT, InterDigital, vivo, [Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Ericsson, Qualcomm CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254186
    S3‑254433 AioT correction to the authentication procedures Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesORANGE didn’t agree with the removal of the editor's note. There was another CR that dealt with the editor's note (tdoc 268). MCC: it needs clean up, no changes on changes. It was agreed not to pursue this CR and keep the orginal from the previous meeting.
 		not pursued No   S3‑253677
    S3‑254268 resloving the editor's note on randomness Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesThales was not in favour of the last sentence of the NOTE. ORANGE: hard for the implementor to figure out what the randomness means here.
 		revised No S3‑254553  
    S3‑254553 resloving the editor's note on randomness Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑254268
    S3‑254187 Information protection during command procedure - corrections [Philips International B.V.], vivo CR Approval Yes
YesMCC: it needs cleanup. Only changes on the baseline specificaiton.
 		revised No S3‑254554 S3‑253684
    S3‑254554 Information protection during command procedure - corrections [Philips International B.V.], vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254187
    S3‑254188 Correction on privacy vivo, [Lenovo, ZTE, OPPO, Qualcomm, Huawei, InterDigital, CATT] CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254555 S3‑253685
    S3‑254555 Correction on privacy vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254188
    S3‑254353 CR to TS33.369 Update privacy general clause for privacy policy pre-configuration Lenovo [CATT] CR Approval Yes
YesDiscussed together with tdoc 360.
 		not pursued No   S3‑253676
    S3‑254357 Addressing the missing information on the initial value of temporary identifier in Clause 5.4.3 and Annex B. Lenovo [Ericsson] CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254725 S3‑253854
    S3‑254725 Addressing the missing information on the initial value of temporary identifier in Clause 5.4.3 and Annex B. Lenovo [Ericsson] CR Agreement No
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑254357
    S3‑254459 Correction on privacy Ericsson CR Approval Yes
YesMCC: it needs cleanup, only changes on the specification.
 		merged No S3‑254555 S3‑253685
    S3‑254515 Adding a NOTE to the authentication requirements in inventory service China Mobile CR   Yes
YesORANGE objected to the CR. AT&T: this doesn’t apply to PLMN operators. Huawei agreed with AT&T: the whole TS 33.363 is for private deployment, it’s up to whoever deploys this to do it. No need to mandate the deployment. Adjust the stage 2 requirement. Lenovo didn’t agree with this CR. Thales didn’t understand the indoor deployment context. CMCC (RAN2 delegate) commented that there was an impact on coverage for uplink/downlink. NTT-Docomo: this should be a modification of a feature (cat-C). AT&T: not acceptable for PLMN operators.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑254360 Clarification for requirements on privacy Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesORANGE and Lenovo objected this CR.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑254361 Removing the Editor's Note related to requirements of identifier privacy Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesOverlapping with 4467. ORANGE supported this contrbution.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑254467 CR to TS33.369 Update identifier privacy requirements CATT CR Approval Yes
YesORANGE didn’t agree with this contribution.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑254138 update T-ID generation in annex B ZTE CR Agreement Yes
YesTerminology alignment: T-ID and Temp ID need to be aligned in the whole specificaiton. It was not clear whether they were the same thing or not.
 		revised No S3‑254726  
    S3‑254726 update T-ID generation in annex B ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254138
    S3‑254273 Update to the length of security parameters Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254556  
    S3‑254418 Clarification of key lengths and length of RE/XRES Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254556  
    S3‑254556 Clarification of key lengths and length of RE/XRES Lenovo CR Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254418
    S3‑254469 CR to TS33.369 define the length of (X)RES CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254556  
    S3‑254190 New clause for security related services [Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo], vivo CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑253801
    S3‑254137 Add some abbreviations ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑254189 Add new terms and abbreviations vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑254557 Add new terms and abbreviations vivo CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑254253 Clarification on key update of UE-Satellite-UE in IMS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: we disagree. This key issue was not agreed in the study. Besides, this is not a correction at all. Ericsson and Qualcomm disagreed as well.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑254043 [33.180] Error in message structure Motorola Solutions Germany CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑254044 [33.180] Error in message structure (R15 mirror) Motorola Solutions, Inc. CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑254045 [33.180] Error in message structure (R16 mirror) Motorola Solutions, Inc. CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑254046 [33.180] Error in message structure (R17 mirror) Motorola Solutions, Inc. CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑254047 [33.180] Error in message structure (R18 mirror) Motorola Solutions, Inc. CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑254048 [33.180] Error in message structure (R19 mirror) Motorola Solutions, Inc. CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑254049 [33.180] Error in message structure (R20 mirror) Motorola Solutions, Inc. CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑254485 5GC Signaling Traffic Monitoring Security Requirements Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254558  
    S3‑254558 5GC Signaling Traffic Monitoring Security Requirements Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254485
    S3‑254396 Way forward for the IMS Data Channel and LI cases Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254397 Rel-18 Corrections for IMS Data Channels and LI Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑254398 Rel-19 Corrections for IMS Data Channels and LI Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254721  
    S3‑254721 Rel-19 Corrections for IMS Data Channels and LI Ericsson CR Agreement No
YesThere was a technical agreement on this CR, but it needed to be clarified whether there was alignment with SA2. Nokia didn’t want to agree on it until the above was verified. Ericsson didn’t agree that there was such issue. Charles (Cisco) commented that this topic was related to the postponed LS from IETF.
 		not pursued No   S3‑254398
    S3‑254192 Add abbreviations for LTM vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑254399 Alignment of AKMA UE ID exposure via NEF with TS 23.502 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesIt was discussed whether this should be done in Rel-18 as well.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑254497 Alignment CR for UPU Header Security Qualcomm Incorporated, Lenovo, Nokia, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑253662
    S3‑254239 Removal of Editors Notes Lenovo CR Approval Yes
YesLenovo: part of this CR depends on a CT1 CR under discussion during this meeting week. It was left open until CT1 made a decision on their CR.
 		revised No S3‑254741  
    S3‑254741 Removal of Editors Notes Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254239
    S3‑254241 Terminology Correction Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254730  
    S3‑254730 Terminology Correction Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254241
    S3‑254191 Correction on privacy vivo CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑254356 Information protection during command procedure - corrections Lenovo [Philips International B.V.] CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes   S3‑253684
    S3‑254493 Adding a NOTE to the authentication requirements in inventory service China Mobile CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.2 Study Items                      
4.2.1 All Rel-19 and pre-Rel-19 SIs S3‑254266 Adding security requirements for the new EMM TRANSPORT message Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254549  
5 Rel-20 topics                      
5.1 5GA Work Items                      
5.1.1 Security related Events Handling S3‑254125 pCR to TS 33.502 - Scope Vodafone, Verizon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254124 pCR to TS 33.502 - Example of trust domain Vodafone, China Mobile, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254672  
    S3‑254672 pCR to TS 33.502 - Example of trust domain Vodafone, China Mobile, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia pCR Approval No
YesHuawei objected to the figure, they wanted to align with the MONSTRA work. They proposed to add an editor's note, but ORANGE didn’t agree with this. Verizon commented that the use case in MONSTRA was different. In favour of Editor's note: Huawei No editor's note: Vodafone, Charter, China Mobile, NSA, Telecom Italia, OTD, AT&T, Verizon, Nokia, NCSC, KDDI, Ntt-Docomo, John Hopkins University. Huawei commented that this was just a pCR, it was an unnecessary delay of progress. Vodafone commented that the paper was capturing Huawei's concerns. Huawei commented that they didn’t have a technical reason why their proposal wasn’t captured. Huawei objected to removing the editor's note.
 		approved No   S3‑254124
    S3‑254252 Update to Overview of Security related Events Handling Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254114 pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for Authentication Failure IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254676  
    S3‑254122 pCR to TS 33.502 – Failed Authentication Event Vodafone, Verizon, T-Mobile US, China Mobile, NTT DOCOMO, Telecom Italia, AT&T, Charter Communications, KDDI pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254676  
    S3‑254405 Pseudo-CR on Security events related to authentication failure Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254676  
    S3‑254676 Pseudo-CR on Security events related to authentication failure Ericsson pCR Approval No
YesVodafobe commented that they were late already and wanted to send for approval. The Chair added that it could be sent for approval with the editor's note because it would be just 80% complete. ORANGE commented that there was a danger to have the TR not approved if the editor's note was left pending.
 		approved No   S3‑254405
    S3‑254113 pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for Massive Number of Incoming Messages IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254677  
    S3‑254119 pCR to TS 33.502 – Flooding Event Vodafone, Verizon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254677  
    S3‑254677 pCR to TS 33.502 – Flooding Event Vodafone, Verizon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254119
    S3‑254133 Unexpected number of incoming messages Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254677  
    S3‑254407 Pseudo-CR on Data related to massive number of messages Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254677  
    S3‑254115 pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for replay attacks on the SBA layer IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254678  
    S3‑254132 Replayed messages on SBA layer Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254678  
    S3‑254678 Replayed messages on SBA layer Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑254132
    S3‑254116 pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for unexpected SBI call flows IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254490 pCR to TS 33.502 – Detecting SBA layer parameters change Vodafone pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254679  
    S3‑254679 pCR to TS 33.502 – Detecting SBA layer parameters change Vodafone pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254490
    S3‑254120 pCR to TS 33.502 – Protection for delivery of events Vodafone, AT&T, China Mobile, T-Mobile USA, Verizon, Telecom Italia, NTT DOCOMO, KDDI, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254680  
    S3‑254680 pCR to TS 33.502 – Protection for delivery of events Vodafone, AT&T, China Mobile, T-Mobile USA, Verizon, Telecom Italia, NTT DOCOMO, KDDI, Charter Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254120
    S3‑254121 pCR to TS 33.502 – Protection for configuration of events Vodafone, T-Mobile US, AT&T, China Mobile, Verizon, Charter Communications, Telecom Italia, KDDI, NTT DOCOMO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254681  
    S3‑254681 pCR to TS 33.502 – Protection for configuration of events Vodafone, T-Mobile US, AT&T, China Mobile, Verizon, Charter Communications, Telecom Italia, KDDI, NTT DOCOMO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254121
    S3‑254167 Adding a NOTE for clarification regarding security related events Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254683  
    S3‑254683 Adding a NOTE for clarification regarding security related events Nokia pCR Approval No
YesHuawei: not needed.
 		noted No   S3‑254167
    S3‑254403 Pseudo-CR on Message type Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254682  
    S3‑254400 Pseudo-CR on Event source Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254682  
    S3‑254401 Pseudo-CR on Event identifiers Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254682  
    S3‑254402 Pseudo-CR on NF Consumer (malformed message) Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254682  
    S3‑254404 Pseudo-CR on NF Consumer (authorization failure) Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254682  
    S3‑254432 pCR to TS 33.502 – Addressing ENs in clause 6 Vodafone pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254682  
    S3‑254682 pCR to TS 33.502 – Addressing ENs in clause 6 Vodafone pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254432
    S3‑254126 pCR to TS 33.502 – EN resolving on configuration Vodafone, Verizon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254673  
    S3‑254673 pCR to TS 33.502 – EN resolving on configuration Vodafone, Verizon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254126
    S3‑254128 pCR to TS 33.502 – Addressing NOTE on delivery Vodafone, Verizon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254675  
    S3‑254675 pCR to TS 33.502 – Addressing NOTE on delivery Vodafone, Verizon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254128
    S3‑254406 Pseudo-CR on Prevention of DoS attacks on the Security related events collection entity Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254674  
    S3‑254674 Pseudo-CR on Prevention of DoS attacks on the Security related events collection entity Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254406
    S3‑254441 Pseudo-CR to resolve EN in configuration of security related events Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254673  
    S3‑254758 Cover sheet 33.502 for information Vodafone TS or TR cover Approval No
YesAgreed to send the draft TR for information.
 		email approval No    
    S3‑254021 Draft TS 33.502 Vodafone draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.1.2 New WID on Mission Critical security S3‑254030 [33.180] Alignment of recording replay user service authorization Airbus CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑253235
    S3‑254031 [33.180] Alignment on Logging, Recording, Audit and Discreet Monitoring Airbus, Motorola CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑253236
    S3‑254301 Clarification about security for MC over IOPS Huawei, HiSilicon, Motorola Solutions, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑254302 Security for MC 3GPP system Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson was not fine with this document. Motorola commented that this may have nothing to do with Mission Critical. Nokia supported the note.
 		not pursued No    
5.1.3 New WID on Security Assurance Specification for 5G-Advanced S3‑254098 Pseudo-CR for 33.518 on New TC on NRF access token request MITRE-FFRDC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254617  
    S3‑254617 Pseudo-CR for 33.518 on New TC on NRF access token request MITRE-FFRDC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254098
    S3‑254312 Living document to TS 33.518 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254618  
    S3‑254618 Living document to TS 33.518 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑254312
    S3‑254099 Pseudo-CR for 33.926 on new threat on verification of access token request MITRE-FFRDC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254619  
    S3‑254619 Pseudo-CR for 33.926 on new threat on verification of access token request MITRE-FFRDC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254099
    S3‑254306 Living document to TR 33.926 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254620  
    S3‑254620 Living document to TR 33.926 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑254306
    S3‑254100 Pseudo-CR for 33.117 on Modify TC on security event logging MITRE-FFRDC, BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254213 pCR for 33.117 on Authorization token verification failure handling in different PLMNs BSI (DE) other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254214 pCR for 33.117 on unnecessary or insecure services / protocols BSI (DE) other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254621  
    S3‑254621 pCR for 33.117 on unnecessary or insecure services / protocols BSI (DE) other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254214
    S3‑254215 pCR for 33.117 on Restricted reachability of services BSI (DE) other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254622  
    S3‑254622 pCR for 33.117 on Restricted reachability of services BSI (DE) other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254215
    S3‑254255 GSMA NESAS change to TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254623  
    S3‑254623 GSMA NESAS change to TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254255
    S3‑254307 Living document to TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254624  
    S3‑254624 Living document to TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑254307
    S3‑254217 pCR for 33.514 on UP security policy configuration for 5G LAN service BSI (DE) other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254625  
    S3‑254625 pCR for 33.514 on UP security policy configuration for 5G LAN service BSI (DE) other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254217
    S3‑254216 pCR for 33.514 on SUPI de-concealment protection schemes BSI (DE) other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254626  
    S3‑254626 pCR for 33.514 on SUPI de-concealment protection schemes BSI (DE) other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254216
    S3‑254259 living document to TS 33.514 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT, China Telecom Corporation Ltd. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254627  
    S3‑254627 living document to TS 33.514 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT, China Telecom Corporation Ltd. draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑254259
    S3‑254140 Update to UPF SCAS living doc according to NESASG feedback ZTE Corporation draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254258 living document to TS 33.513 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT, China Telecom Corporation Ltd. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254628  
    S3‑254628 living document to TS 33.513 Huawei, HiSilicon, CAICT, China Telecom Corporation Ltd. draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑254258
    S3‑254218 pCR for 33.521 Clarification of Data Masking BSI (DE) other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254645  
    S3‑254645 pCR for 33.521 Clarification of Data Masking BSI (DE) other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254218
    S3‑254314 Living document to TS 33.521 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254629  
    S3‑254629 Living document to TS 33.521 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑254314
    S3‑254139 Update to TS 33.116 MME SCAS according to NESASG feedback ZTE Corporation draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254630  
    S3‑254630 Update to TS 33.116 MME SCAS according to NESASG feedback ZTE Corporation draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254139
    S3‑254219 draftCR for 33.226 for correction of test case IDs BSI (DE), Montsecure draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254631  
    S3‑254631 Living document for TS 33.226 BSI (DE), Montsecure draftCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254219
    S3‑254220 Clean-up of 33.523 BSI (DE) draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254632  
    S3‑254632 Clean-up of 33.523 BSI (DE) draftCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254220
    S3‑254316 GSMA change to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254308 Living document to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254633  
    S3‑254633 Living document to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑254308
    S3‑254254 Reply LS to GSMA NESASG on changes Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254634  
    S3‑254634 Reply LS to GSMA NESASG on changes Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesIT was decided to hold a meeting on the week of Jan 22nd for this.
 		approved No   S3‑254254
    S3‑254309 Living document to TS 33.512 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254311 Living document to TS 33.517 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254313 Living document to TS 33.519 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254315 Living document to TS 33.216 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254310 withdrawn Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
5.1.4 New WID on PRINS Refinement S3‑254050 PRINS Refinement on Trust Anchoring BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254742  
    S3‑254742 PRINS Refinement on Trust Anchoring BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254050
5.1.5 New WID on SCAS for NR Femto S3‑254430 Update Annex with NR Femto authentication threat in TR 33.926 China mobile other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254691  
    S3‑254691 Update Annex with NR Femto authentication threat in TR 33.926 China mobile other - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254430
    S3‑254425 Update Annex with NR Femto location threats in TR 33.926 China Mobile Com. Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254426 Add an Annex for NR Femto in TR 33.926 China Mobile Com. Corporation other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254689  
    S3‑254427 Update Annex with NR Femto critical assets in TR 33.926 China mobile other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254690  
    S3‑254141 Network product class description for SCAS_NR_Femto ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254689  
    S3‑254689 Network product class description for SCAS_NR_Femto ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254141
    S3‑254142 Critical assests for SCAS_NR_Femto ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254690  
    S3‑254690 Critical assests for SCAS_NR_Femto ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254142
    S3‑254358 Pseudo-CR-Add test case for location verification in TS 33.546 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254359 Pseudo-CR-Add test case for Hosting party authentication of TS 33.546 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254693  
    S3‑254693 Pseudo-CR-Add test case for Hosting party authentication of TS 33.546 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254359
    S3‑254394 Pseudo-CR-Add test case for device authentication in TS 33.546 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR   Yes
YesHuawei: remove normative language.
 		revised No S3‑254692  
    S3‑254692 Pseudo-CR-Add test case for device authentication in TS 33.546 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254394
    S3‑254322 Adding technical baseline text in TS 33.546 China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254743  
    S3‑254743 Adding technical baseline text in TS 33.546 China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254322
    S3‑254532 Draft TS 33.546 China Unicom draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑254744 Living document TR 33.926 China Unicom draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑254395 Update Annex with NR Femto authentication threat in TS 33.926 China mobile draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
5.1.6 New WID on  SCAS for NR Femto SeGW S3‑254533 Draft TS 33.547 CICT draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑254735 Living document TR 33.926 CATT draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑254143 Network product class description for SCAS_Femto_SeGW ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254636  
    S3‑254636 Network product class description for SCAS_Femto_SeGW ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254143
    S3‑254144 Test case related to topology hiding for SCAS_Femto_SeGW ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254637  
    S3‑254637 Test case related to topology hiding for SCAS_Femto_SeGW ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254144
    S3‑254145 Threat related to topology hiding for SCAS_Femto_SeGW ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254638  
    S3‑254638 Threat related to topology hiding for SCAS_Femto_SeGW ZTE Corporation draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254145
    S3‑254431 Update SeGW description for Annex X.1 in TR 33.926 China mobile other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254636  
    S3‑254520 Adding general description to 4.2.2 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254734  
    S3‑254734 Adding general description to 4.2.2 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254520
5.2 5GA Study Items                      
5.2.1 Study on transitioning to Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in 3GPP S3‑254052 Pseudo-CR on NIST security level recommendations NCSC, NTAC, BT, BSI, US NSA, NPL, DSIT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254564  
    S3‑254564 Pseudo-CR on NIST security level recommendations NCSC, NTAC, BT, BSI, US NSA, NPL, DSIT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254052
    S3‑254059 proposed summary of security agencies view Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No    
    S3‑254053 Proposed editorial change on the PQC level description Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesNCSC, Ericsson: no need to mention 128.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254329 Correction to HQC Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254565  
    S3‑254565 Correction to HQC Lenovo, Motorola Mobility other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254329
    S3‑254088 Updating 3GPP Considerations for TLS 1.2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesT-Mobile, NCSC: remove after "TLS 1.2".
 		revised No S3‑254566  
    S3‑254566 Updating 3GPP Considerations for TLS 1.2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254088
    S3‑254089 Updating 3GPP Considerations for TLS 1.3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesT-Mobile: choosing at least two? I don’t understand this statement. Disagreements with the last 4 bullet points.
 		revised No S3‑254567  
    S3‑254567 Updating 3GPP Considerations for TLS 1.3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254089
    S3‑254179 Updating TLS1.2 and TLS1.3 to include EAP-TTLS and OAuth protocols Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254731  
    S3‑254731 Updating TLS1.2 and TLS1.3 to include EAP-TTLS and OAuth protocols Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254179
    S3‑254090 Updating 3GPP Considerations for IKEv2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesCMCC, Qualcomm didn’t agree with the second paragraph.
 		merged No S3‑254567  
    S3‑254177 3GPP consideration for IKEv2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254568  
    S3‑254568 3GPP consideration for IKEv2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesLeaving only yhe first paragraph.
 		approved No   S3‑254177
    S3‑254416 Pseudo-CR on 6.3.3 of TR 33.703 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree with this document.
 		merged No S3‑254567  
    S3‑254091 Updating 3GPP Considerations for PKI Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254567  
    S3‑254178 3GPP consideration for PKI Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254567  
    S3‑254180 Updating PKI to include OCSP protocol Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254732  
    S3‑254732 Updating PKI to include OCSP protocol Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254180
    S3‑254092 Updating 3GPP Considerations for JOSE Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254567  
    S3‑254181 Updating clause 6 for JOSE Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254093 Updating 3GPP Considerations for COSE Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254567  
    S3‑254051 Pseudo-CR on Mission Critical PQ options NCSC, Motorola Solutions, BT, DSIT, NPL pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: let's wait for the end of the study to add this to the conclusions. Nokia didn’t want to take the MIKEY-SAKKE out. They proposed to note this.
 		revised No S3‑254733  
    S3‑254733 Pseudo-CR on Mission Critical PQ options NCSC, Motorola Solutions, BT, DSIT, NPL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254051
    S3‑254058 Solution proposal Hybrid SUCI calculation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei commented that there were solutions proposed that were identical, no need to include them all in the TR. Nokia complained that this wasn’t followed in the previous meeting. The Chair proposed to include in the TR only the solutions that differ from each other. As for symmetric-based solutions, it can be discussed whether it makes sense that they are included. CableLabs: solutions based on existing solutions, only mention the differences.
 		revised No S3‑254745  
    S3‑254745 Solution proposal Hybrid SUCI calculation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254058
    S3‑254060 Solution proposal Symmetric key SUCI Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254746  
    S3‑254746 Solution proposal Symmetric key SUCI Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254060
    S3‑254193 Symmetric solution on SUCI protection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254736  
    S3‑254736 Symmetric solution on SUCI protection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254193
    S3‑254245 New solution to SUCI calculation with symmetric key Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254749  
    S3‑254749 New solution to SUCI calculation with symmetric key Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254245
    S3‑254330 Solution for PQC based SUCI Computation Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254728  
    S3‑254728 Solution for PQC based SUCI Computation Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254330
    S3‑254331 Solution for Hybrid PQC based SUCI Computation Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254729 Solution for Hybrid PQC based SUCI Computation Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑254227 TR33703 - PQC - revision of Solution#1 Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254338 Evaluation of solution #1 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254436 Evaluation for solution #1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254054 Details on the KDF Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254055 Details on how this solution could be used for hybrid PQC Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254056 Details on why is MAC verification after decryption Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254057 Details on why replacement of ECIES functional blocks Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254061 Evaluation of Solution Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254339 Evaluation of solution #2 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254251 Updating sol #3 for SUCI calculation to resolve EN HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Co. Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254340 Evaluation of solution #3 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254278 EN addressing and evaluation for solution#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254341 Evaluation of solution #4 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254342 EN resolution for solution #5 LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254343 EN resolution for solution #6 LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254437 Evaluation for solution #5 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254345 Evaluation of solution #5 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254346 Evaluation of solution #6 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254438 Evaluation for solution #6 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254094 Addressing Editor’s Notes and adding Evaluation to Solution #7 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254347 Solution #8 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254095 Evaluation to Solution #11 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254348 Evaluation of solution #9 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254737  
    S3‑254737 Evaluation of solution #9 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval No
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑254348
    S3‑254096 Discussion on solutions for quantum resistant SUCIs Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254349 Evaluation of solution #10 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254738  
    S3‑254738 Evaluation of solution #10 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval No
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑254349
    S3‑254350 Evaluation of solution #11 THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254440 pCR to update solution #10 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254182 Overall evaluation for solutions Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254439 pCR to merge all Hybrid solutions together Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254739  
    S3‑254739 pCR to merge all Hybrid solutions together Samsung pCR Approval No
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑254439
    S3‑254183 Minutes for Conference Call on Oct 30 Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254534 Draft TR 33.703 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.2 New SID on Security Aspects for IMS resiliency                      
5.2.3 New Study on AIMLE Service Security S3‑254265 Addressing the EN on the security assumption Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254569  
    S3‑254324 Security Assumptions Update Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254569  
    S3‑254569 Security Assumptions Update Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254324
    S3‑254327 Updates to KI#1 to align with SA6 Progress Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254570  
    S3‑254570 Updates to KI#1 to align with SA6 Progress Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254327
    S3‑254106 Solution on authorization for ML and FL operations Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254571  
    S3‑254571 Solution on authorization for ML and FL operations Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254106
    S3‑254263 Resolving the ENs on Solution #2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254572  
    S3‑254572 Resolving the ENs on Solution #2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254263
    S3‑254264 Evaluation to Solution #2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254572  
    S3‑254325 Updates to Solution#1 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254573  
    S3‑254573 Updates to Solution#1 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254325
    S3‑254326 Solution to KI#2 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254574  
    S3‑254574 Solution to KI#2 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254326
    S3‑254444 FL member authorization for AIMLE services Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254575  
    S3‑254575 FL member authorization for AIMLE services Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254444
    S3‑254328 Initial high-level Conclusion Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254727  
    S3‑254727 Initial high-level Conclusion Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254328
    S3‑254535 Draft TR 33.786 Motorola Mobility draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.4 New Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN phase 2                      
5.2.5 New SID on providing PSK for MPQUIC/TLS S3‑254498 Pseudo-CR on evaluation update for solution #1 in MPQUIC Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: non certificate-based solution in this TR.Remove the first part.
 		revised No S3‑254639  
    S3‑254639 Pseudo-CR on evaluation update for solution #1 in MPQUIC Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254498
    S3‑254041 Update solution #1 InterDigital Finland Oy pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254388 Resolution of Editor’s Note for Home-routed Roaming in Solution #3 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254640  
    S3‑254640 Resolution of Editor’s Note for Home-routed Roaming in Solution #3 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254388
    S3‑254276 Update solution#4 for key derivation of roaming scenarios Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254086 Pseudo-CR on ENs resolution for solution 6.6 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254641  
    S3‑254641 Pseudo-CR on ENs resolution for solution 6.6 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254086
    S3‑254305 Adding conclusion to MPQUIC Huawei, HiSilicon, CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254642  
    S3‑254477 Conclusion for MPQUIC study Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254643  
    S3‑254643 Conclusion for MPQUIC study Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑254477
    S3‑254304 Adding scope Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254644  
    S3‑254644 Adding scope Huawei, HiSilicon,ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254304
    S3‑254146 Update the Scope ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254644  
    S3‑254386 Update to Solution #2 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254747 Update to Solution #2 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑254499 Pseudo-CR on evaluation update for solution #2 in MPQUIC Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254387 Resolution of Editor’s Note for Key Update in Solution #3 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254748 Resolution of Editor’s Note for Key Update in Solution #3 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑254500 Pseudo-CR on evaluation update for solution #3 in MPQUIC Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254277 EN addressing for solution#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254501 Pseudo-CR on evaluation update for solution #4 in MPQUIC Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254256 Addressing roaming EN in sol#5 and updating evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254257 Addressing key updating EN in sol#5 and updating evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254502 Pseudo-CR on evaluation update for solution #5 in MPQUIC Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254503 Pseudo-CR on evaluation update for solution #6 in MPQUIC Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254641  
    S3‑254042 Conclusion for Key Issue #1 InterDigital Finland Oy pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254642  
    S3‑254642 Conclusion for Key Issue #1 InterDigital Finland Oy pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑254042
    S3‑254083 Pseudo-CR on Conclusion for MPQUIC Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson objected to this contribution. This solution did not have a minimum impact on the network. Nokia replied that supporting solutions from SA2 meant haiving this level of impact. Cable Labs added that this was adding key derivation on top of SA2 solutions.
 		merged No S3‑254642  
    S3‑254389 Conclusion on PSK support for MPQUIC TLS Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254642  
    S3‑254536 Draft TR 33.778 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.6 New Study on Security for Core Network Enhanced Support for Artificial Intelligence (AI) / Machine Learning (ML) Phase 2 S3‑254039 New Solution Security for UE-side data collection exposure InterDigital Finland Oy pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: Not OK with Annex reference. Let's wait for SA6's output. Add an editor's note in the evaluation part. Huawei: we don’t agree with the data collection profile text.
 		revised No S3‑254576  
    S3‑254576 New Solution Security for UE-side data collection exposure InterDigital Finland Oy pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254039
    S3‑254288 Solution to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254577  
    S3‑254577 Solution to KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254288
    S3‑254274 New Solution on Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: new scenario that needs to be verified with RAN2,SA2. Ericsson supported this.
 		revised No S3‑254578  
    S3‑254578 New Solution on Authorization for Exposure of UE Data towards OTT Servers Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254274
    S3‑254378 New sol for TR 33.785 KI#2 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254579  
    S3‑254579 New sol for TR 33.785 KI#2 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254378
    S3‑254428 Granular authorization for OTT/AF Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254580  
    S3‑254580 Granular authorization for OTT/AF Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254428
    S3‑254481 Pseudo-CR on Security of UE data exposure towards OTT servers Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254579  
    S3‑254479 Pseudo-CR on Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF using TLS Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254581  
    S3‑254581 Pseudo-CR on Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF using TLS Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254479
    S3‑254038 Update solution #2 InterDigital Finland Oy pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254582  
    S3‑254582 Update solution #2 InterDigital Finland Oy pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254038
    S3‑254377 Update TR 33.785 sol#5 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254583  
    S3‑254583 Update TR 33.785 sol#5 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254377
    S3‑254429 Solution 1 update for key generation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254584  
    S3‑254584 Solution 1 update for key generation Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254429
    S3‑254473 Update Solution#3 Security of connection between UE and Data Collection NF OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: unclear how AKMA or GBA could be used. Add an explanation. Huawei: leave the evaluation open.
 		revised No S3‑254585  
    S3‑254585 Update Solution#3 Security of connection between UE and Data Collection NF OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254473
    S3‑254195 Update on Key Issue #1 vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital supported this contribution as it showed the progress from SA2. Huawei: keep the second editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑254586  
    S3‑254586 Update on Key Issue #1 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254195
    S3‑254475 Discussion on privacy protection for UE-side data collection OPPO pCR Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254474 New KI on privacy protection for UE training data collection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: this is not necessary.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254165 KI on gNB based data collection Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254040 Add conclusion for KI#1 InterDigital Finland Oy pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: premature. Vivo liked bullet 4.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254537 Draft TR 33.785 Vivo draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.7 New Study on Security and Privacy Aspects of Integrated Sensing and Communication S3‑254295 Sensing scope alignment Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254603  
    S3‑254603 Sensing scope alignment Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254295
    S3‑254222 Update to scope Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254603  
    S3‑254076 pseudo-CR on authorization of sensing service request solution Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254750  
    S3‑254750 pseudo-CR on authorization of sensing service request solution Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254076
    S3‑254147 Add evaluation for solution #1.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: clarification with SA2 is needed.Ericsson added that alignment with SA2 was needed.
 		revised No S3‑254751  
    S3‑254751 Add evaluation for solution #1.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254147
    S3‑254150 Resolve EN in Solution #1.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: reword the Notes to point that they are not in scope of the present document. Xiaomi: we don’t need the change in the first step.
 		revised No S3‑254604  
    S3‑254604 Resolve EN in Solution #1.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254150
    S3‑254196 Solution Update for Solution#1.2 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254247 Update of solution 7 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254605  
    S3‑254605 Update of solution 7 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254247
    S3‑254248 Update of Solution #1.6 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254606  
    S3‑254606 Update of Solution #1.6 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254248
    S3‑254249 Clarification on the Sensing Profile Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254250 Evaluation of Solution #1.6 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254607  
    S3‑254607 Evaluation of Solution #1.6 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254250
    S3‑254298 Address EN and add evaluation to Solution#1.4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254608  
    S3‑254608 Address EN and add evaluation to Solution#1.4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254298
    S3‑254492 Update solution #1.3 in TR 33.777 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254609  
    S3‑254609 Update solution #1.3 in TR 33.777 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254492
    S3‑254107 A new solution for sensing results exposure via a proxy AF InterDigital Washington DC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254246 New Solution to KI#1 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254149 Conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254610  
    S3‑254197 Conclusion for KI#1 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254610  
    S3‑254383 Intermediate conclusion for KI#1 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254610  
    S3‑254610 Intermediate conclusion for KI#1 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254383
    S3‑254238 Update KI #2 in TR 33.777 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254611  
    S3‑254296 Update Key Issue#2 about the SF architecture alignment Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254611  
    S3‑254321 KI#2 update Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254611  
    S3‑254611 KI#2 update Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254321
    S3‑254148 Add evaluation for solution #2.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254612  
    S3‑254612 Add evaluation for solution #2.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254148
    S3‑254151 Resolve EN in Solution #2.1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254297 Update Solution#2.2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254613  
    S3‑254613 Update Solution#2.2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254297
    S3‑254078 pseudo-CR on solution on security of sensing operation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson objected because in their view this wasn't decided yet in SA2.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254108 New Solution for SE sensing authorization policy enforcement InterDigital Washington DC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254129 pCR Privacy requirements for sensing NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254614  
    S3‑254614 pCR Privacy requirements for sensing NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254129
    S3‑254299 Key Issue on privacy aspect of sensing Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254614  
    S3‑254382 New KI on ISAC privacy Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254614  
    S3‑254130 pCR KI on active attacks NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: attack not valid. Cable Labs and ORANGE supported the document. ZTE: not in 3GGP scope. Nokia: is this attack feasible? Any study or demonstration? NTT-Docomo replied that there were papers showing this kind of attack. Huawei: what kind of solution would you expect here? Xiaomi: the attacker doesn’t need to use a technical way to do the first threat. It was agreed that a conference call could be held to clarify the nature of the attacks. Ericsson added that RAN WGs should be consulted as well. An editor's note was added.
 		revised No S3‑254615  
    S3‑254615 pCR KI on active attacks NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: this threat is not relevant according to some papers we've seen. Cable Labs: remove threat, remove requirement, we come back to this next meeting.
 		approved No   S3‑254130
    S3‑254131 pCR KI on passive unauthorized sensing NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
YesEverybody agreed that there was a key issue, but a discussion paper on the threat and potential way forward would be needed.
 		revised No S3‑254616  
    S3‑254616 pCR KI on passive unauthorized sensing NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson had the same concerns as the previous one.
 		approved No   S3‑254131
    S3‑254538 Draft TR 33.777 Xiaomi draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑254077 pseudo-CR on authorization of sensing service request solution Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
5.2.8 New Study on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for Container-based Product S3‑254539 Draft TR 33.730 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑254097 Pseudo-CR on Modify TC on image repository MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254221 pCR for 33.730 conclusion BSI (DE) other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254635  
    S3‑254635 pCR for 33.730 conclusion BSI (DE) other - No
YesHuawei objected.
 		noted No   S3‑254221
    S3‑254237 Presentation of Report to TSG: TR 33.730 Study on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for Container-based Product Ericsson TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.2.9 New Study on Security Aspects of Satellite Access in 5G Phase 4 S3‑254154 Resolve EN in Solution #1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254752  
    S3‑254752 Resolve EN in Solution #1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254154
    S3‑254152 Add evaluation for solution #1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254753  
    S3‑254753 Add evaluation for solution #1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254152
    S3‑254155 Resolve EN in Solution #2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254587  
    S3‑254587 Resolve EN in Solution #2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254155
    S3‑254530 Remove ENs in solution #2 in TR 33.700-30 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254587  
    S3‑254153 Add evaluation for solution #2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254588  
    S3‑254588 Add evaluation for solution #2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254153
    S3‑254457 Update Solution#3 for removing ENs and adding evaluation CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesPhillips disagreed with NOTE 1. Nothing of NOTE 2 is mentioned in the evaluation. There are changes in the NAS key procedure, contrary to what is stated here.
 		revised No S3‑254589  
    S3‑254589 Update Solution#3 for removing ENs and adding evaluation CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254457
    S3‑254117 EN removal for Solution #4 to Key Issue #1 Sateliot, Novamint pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254590  
    S3‑254590 EN removal for Solution #4 to Key Issue #1 Sateliot, Novamint pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254117
    S3‑254371 Address the ENs in solution #5 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254754  
    S3‑254754 Address the ENs in solution #5 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254371
    S3‑254280 Evaluation to Sol#5 of TR 33.700-30 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254591  
    S3‑254372 Add the evaluation of solution #5 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254591  
    S3‑254591 Add the evaluation of solution #5 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254372
    S3‑254283 Address ENs in Sol#6 of TR 33.700-30 Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254755  
    S3‑254755 Address ENs in Sol#6 of TR 33.700-30 Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254283
    S3‑254279 Add evaluation in Sol#6 of TR 33.700-30 Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254756  
    S3‑254756 Add evaluation in Sol#6 of TR 33.700-30 Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254279
    S3‑254071 EN Removal for Solution for NAS COUNT synchronization in store-and-forward operations Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254592  
    S3‑254592 EN Removal for Solution for NAS COUNT synchronization in store-and-forward operations Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254071
    S3‑254072 Evaluation for Solution for NAS COUNT synchronization in store-and-forward operations Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254281 Evaluation to Sol#7 of TR 33.700-30 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254118 EN removal for Solution #8 to Key Issue #1 Sateliot, Novamint pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254282 New Solution for KI#1 Secure NAS messages via one pair of COUNTs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254458 New solution on download task management for S&F operations CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254461 New solution on NAS keys isolation in S&F operations CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254540 Draft TR 33.700-30 Qualcomm draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.10 New Study on Security aspects of CAPIF Phase 4 S3‑254176 Scope alignment Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254081 Pseudo-CR on KI#4 of CAPIF Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254593  
    S3‑254593 Pseudo-CR on KI#4 of CAPIF Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑254081
    S3‑254102 Solution for Group-UE-hosted API invoker authorization Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254594  
    S3‑254594 Solution for Group-UE-hosted API invoker authorization Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254102
    S3‑254156 Solution on group authorization ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254595  
    S3‑254595 Solution on group authorization ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254156
    S3‑254163 New sol on KI#1 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254722  
    S3‑254722 New sol on KI#1 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254163
    S3‑254379 New sol for TR 33.700-23 KI#1 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254596  
    S3‑254596 New sol for TR 33.700-23 KI#1 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254379
    S3‑254455 Group authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254723  
    S3‑254723 Group authorization for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs' resources of a group Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254455
    S3‑254080 Pseudo-CR on Solution for Open Discovery Service Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254597  
    S3‑254597 Pseudo-CR on Solution for Open Discovery Service Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254080
    S3‑254101 Solution for Open Service Discovery Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254598  
    S3‑254598 Solution for Open Service Discovery Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254101
    S3‑254380 New sol for TR 33.700-23 KI#2 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254599  
    S3‑254599 New sol for TR 33.700-23 KI#2 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254380
    S3‑254103 New Solution for more granular authorization based on purpose information Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254600  
    S3‑254600 New Solution for more granular authorization based on purpose information Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254103
    S3‑254381 New sol for TR 33.700-23 KI#3 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254601  
    S3‑254601 New sol for TR 33.700-23 KI#3 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254381
    S3‑254079 Pseudo-CR on Solution for purpose of information Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254602  
    S3‑254602 Pseudo-CR on Solution for purpose of information Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254079
    S3‑254212 Draft TR 33.700-23 v020 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.11 New Study on security aspect of support of Ambient power-enabled Internet of Things-Phase 2 S3‑254198 New solution: communication protection vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesOPPO: add an editor's note on bidding down attacks. Qualcomm: align with sA2 procedures.
 		revised No S3‑254695  
    S3‑254695 New solution: communication protection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254198
    S3‑254270 solution on information protection for DO-A capable AIOT device Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: first time we see the solution, it is too early to go ahead with this.
 		revised No S3‑254696  
    S3‑254696 solution on information protection for DO-A capable AIOT device Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254270
    S3‑254489 new Solution on Protecting Information OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesMCC: if you are referring to something that is still under construction, better to add an editor's note.T-Mobile suggested the same thing. Huawei: meaning of first message needs to be clarified.
 		revised No S3‑254697  
    S3‑254697 new Solution on Protecting Information OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254489
    S3‑254462 Update KI on AIOT device ID protection in DO-A procedure OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: still under discussion in SA2. Not sure that SA3 can make this decision. Ericsson: capabilities of these devices? Send an LS to RAN about this? ORANGE: the sentence looks like a requirement.
 		revised No S3‑254698  
    S3‑254698 Update KI on AIOT device ID protection in DO-A procedure OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254462
    S3‑254199 New solution: privacy protection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254699  
    S3‑254699 New solution: privacy protection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254199
    S3‑254364 New Solution for privacy-presserving responses from individual devices to group paging Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: IKE Rel-19 to IKE Rel-20 needs clarification. Ericsson: If the device is unregistered, does the network page the device? This is an unanswered question. ORANGE: remove the evaluation.
 		revised No S3‑254700  
    S3‑254700 New Solution for privacy-presserving responses from individual devices to group paging Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254364
    S3‑254363 New Solution for group paging in a privacy preserving manner Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254701  
    S3‑254701 New Solution for group paging in a privacy preserving manner Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254363
    S3‑254434 DO-A Capable AIoT device identifier protection with Bloom filter Xidian University, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254702  
    S3‑254702 DO-A Capable AIoT device identifier protection with Bloom filter Xidian University, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254434
    S3‑254516 KI #4: solution for DO-A capable AIoT devices THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254703  
    S3‑254703 KI #4: solution for DO-A capable AIoT devices THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254516
    S3‑254269 update to the key issue on authentication Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254705  
    S3‑254336 KI#2 THALES pCR Approval Yes
YesAT&T: elaorate on the network, which type it is.
 		revised No S3‑254705  
    S3‑254705 KI#2 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254336
    S3‑254369 Update Key issue #2 for 5G Ambient IoT services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254705  
    S3‑254421 KI2: Security threats and requirements Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254705  
    S3‑254454 Update on KI#2 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254705  
    S3‑254460 Update KI on AIOT authenticaiton OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254705  
    S3‑254472 Update Key Issue#2 for adding threaten and requirement CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254705  
    S3‑254505 Updates on Key Issue #2 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254705  
    S3‑254160 Solution on Authentication for AIoT devices ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254337 KI#2: solution for DO-A capable AIoT devices THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254370 New solution of authentication and security establishment for DO-A capable device Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254480 KI#2: solution for AIoT devices 1 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254435 Discussion on R20 AIOT security OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254422 KI1: security threats and requirements Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254706  
    S3‑254706 KI1: security threats and requirements Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254422
    S3‑254368 Update Key issue #1 for 5G Ambient IoT services Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254706  
    S3‑254453 Update on KI#1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254706  
    S3‑254464 Update KI on intermediate UE authorization OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254706  
    S3‑254471 Update Key Issue#1 for adding threaten and requirement CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254706  
    S3‑254242 New solution on authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254362 Updating potential security requirements in key issue on resource exhaustion Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254488 TR 33.714 Scope OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254694  
    S3‑254335 Scope of TR 33.714 THALES pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: copy the content of SP-250852 isntead of referring to the tdoc. ORANGE : device type 1? Nokia: are there use cases for device type 1 in SA1? OPPO: feasiblity of device type 1 is a SA-wide decision for which we can provide feedback. T-.Mobile: device type 1 definition is too wide in scope. ORANGE: add a note saying it is only for isolated networks. It was commented that a revised SID should be brought next meeting given that the scope was being changed. Ericsson preferred to send an LS instead of updating the SID. Huawei didn’t agree and this was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑254694  
    S3‑254694 Scope of TR 33.714 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254335
    S3‑254541 Draft TR 33.714 OPPO draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑254704 LS on scope alignment on AioT rel-20 OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254759  
    S3‑254759 LS on scope alignment on AioT rel-20 OPPO LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254704
5.2.12 New Study on best security practices for SBA S3‑254284 BSP4SBA Clause 2.3 Access Token Privilege Restriction (RFC 9700) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254710  
    S3‑254410 Pseudo-CR on BCP for access token privilege restriction Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254710  
    S3‑254710 Pseudo-CR on BCP for access token privilege restriction Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254410
    S3‑254285 BSP4SBA Clause 2.2 Token replay prevention (RFC 9700) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254711  
    S3‑254711 BSP4SBA Clause 2.2 Token replay prevention (RFC 9700) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254285
    S3‑254286 BSP4SBA Clause 2.5 Client Authentication (RFC 9700) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254712  
    S3‑254712 BSP4SBA Clause 2.5 Client Authentication (RFC 9700) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254286
    S3‑254408 Pseudo-CR on adapting best practice for protecting redirect-based flows Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254713  
    S3‑254409 Pseudo-CR on adapting best practice for resource owner password credentials grant Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254713  
    S3‑254287 BSP4SBA Clause 3.2 Use Appropriate Algorithms (RFC 8725) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254714  
    S3‑254714 BSP4SBA Clause 3.2 Use Appropriate Algorithms (RFC 8725) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254287
    S3‑254289 BSP4SBA Clause 3.10 Do Not Trust Received Claims (RFC 8725) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254715  
    S3‑254715 BSP4SBA Clause 3.10 Do Not Trust Received Claims (RFC 8725) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254289
    S3‑254292 BSP4SBA Clause 3.11 Use Explicit Typing (RFC 8725) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254716  
    S3‑254716 BSP4SBA Clause 3.11 Use Explicit Typing (RFC 8725) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254292
    S3‑254293 BSP4SBA Clause 3.8 Validate Issuer and Subject (RFC 8725) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254717  
    S3‑254717 BSP4SBA Clause 3.8 Validate Issuer and Subject (RFC 8725) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254293
    S3‑254294 BSP4SBA Clause 3.9 Use and Validate Audience (RFC 8725) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254718  
    S3‑254718 BSP4SBA Clause 3.9 Use and Validate Audience (RFC 8725) Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254294
    S3‑254291 Overall pCR for not applicable Best practice RFC 8725 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254719  
    S3‑254719 Overall pCR for not applicable Best practice RFC 8725 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254291
    S3‑254513 Not Applicable Best Practices (RFC 8725) - combined version Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254317 Overall pCR for not applicable Best practice RFC 9700 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254713  
    S3‑254713 Overall pCR for not applicable Best practice RFC 9700 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254317
    S3‑254514 Pseudo-CR on not applicable best practice RFC 9700 Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254290 Conclusion to the Best practices Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254542 Draft TR 33.755 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.13 New SID on Security Aspect for NR Femto Phase 2 S3‑254171 Updates to Key Issue#5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesCable Labs: already covered in key issue#1.
 		revised No S3‑254684  
    S3‑254684 Updates to Key Issue#5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254171
    S3‑254074 Evaluation for Solution for security of Local UPF for key issue 2 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesCalbe Labs: reformulation is needed.
 		revised No S3‑254685  
    S3‑254685 Evaluation for Solution for security of Local UPF for key issue 2 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254074
    S3‑254075 EN Removal for Solution for detection of compromised Femto Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesCable Labs: description of the threat is too limited.
 		revised No S3‑254686  
    S3‑254686 EN Removal for Solution for detection of compromised Femto Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254075
    S3‑254170 Evaluation to solution #3 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254172 Update the solution #1 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
YesCable Labs: 6.2.2.1 is not needed.
 		revised No S3‑254687  
    S3‑254687 Update the solution #1 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254172
    S3‑254174 Evaluation to solution#5 China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254161 New solution to KI#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254688  
    S3‑254688 New solution to KI#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254161
    S3‑254543 Draft TR 33.746 ZTE draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.14 New SID on Security aspects of WAB nodes for NR S3‑254169 Title update for Key Issue #2 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: not needed. Samsung and Ericsson didn’t agree with it either
 		noted No    
    S3‑254451 Update to KI#2 on security protection of compromised WAB nodes Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: out of 3GPP Scope, implementation specific. Nokia supported the change, it was related to one of the work tasks in the SID.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254073 Solution for Detection of compromised MWAB nodes Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254707  
    S3‑254707 Solution for Detection of compromised MWAB nodes Nokia pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑254073
    S3‑254240 New solution to detect compromised MWAB nodes using location tracking Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254168 Updates for Key Issue#3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑254173 New key issue for support of dynamic CAG for MWAB nodes Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254544 Draft TR 33.724 China Telecom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.3 6G Study Items                      
5.3.1 6G Security SID S3‑254162 A new annex on security requirement analysis for 6G CableLabs pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: it looks like we are going to duplicate work here.We don’t understand how high level requirements can be extracted from the gap analysis. Why is this an annex if we are extracting requirements? ORANGE, Ericsson and Nokia had similar concerns. ORANGE added if the specification structure had to be changed it should be studied separately. Huawei added that a simpler version of this contribution could be acceptable.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254206 Update on Annex B: Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues vivo, Qualcomm pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254646  
    S3‑254646 Update on Annex B: Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues vivo, Qualcomm pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254206
    S3‑254412 New Security Area on Data collection for security monitoring Ericsson, AT&T, Lenovo, MITRE, Motorola Mobility, NSA, TMO US pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with this. We would be speculating with security mechanisms. Vodafone supported this. OPPO, Qualcomm: no impact on UE whatsoever. ORANGE didn’t agree with the use cases format. Apple: we don’t need this. NTT-Docomo: important to address this monitoring. This qualifies as key issue. Huawei supported this. ORANGE: I prefer to have it as a separate security area.
 		revised No S3‑254656  
    S3‑254656 New Security Area on Data collection for security monitoring Ericsson, AT&T, Lenovo, MITRE, Motorola Mobility, NSA, TMO US pCR Approval No
YesHuawei objected because they considered it was too premature.
 		noted No   S3‑254412
    S3‑254527 Updating access-agnostic authentication in Security area #3 CableLabs, Charter Communications, China Telecom, ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254650  
    S3‑254650 Updating access-agnostic authentication in Security area #3 CableLabs, Charter Communications, China Telecom, ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254527
    S3‑254234 6G RAN Security Area KI for PHY Signal Security OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254509 Update to Security Area #1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: premature. Figure out mandatory features then build on top of it. Apple also found it too early. Xiaomi: what services do you refer to in the first bullet?
 		revised No S3‑254648  
    S3‑254648 Update to Security Area #1 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑254509
    S3‑254393 New Key Issue for SA#2 on Security Enhancement for RAN Mobility Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254111 Lower layer security considerations for 6G Radio ST Engineering iDirect discussion Discussion Yes
YesNokia: some of this should be discussed in RAN1 and RAN2. Huawei: physical layer and RAN1-related aspects should be taken over that group.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254352 New Key issue on MAC CE security OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254655  
    S3‑254112 Removing EN about LLS in RAN security area ST Engineering iDirect pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254506 Security for RAN mobility Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254424 New key issue on 6G re-authentication optimization Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254376 New Security Area on security and privacy aspects of network exposure Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254654  
    S3‑254158 Updating introduction of security area#2 to include lower layer secuirty ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254354 DP on MAC CE Security Threats in 6G OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254510 Update to security area #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesApple, Thales, NTT-Docomo and ORANGE disagreed with the contribution. Xiaomi: device authenticated by whom? Vivo: state evaluation is not clear. OPPO didn’t understand this either.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254517 Update Security area #2 for adding MAC layer security CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254507 User-plane security in 6G RAN Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254508 Robust AS security setup Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254228 TR33801-01- Upadte the security area#3 Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254652  
    S3‑254036 New Security Area on Core Network Security Deutsche Telekom AG pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254653  
    S3‑254319 New Security Area - Network Security Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254653  
    S3‑254104 6G new security area: exposure security Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesIt was agreed to have this as a separate security area.
 		revised No S3‑254654  
    S3‑254654 6G new security area: exposure security Ericsson, Xiaomi, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254104
    S3‑254318 New Key Issue on Security Aspects for New NAS Security Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254300 New security area on the security visibility Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254200 Discussion Paper on Security Area for Data Framework vivo, InterDigital, OPPO, China Mobile discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254201 New Security Area: Security and Privacy of Data Framework vivo, InterDigital, OPPO, China Mobile, Apple, CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254484 New Security Area on User Consent Nokia, InterDigital pCR Approval Yes
YesVodafone: user consent framework is of concern for us. User consent at application level is out of scope of 3GPP. ORANGE found this premature, better to wait for other groups' progress.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254223 DP on Security Area for PHY Layer Sensing Signals in 6G OPPO, BUPT discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254235 6G Security- PHY Sensing Signal Attack Model OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE didn’t agree with this contribution. Huawei: high dependency on sensing, come back later.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254110 Discussion On Threats from Malicious and Compromised UE InterDigital Washington DC discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254320 New Security Area - Security Architecture Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: risk of overlap in second bullet. An editor's note was added about this.
 		revised No S3‑254652  
    S3‑254652 New Security Area - Security Architecture Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254320
    S3‑254332 Abnormal behaviour identification over UE-N/W connection to improve security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, T-Mobile US, Deutsche Telekom, AT&T, SK Telecom, China Mobile, Telefonica, Interdigital, CATT, China Telecom, ZTE, Telecom Italia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254656 S3‑253674
    S3‑254411 Pseudo-CR on Security Area: UE to Core Network security, security anchor Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: it should be a key issue.
 		revised No S3‑254649  
    S3‑254649 Pseudo-CR on Security Area: UE to Core Network security, security anchor Ericsson pCR Approval No
YesQualcomm: too many assumptions.
 		noted No   S3‑254411
    S3‑254244 New KI on MAC-CE security Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254655  
    S3‑254390 New Security Area on Sensing Security and Privacy Xiaomi EV Technology, InterDigital pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: let's have a separate security area for Sensing because it is not a core feature of 6G.Otherwise Sensing will never be prioritised in the 6G study. Ericsson supported this contribution with some wording changes. Xiaomi: in RAN this is included in the 6G study. ORANGE replied that Sensing was not an essential feature in 6G, it would be very difficult to have Sensing-related document treated given higher priority items. Huawei: there is no guidance from SA Plenary about what features have priority, it is up to the SA3 Chair to decide what topics to handle.There is consensus that this feature is part of 6G.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254303 New security area on AIML Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: not clear AI's place in 6G, too premature.What is AI in 6G? Vodafone supported ORANGE. SA2 was still discussing the place of AI in 6G.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254526 New KI on 6G New NAS security for UE to Core Network Security CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254333 Discussions on Abnormal behaviour identification over UE-N/W connection to improve security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, SK Telecom discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254344 New key issue for MAC layer protection LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254655  
    S3‑254445 Update to Security Area - RAN Security Samsung, SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254446 Key issue for MAC CE protection Samsung, SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254655  
    S3‑254236 6G Sensing Security Area Including Lower Layer Security OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254447 Key issue for initial RACH protection Samsung, SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254466 KI on long term credential management SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254468 KI on SIB protection SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254157 New key issue on MAC CE security ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254655  
    S3‑254230 TR33801-01- New KI on MAC layer security in RAN security Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254655  
    S3‑254365 Security area#3: Clarification regarding access agnostic authentication Ericsson, Orange pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254650  
    S3‑254366 Reducing the impact of long-term shared secret key leakage Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254374 New Key Issue of re-authentication in roaming scenarios in security area #3 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254375 New Key Issue of subscriber identifier privacy in security area #3 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254391 New Key Issue for SA#1 on Security for 6G NAS Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254205 New key issue of SA#2: SI/Paging Protection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254203 New key issue of SA#3: Vulnerability Resolution vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254204 New key issue of SA#3: Subscriber ID Protection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254202 New key issue of SA#3: Primary Authentication vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254518 Update Security area #3 for adding secondary authentication CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: better add it as an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑254651  
    S3‑254651 Update Security area #3 for adding secondary authentication CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254518
    S3‑254229 TR33801-01- New KI on authentication request replay protection in Authentication Security areas Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254423 New key issue on 6G authentication enhancements Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254231 TR33801-01- New KI on long term key leakage in Authentication Security areas Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254413 Pseudo-CR on System overview for the Attacker model Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254647  
    S3‑254647 Pseudo-CR on System overview for the Attacker model Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254413
    S3‑254392 New Key Issue for SA2#2 on Security Enhancement for RAN User Plane Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254512 New Security Area on Security for Core Network, Interconnect and Roaming Nokia, Ericsson, Samsung pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254653  
    S3‑254653 New Security Area on Security for Core Network, Interconnect and Roaming Nokia, Ericsson, Samsung pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254512
    S3‑254449 Key Issue on security for interworking Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254528 Attacker model for MAC CE OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: it should be more high level. Huawei: too early for this kind of detail. Nokia supported this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254529 KI on Authentication for 6GS Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254450 Key Issue on protection against SUCI replay attack Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254034 Discussion Paper on Security Considerations for MAC Control Elements (MAC CEs) in 6G InterDigital Communications discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254478 Pseudo-CR on key issue related to MAC layer risk mitigation Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254655  
    S3‑254655 Pseudo-CR on key issue related to MAC layer risk mitigation Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254478
    S3‑254519 New KI on NSWO authentication in 6G CableLabs, Charter Communications, China Telecom, ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254522 New Security Area on User Consent CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254523 security area on AI CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254524 New Security Area on Data Security and Privacy CATT, vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: too early, SA2 and SA5 havent figured anything out. Vivo: there is progress in SA2 suring this meeting. Apple: let's create a place holder. ORANGE didn’t agree with this and preferred to wait until the next meeting. Vodafone: there is still coordination needed between SA2 and SA5, so we'd better not to enter there yet. Qualcomm: this is too early. NTT-Docomo: there is no rush.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254525 New KI on security and privacy of user identification for Subscription Authentication and Authorization CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254448 Key issue for unprotected system information Samsung, SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254037 New KI on NF Authentication on Application Layer in 6G Deutsche Telekom AG pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254545 Draft TR 33.801-01 ORANGE draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑254563 6G Security study - working procedures and priorities for the next meeting ORANGE discussion discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
5.3.2 New Study on supporting AEAD algorithms S3‑254087 FS_AEAD planning KDDI Corporation, vivo discussion   Yes
YesHuawei, Ericsson: no need to endorse anything.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254417 Overview and Assumption for AEAD vivo Mobile Communication Co., pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: don’t use the term hybrid here, it's misleading in this context. MCC: what does SA/RAN procedure aspects mean?? Qualcomm, Ericsson also had concerns on the use of hybrid. Huawei: some text belongs to the scope. Apple preferred to include the hybrid aspects in the study.
 		revised No S3‑254657  
    S3‑254657 Overview and Assumption for AEAD vivo Mobile Communication Co., pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254417
    S3‑254496 Pseudo-CR on defining standalone algorithms Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254355 Add New Annex Hiding Process vivo Mobile Communication Co., pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑254067 Discussion on AEAD properties Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
YesNCSC, Ericsson: no need to discuss this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254063 introduction of KI on coexistence Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesNCSC didn’t understand the table.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254495 Pseudo-CR on Key issue on AEAD compatibility with earlier 3GPP systems Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254066 New Key Issue on Key Hierarchy for AS and NAS AEAD Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254658  
    S3‑254210 New Key Issue on AEAD Keys vivo, THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254658  
    S3‑254658 New Key Issue on AEAD Keys vivo, THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254210
    S3‑254068 New Key Issue on UE specific 256 bit Algo selection Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254069 Discussion on the MAC length Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254070 introduction of the KI for MAC length Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: this discussion needs to be had, but where? AEAD or 6G stduy? Huawei: this should go to the 6G study. KDDI commented that this was out of scope of the study. Vivo supported the contrbution. ORANGE: these don’t look like requirements.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254211 New Key Issue and Conclusion on Operational Sequence of AEAD vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: this is not needed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254487 New KI on running AEAD without including MAC OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this is not needed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254082 Pseudo-CR on KI#1 update KDDI Corporation pCR   Yes
YesNokia: weak can be good enough. 1280bits is weaker but it is not broken.
 		revised No S3‑254659  
    S3‑254659 Pseudo-CR on KI#1 update KDDI Corporation pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254082
    S3‑254208 Update on Key Issue #1 Algorithm Selection vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesXiaomi: not in scope of the study.ORANGE supported that this should be part of the 6G study.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254105 Requirement for AEAD interface Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254660  
    S3‑254660 Requirement for AEAD interface Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254105
    S3‑254209 Update on Key Issue #2 AEAD algorithm interface vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑254660  
    S3‑254062 Solution proposal AEAD algo selection for NAS and AS Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254661  
    S3‑254661 Solution proposal AEAD algo selection for NAS and AS Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254062
    S3‑254084 Pseudo-CR on new solution for algorithm selection KDDI Corporation pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254662  
    S3‑254662 Pseudo-CR on new solution for algorithm selection KDDI Corporation pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254084
    S3‑254159 Solution to KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254663  
    S3‑254663 Solution to KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254159
    S3‑254207 New Solution on AEAD Algorithm Selection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254664  
    S3‑254664 New Solution on AEAD Algorithm Selection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254207
    S3‑254272 New solution on the AEAD algorithm negoiation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254665  
    S3‑254665 New solution on the AEAD algorithm negoiation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254272
    S3‑254373 New solution for AEAD algorithms negotiation Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254666  
    S3‑254666 New solution for AEAD algorithms negotiation Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254373
    S3‑254064 Solution proposal AEAD key usage for NAS and AS algorithm Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254667  
    S3‑254667 Solution proposal AEAD key usage for NAS and AS algorithm Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254064
    S3‑254085 Pseudo-CR on new solution for KI#2 interface KDDI Corporation pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254668  
    S3‑254668 Pseudo-CR on new solution for KI#2 interface KDDI Corporation pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254085
    S3‑254271 New solution on the details of AEAD interface Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254669  
    S3‑254669 New solution on the details of AEAD interface Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254271
    S3‑254275 New solution about creation of EXTRA_IV Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254670  
    S3‑254670 New solution about creation of EXTRA_IV Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254275
    S3‑254065 Solution proposal Key Hierarchy for NAS and AS AEAD Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE,Thales: key derivation from 5G should not be part of this study
 		revised No S3‑254671  
    S3‑254671 Solution proposal Key Hierarchy for NAS and AS AEAD Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑254065
    S3‑254546 Draft TR 33.771 Vivo draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
6 New Study/Work items                      
6.1 New 5G-Advance SIDs/WIDs S3‑254028 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the CAPIF Core Function BSI (DE) WID new Approval Yes
YesHuawei: shouldn’t we incorporate this into an existing SCAS spec? Nokia: we need to define the test architecture.
 		revised No S3‑254560  
    S3‑254560 Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the CAPIF Core Function BSI (DE) WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254028
    S3‑254029 Discussion on SCAS tests for the CAPIF CF work item (WID proposal) BSI (DE) discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254260 New WID on Security Enhancements for SEAL Data Delivery-phase 3 Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: we need to do a threat analysis.We prefer to start with a WID. Nokia: threat analysis is needed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254261 Discussion paper on Security Enhancements for SEAL Data Delivery Phase 3 Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254262 Add optional Flow ID Parameter for Security of SEALDD Services Huawei, Hisilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑254414 New SID on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 3 Ericsson SID new Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254415 New WID on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 3 Ericsson WID new Discussion Yes
YesNokia: we should wait for SA2 to conclude to know what normative work needs to be done in SA3. It was agreed to bring back the WID after SA2 had concluded their work.
 		noted No    
6.2 New 6G SIDs/WIDs S3‑254511 New SID on enhanced security management service about security policy provisioning in 6G China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
YesIt was discussed whether this was better suited for 5GA instead.
 		revised No S3‑254561  
    S3‑254561 New SID on enhanced security management service about security policy provisioning in 6G China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254511
6.3 SIDs/WIDs revisions S3‑254027 Revised WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 20 Motorola Solutions Germany WID revised Agreement Yes
YesIt was commented that there was no need to send this to Plenary if the only change was an increase of TUs. NTT-Docomo added that in case there was a significant increase of TUs that impacted prioritization, the WIDs could be sent to Plenary for approval (not this case).
 		endorsed No   S3‑252353
    S3‑254175 Revised SID for CAPIF-4 Huawei, HiSilicon SID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑254562  
    S3‑254562 Revised SID for CAPIF-4 Huawei, HiSilicon SID revised Agreement Yes
YesMCC commented that this should have been a revision of the SP approved WID.
 		agreed No   S3‑254175
    S3‑254194 Revised SID on Core Network Enhanced Support for Artificial Intelligence (AI) Machine Learning (ML) Phase 2 vivo, China Mobile SID revised Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: it should be a separate SID, not a revision. Ericsson, ORANGE, Huawei: disagree with the SA5 part here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑254323 Discussion Paper on adding a new Work Task to the SID of FS_IMSRE_SEC KDDI, Samsung, vivo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254443 Revised SID on Security Aspects for IMS resiliency Samsung, KDDI, vivo SID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254463 New WID on Security related Events Handling Vodafone WID revised Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: too open ended, we don’t understand what information is collected. They added that since a new feature was being added they preferred to have a new meeting cycle. There was a pCR related for this feature. Huawei was ok with removing the bullet and keeping the pCR.
 		revised No S3‑254757 SP‑250876
    S3‑254757 New WID on Security related Events Handling Vodafone WID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑254463
6.4 SIDs/WIDs Prioritization                      
7 CVD and research S3‑254022 CVD-2024-0096 – SNI5GECT: A Practical Approach to Inject aNRchy into 5G NR GSMA CVD LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑254334 LS reply on CVD-2024-0096 – SNI5GECT: A Practical Approach to Inject aNRchy into 5G NR Nokia LS out   Yes
YesAlex (GSMA) encouraged to send a reply to close the loop. Huawei didn't find it necessary to send an LS to RAN2. Apple: GSMA is aware of RAN2's work.No need to send this LS. Qualcomm: it doesn’t seem that they want a response. We don’t need to send an "ack" response.
 		noted No   S3‑253651
8 Any Other Business