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**

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Contents

Foreword 5

Introduction 5

1 Scope 6

2 References 6

3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations 8

3.1 Definitions 8

3.2 Symbols 9

3.3 Abbreviations 9

4 Overview over network domain security for IP based protocols 10

4.1 Introduction 10

4.2 Protection at the network layer 10

4.3 Security for native IP based protocols 10

4.4 Security domains 10

4.4.1 Security domains and interfaces 10

4.5 Security Gateways (SEGs) 10

5 Key management and distribution architecture for NDS/IP 11

5.1 Security services afforded to the protocols 11

5.2 Security Associations (SAs) 11

5.2.0 General 11

5.2.1 Security Policy Database (SPD) 12

5.2.2 Security Association Database (SAD) 12

5.3 Profiling of IPsec 12

5.3.0 General 12

5.3.1 Support of ESP 12

5.3.2 Support of tunnel mode 12

5.3.3 Support of ESP encryption transforms 12

5.3.4 Support of ESP authentication transforms 13

5.3.5 Requirements on the construction of the IV 13

5.4 Profiling of IKEv2 13

5.4.0 General 13

5.4.1 Void 13

5.4.2 Profiling of IKEv2 13

5.4.3 Void 14

5.5 Security policy granularity 14

5.6 Network domain security key management and distribution architecture for native IP based protocols 15

5.6.1 Network domain security architecture outline 15

5.6.2 Interface description 16

6 Other 3GPP profiles 17

6.1 General 17

6.2 TLS protocol profiles 17

6.2.1 General 17

6.2.2 Profiling for TLS 1.3 18

6.2.3 Profiling for TLS 1.2 18

6.3 JWE and JWS profiles 19

6.3.1 General 19

6.3.2 JWE profile 19

6.3.3 JWS profile 20

7 Void 20

Annex A (informative): Other issues 21

A.1 Network Address Translators (NATs) and Transition Gateways (TrGWs) 21

A.2 Filtering routers and firewalls 21

A.3 The relationship between BGs and SEGs 21

Annex B (normative): Security protection for GTP 22

B.0 General 22

B.1 The need for security protection 22

B.2 Policy discrimination of GTP-C and GTP-U 22

B.3 Protection of GTP-C transport protocols and interfaces 23

Annex C (normative): Security protection of IMS protocols 24

C.0 General 24

C.1 The need for security protection 24

C.2 Protection of IMS protocols and interfaces 24

Annex D (normative): Security protection of UTRAN/GERAN IP transport protocols 25

D.0 General 25

D.1 The need for security protection 25

D.2 Protection of UTRAN/GERAN IP transport protocols and interfaces 25

Annex E (informative): Void 26

Annex F (informative): Change history 27

# Foreword

This Technical Specification has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

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x the first digit:

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z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.

# Introduction

An identified security weakness in GPRS systems is the absence of security in the core network. This was formerly perceived not to be a problem, since the GPRS networks previously were the provinces of a small number of large institutions. This is no longer the case, and so there is now a need for security precautions. Another significant development has been the introduction of IP as the network layer in the GPRS backbone network and then later in the UMTS network domain. Furthermore, IP is not only used for signalling traffic, but also for user traffic. The introduction of IP therefore signifies not only a shift towards packet switching, which is a major change by its own accounts, but also a shift towards completely open and easily accessible protocols. The implication is that from a security point of view, a whole new set of threats and risks must be faced.

For UMTS and fixed broadband systems it is a clear goal to be able to protect the core network signalling protocols, and by implication this means that security solutions must be found for both SS7 and IP based protocols.

Starting with LTE, but especially with 5G, security of signalling protocols moves onto the application layer. The current document is the central repository of the protection mechanisms and profiles for these protocols."

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This document is the stage-2 specification for IP related security in the 3GPP and fixed broadband core networks.

The security services that have been identified as being needed are confidentiality, integrity, authentication and anti-replay protection. These will be ensured by standard procedures, based on cryptographic techniques.

# 1 Scope

The present document defines the security architecture for network domain IP based control planes, which shall be applied to NDS/IP-networks (i.e. 3GPP and fixed broadband networks). The scope of network domain control plane security is to cover the control signalling on selected interfaces between network elements of NDS/IP networks. . The present document furthermore serves as a central repository for cryptographic profiles for security above IP layer.

# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.

- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

[1] Void.

[2] 3GPP TR 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".

[3] 3GPP TS 23.002: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and Systems Aspects; Network architecture".

[4] Void.

[5] Void.

[6] 3GPP TS 29.060: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) across the Gn and Gp Interface".

[7] Void.

[8] Void.

[9] Void.

[10] 3GPP TS 33.203: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Access security for IP-based services".

[11] -[25] Void.

[26] RFC‑3554: "On the Use of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) with IPsec".

[27] Void.

[28] 3GPP TS 25.412: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; UTRAN Iu interface signalling transport".

[29] Void.

[30] 3GPP TS 33.310: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Network domain security; Authentication Framework".

[31] RFC-4303: "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"

[32] Void.

[33] Void

[34] Void.

[35] RFC-4301: "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol".

[36] Void.

[37] Void.

[38] 3GPP TS 25.422: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; UTRAN Iur interface signalling transport".

[39] 3GPP TS 25.467: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; UTRAN architecture for 3G Home Node B (HNB); Stage 2".

[40] 3GPP TS 25.468: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; UTRAN Iuh Interface RANAP User Adaption (RUA) signalling".

[41] 3GPP TS 25.471: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Radio Access Network; UTRAN Iurh Interface RNSAP User Adaption (RNA) signalling".

[42] RFC-6311: "Protocol Support for High Availability of IKEv2/IPsec".

[43] RFC-7296: "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)".

[44] IANA: "Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2) Parameters".

[45] Void.

[46] IETF RFC 7515: "JSON Web Signature (JWS)".

[47] IETF RFC 7516: "JSON Web Encryption (JWE)".

[48] IETF RFC 7518: "JSON Web Algorithms (JWA)".

[49] IETF RFC 6347: "Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2".

[50] IETF RFC 5246: "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2".

[51] IETF RFC 8442: "ECDHE\_PSK with AES-GCM and AES-CCM Cipher Suites for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2”.

[52] Void

[53] IETF RFC 2817: "Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1".

[54] Void

[55] IETF RFC 5289: "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)".

[56] Void.

[57] IETF RFC 6066: "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: Extension Definitions".

[58] Void.

[59] IETF RFC 5077: "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Resumption without Server-Side State".

[60] IETF RFC 5746: "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension".

[61] IETF RFC 7627: "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension".

[62] IETF RFC 7919: "Negotiated Finite Field Diffie-Hellman Ephemeral Parameters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)".

[63] Void

[64] IETF RFC 5489: "ECDHE\_PSK Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)".

[65] Void.

[66] IETF RFC 8446: “The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3".

[67] Void.

[68] Void.

[69] IETF RFC 4086: "Randomness Recommendations for Security".

[70] IETF RFC 8221: "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)".

[71] IETF RFC 8422: "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS) ".

[72] IETF RFC 8937: " Randomness Improvements for Security Protocols".

[73] IETF RFC-8247: "Algorithm Implementation Requirements and Usage Guidance for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)".

[74] RFC 9110: "HTTP Semantics".

[75] IETF RFC 9147: "Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.3".

[76] IETF RFC 8750: "Implicit Initialization Vector (IV) for Counter-Based Ciphers in Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)".

[77] RFC 9112: "HTTP/1.1".

[78] IETF RFC 9113: "HTTP/2".

[79] IETF RFC 9325: "Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)".

# 3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations

## 3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [2] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [2].

**Anti-replay protection:** Anti-replay protection is a special case of integrity protection. Its main service is to protect against replay of self-contained packets that already have a cryptographical integrity mechanism in place.

**Confidentiality:** The property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities or processes.

**Data integrity:** The property that data has not been altered in an unauthorised manner.

**Data origin authentication:** The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed.

**Entity authentication:** The provision of assurance of the claimed identity of an entity.

**Key freshness:** A key is fresh if it can be guaranteed to be new, as opposed to an old key being reused through actions of either an adversary or authorised party.

**NDS/IP Traffic:** Traffic that requires protection according to the mechanisms defined in this specification.

**NDS/IP-networks:** 3GPP and fixed broadband networks.

**IPsec Security Association:** A unidirectional logical connection created for security purposes. All traffic traversing a SA is provided the same security protection. The SA itself is a set of parameters to define security protection between two entities. A IPsec Security Association includes the cryptographic algorithms, the keys, the duration of the keys, and other parameters.

**Security Domain**: Networks that are managed by a single administrative authority. Within a security domain the same level of security and usage of security services will be typical.

**Transit Security Domain:** A security domain, which is transmitting NDS/IP traffic between other security domains.

**Transport mode**: Mode of operation that primarily protects the payload of the IP packet, in effect giving protection to higher level layers.

**Tunnel mode**: Mode of operation that protects the whole IP packet by tunnelling it so that the whole packet is protected.

## 3.2 Symbols

For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:

Gi Reference point between GPRS and an external packet data network

Gn Interface between two GSNs within the same PLMN

Gp Interface between two GSNs in different PLMNs. The Gp interface allows support of GPRS network services across areas served by the co-operating GPRS PLMNs

Mm Interface between a CSCF and an IP multimedia network

Mw Interface between a CSCF and another CSCF

Za Interface between SEGs belonging to different networks/security domains

Zb Interface between SEGs and NEs and interface between NEs within the same network/security domain

## 3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

AAA Authentication Authorization Accounting

AES Advanced Encryption Standard

AH Authentication Header

BG Border Gateway

CS Circuit Switched

CSCF Call Session Control Function

DES Data Encryption Standard

DoI Domain of Interpretation

ESP Encapsulating Security Payload

GTP GPRS Tunnelling Protocols

IESG Internet Engineering Steering Group

IETF Internet Engineering Task Force

IKE Internet Key Exchange

IKEv2 Internet Key Exchange version 2

IP Internet Protocol

IPsec IP security - a collection of protocols and algorithms for IP security incl. key mngt.

ISAKMP Internet Security Association Key Management Protocol

IV Initialisation Vector

MAC Message Authentication Code

NAT Network Address Translator

NDS Network Domain Security

NDS/IP NDS for IP based protocols

NE Network Entity

PS Packet Switched

SA Security Association

SAD Security Association Database (sometimes also referred to as SADB)

SEG Security Gateway

SIP Session Initiation Protocol

SPD Security Policy Database (sometimes also referred to as SPDB)

SPI Security Parameters Index

TISPAN Telecoms & Internet converged Services & Protocols for Advanced Networks

TrGW Transition Gateway

# 4 Overview over network domain security for IP based protocols

## 4.1 Introduction

The scope of this section is to outline the basic principles for the network domain security architecture. A central concept introduced in this specification is the notion of a security domain. The security domains are networks that are managed by a single administrative authority. Within a security domain the same level of security and usage of security services will be typical. Typically, a network operated by a single network operator or a single transit operator will constitute one security domain although an operator may at will subsection its network into separate sub-networks.

## 4.2 Protection at the network layer

For native IP-based protocols, security shall be provided at the network layer. The security protocols to be used at the network layer are the IETF defined IPsec security protocols as specified in RFC-4301 [35] .

## 4.3 Security for native IP based protocols

The network domain control plane of an NDS/IP-network is sectioned into security domains and typically these coincide with operator borders. The border between the security domains is protected by Security Gateways (SEGs). The SEGs are responsible for enforcing the security policy of a security domain towards other SEGs in the destination security domain. The network operator may have more than one SEG in its network in order to avoid a single point of failure or for performance reasons. A SEG may be defined for interaction towards all reachable security domain destinations or it may be defined for only a subset of the reachable destinations.

The network domain security of an NDS/IP-network does not extend to the user plane and consequently the security domains and the associated security gateways towards other domains do not encompass the user plane Gi-interface towards other, possibly external, IP networks.

A chained-tunnel/hub-and-spoke approach is used which facilitates hop-by-hop based security protection between security domains.

Within a security domain the use of Transport Mode is allowed.All NDS/IP traffic shall pass through a SEG before entering or leaving the security domain.

## 4.4 Security domains

### 4.4.1 Security domains and interfaces

The network domain of an NDS/IP-network shall be logically and physically divided into security domains. These control plane security domains may closely correspond to the core network of a single operator and shall be separated by means of security gateways.

## 4.5 Security Gateways (SEGs)

Security Gateways (SEGs) are entities on the borders of the IP security domains and will be used for securing native IP based protocols. The SEGs are defined to handle communication over the Za-interface, which is located between SEGs from different IP security domains.

All NDS/IP traffic shall pass through a SEG before entering or leaving the security domain. Each security domain can have one or more SEGs. Each SEG will be defined to handle NDS/IP traffic in or out of the security domain towards a well-defined set of reachable IP security domains.

The number of SEGs in a security domain will depend on the need to differentiate between the externally reachable destinations, the need to balance the traffic load and to avoid single points of failure. The security gateways shall be responsible for enforcing security policies for the interworking between networks. The security may include filtering policies and firewall functionality not required in this specification.

SEGs are responsible for security sensitive operations and shall be physically secured. They shall offer capabilities for secure storage of long-term keys used for IKE authentication.

# 5 Key management and distribution architecture for NDS/IP

## 5.1 Security services afforded to the protocols

IPsec offers a set of security services, which is determined by the negotiated IPsec security associations. That is, the IPsec SA defines which security protocol to be used, the mode and the endpoints of the SA.

For NDS/IP-networks the IPsec security protocol shall always be ESP. For NDS/IP-networks it is further mandated that integrity protection/message authentication together with anti-replay protection shall always be used.

The security services provided by NDS/IP:

- data integrity;

- data origin authentication;

- anti-replay protection;

- confidentiality (optional);

- limited protection against traffic flow analysis when confidentiality is applied.

## 5.2 Security Associations (SAs)

### 5.2.0 General

For NDS/IP-networks the key management and distribution between SEGs is handled by the protocol Internet Key Exchange Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) (RFC 7296 [43]). The main purpose of IKEv2 is to negotiate, establish and maintain Security Associations between parties that are to establish secure connections. The concept of a Security Association is central to IPsec and IKEv2.

To secure a typical, bi-directional communication between two nodes using IKEv2 an IKE SA is established through which the Child Security associations i.e. IPsec security associations are established.

IPsec Security associations are uniquely defined by the following parameters:

- A Security Parameter Index (SPI);

- An IP Destination Address (this is the address of the ESP SA endpoint);

- A security protocol identifier (this will always be the ESP protocol in NDS/IP).

With regard to the use of IPsec security associations in the network domain control plane of NDS/IP-networks the following is noted:

- NDS/IP only requires support for ESP SAs;

The specification of IPsec SAs can be found in RFC4301 [35].

### 5.2.1 Security Policy Database (SPD)

The Security Policy Database (SPD) is a policy instrument to decide which security services are to be offered and in what fashion.

The SPD shall be consulted during processing of both inbound and outbound traffic. This also includes traffic that shall not/need not be protected by IPsec. In order to achieve this, the SPD shall have unique entries for both inbound and outbound traffic such that the SPD can discriminate among traffic that shall be protected by IPsec, that shall bypass IPsec or that shall be discarded by IPsec.

The SPD plays a central role when defining security policies, both within the internal security domain and towards external security domains. The security policy towards external security domains will be subject to roaming agreements.

### 5.2.2 Security Association Database (SAD)

The Security Association Database (SAD) contains parameters that are associated with the active security associations. Every SA has an entry in the SAD. For outbound processing, a lookup in the SPD will point to an entry in the SAD. If an SPD entry does not point to an SA that is appropriate for the packet, an SA shall be automatically created.

## 5.3 Profiling of IPsec

### 5.3.0 General

This section gives an overview of the features of IPsec that are used by NDS/IP. The overview given here defines a minimum set of features that shall be supported. In particular, this minimum set of features is required for interworking purposes and constitutes a well-defined set of simplifications.

The accumulated effect of the simplifications is quite significant in terms of reduced complexity. This is achieved without sacrificing security in any way. It shall be noted explicitly that the simplifications are specified for NDS/IP and that they may not necessarily be valid for other network constellations and usages.

Within their own network, operators are free to use IPsec features not described in this section although there should be no security or functional reason to do so.

NOTE: Void

Clause 5.3 contains the general 3GPP IPsec ESP profile. Other 3GPP specifications (e.g. TS 33.203 [10], etc.) may point to clause 5.3. Thus parts of clause 5.3 may also apply to devices and network nodes as specified in other specifications. New specifications using ESP should refer to this profile with as few exceptions as possible. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the 3GPP ESP profile apply for all uses of ESP to protect 3GPP interfaces

### 5.3.1 Support of ESP

When NDS/IP is applied, the ESP security protocol shall be used. IPsec ESP shall be supported according to RFC-4303 [31]. Extended sequence number may be supported. Usage guidance for the Implementation of Cryptographic Algorithm for ESP shall follow RFC-8221[70].

NOTE: Void

### 5.3.2 Support of tunnel mode

Since security gateways are an integral part of the NDS/IP architecture, tunnel mode shall be supported. For NDS/IP inter-domain communication, security gateways shall be used and consequently only tunnel mode (RFC-4301 [35]]) is applicable for this case.

### 5.3.3 Support of ESP encryption transforms

The implementation conformance requirements for ESP encryption transforms (including authenticated encryption transforms) in RFC 8221 [69] shall be followed.

Only the ESP encryption algorithms (including authenticated encryption algorithms) mentioned in RFC 8221 [70] or RFC 8750 [76] shall be used. Algorithms marked with "MUST" shall be supported. However, for IV generation, initiators may propose implicit IV variant of algorithms as defined in RFC 8750 [76], while negotiating the ESP encryption transforms, as they have higher performance.

### 5.3.4 Support of ESP authentication transforms

The implementation conformance requirements for ESP authentication transforms in RFC 8221 [70] shall be followed.

Only the ESP authentication algorithms mentioned in RFC 8221 [70] shall be used. Algorithms marked with "MUST" shall be supported. AES-GMAC with AES-128 shall be supported.

ESP shall always be used to provide integrity, data origin authentication, and anti-replay services, thus the NULL authentication algorithm is explicitly not allowed for use, unless an authenticated encryption algorithm is used.

### 5.3.5 Requirements on the construction of the IV

The following strengthening of the requirements on how to construct the IV shall take precedence over the description given in RFC‑2451 [24] section 3 and all other descriptions that allow for predictable IVs.

- For CBC mode: the IV field shall be the same size as the block size of the cipher algorithm being used. The IV shall be chosen at random, and shall be unpredictable to any party other than the originator.

- For CTR, GCM, CCM, ChaCha20-Poly1305 and GMAC mode: the IV field is 8 octets. The IV shall be generated in a manner that ensures uniqueness. The same IV and key combination shall not be used more than once. - It is explicitly not allowed to construct the IV from the encrypted data of the preceding encryption process. It is explicitly not allowed to use a random IV.

The previously common practice of constructing an IV in CBC mode from the encrypted data of the preceding encryption process means that the IV is disclosed before it is used. A predictable IV exposes IPsec to certain attacks irrespective of the strength of the underlying cipher algorithm. The first bullet point forbids this practice in the context of NDS/IP.

These requirements on CBC mode imply that the network elements shall have a capability to generate random data. RFC 4086 [69] gives guidelines for hardware and software pseudorandom number generators.

## 5.4 Profiling of IKEv2

### 5.4.0 General

Clause 5.4 contains the general 3GPP IKEv2 profile. Other 3GPP specifications point to clause 5.4. Thus parts of clause 5.4 may also apply to devices and network nodes as specified in other specifications. New specifications using IKE should refer to this profile with as few exceptions as possible. Unless explicitly stated otherwise, the 3GPP IKEv2 profile apply for all uses of IKEv2 to protect 3GPP interfaces.

NOTE 1: Clause 6.2.1b of TS 33.310 [30] provides additional requirements to the general 3GPP IKEv2 profile when certificate based IKEv2 authentication is used.

NOTE 2: For implementation requirements and usage guidance for IKEv2, RFC 7296 [43] has been updated in RFC 8247 [73]. In this case, RFC 8247 [73] and the present document takes precedence over RFC 7296 [43].

### 5.4.1 Void

### 5.4.2 Profiling of IKEv2

The Internet Key Exchange protocol IKEv2 shall be supported for negotiation of IPsec SAs. The following additional requirements apply.

**General:**

IKEv2 Configuration Payload as defined in RFC 7296 [43] should be supported.

Protocol support for High Availability as defined in RFC 6311 [42] should be supported.

An ephemeral private key shall be used in exactly one key establishment transaction and shall be destroyed (zeroized) as soon as possible.

**For IKE\_SA\_INIT exchange:**

The following algorithms are listed with their names according to [44].

Following algorithms shall be supported:

- Confidentiality: AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV with 128-bit key length;

- Pseudo-random function: PRF\_HMAC\_SHA2\_256;

- Diffie-Hellman group 19 (256-bit random ECP group) ;

Following algorithms should be supported:

- Confidentiality: AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV with 256-bit key length;

- Pseudo-random function: PRF\_HMAC\_SHA2\_384;

- Diffie-Hellman group 20 (384-bit random ECP group).

- Diffie-Hellman group 31 (Curve25519).

NOTE 1: The IANA IKEv2 registry [44] contains further references for the algorithms listed.

For security reasons, the use of Diffie-Hellman MODP groups less than 2048-bit shall not be supported.

**For IKE\_AUTH exchange:**

- Authentication method 2 - Shared Key Message Integrity Code shall be supported;

- IP addresses and Fully Qualified Domain Names (FQDN) shall be supported for identification;

- Re-keying of IPsec SAs and IKE SAs shall be supported as specified in RFC 7296 [43].

- In addition to the requirements defined in RFC 7296 [43], rekeying shall not lead to a noticeable degradation of service.

- Identification Payloads (IDi and IDr) shall not be used for the IKEv2 authentication but may be used for policy lookup.

**For the CREATE\_CHILD\_SA exchange:**

- A DH key exchange should be used (giving Perfect Forward Secrecy) and the session keys should be changed frequently.

**For reauthentication:**

- Reauthentication of IKE SAs as specified in RFC 7296 [43] section 2.8.3 shall be supported;

- A NE shall proactively initiate reauthentication of IKE SAs, and creation of its Child SAs, i.e. the new SAs shall be established before the old ones expire;

- A NE shall destroy an IKE SA and its Child SAs when the authentication lifetime of the IKE SA expires;

NOTE 2: NE actions related to reauthentication are controlled by locally configured lifetimes according to RFC 4301 [35]: a soft authentication lifetime that warns the implementation to initiate reauthentication, and a hard authentication lifetime when the current IKE SA and its Child SAs are destroyed.

- In addition to the requirements defined in RFC 7296 [43], reauthentication shall not lead to a noticeable degradation of service.

### 5.4.3 Void

## 5.5 Security policy granularity

The policy control granularity afforded by NDS/IP is determined by the degree of control with respect to the ESP Security Association between the NEs or SEGs. The normal mode of operation is that only one ESP Security Association is used between any two NEs or SEGs, and therefore the security policy will be identical to all secured traffic passing between the NEs.

This is consistent with the overall NDS/IP concept of security domains, which should have the same security policy in force for all traffic within the security domain. The actual inter-security domain policy is determined by roaming agreements when the security domains belong to different operators or may be unilaterally decided by the operator when the security domains both belong to him. IPsec security policy enforcement for inter-security domain communication is a matter for the SEGs of the communicating security domains.

## 5.6 Network domain security key management and distribution architecture for native IP based protocols

### 5.6.1 Network domain security architecture outline

The NDS/IP key management and distribution architecture is based on the IKEv2 (RFC 7296 [43]) protocol. As described in the previous section a number of options available in the full IETF IPsec protocol suite have been considered to be unnecessary for NDS/IP. Furthermore, some features that are optional in IETF IPsec have been mandated for NDS/IP and lastly a few required features in IETF IPsec have been deprecated for use within NDS/IP scope. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 give an overview over the profiling of IPsec and IKEv2 in NDS/IP.

The compound effect of the design choices in how IPsec is utilized within the NDS/IP scope is that the NDS/IP key management and distribution architecture is quite simple and straightforward.

The basic idea to the NDS/IP architecture is to provide hop-by-hop security. This is in accordance with the *chained-tunnels* or *hub-and-spoke* models of operation. The use of hop-by-hop security also makes it easy to operate separate security policies internally and towards other external security domains.

In NDS/IP only the Security Gateways (SEGs) shall engage in direct communication with entities in other security domains for NDS/IP traffic. The SEGs will then establish and maintain IPsec secured ESP Security Association in tunnel mode between security domains. SEGs will normally maintain at least one IPsec tunnel available at all times to a particular peer SEG. The SEG will maintain logically separate SAD and SPD databases for each interface.

The NEs may be able to establish and maintain ESP Security Associations as needed towards a SEG or other NEs within the same security domain. All NDS/IP traffic from a NE in one security domain towards a NE in a different security domain will be routed via a SEG and will be afforded hop-by-hop security protection towards the final destination.

Operators may decide to establish only one ESP Security Association between two communicating security domains. This would make for coarse-grained security granularity. The benefits to this is that it gives a certain amount of protection against traffic flow analysis while the drawback is that one will not be able to differentiate the security protection given between the communicating entities. This does not preclude negotiation of finer grained security granularity at the discretion of the communicating entities.



Figure 1: NDS architecture for IP-based protocols

Additional guidelines on how to apply IPsec in SCTP are specified in RFC3554 [26]. This RFC is optional for implementation unless otherwise explicitly indicated per reference point.

NOTE: TS 33.310 [30] defines an inter-operator Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) that can be used to support the establishment of IPsec connections.

### 5.6.2 Interface description

The following interfaces are defined for protection of native IP based protocols:

**- Za-interface (SEG-SEG)**

 The Za-interface covers all NDS/IP traffic between security domains. On the Za-interface, authentication/integrity protection is mandatory and encryption is recommended. ESP shall be used for providing authentication/integrity protection and encryption. The SEGs use IKEv2 to negotiate, establish and maintain a secure ESP tunnel between them. The tunnel is subsequently used for forwarding NDS/IP traffic between security domain A and security domain B. Inter-SEG tunnels can be available at all times, but they can also be established as needed.

 One SEG of security domain A can be dedicated to only serve a certain subset of security domains that security domain A needs to communicate with. This will limit the number of SAs and tunnels that need to be maintained.

 All security domains compliant with the present document shall operate the Za-interface.

NOTE 1: It is possible to use transit security domains between other security domains. The Za interface is used to protect the interface between the transit security domain and other security domains. If there are multiple transit security domains between two security domains then Za-interface is used to protect interfaces between transit security domains.

NOTE 2: Further details about the usage of encryption in specific cases are provided in the (normative) Annexes of the present document and in other 3GPP specifications referencing the present document.

**- Zb-interface (NE-SEG / NE-NE)**

 The Zb-interface is located between SEGs and NEs and between NEs within the same security domain. The Zb-interface is optional for implementation. If implemented, it shall implement ESP in tunnel mode and IKE as described in clause 5.4. The support of ESP in Transport mode is optional.

 On the Zb-interface, ESP shall always be used with authentication/integrity protection. The use of encryption is optional. The ESP Security Association shall be used for all control plane traffic that needs security protection.

 Whether the Security Association is established when needed or a priori is for the security domain operator to decide. The Security Association is subsequently used for exchange of NDS/IP traffic between the nodes.

NOTE 3: The security policy established over the Za-interface may be subject to roaming agreements. This differs from the security policy enforced over the Zb-interface, which is unilaterally decided by the security domain operator.

NOTE 4: There is normally no NE-NE interface for NEs belonging to separate security domains. This is because it is important to have a clear separation between the security domains. This is particularly relevant when different security policies are employed whithin the security domain and towards external destinations.

 The restriction not to allow secure inter-domain NE-NE communication does not preclude a single physical entity to contain both NE and SEG functionality. It is observed that SEGs are responsible for enforcing security policies towards external destinations and that a combined NE/SEG would have the same responsibility towards external destinations. The exact SEG functionality required to allow for secure inter-domain NE🡨🡪NE communication will be subject to the actual security policies being employed. Thus, it will be possible to have secure direct inter-domain NE🡨🡪NE communication within the framework of NDS/IP if both NEs have implemented SEG functionality. If a NE and SEG is combined in one physical entity, the SEG functionality of the combined unit should not be used by other NEs towards external security domains.

# 6 Other 3GPP profiles

## 6.1 General

The present document also serves as a repository for 3GPP profiles of protocols above the IP layer. These are collected in the present clause.

## 6.2 TLS protocol profiles

## 6.2.1 General

The present clause contains the general 3GPP TLS profile. Other 3GPP specifications point to the present clause. Thus, parts of the present clause may also apply to devices and network nodes as specified in other specifications. New specifications using TLS should refer to this profile with as few exceptions as possible.

NOTE 1: Recommendations for Secure Use of TLS and DTLS can be found in RFC 9325 [79] and RFC 9113 [78].

NOTE 2: DTLS 1.2 as specified in RFC 6347 [49] is based on TLS 1.2. DTLS 1.3 as specified in RFC 9147 [75] is based on TLS 1.3. Hence all requirements defined in this profile apply to DTLS protocol as well.

TLS end points shall support TLS with the following restrictions and extensions:

**TLS versions**

- SSL 1.0, SSL 2.0, SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0, TLS 1.1 and DTLS 1.0 shall not be supported.

- TLS 1.2 as specified in RFC 5246 [50] shall be supported. TLS 1.3 as specified in RFC 8446 [66] shall be supported. If DTLS is supported then DTLS 1.2 as specified in RFC 6347 [49] shall be supported and DTLS 1.3 as specified in RFC 9147 [75] should be supported.

**Other**

- If the TLS connection is used to transport HTTP/2 over TLS, then the additional requirements specified in RFC 9113 [78] shall be followed.

- If the TLS connection is used to transport HTTP over TLS as specified in RFC 9110 [74], then the client shall not establish a connection "upgraded to TLS Within HTTP/1.1" per RFC 9110 [74] and per RFC 9112 [77] but shall only establish the tunnel over a raw TCP connection.

## 6.2.2 Profiling for TLS 1.3

For TLS 1.3 the following restrictions and extensions shall apply:

**TLS cipher suites and Diffie-Hellman groups**

- The requirements given in section 9.1 of TLS 1.3 RFC 8446 [66] shall be followed. In addition:

- Key exchange with secp384r1 should be supported.

- Ffdhe2048 shall not be supported.

- For HTTP/2 over TLS 1.3, then the additional requirements specified in section 9.2.3 of RFC 9113 [78] shall be followed.

**TLS signature schemes**

- ecdsa\_secp384r1\_sha384 should be supported.

**TLS PSK key exchange modes**

- psk\_ke shall not be supported.

**TLS cipher suites**

- TLS\_SHA256\_SHA256 and TLS\_SHA384\_SHA384 shall not be supported.

**TLS extensions**

- The requirements given in sections 4.2 and 9.2 of TLS 1.3 RFC 8446 [66] and in RFC 9325 [79] shall be followed. In addition:

- The TLS Certificate Status Request extension (i.e., "OCSP stapling") as defined in RFC 6066 [57] and RFC 8446 [66] should be supported.

- For HTTP/2 over TLS 1.3, then the additional requirements specified in section 9.2.3 of RFC 9113 [78] shall be followed. Specifically, HTTP/2 servers shall not send post-handshake TLS 1.3 CertificateRequest messages and the prohibition on post-handshake authentication applies even if the client offered the "post\_handshake\_auth" TLS extension.

## 6.2.3 Profiling for TLS 1.2

TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246 [50]) shall support the following restrictions and extensions:

**TLS cipher suites**

- The rules on allowed cipher suites given in TLS 1.2 (RFC 5246 [50]) shall be followed.

- In addition, the following cipher suites are mandatory to support and recommended to use:

- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [55]

- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 5289 [55]

- Support of the following cipher suites is recommended:

- TLS\_ECDHE\_ECDSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 [55]

- TLS\_ECDHE\_RSA\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 5289 [55]

- Only cipher suites with AEAD (e.g. GCM) and PFS (i.e., ECDHE) shall be supported.

**Diffie-Hellman groups**

- For ECDHE, the curve secp256r1 (P-256) as defined in RFC 8422 [71] shall be supported, secp384r1 (P-384) as defined in RFC 8422 [71] should be supported. Except x25519, elliptic curve groups of less than 256 bits shall not be supported.

- Finite field Diffie-Hellman (i.e. DHE) shall not be supported.

**TLS hash algorithms and signature algorithms**

- Hash algorithms: SHA-256 shall be supported. SHA-384 should be supported. MD5 and SHA-1 shall not be supported.

- Signature algorithms: ecdsa, rsa\_pss\_rsae, and rsa\_pkcs1 shall be supported. Usage of rsa\_pkcs1 is not recommended.

- ecdsa\_secp384r1\_sha384 should be supported.

**TLS compression**

- The “null” compression method as specified in TLS 1.2 RFC 5246 [50] is mandatory to support. All other compression methods shall not be supported.

**TLS extensions**

- If TLS Extensions are used in conjunction with TLS, then for RFC 6066 [57] shall apply.

- The Server Name Indication (SNI) extension defined in RFC 6066 [57] shall be supported.

- The Truncated HMAC extension, defined in RFC 6066 [57] shall not be supported.

- TLS Session Resumption based on RFC 5246 [50] or RFC 5077 [59] should be supported.

- TLS servers and TLS clients shall support RFC 5746 [60]. The server shall accept client-initiated renegotiation only if secured according to RFC 5746 [60].

* The Extended Master Secret extension, defined in RFC 7627 [61] shall be supported.
* Signature Algorithms, defined in RFC 5246 [50] shall be supported.

- The Supported Groups extension, defined in RFC 8422 [71] and RFC 7919 [62] shall be supported.

- The OCSP Status (a.k.a. certificate status request) extension, defined in RFC 6066 [57] should be supported.

**PSK cipher suites**

- If pre-shared key (psk) cipher suites are implemented in TLS, then RFC 5489 [64] shall apply and the following cipher suites are mandatory to support and recommended to use:

- TLS\_ECDHE\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_128\_GCM\_SHA256 as defined in RFC 8442 [51].

- Support of the following cipher suite is recommended:

- TLS\_ECDHE\_PSK\_WITH\_AES\_256\_GCM\_SHA384 as defined in RFC 8442 [51].

## 6.3 JWE and JWS profiles

### 6.3.1 General

JWS (JSON Web Signature) [46] and JWE (JSON Web Encryption) [47] are used to integrity protect and encrypt JSON objects. The JWE profile and JWS profile describe the restrictions and extensions to the RFCs for 3GPP entities or functions that support JWS and/or JWE.

The cipher suites used in clause 6.2 are described in RFC 7518 [48].

### 6.3.2 JWE profile

All entities and functions that support JWE according to RFC 7516 [47] shall follow the following restrictions and extensions:

"enc" parameter A128GCM (AES GCM with a 128-bit key) shall be supported. "enc" parameter A256GCM (AES GCM using 256-bit key) should be supported.

"alg" parameter "dir" (Direct use of a shared symmetric key as the CEK) shall be supported.

If ECDH is used as a key agreement protocol, the receiving party shall perform public key validation and check that the received public key is on the agreed upon curve.

### 6.3.3 JWS profile

All entities and functions that support JWS according to RFC 7515 [46] shall follow the following restrictions and extensions:

"alg" parameter ES256 (ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256) shall be supported.

The "none" "alg" parameter shall not be supported.

The "kid" field shall be supported. End points may establish the expected signing algorithm and associated keys out-of-band (e.g. N32-c) and use this field to pass a key identifier. If the “kid” field is used the end point shall check the indicated “alg” matches that specified by the parameters.

If an end point has established a public key and algorithm out of band (e.g. N32-c) and the "kid" field is not used, then the end point shall check the indicated "alg" parameter against the established algorithm

The "jwk" field shall not be supported.

# 7 Void

Annex A (informative):
Other issues

# A.1 Network Address Translators (NATs) and Transition Gateways (TrGWs)

Network Address Translators (NATs) are not designed to be part of the network domain control plane of NDS/IP-networks. Since network domain security employs a chained-tunnel approach it may be possible to use NATs provided that the network is carefully configured.

NDS/IP provides no explicit support for Transition Gateways (TrGWs) to be used in the network domain control plane of NDS/IP-networks, but the NDS/IP architecture will not itself prohibit the use of TrGWs. However, the inclusion of TrGWs needs to be carefully executed in order not to create interoperability problems.

# A.2 Filtering routers and firewalls

In order to strengthen the security for IP based networks, border gateways and access routers would normally use packet filtering strategies to prevent certain types of traffic to pass in or out of the network. Similarly, firewalls are used as an additional measure to prevent certain types of accesses towards the network.

The rationale behind the application of packet filters and firewalls could be found in the security policy of the network operator. Preferably, the security policy would be an integral part of the network management strategy as a whole.

While network operators are strongly encouraged to use filtering routers and firewalls, the usage, implementation and security policies associated with these are considered outside the scope of this document.

Simple filtering may be needed before the Security Gateway (SEG) functionality. The filtering policy allosw key protocols such as DNS and NTP to pass. This will include traffic over the Za interface from IKEv2 and IPsec ESP in tunnel mode. Unsolicited traffic is rejected.

# A.3 The relationship between BGs and SEGs

It is observed that GPRS Border Gateways (BG) and NDS/IP Security Gateways (SEGs) will both reside at the border of an operator network.

Annex B (normative):
Security protection for GTP

# B.0 General

This section details how NDS/IP shall be used when GTP is to be security protected.

# B.1 The need for security protection

The GPRS Tunnelling Protocol (GTP) is defined in 3GPP TS 29.060 [6]. The GTP protocol includes both the GTP control plane signalling (GTP-C) and user plane data transfer (GTP-U) procedures. GTP is defined for Gn interface, i.e. the interface between GSNs within a PLMN, and for the Gp interface between GSNs in different PLMNs.

GTP-C is used for traffic that that is sensitive in various ways including traffic that is:

- critical with respect to both the internal integrity and consistency of the network;

- essential in order to provide the user with the required services;

- crucial in order to protect the user data in the access network and that might compromise the security of the user data should it be revealed.

Amongst the data that clearly can be considered sensitive are the mobility management messages, the authentication data and MM context data. Therefore, it is necessary to apply security protection to GTP signalling messages (GTP-C).

Network domain security is not intended to cover protection of user plane data and hence GTP-U is not protected by NDS/IP mechanisms.

Table 1 presents a list of GTP interfaces that shall be considered by NDS/IP.

Table 1: GTP Interfaces that are affected by NDS/IP

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| Interface | Description | Affected protocol |
| Gn | Interface between GSNs within the same network | GTP |
| Gp | Interface between GSNs in different PLMNs. | GTP |

# B.2 Policy discrimination of GTP-C and GTP-U

It shall be possible to discriminate between GTP-C messages, which shall receive protection, and other messages, including GTP-U, that shall not be protected. Since GTP-C is assigned a unique UDP port-number in (TS29.060 [6]) IPsec can easily distinguish GTP-C datagrams from other datagrams that may not need IPsec protection.

Security policies shall be checked for all traffic (both incoming and outgoing) so datagrams can be processed in the following ways:

- discard the datagram;

- bypass the datagram (do not apply IPsec);

- apply IPsec.

Under this regime GTP-U will simply bypass IPsec while GTP-C will be further processed by IPsec in order to provide the required level of protection. The SPD has a pointer to an entry in the Security Association Database (SAD) which details the actual protection to be applied to the datagram.

NOTE 1: Selective protection of GTP-C relies on the ability to uniquely distinguish GTP-C datagrams from GTP-U datagrams. For R99 and onwards this is achieved by having unique port number assignments to GTP-C and GTP-U. For previous version of GTP this is not the case and provision of selective protection for the control plane parts of pre-R99 versions of GTP is not possible. Although NDS/IP was not designed for protection of pre-R99 versions of GTP, it is recognized that NDS/IP may also be used for protection of GTP pre-R99. It should be noted that NDS/IP support for pre-R99 versions of GTP is not mandatory.

NOTE 2: NDS/IP has been designed to protect control plane protocols. However, it is recognized that NDS/IP may also be used to protect GTP-U. It should be noted that NDS/IP support for GTP-U is outside the scope of this specification.

# B.3 Protection of GTP-C transport protocols and interfaces

IPsec ESP shall be used with both encryption and integrity protection for all GTP-C messages traversing inter-security domain boundaries.

Gn and Gp control plane traffic shall be routed via a SEG when it takes place between different security domains. In order to do so, operators shall operate NDS/IP Za-interface between SEGs. If a network node has implemented SEG functionality within the same physical entity, transport mode IPsec is optional for implementation and use on the Gn and Gp interfaces.

It will be for the operator to decide whether and where to deploy Zb-interfaces in order to protect the GTP-C messages over the Gn and Gp interfaces within the same security domain.

Annex C (normative):
Security protection of IMS protocols

# C.0 General

This section details how NDS/IP shall be used to protect IMS protocols and interfaces. The network domain security for IMS in 3GPP2 networks shall be as specified in in Annex S.5 of TS 33.203[10].

# C.1 The need for security protection

The security architecture of the IP multimedia Core Network Subsystem (IMS) is specified in 3GPP TS 33.203 [10]. 3GPP TS 33.203 [10] defines that the confidentiality and integrity protection for SIP-signalling are provided in a hop-by-hop fashion.

The first hop i.e. between the UE and the P‑CSCF through the IMS access network (i.e. Gm reference point) is protected by security mechanisms specified in 3GPP TS 33.203 [10].

The other hops, within the IMS core network including interfaces within the same security domain or between different security domains are protected by NDS/IP security mechanisms as specified by this Technical Specification.

3GPP TS 23.002 [3] specifies the different reference points defined for IMS.

# C.2 Protection of IMS protocols and interfaces

IMS control plane traffic within the IMS core network shall be routed via a SEG when it takes place between different security domains (in particular over those interfaces that may exist between different IMS operator domains). In order to do so, IMS operators shall operate NDS/IP Za-interface between SEGs as described in clause 5.6.2.

When SEGs are deployed to secure a Za reference point potentially carrying IMS session keys (i.e. in IMS roaming scenarios, when SEGs are deployed between a P-CSCF and I-CSCF located in different security domains), IPsec ESP shall be used with both encryption and integrity protection for all SIP signalling traversing inter-security domain boundaries.

It will be for the IMS operator to decide whether and where to deploy Zb-interfaces in order to protect the IMS control plane traffic over those IMS interfaces within the same security domain.

Annex D (normative):
Security protection of UTRAN/GERAN IP transport protocols

# D.0 General

This annex details how NDS/IP shall be used to protect UTRAN/GERAN IP transport protocols and interfaces.

# D.1 The need for security protection

The control plane in question is used to transfer signalling messages in UTRAN/GERAN IP transport network. The UTRAN IP transport option is specified in Rel-5 UTRAN Technical Specifications. UTRAN Iu interface signalling transport is specified in 3GPP TS 25.412 [28] and Iur interface signalling transport in TS 25.422 [38]. The architecture for the UTRAN Iuh/Iurh interfaces is specified in 3GPP TS 25.467 [39], stage 3 specification is contained in 3GPP TS 25.468 [40] and TS 25.471 [41]. Based on the known security threats in IP networking, the traffic shall be protected properly. This is in order not to restrict the application of IP in UTRAN and GERAN only to closed network environments.

The security solution for IP based UTRAN/GERAN transport shall follow the principles introduced in the NDS/IP since the IPsec provides application independent security solution for all IP traffic.

Iu/Iuh and Iur/Iurh interfaces are carrying information that is classified as sensitive. Iu/Iuh and Iur/Iurh are used for conveying e.g. subscriber specific security keys. These keys are vital for the end-user security. Hence Iu/Iuh and Iur/Iurh shall be encrypted along with the integrity check.

# D.2 Protection of UTRAN/GERAN IP transport protocols and interfaces

IPsec ESP shall be used with both encryption and integrity protection for all RANAP and RNSAP messages traversing inter-security domain boundaries.

Iu/Iuh and Iur/Iurh control plane traffic shall be routed via a SEG when it takes place between different security domains (in particular over those interfaces that may exist between different operator domains). In order to do so, operators shall operate NDS/IP Za-interface between SEGs. If a UTRAN node has implemented SEG functionality within the same physical entity, transport mode IPsec is optional for implementation and use on the Iur/Iurh interface.

It will be for the operator to decide whether and where to deploy Zb-interfaces in order to protect the RANAP and RNSAP messages over the Iu/Iuh and Iur/Iurh interfaces within the same security domain.

Annex E (informative):
Void

Annex F (informative):
Change history

|  |
| --- |
| **Change history** |
| **Date** | **TSG #** | **TSG Doc.** | **CR** | **Rev** | **Subject/Comment** | **Old** | **New** | **WI** |
| 03-2002 | SA\_15 | SP-020117 | - | - | Approved at TSG SA#15 and placed under change control | 2.0.0 | 5.0.0 |  |
| 06-2002 | SA\_16 | SP-020355 | 0001 |  | NDS/IP Confidentiality protection for IMS session keys | 5.0.0 | 5.1.0 |  |
| 06-2002 | SA\_16 | SP-020356 | 0002 |  | Strengthening the requirements on IV construction to prevent attacks based on predictable IV | 5.0.0 | 5.1.0 |  |
| 12-2002 | SA\_18 | SP-020719 | 0003 |  | Adding requirement to provide mandatory support for 3DES encryption in NDS/IP.Remove AES references and dependencies | 5.1.0 | 5.2.0 |  |
| 12-2002 | SA\_18 | SP-020720 | 0004 |  | Securing UTRAN/GERAN IP Transport interfaces and specifically the Iu interface with NDS/IP mechanisms (Implemented after Rel-5 CR 003 included) | 5.1.0 | 6.0.0 | SECNDSIP |
| 03-2003 | SA\_19 | SP-030104 | 0006 |  | Za-interface and roaming agreements | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | SECNDSIP |
| 03-2003 | SA\_19 | SP-030105 | 0008 |  | Clarification to the re-keying aspects of network domain security | 6.0.0 | 6.1.0 | SECNDSIP |
| 06-2003 | SA\_20 | SP-030225 | 0010 |  | Use of IPsec ESP with encryption on the Za-interface | 6.1.0 | 6.2.0 | SECNDSIP |
| 09-2003 | SA\_21 | SP-030488 | 0012 |  | Change of IKE profiling | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | SECNDSIP |
| 09-2003 | SA\_21 | SP-030489 | 0014 |  | Update draft-ietf-ipsec-sctp-04.txt reference to new standard RFC: RFC 3554 | 6.2.0 | 6.3.0 | SECNDSIP |
| 03-2004 | SA\_23 | SP-040153 | 0015 | - | Addition of AES transform | 6.3.0 | 6.4.0 | SECNDSIP |
| 06-2004 | SA\_24 | SP-040374 | 0016 | - | Diffie-Hellman groups in NDS/IP | 6.4.0 | 6.5.0 | SEC-NDS-IP |
| 2005-12 | SP- 30 | SP-050841 | 0017 | 2 | Extension of scope to encompass TISPAN NGN | 6.5.0 | 7.0.0 | FBI |
| 2006-09 | SP-33 | SP-060492 | 0019 | - | Clarifying the use of RFC3554 | 7.0.0 | 7.1.0 | SEC1-NDS |
| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060808 | 0020 | 1 | Clarifying the use of transit security domains | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | SEC7-NDS |
| 2006-12 | SP-34 | SP-060808 | 0021 | 1 | Addition of reference to NDS/AF specification | 7.1.0 | 7.2.0 | SEC7-NDS |
| 2007-09 | SP-37 | SP-070590 | 0022 | 1 | Clarification on the use of the IPsec mode for the Zb-reference point | 7.2.0 | 7.3.0 | SEC1-NDS |
| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080142 | 0024 | - | Introducing the support of IKEv2 for EPS | 7.3.0 | 8.0.0 | SAES |
| 2008-03 | SP-39 | SP-080142 | 0025 | 1 | Introducing the support of RFC-4303 for EPS | 7.3.0 | 8.0.0 | SAES |
| 2008-09 | SP-41 | SP-080544 | 0023 | 3 | Introduction of Network Domain Security support for 3GPP2 IMS | 8.0.0 | 8.1.0 | IMS-Sec |
| 2008-12 | SP-42 | SP-080747 | 0026 | - | Update of IKEv2 SA profile | 8.1.0 | 8.2.0 | TEI8 |
| 2009-06 | SP-44 | SP-090273 | 0027 | -- | Clarification about the encryption on Za reference point | 8.2.0 | 8.3.0 | TEI8 |
| 2009-12 | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-9 version (MCC) | 8.3.0 | 9.0.0 | - |
| 2010-06 | SP-48 | SP-100251 | 0028 | - | Correction of explanations of abbreviations CSCF and IKEvx | 9.0.0 | 9.1.0 | TEI9 |
| 2010-10 | SP-49 | SP-100474 | 0029 | 2 | IPsec Alignment | 9.1.0 | 10.0.0 | TEI10 |
| 2010-10 | SP-49 | SP-100482 | 0031 | - | Clarification on usage of ESP authentication and encryption transforms | 9.1.0 | 10.0.0 | TEI10 |
| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100731 | 0033 | - | NDS corrections | 10.0.0 | 10.1.0 | TEI10 |
| 2010-12 | SP-50 | SP-100833 | 0034 | 2 | Correction of IKEv2 references and IKE usage | 10.1.0 | 11.0.0 | TEI11 |
| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110019 | 0036 | 1 | Correction of Iur security | 11.0.0 | 11.1.0 | TEI10 |
| 2011-03 | SP-51 | SP-110020 | 0038 | 1 | IKEv1 usage | 11.0.0 | 11.1.0 | TEI11 |
| 2011-06 | SP-52 | SP-110269 | 0039 | - | Clarification of algorithm names and DH group usage in IKEv2 | 11.1.0 | 11.2.0 | TEI10 |
| 2011-06 | SP-52 | SP-110264 | 0041 | - | Correction of Iuh/Iurh security | 11.1.0 | 11.2.0 | TEI11 |
| 2011-12 | SP-54 | SP-110848 | 0032 | - | Introduction of reference to RFC 4301 in overview clause | 11.2.0 | 11.3.0 | Sec11 |
| 2012-06 | SP-56 | SP-120338 | 0042 | 1 | Implementation requirements for IPsec authentication transforms | 11.3.0 | 12.0.0 | SEC12 |
| 2012-09 | SP-57 | SP-120605 | 0044 | - | Clarification of integrity and confidentiality requirements for GTP-C [Rel-12] | 12.0.0 | 12.1.0 | SEC11 |
| 2012-12 | SP-58 | SP-120856 | 0045 | 1 | Specification of missing IKEv2 reauthentication | 12.1.0 | 12.2.0 | SEC12 |
| 2015-12 | SP-70 | SP-150731 | 0046 | 1 | Updating IKEv2 profiles in TS 33.210 | 12.2.0 | 13.0.0 | SEC13 |
| 0047 | 1 | Updating ESP profiles in TS 33.210 |
| 0048 | - | Removing IKEv1 from TS 33.210 |

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| **Change history** |
| **Date** | **Meeting** | **TDoc** | **CR** | **Rev** | **Cat** | **Subject/Comment** | **New version** |
| 2016-12 | SA#74 | SP-160788 | 0049 | 1 | F | 3GPP security profile update – IPsec | 14.0.0 |
| 2018-06 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-15 version (MCC) | 15.0.0 |
| 2018-09 | SA#81 | SP-180706 | 0050 | 1 | B | Update NDS/IP scope with application layer crypto profiles | 15.1.0 |
| 2018-12 | SA#82 | SP-181022 | 0055 | - | F | Adding references for the TLS Protocol Profiles clause | 15.2.0 |
| 2018-12 | SA#82 | SP-181030 | 0056 | - | B | Update NDS/IP scope with application layer crypto profiles | 16.0.0 |
| 2019-03 | SA#83 | SP-190104 | 0057 | - | F | Correcting TLS crypto profiles | 16.1.0 |
| 2019-06 | SA#84 | SP-190354 | 0058 | 1 | F | Deprecation of TLS 1.1 | 16.2.0 |
| 2019-06 | SA#84 | SP-190354 | 0059 | - | F | References to several obsoleted RFCs | 16.2.0 |
| 2020-03 | SA#87E | SP-200143 | 0064 | 1 | B | ESP profile update | 16.3.0 |
| 2020-03 | SA#87E | SP-200143 | 0065 | - | B | TLS Recommended Cipher Suites | 16.3.0 |
| 2020-03 | SA#87E | SP-200143 | 0066 | 1 | B | Required TLS extenstions and algorithms | 16.3.0 |
| 2020-03 | SA#87E | SP-200143 | 0067 | - | B | IKEv2 profile update 33.210 | 16.3.0 |
| 2020-07 | SA#88E | SP-200356 | 0068 | 2 | F | Editorial corrections to NDS/IP | 16.4.0 |
| 2020-07 | SA#88E | SP-200363 | 0069 | 1 | F | Elliptic Curve Group Size | 16.4.0 |
| 2020-07 | SA#88E | SP-200363 | 0070 | 1 | F | TLS 1.3 cipher suites | 16.4.0 |
| 2021-12 | SA#94e | SP-211379 | 0072 | - | B | Security updates for algorithms and protocols for 33.210 | 17.0.0 |
| 2022-09 | SA#97e | SP-220888 | 0073 | 1 | F | Update IPSec references to rfc8221 | 17.1.0 |
| 2022-09 | SA#97e | SP-220888 | 0074 | 1 | F | Update IPSec reference from obsolete RFC 7296 to RFC 8247 | 17.1.0 |
| 2024-03 | - | - | - | - | - | Update to Rel-18 version (MCC) | 18.0.0 |
| 2024-06 | SA#104 | SP-240656 | 0083 | 1 | F | HTTP RFC obsoleted by IETF RFC 9110 | 18.1.0 |
| 2025-01 | SA#106 | SP-241801 | 0084 |  | B | Updates to cryprographic profiles | 19.0.0 |
| 2025-06 | SA#108 | SP-250679 | 0087 | 1 | F | Correcting inconsistencies to clause 6.2.3 of 33.210  | 19.1.0 |