Tdoc List
2021-02-08 15:29
TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Agenda | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
S3‑210000 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda |
1Agenda and Meeting Objectives
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑210001 | Report from SA3#101e meeting | MCC | report |
2Meeting Reports
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑210002 | Process for SA3#102e meeting | SA WG3 Chair | other |
1Agenda and Meeting Objectives
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210003 | Report from last SA | SA WG3 Chair | report |
2Meeting Reports
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210004 | AMF transparency for SOR | C1-207736 | LS in |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210005 | LS on Storage of KAUSF | C1-207764 | LS in |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑210006 | User location identification from Carrier Aggregation secondary cell activation messages | GSMA FSAG | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210007 | LS on broadcasting gNB ID length in system information block | R3-207226 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210008 | Reply LS on MuDe functionality | S1-204380 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210009 | Reply LS on security issue for on-boarding and remote provisioning from SA3 | S2-2009132 | LS in |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑210010 | LS Response on Support of L2TP in PFCP | S2-2009331 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210011 | Reply LS on IP address to GPSI translation | S2-2009339 | LS in |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210012 | Reply-LS on user consent requirements for analytics | S2-2009383 | LS in |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑210013 | Independent evaluation of SNOW V | ETSI SAGE | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210014 | 256-bit algorithms based on SNOW 3G or SNOW V | ETSI SAGE | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210015 | LS on SG17 new work item 'Security Methodology for Zero-Touch Massive IoT Deployment' | ITU-T SG17 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210016 | LS on Use of Inclusive Language in 3GPP | SP-201143 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210017 | LS on 5G-GUTI reallocation after paging of a UE in 5GMM-IDLE mode with suspend indication | C1-200967 | LS in |
4.6Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210018 | Reply LS to SA3 on FBS detection | R2-1914224 | LS in |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑210019 | LS on propagation of user consent related information during Xn inter-PLMN handover | R3-204378 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||
S3‑210020 | LS on Security Requirements for Sidelink/PC5 Relays | S2-2004750 | LS in |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210021 | LS on method for collection of data from the UE | S2-2006292 | LS in |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑210022 | Reply to LS on Resynchronisations | ETSI SAGE | LS in |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210023 | Reply LS on AUSF/UDM discovery based on SUCI information | S2-2009207 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210024 | LS on Support of L2TP on SGi/N6 with Control and User Plane Separation | C4-205478 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑210025 | LS on Changes to SoR Delivery Mechanism | C4-205696 | LS in |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210026 | Reply LS on the user consent for trace reporting | R2-2010894 | LS in |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210027 | Reply LS on the re-keying procedure for NR SL | R2-2010963 | LS in |
4.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||
S3‑210028 | LS on propagation of user consent related information during Xn inter-PLMN handover | R3-204378 | LS in |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210029 | Reply LS on System support for Multi-USIM devices | R3-207207 | LS in |
5.19Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210030 | LS on integrity and confidentiality protection of xcap-diff and pidf documents in MCPTT (TS 24.379) | R5- 206273 | LS in |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210031 | LS on Security Requirements for Sidelink/PC5 Relays | S2-2004750 | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||
S3‑210032 | Reply on method for collection of data from the UE | S4-201584 | LS in |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210033 | TC CYBER Activities | ETSI TC CYBER | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210034 | New Key Issue: MBS Location Privacy | MITRE | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| No |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210036 | |
S3‑210035 | New Key Issue: MBS Location Privacy | MITRE | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑210036 | New Key Issue: MBS Location Privacy | MITRE | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑210034 | |
S3‑210037 | Update of clause 4.2 | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210038 | New KI: Protection of TUAK TOPc value during storage in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210039 | New KI: Protection of TUAK TOPc value during transfer out of UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210040 | New Solution: Protection of SQN during storage in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210709 | |
S3‑210041 | New Solution: Protection of SQN during transfer out of UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210715 | |
S3‑210042 | New Solution: Protection of TUAK TOPc value during storage in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210712 | |
S3‑210043 | New Solution: Protection of TUAK TOPc value during transfer out of UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210713 | |
S3‑210044 | Updated Solution #8: Encrypted transfer of OPc between UDR and UDM/ARPF | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210714 | |
S3‑210045 | Updated Solution #9: Encrypted transfer of OP between UDR and UDM/ARPF | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210716 | |
S3‑210046 | Updated Solution #10: Encrypted strorage of OPc in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210717 | |
S3‑210047 | Updated Solution #11: Encrypted storage of OP in UDR | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210718 | |
S3‑210048 | TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur | InterDigital, Inc. | report | Information |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
YesPublication of new or revised deliverables (incremental changes from the status reported at SA3#101-e)
• TCG Canonical Event Log Format – public review December 2020
• TCG Endorsement Key Credential Profile – public review December 2020
• TCG Reference Integrity Manifest (RIM) Information Model – published November 2020
• TCG PC Client Reference Integrity Manifest – published November 2020
• TCG Cyber Resilient Module & Building Block Requirements – public review November 2020
• TCG SMBIOS-based Component Class Registry – public review November 2020
• TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Integrity Measurement – public review November 2020
• TCG MARS Use Cases and Considerations – public review October 2020
• TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile – public review October 2020
• TCG TPM 2.0 Keys for Device Identity and Attestation – public review October 2020
• TCG DICE Attestation Architecture – public review October 2020
Meetings
• TCG Members Meeting Virtual F2F – 22-26 February 2021
• MP WG meets every Monday at 10-11 ET
• TMS WG meets every Monday and Friday at 12-13 ET
• CyRes WG meets every Wednesday at 11-12:30 ET
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210049 | Limited service state for missioncritical services | BDBOS | CR | Agreement |
4.19Mission critical security enhancements phase 2 (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210050 | Update to solution #17 (6.17.2) of TR 33.809 | Deutsche Telekom AG | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210051 | Discussion – R17 Group regroup and user regroup security | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | discussion | Information |
4.19Mission critical security enhancements phase 2 (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210052 | [33.180] R17 Group regroup and user regroup security | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.19Mission critical security enhancements phase 2 (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210053 | [33.180] R14 RFC3830 reference correction | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210054 | [33.180] R15 RFC3830 reference correction (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210055 | [33.180] R16 RFC3830 reference correction (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210056 | [33.180] R17 RFC3830 reference correction (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210057 | [33.180] R14 XML encryption correction | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210058 | [33.180] R15 XML encryption correction (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210059 | [33.180] R16 XML encryption correction (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210060 | [33.180] R17 XML encryption correction (mirror) | Motorola Solutions Danmark A/S | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210061 | Discussion on Conclusion to TR 33.840 | Futurewei | discussion | Endorsement |
5.13Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| endorsed | No | ||
S3‑210062 | Conclusion to TR 33.840 | Futurewei | pCR | Approval |
5.13Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210595 | |
S3‑210063 | LS on conclusion of security study of disaggregated gNB architecture | Futurewei | LS out | Approval |
5.13Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210596 | |
S3‑210064 | 5G architecture enhancements for BEST | KPN N.V. | draftCR | Approval |
4.21Adapting BEST for use in 5G networks (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210065 | Error code details - Resolving ed note in 13.2.2.6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑201797 | |
S3‑210066 | TS 33.536 - overall clean-up | LG Electronics Inc. | CR | Approval |
4.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210705 | |
S3‑210067 | TR 33.847 - Remove ENs in KI1 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210068 | TR 33.847 - Resolve ENs in Sol13 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210636 | |
S3‑210069 | TR 33.847 - Evaluation of Sol13 | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210637 | |
S3‑210070 | TR 33.847 - New KI on security protection misalignment in L3 UE2NW relay | LG Electronics Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210071 | Updated Solution #22: Representation of identities during broadcast | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210555 | |
S3‑210072 | Updated Solution #23: Initial key with validity time | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210557 | |
S3‑210073 | Correct NAS uplink COUNT for KgNB/KeNB derivation | MediaTek Inc. | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑202947 | |
S3‑210074 | Error code details - Resolving ed note in 13.2.2.6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210723 | S3‑201797 |
S3‑210075 | Error code details - Resolving ed note in 13.2.2.6 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210724 | |
S3‑210076 | Evaluation of solution 6 | NCSC | pCR |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑210077 | Evaluation of solution 7 | NCSC | pCR |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑210078 | Evaluation of solution 8 | NCSC | pCR |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210079 | Evaluation of solution 9 | NCSC | pCR |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210080 | Evaluation of solution 10 | NCSC | pCR |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210081 | Evaluation of solution 11 | NCSC | pCR |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210082 | New solution for KI#8 | NCSC | pCR |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210709 | ||
S3‑210083 | New solution for KI#9 | NCSC | pCR |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210715 | ||
S3‑210084 | Some conclusions for TR 33.845 | NCSC | pCR |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210708 | ||
S3‑210085 | Editorial corrections | NCSC | pCR |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑210086 | TR 33.847 Update for KI #4 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210149 | |
S3‑210087 | TR 33.848 Jan 2021 Refresh | BT plc | pCR | Agreement |
5.4Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210088 | Discussion on user versus subscriber in relation to the U3C study | Futurewei | discussion | Endorsement |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210089 | KI on U3C User Identification | Futurewei | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210090 | gNB Cipher Security Policy Verification | Futurewei | CR | Agreement |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210795 | |
S3‑210091 | gNB Integrity Security Policy Verification | Futurewei | CR | Agreement |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210796 | |
S3‑210092 | pCR Signing solutions and cell selection in TR 33.809 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210093 | TR 33.854 Update for solution#5 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210593 | |
S3‑210094 | Solution for UAV location privacy | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210594 | |
S3‑210095 | Choice of cryptographic algorithm in 256-bit Milenage | ETSI SAGE | LS in |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑210096 | NF Service Consumer and Producer in Service Request Process | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR |
4.4Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210725 | ||
S3‑210097 | Access Token Misuse Prevention | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR |
4.4Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210727 | ||
S3‑210098 | NF Service Consumer and Producer in Service Request Process | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR |
4.4Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210726 | ||
S3‑210099 | Access Token Misuse Prevention | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR |
4.4Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210728 | ||
S3‑210100 | SCAS Protection Policies - TBD updated | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210729 | ||
S3‑210101 | Protection policies test case | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NTT Docomo, Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210730 | ||
S3‑210102 | Optional registration of NF Service Consumer to NRF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||
S3‑210103 | Optional registration of NF Service Consumer to NRF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||
S3‑210104 | Optional registration of NF Service Consumer to NRF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Huawei, HiSilicon | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||
S3‑210105 | TR 33866-020_update on formats and typos | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210569 | |
S3‑210106 | Abbreviations.doc | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210570 | |
S3‑210107 | KI on protection of data in transfer | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210573 | |
S3‑210108 | Usage of current SBA mechanisms to protect data in transfer | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210574 | |
S3‑210109 | KI details on Anomalous NF behaviour detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210110 | Threats on KI Anomalous NF behavior detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210111 | Requirements on KI Anomalous NF behavior detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210572 | |
S3‑210112 | KI on UE data collection protection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210113 | Threats and requirements to KI on UE data collection protection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210114 | Solution on UE data collection protection.docx | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210581 | |
S3‑210115 | Requirements to KI on Processing of tampered data | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210116 | KI on Authorization of consumers for data access via DCCF.doc | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210571 | |
S3‑210117 | TR 33.867 – New KI – Confidentiality Protection | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210118 | TR 33.867 – New KI – User Authentication | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210119 | TR 33.867 – New KI – Replay Protection | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210120 | TR 33.867 – New KI – Integrity Protection | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210121 | TR 33.867 – New KI – Non-Repudiation | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210122 | TR 33.847 Update for solution #10 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210598 | |
S3‑210123 | Solution for NSSAA procedure for Remote UE with L3 UE-to-Network relay | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210601 | |
S3‑210124 | Solution for secondary authentication Remote UE with L3 UE-to-Network relay | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210600 | |
S3‑210125 | TR 33.847 Update for solution #12 | InterDigital, Inc. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210126 | TR 33.857: scope | THALES | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210127 | Living document for TS 33.220: addition of UDM | THALES | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210128 | Living document for TS 33.223: addition of UDM | THALES | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210129 | TR 33.846: conclusion for key issue #2.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210130 | TR 33.846: conclusion for key issue #4.1 | THALES | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210131 | Additions to FBS Solution #23 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210783 | |
S3‑210132 | Additions to FBS Solution #24 | Philips International B.V., CableLabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210784 | |
S3‑210133 | New solution FBS KI#2 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210134 | Additions to MBS Solution #2 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210135 | Clarifications regarding Authentication procedure for V2X PC5 unicast link | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210804 | |
S3‑210136 | Solution for protecting the privacy of the UE identity. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210801 | |
S3‑210137 | [DRAFT] Reply-LS on security issue for on-boarding and remote provisioning. | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210800 | |
S3‑210138 | Discussion on NSSAA Editor note for sending S-NSSAI to the AAA-S. | Nokia | discussion | Endorsement |
4.9Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210139 | CR to delete the EN (rel-16) in NSSAA clause | Nokia | CR |
4.9Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||
S3‑210140 | CR to dete the NSSAA Editor Note (Rel-17) | Nokia | CR | Approval |
4.9Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210141 | Authentication procedure during Xn handover procedure | NEC | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210142 | New WID for supporting NSWO in 5G | ATT, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | WID new | Approval |
4.22New work item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210143 | Enhanced description for KI#7 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Philips | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210144 | DISC Handling of latest Kasuf | NEC | discussion | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210145 | Key Issue on privacy issues relating to Paging Cause exposure | Nokia, Nokia Shangahi Bell, Samsung | other | Approval |
5.19Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210146 | Maintaining latest Kausf | NEC | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210147 | Secure Busy indication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | other | Approval |
5.19Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210148 | SUCI Linkability attack | NEC | pCR | Agreement |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210149 | TR 33.847 Update for KI #4 | InterDigital, Inc., LG Electronics | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑210086 | |
S3‑210150 | AMF re-allocation Solution#4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210684 | |
S3‑210151 | AAnF checks AKMA service for UE and AF in clause 6.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210760 | |
S3‑210152 | AAnF selection in AF | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210761 | |
S3‑210153 | Add Application Key Get service in clause 7.1 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210762 | |
S3‑210154 | Kakma invalid and Kausf invalid in clause 6.2 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210155 | Resolution of EN on other parameter in clause 6.3 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210156 | the KAF lifetime expiration in clause 5.2 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210763 | |
S3‑210157 | Discussion paper on KAUSF invalid and KAKMA invalid | ZTE Corporation | discussion | Endorsement |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210158 | UDM notifies AAnF AKMA context removal | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210159 | New security functional requirement and related test case on validating of user data transported | ZTE Corporation | draftCR | Agreement |
4.17Security Assurance Specification for Inter PLMN UP Security (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210755 | |
S3‑210160 | Update the clause 5.2.5.5.7 | ZTE Corporation, China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210764 | |
S3‑210161 | Conclusion for Key Issue #4.1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210162 | New solution for key issue# 4.1 in TR 33.846 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210766 | |
S3‑210163 | Solution of Mitigation against the SUPI replay attack | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210769 | |
S3‑210164 | Update solution#2.1 in TR 33.846 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210767 | |
S3‑210165 | Update the evaluation for solution# 4.1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210166 | Update the evaluation for solution# 4.2 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210167 | Update the evaluation for solution# 4.3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210168 | Update the evaluation for solution# 4.4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210169 | Update the key issue 4.1 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210170 | AMF selection in multiple NAS connections in solution#6.7 in TR 33.839 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210171 | LBO roaming scenario should be supported in solution#6.7 in TR 33.839 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210633 | |
S3‑210172 | Update the key issue#7 in TR 33.839 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210634 | |
S3‑210173 | Update the solution#14 in TR 33.839 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210635 | |
S3‑210174 | Update to Solution #3 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210175 | Update to Solution #4 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210176 | Evaluation of Solution #8 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210638 | |
S3‑210177 | Evaluation of Solution #9 | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210639 | |
S3‑210178 | New solution on security of AMF re-allocation using Registration Reject message | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210179 | New solution on security of AMF re-allocation using RRC Release message | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210180 | Updates to solution 18: Removal EN related to EEC ID | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210623 | |
S3‑210181 | Add new solution in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210182 | Updates to solution 18: Removal EN related to identification of serving AMF | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210624 | |
S3‑210183 | Remove the EN in solution #5 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210677 | |
S3‑210184 | Key issue on authorization revocation in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210185 | Remove EN in Solution #6 in TR 33.839 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210678 | |
S3‑210186 | Updates to solution 18: Removal EN related to roaming | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210187 | Add new key issue for user consent | CATT | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210188 | Add references in TR 33.866 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210569 | |
S3‑210189 | Add new key issue in TR 33.866 | CATT | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210679 | |
S3‑210190 | Updates to solution 4: evaluation | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210191 | Updates to solution 4 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210192 | Updates to solution 12: Removing EN | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210625 | |
S3‑210193 | Detection of MitM FBS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210194 | Reply LS on FBS detection | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210756 | |
S3‑210195 | Discussion paper for Rel17 SID on network slicing security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, CableLab, CATT, CAICT, China Unicom, China Mobile, InterDigital, NEC | discussion | Discussion |
5.21New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210196 | Rel17 SID on network slice security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, CableLab, CATT, CAICT, China Unicom, China Mobile, InterDigital, NEC | SID new | Approval |
5.21New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||
S3‑210197 | Discussion on SN-ID in NSSAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion |
4.9Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210198 | Serving network ID in NSSAA | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement |
4.9Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210199 | validity peirod of NSSAA result | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement |
4.9Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210200 | Addressing EN in KI#7: scope of C2 Security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210201 | Remove EN1-align SA2 procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210202 | Remove EN2-align AF defined by SA2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210203 | Remove EN3-revocation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210615 | |
S3‑210204 | Remove EN1-exchange ID with USS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210616 | |
S3‑210205 | Remove EN2- revocation | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210617 | |
S3‑210206 | Remove EN1:security of group management | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210618 | |
S3‑210207 | Remove EN2: Time synchronization | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210619 | |
S3‑210208 | Adding Evalaution | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210209 | Security Solution for Busy Indication using NAS signaling | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Approval |
5.19Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210626 | |
S3‑210210 | Updates to key issue 2 | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | other | Approval |
5.19Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210211 | New WID on 5GFBS | Apple, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Charter Communication, China Unicom, NIST, CableLabs, Interdigital, Ericsson, Samsung, CAICT, CATT, Intel, vivo, MITRE, Philips | WID new | Approval |
4.22New work item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210212 | 5GFBS-Edotorial change After EditHelp | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210213 | MUSIM-key issue on BUSY indication | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.19Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210694 | |
S3‑210214 | MUSIM-Solution to protect BUSY indication | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.19Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210626 | |
S3‑210215 | MBS-Modification on solution#1 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210693 | |
S3‑210216 | MEC-Evaluation on solution#1 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210217 | MEC-Modification on solution#22 | Apple | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210692 | |
S3‑210218 | New Key Issue on UE preferred SNPN information update | Alibaba Group | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210219 | New solution on preferred SNPN information update | Alibaba Group | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210220 | New solution on UE onboarding for SNPN with the interaction between PS and DCS | Alibaba Group | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210602 | |
S3‑210221 | Threat to send EAP-Identity Request by N3IWF | China Unicom | CR |
4.16Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210805 | ||
S3‑210222 | Check whether the N3IWF sends the EAP-Identity Request message | China Unicom | pCR |
4.16Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210802 | ||
S3‑210223 | Draft CR on Clarification for UP integrity Mechanisms between the UE and the ng-eNB | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.20Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210700 | |
S3‑210224 | Draft CR on Clarification for Handling for indication of UE supports UPIP | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.20Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210225 | New Solution for UPIP for EPS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210655 | |
S3‑210226 | New Use Case for MEC | Huawei, HiSilicon, Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210227 | Add Terms for UC3S | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210228 | Analysis for UC3S | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210656 | |
S3‑210229 | New Solution for Network Framework for DDoS Attack | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210230 | Reply LS on Security issue for On-boarding and Remote Provisioning | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210800 | |
S3‑210231 | New Solution on Authentication for UE onboarding for SNPN | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210657 | |
S3‑210232 | Solution Update for Solution #5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210658 | |
S3‑210233 | System Impact and Evaluation for solution #5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210234 | Threat analysis related to RRCConnectionReestablsihment in CP CIoT 5GS Optimization | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210235 | Draft CR on New Test Case on RRCConnectionReestablsihment in CP CIoT 5GS Optimization | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210236 | Critical Assets for NWDAF | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile | draftCR | Approval |
4.15Security Assurance Specification for 5G NWDAF (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210237 | Network Product Class Description for NWDAF | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile | draftCR | Approval |
4.15Security Assurance Specification for 5G NWDAF (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210238 | Correction to the access token storage in NF service consumer | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210239 | Correction to the access token storage in NF service consumer | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210735 | |
S3‑210240 | Correction to the access token storage in NF service consumer | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210736 | |
S3‑210241 | Correction to service request process in OAuth 2.0 based authorization rel16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.4Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210793 | |
S3‑210242 | Correction to service request process in OAuth 2.0 based authorization rel17 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.4Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210794 | |
S3‑210243 | Slice privacy protection in NSSAA related procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.9Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210244 | Address Editor's Note in solution 15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210659 | |
S3‑210245 | A solution to protect PDU session related parameters for L2 relay | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210660 | |
S3‑210246 | Propose to resolve EN in KI#16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210247 | Propose to resolve ENs in the clause of KI detail of KI#12 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210248 | Propose to mitigate policy confliction using match report | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210662 | |
S3‑210249 | Propose to mitigate policy conflication using restricted discovery | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210663 | |
S3‑210250 | Clarification on key derivation | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210737 | |
S3‑210251 | Reply LS about the layer to provide security | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval |
4.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210738 | |
S3‑210252 | Update evaluation to Solution#7 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210253 | Clarification on A-KID generation | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210739 | |
S3‑210254 | Clarification on AAnF Selection | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210255 | Update Key issue #11 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210256 | Evaluation on Solution#3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210664 | |
S3‑210257 | Evaluation on Solution#4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210665 | |
S3‑210258 | Evaluation on Solution#5 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210259 | Evaluation on solution #11 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210260 | Conclusion on PC3 protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210261 | Address Editor's Note in solution 14 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210680 | |
S3‑210262 | Threat to trigger condition on NSSAA procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210263 | Living document for TS 33.511 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210264 | Living document for TS 33.512 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210740 | |
S3‑210265 | Living document for TS 33.514 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210266 | Living document for TS 33.517 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210267 | Living document for TS 33.117 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210268 | Living document for TR 33.926 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210741 | |
S3‑210269 | Threat analysis on the ability to create different child Sas | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210270 | Check whether the N3IWF has the ability to create different child Sas | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210271 | Threat analysis on mixing CP and UP into main SA | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210272 | Check whether the N3IWF creats a child SA for PDU session | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.16Security Assurance Specification for Non-3GPP InterWorking Function (N3IWF) (Rel- 17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210273 | Threat analysis on select AAA-P and AAA-S | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.18eSCAS_5G for Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization Function (NSSAAF) (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210274 | NSSAAF route the S-NSSAI to the right place | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.18eSCAS_5G for Network Slice-Specific Authentication and Authorization Function (NSSAAF) (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210275 | New skeleton to TR 33867 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210276 | Threat analysis on finding the right NF insances are serving this UE | Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile | draftCR | Approval |
4.15Security Assurance Specification for 5G NWDAF (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210277 | Solution to UE onboarding for non-public networks | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210621 | |
S3‑210278 | Conclusions to TR33.840 | China Telecommunications | pCR | Approval |
5.13Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210595 | |
S3‑210279 | Authentication procedure during Xn handover procedure | NEC | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210280 | Solution to UE onboarding for non-public networks using PA and SA | Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210622 | |
S3‑210281 | pCR to TR33.847- New solution on L3 UE-to-Network Relay | CATT | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210674 | |
S3‑210282 | new solution to mitigate supi guessing and suci replay attack | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210742 | |
S3‑210283 | F1 interface security for IAB in NR-DC mode | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.18Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210284 | updating the scope in TR33.824 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.18Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210666 | |
S3‑210285 | Conclusion on key issue 4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210286 | Addressing the EN on solution1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210287 | Addressing the EN on solution2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210672 | |
S3‑210288 | New solution for traffic protection in service layer | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210667 | |
S3‑210289 | New solution to support the UE mobility in MBS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210610 | |
S3‑210290 | Update the terms in TR 33.850 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210291 | Add evaluation to solution 1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.10Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210668 | |
S3‑210292 | Add evaluation to solution 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.10Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210669 | |
S3‑210293 | Reply LS on User location identification from Carrier Aggregation secondary cell activation messages | HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Co. Ltd. | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210294 | Clarification on security protection in AMF reallocation(direct NAS reroute) | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210743 | |
S3‑210295 | UC3S_SID_revision | Huawei, HiSilicon | SID revised | Approval |
5.21New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210296 | pCR to TR33.847- New solution on UE-to-Network Relay based on primary authentication | CATT | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210675 | |
S3‑210297 | Adding a new threat related with biding down attack in the threats | China Telecom, Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210298 | New SID on security aspects on PAP/CHAP protocols in 5GS | China Telecom, Huawei, HiSilicon | SID new | Approval |
5.21New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210299 | Evaluation on solution #14 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210300 | Resolving the ENs related with abort operation in the test case | China Telecom, Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210301 | Reply LS on propagation of user consent related information during Xn inter-PLMN handover | Ericsson Limited | LS out | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210302 | Reply LS on SLIC | Ericsson Limited | LS out | Approval |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210303 | Clarifying the scope | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210770 | |
S3‑210304 | Clarifying for types of virtualised network product class | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210771 | |
S3‑210305 | Clarifying for Generic virtualised network product model class description | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210306 | Clarifying for Generic assets and threats for GVNP of type 1 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210772 | |
S3‑210307 | Clarifying for Generic assets and threats for GVNP of type 2 and type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210308 | Adding comparison | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210309 | Modifying test case in clause 5.2.5.5.7.2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210310 | clarifying the content in clause 5.2.5.6.6.1 and clause 5.2.5.6.7 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210773 | |
S3‑210311 | Clarifying for the security requirements and test cases in clause 5.2.5.7.7.1 and 5.2.5.7.7.2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210312 | Adding hardening requirements for GVNP of type 3 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210313 | Adding vendor development and product lifecycle processes and test laboratory accreditation into Clause 6 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210314 | Adding evaluation and SCAS instantiation into clause 7 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210315 | new proposal for way forward v2 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210316 | editorial correction on TR33818-coversheet | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.2Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210317 | Solution to botnet terminal detection | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210318 | Solution to provisioning of PNI-NPN credentials | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210319 | Authentication and Authorization between 5GMSGS Client and MSGin5G server based on AKMA | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.15Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210320 | Overview of MSGin5G Service | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.15Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210321 | Solution to address the Key issue #2.2 in TR 33.846 | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210322 | Discussion on enlarging the length of truncated MACs for 5G systems | China Mobile | pCR | Discussion |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210323 | Find the right NF instance are serving the UE | China Mobile, Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.15Security Assurance Specification for 5G NWDAF (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210324 | New Use Case for eNA | China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.14Study on User Consent for 3GPP services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210603 | |
S3‑210325 | Adding test case on the confidentiality configuration in P-CSCF | China Telecom, Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210326 | Correct current uplink EPS NAS COUNT used at derivation of a mapped 5G security context | MediaTek Inc. | CR |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210787 | ||
S3‑210327 | Linkability by distinguishing MAC failure and synchronization failure | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210328 | Update KI on SUPI guessing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210329 | KI on linkability by SUCI | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210731 | |
S3‑210330 | Assuring SUCI generation by legitimiate SUPI owner | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210331 | EN resolution on SQNms protection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210332 | Evaluation of solution 2.3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210333 | EN related note to solution 4.4 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210334 | Evaluation criterias | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210779 | |
S3‑210335 | Editorial changes to TR | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210732 | |
S3‑210336 | SQNms protection by concealment in ME | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210733 | S3‑203330 |
S3‑210337 | AUTS SQNMS solution for EPS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210338 | AUTS SQNMS solution for 5GS | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210339 | Typo correction in clause 6.9.9.4 | Xidian University | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | |||
S3‑210340 | High-level conclusions for KI#1 (Credentials owned by an external entity) | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210341 | Resolving EN in KI#1 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210342 | Authentication method selection for N5CW | Ericsson,Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Cablelabs | CR | Agreement |
4.7Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
YesOverlaps with 453.
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210343 | draft LS on Feedback on function supporting primary authentication and authorization of SNPN UEs that use credentials from the AAA Server | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210560 | |
S3‑210344 | Resolving EN on SUPI privacy in solution #1 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210561 | |
S3‑210345 | Authentication method selection for N5CW | Ericsson,Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Cablelabs | CR | Agreement |
4.7Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
YesOverlaps with 452.
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210346 | High-level conclusions for KI#1 (Credentials owned by an external entity) | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210347 | Clarification on the format of NF type in the NF certification | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.4Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210348 | Threats related to session establishment procedure | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210349 | New test case on validation of S-NSSAIs in PDU session establishment request | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210350 | DP on loop registration in CAG | Huawei, Hisilicon | discussion | Endorsement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210351 | LS on loop registration in CAG | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210352 | New KI on service authorization for SNPNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210644 | |
S3‑210353 | New solution on service authorization for SNPNs | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210645 | |
S3‑210354 | New requirement on key issue #2 of TR 33.851 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.10Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210355 | Assets and threats specific of encryption in network hiding in the I-CSCF | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210356 | New test case on encryption in network hiding in the I-CSCF | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210357 | Assets and threats specific of network hiding in the IBCF | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210358 | New test case on network hiding in the IBCF | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210359 | eSCAS:Add a new test case for GUTI allocation | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210360 | SCAS IPUPS: Add a new test | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.17Security Assurance Specification for Inter PLMN UP Security (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210755 | |
S3‑210361 | eSCAS:Add a new test case for NSSAA | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210362 | eSCAS: Updating the security threat to user privacy | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210363 | eSCAS: Add a new threat on unauthorized slice access | Huawei, Hisilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.13Security Assurance Specification Enhancements for 5G (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210364 | SCAS: Correction of incomplete test cases | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210365 | EC: New key issue on N4 protection for UPF in customer network | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210366 | EC: New solution to th ekey issue on N4 security | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210367 | LS reply on changes to SoR delivery mechanims | Huawei, Hisilicon | LS out | Approval |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210368 | 5MBS: Updats to solution #3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210641 | |
S3‑210369 | 5MBS: Adding overview | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210370 | 5MBS: Updates to solution #4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210642 | |
S3‑210371 | 5MBS: Updates to solution #5 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210643 | |
S3‑210372 | NPN: New solution to key issue #1 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210373 | AMFReal: Updates to solution #3 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210646 | |
S3‑210374 | AMFReal: Updates to TR 33.864 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210647 | |
S3‑210375 | IMS SCAS: living doc for the threats | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210376 | Resolving the ENs related with biding down attacker in the test case | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210377 | Resolving the Ens related with biding down attack in the threats | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210378 | Clarification on confidential IEs replacement handling in original N32-f message | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210745 | |
S3‑210379 | Clarification on exposure of confidential IEs in N32-f message in TR 33.926 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.2Security Assurance Specification for 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210746 | |
S3‑210380 | Clarification on a figure and the key activation | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.10Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210381 | Resolving the EN on the authorization between SCPs | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.4Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210747 | |
S3‑210382 | Align the JSON format on encryption IE with CT4 in Rel15 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210748 | |
S3‑210383 | Mirror: align the JSON format on encryption IE with CT4 in Rel16 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210749 | |
S3‑210384 | Mirror: align the JSON format on encryption IE with CT4 in Rel17 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210750 | |
S3‑210385 | Adding the security requirement with encBlockIndex in Rel15 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210386 | Mirror Adding the security requirement with encBlockIndex in Rel16 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210751 | |
S3‑210387 | Mirror Adding the security requirement with encBlockIndex in Rel17 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210752 | |
S3‑210388 | EC: Editorial changes and Resolving the ENs of solution #13 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210389 | EC: Resolving the En and adding evalution of solution #16 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210648 | |
S3‑210390 | EC: Evaluation of solution #20 and conclusion of KI #8 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210649 | |
S3‑210391 | EC: Evaluation of solution #21 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210392 | EC: Resolving the Editor’s notes and evaluation of solution #22 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210650 | |
S3‑210393 | EC: skeleton of clause 7 and conclusion of KI #4 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210651 | |
S3‑210394 | ProSe: Resolving the ENs of solution #16 | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210652 | |
S3‑210395 | Clarification on PLMN ID verification in Rel15 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210396 | Clarification on PLMN ID verification in Rel16 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210397 | Discussion paper on TAU reject issue during MME handover | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210398 | LS on TAU reject issue during MME handover | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210399 | IMS SCAS: Adding the assets and threats of the AS | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210400 | Adding test cases on the authorization and privacy in AS | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210401 | IMS SCAS: Adding the assets and threats of the MRFC | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval |
4.12Security Assurance Specification for IMS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210402 | Adding details to provisioning key issue | Ericsson, China Mobile, Huawei, InterDigital, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Philips, Samsung, ZTE | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210704 | |
S3‑210403 | Use case for KI#3 (Supporting IMS in SNPNs) not yet covered by existing specifications | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210404 | New Solution to KI#3: Authentication to IMS Core using credentials generated with AKMA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210405 | New Solution to KI#3: Authentication to IMS Core using credentials generated from the KAUSF | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210406 | LS on Feedback on Key Issue #4 "UE onboarding and remote provisioning" | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210407 | Resolving SUPI privacy EN in solution #10 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210583 | |
S3‑210408 | Resolving prerequisite EN in solution #10 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210584 | |
S3‑210409 | Resolving indication EN in solution #10 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210410 | Resolving CP provisioning EN in solution #10 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210411 | Corrections for the NRF token request service | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.4Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210412 | Corrections for the NRF token request service | Ericsson | CR | Agreement |
4.4Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210413 | OAuth 2.0 client registration and NF Service registration | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210414 | New KI: Roaming case for token-based authorization in indirect communication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210415 | Correcting notation used for inter-AMF mobility key derivation | MediaTek Inc. | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210782 | S3‑202948 |
S3‑210416 | KI on Verification of UE in subscription and notification in the delegated "Subscribe-Notify" scenarios | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210653 | |
S3‑210417 | KI on Verification of UE in subscription and notification in the non-delegated "Subscribe-Notify" scenarios | Huawei, Hisilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210653 | |
S3‑210418 | New key issue for Paging Cause protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval |
5.19Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210419 | Analytics for MitM Attack Detection | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210420 | Skeleton of TR eSBA SEC | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210421 | Introduction | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210562 | |
S3‑210422 | Scope | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210423 | Authentication of NRF and NFp in indirect communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210564 | |
S3‑210424 | End-to-end authentication in roaming case | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210425 | SCP deployment models | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210565 | |
S3‑210426 | Verification of URI in subscription and notification | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210653 | |
S3‑210427 | Dynamic authorization between SCPs or between NF and SCP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210566 | |
S3‑210428 | End-to-End Critical HTTP headers and body parts integrity protection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210567 | |
S3‑210429 | NRF service management | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210430 | Update of Solution #7 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210431 | Update of solution #6 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210432 | Evaluation of solution #6 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210433 | Update to Solution #24: Interworking handover from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210588 | |
S3‑210434 | Update to Solution #21: Interworking handover from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210589 | |
S3‑210435 | Update to Solution #22: S1 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210590 | |
S3‑210436 | Update to Solution #23: X2 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210591 | |
S3‑210437 | Discussion paper on UP IP policy in EPS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210438 | Conclusion on UE connects to EPC via eUTRA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210592 | |
S3‑210439 | ProSe: Update to solution #21 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210585 | |
S3‑210440 | ProSe: New solution for the use of authorization token in UE-to-UE relay | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210586 | |
S3‑210441 | ProSe: Update to solution #6 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210587 | |
S3‑210442 | Mapping table | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210443 | Evaluation update of solution 7 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210444 | DHIES encryption to avoid UAV spoofing | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210445 | Correction to FC values in range for future use in 3GPP specifications | Samsung | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210446 | [eNA]Updates to KI #1.1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210447 | Network provides authorization to AF/UE for KAF key refresh | Samsung | CR | Approval |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210448 | [ProSe] pCR for resolving ENs in solution#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210577 | |
S3‑210449 | Discussion on MitM attack | Samsung | discussion | Discussion |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210450 | CR for identification of MitM attack | Samsung | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210451 | CR for correction in SEAL | Samsung | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210707 | |
S3‑210452 | CR to correct figure 7A.2.4-1 | Samsung,Ericsson,Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Cablelabs | CR | Approval |
4.7Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
YesSame change as in S3-210345.
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210453 | CR to correct figure 7A.2.4-1 | Samsung,Ericsson,Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Cablelabs | CR | Agreement |
4.7Security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (Rel-16)
| Yes |
YesSame change as in S3-210342.
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210454 | Update to KI#4 in TR 33.862 | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.15Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210578 | |
S3‑210455 | Authentication and authorization for MSGin5G UE | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.15Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210579 | |
S3‑210456 | Authentication and authorization for legacy UE | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.15Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210580 | |
S3‑210457 | Authentication and authorization for Non-3GPP UE | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.15Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210582 | |
S3‑210458 | Updates to solution#7 to identify the appropriate AMF by the NEF | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210575 | |
S3‑210459 | LS on Reply LS on Storage of KAUSF from CT1 | Samsung | LS out | Approval |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210706 | |
S3‑210460 | Handling of KAUSF upon successful primary authentication | Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Intel | CR | Approval |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210461 | pCR: AMF re-allocation by re-directing UE to new AMF | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210576 | |
S3‑210462 | Key Issue on Authorization for MUSIM optimizations | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.19Study on the security of the system enablers for devices having multiple Universal Subscriber Identity Modules
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210463 | Addition to support key update in Solution 1 | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210690 | |
S3‑210464 | Conclusions for TR 33.845 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210708 | |
S3‑210465 | Update to solution #17 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210604 | |
S3‑210466 | Update to solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210605 | |
S3‑210467 | Typo correction in clause 6.9.9.4 | Xidian University | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||
S3‑210468 | removal of Editor’s Notes | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.6Study on storage and transport of 5GC security parameters for ARPF authentication
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210469 | Some clarifications to solution #10 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210628 | |
S3‑210470 | Proposed solution for pairing authorisation in 5G | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210629 | |
S3‑210471 | Proposed solution for UAV authorisation when connected to 4G | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210630 | |
S3‑210472 | Discussion on K_AUSF handling | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Endorsement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210473 | Update of solution #1 in TR 33.864 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210631 | |
S3‑210474 | Addressing the EN in solution #18 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210632 | |
S3‑210475 | Addressing some ENs in solution #20 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210476 | Proposed partial conclusion to key issues #1 and #2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210592 | |
S3‑210477 | Profiling the GBA TLS protocols for use with AKMA | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210478 | Adding references to AKMA profiles of Ua protocols | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement |
4.23Other work areas (no release restrictions)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210479 | New WID on AKMA Ua protocol profiles | Qualcomm Incorporated | WID new | Agreement |
4.22New work item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210480 | 5G GUTI re-allocation | Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement |
4.6Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210759 | |
S3‑210481 | 5G CIoT K_NG-RAN derivation | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement |
4.6Evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑210482 | New Key Issue on security policy handling for 5G Prose services | Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, Hisilicon, Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210483 | Solution 18 EN resolution | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210608 | |
S3‑210484 | Solution 19 EN resolution | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210485 | Solution 20 EN resolution | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210609 | |
S3‑210486 | Update of solution #18 to add authorization for the UE-to-Network relay | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210607 | |
S3‑210487 | Security for MBS traffic during handover | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR |
5.11Study on Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210610 | ||
S3‑210488 | Reply LS on False Base Station Detection | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||
S3‑210489 | Sending UE identifier to the AKMA AF | Qualcomm Incorporated, China Mobile | CR | Agreement |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑203191 | |
S3‑210490 | Extend UPIP support in 5GS for all 5GC connected RAN architecture (NG-RAN) options | Qualcomm Incorporated | draftCR | Approval |
4.20Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210701 | S3‑203511 |
S3‑210491 | pCR to UP IP draft CR to TS 33.501 | Qualcomm Incorporated | other | Approval |
4.20Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210700 | |
S3‑210492 | Reply LS method for collection of data from the UE | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210611 | |
S3‑210493 | Addressing the EN in solution #4 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210613 | |
S3‑210494 | pCR: Security architecture conclusion for KI #1 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210614 | |
S3‑210495 | Addressing some ENs in solution #11 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210612 | |
S3‑210496 | UE Sending GPSI (if available) to the AF | Samsung | CR | Approval |
4.5Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G (Rel-16)
| Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||
S3‑210497 | pCR to TR 33.853 – New Best Effort solution for EPS using UE Radio Access capabilities | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210556 | |
S3‑210498 | Key issue on security of data via Messaging Framework | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210679 | |
S3‑210499 | New WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols | Ericsson | WID new | Agreement |
4.22New work item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210781 | |
S3‑210500 | pCR to TR 33.853 - Updates to Solution#13 - MME and IoDT test impacts | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210558 | |
S3‑210501 | Home network triggered reauthentication | NTT DOCOMO INC. | pCR | Approval |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210502 | pCR to TR 33.853 - Updates to Solution#14 – optional use of security mode command | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210503 | pCR to TR 33.853 - Updates to Solution#15 – 5GC control concept | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210504 | pCR to TR 33.853 - Updates to Solution#18 – small corrections | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210632 | |
S3‑210505 | Evaluation of Solution #7 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210682 | |
S3‑210506 | TR editorials | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.10Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210507 | Mapping table | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.10Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210508 | Annex on Security considerations for integration with TSN | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.10Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210509 | KI details Attacks based on asymmetric channel delay | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Deutsche Telekom | pCR | Approval |
5.10Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210510 | Authorization of incoming time synchronization messages based on policies | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.10Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210511 | Evaluation to solution 1 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.10Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210668 | |
S3‑210512 | Evaluation to solution 3 | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.10Study on security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210669 | |
S3‑210513 | pCR to TR 33.853 - Updates to Solution #20 – small corrections | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210559 | |
S3‑210514 | pCR to TR 33.853 - Updates to Solution #21 EPS to 5GS handover– evaluation | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210515 | Updated proposal to introduce draft-ietf-emu-rfc5448bis to TS 33.501 | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑203322 | |
S3‑210516 | pCR to TR 33.853 – New Solution #AC Handover from EPS to 5GS using unmodified R15/16 messages and procedures | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210517 | TR 33.846: comparison of candidate solutions | THALES | pCR | Discussion |
5.5Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210779 | |
S3‑210518 | pCR to 33.809 - addition of evaluation for solution 8 | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210519 | Living document for TS 33.220: SBA support for Zh and Zn interfaces | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210520 | Living document for TS 33.223: SBA support for Zpn | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210521 | pCR to living document for TS 33.220: Support GBA in UDM | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210522 | pCR to living document for TS 33.223: Support GBA in UDM | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.11Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210523 | [DRAFT] LS on the SBA for GBA | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
4.11Integration of GBA into 5GC (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210524 | AMF reallocation: Update to solution #2 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210525 | Discussion paper on the shared network entity assumptions for the AMF re-allocation security study | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210526 | Shared network entity assumptions for the purpose of AMF re-allocation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210527 | New solution for NAS re-route via RAN and the use of a well-connected network function | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210528 | New solution for AMF re-allocation using a well-connected network function | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210529 | Draft CR on algorithm selection | Ericsson | draftCR | Approval |
4.20Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS (Rel-17)
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210530 | Notes: SAGE/SA3 2nd joint conference call on the 256-bit topics | NTT DOCOMO INC. | report | Information |
3Reports and Liaisons from other Groups
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210531 | Resolving EN in Clause 4.3 Architecture and Security Assumptions | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210683 | |
S3‑210532 | Typo correction in clause 6.9.4.4 | Xidian University | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | |||
S3‑210533 | Update to Solution#4 on enabling security during AMF reallocation via RAN | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210684 | |
S3‑210534 | Solution to ensure system availability for indirect AMF reallocation | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210685 | |
S3‑210535 | Updates to Key Issue #7 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210686 | |
S3‑210536 | Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR33.853, Version <2.0.0> | VODAFONE Group Plc | TS or TR cover | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210537 | Update to Solution #7 | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210687 | |
S3‑210538 | Solution on UAV and UAV-C Pairing Authorization | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210688 | |
S3‑210539 | Rel17 SID on network slice security | Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, CableLab, CATT, CAICT, China Unicom, China Mobile, InterDigital, NEC | SID new | Approval |
5.21New study item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210757 | |
S3‑210540 | pCR to TR 33.853 – Conclusion on UE connects to EPC via eUTRA | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210592 | |
S3‑210541 | New annex of TR 33.809 – analysis of KI#2 and recommendations | CableLabs, Deutsche Telekom AG, InterDigital | pCR | Approval |
5.1Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210542 | [DRAFT] LS on User Plane Integrity Protection for eUTRA connected to EPC | VODAFONE Group Plc | LS out | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210563 | |
S3‑210543 | Solution to mitigate privacy issues of relay service codes and PDU parameters for L3 UE-to-NW relays | Philips International B.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210597 | |
S3‑210544 | New WID on normative changes for User Plane Integrity Protection for LTE options | VODAFONE Group Plc | WID new | Agreement |
4.22New work item proposals
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210722 | |
S3‑210545 | resolving ed note on protection policy mismatch | NTT DOCOMO INC. | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑210792 | ||
S3‑210546 | Typo correction in clause 6.9.4.4 | Xidian University | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||
S3‑210547 | Typo correction in clause 6.9.4.4 | Xidian University | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||
S3‑210548 | Typo correction in clause 6.9.4.4 | Xidian University | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||
S3‑210549 | Typo correction in clause 6.9.4.4 | Xidian University | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||
S3‑210550 | Typo correction in clause 6.9.4.4 | Xidian University | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | |||
S3‑210551 | resolving ed note on protection policy mismatch | NTT DOCOMO INC. | CR |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210723 | ||
S3‑210552 | resolving ed note on protection policy mismatch | NTT DOCOMO INC. | CR | Agreement |
4.1Security aspects of 5G System - Phase 1 (Rel-15)
| Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑210724 | |
S3‑210553 | SA3 meeting calendar | WG Chair | other | Information |
7Any Other Business
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210554 | Draft agenda for SA3 102bis-e | WG Chair | agenda | Discussion |
7Any Other Business
| Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑210555 | Updated Solution #22: Representation of identities during broadcast | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210071 | |
S3‑210556 | pCR to TR 33.853 – New Best Effort solution for EPS using UE Radio Access capabilities | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210497 | |
S3‑210557 | Updated Solution #23: Initial key with validity time | KPN N.V. | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210072 | |
S3‑210558 | pCR to TR 33.853 - Updates to Solution#13 - MME and IoDT test impacts | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210500 | |
S3‑210559 | pCR to TR 33.853 - Updates to Solution #20 – small corrections | VODAFONE Group Plc | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210513 | |
S3‑210560 | draft LS on Feedback on function supporting primary authentication and authorization of SNPN UEs that use credentials from the AAA Server | Ericsson | LS out | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210343 | |
S3‑210561 | Resolving EN on SUPI privacy in solution #1 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210344 | |
S3‑210562 | Introduction | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210421 | |
S3‑210563 | LS on User Plane Integrity Protection for eUTRA connected to EPC | VODAFONE Group Plc | LS out | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210542 | |
S3‑210564 | Authentication of NRF and NFp in indirect communication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs, Mavenir | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210423 | |
S3‑210565 | SCP deployment models | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210425 | |
S3‑210566 | Dynamic authorization between SCPs or between NF and SCP | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210427 | |
S3‑210567 | End-to-End Critical HTTP headers and body parts integrity protection | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Mavenir, CablLabs | pCR | Approval |
5.20Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210428 | |
S3‑210568 | TR33.853 1.4.0 | VODAFONE Group Plc | draft TR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑210569 | TR 33866-020_update on formats and typos | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Mobile | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210105 | |
S3‑210570 | Abbreviations.doc | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210106 | |
S3‑210571 | KI on Authorization of consumers for data access via DCCF.doc | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210116 | |
S3‑210572 | Requirements on KI Anomalous NF behavior detection by NWDAF | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210111 | |
S3‑210573 | KI on protection of data in transfer | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210107 | |
S3‑210574 | Usage of current SBA mechanisms to protect data in transfer | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210108 | |
S3‑210575 | Updates to solution#7 to identify the appropriate AMF by the NEF | Samsung, Lenovo and Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval |
5.8Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210458 | |
S3‑210576 | pCR: AMF re-allocation by re-directing UE to new AMF | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.17Study on the security of AMF re-allocation
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210461 | |
S3‑210577 | [ProSe] pCR for resolving ENs in solution#1 | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210448 | |
S3‑210578 | Update to KI#4 in TR 33.862 | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.15Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210454 | |
S3‑210579 | Authentication and authorization for MSGin5G UE | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.15Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210455 | |
S3‑210580 | Authentication and authorization for legacy UE | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.15Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210456 | |
S3‑210581 | Solution on UE data collection protection.docx | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval |
5.16Study on security aspects of enablers for Network Automation (eNA) for the 5G system (5GS) Phase 2
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210114 | |
S3‑210582 | Authentication and authorization for Non-3GPP UE | Samsung | pCR | Approval |
5.15Study on security aspects of the 5GMSG Service
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210457 | |
S3‑210583 | Resolving SUPI privacy EN in solution #10 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210407 | |
S3‑210584 | Resolving prerequisite EN in solution #10 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.12Study on enhanced security support for Non-Public Networks
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210408 | |
S3‑210585 | ProSe: Update to solution #21 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210439 | |
S3‑210586 | ProSe: New solution for the use of authorization token in UE-to-UE relay | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210440 | |
S3‑210587 | ProSe: Update to solution #6 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.9Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210441 | |
S3‑210588 | Update to Solution #24: Interworking handover from 5GS to EPS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210433 | |
S3‑210589 | Update to Solution #21: Interworking handover from EPS to 5GS | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210434 | |
S3‑210590 | Update to Solution #22: S1 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210435 | |
S3‑210591 | Update to Solution #23: X2 handover | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210436 | |
S3‑210592 | Conclusion on UE connects to EPC via eUTRA | Ericsson | pCR | Approval |
5.3Study on User Plane Integrity Protection
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210438 | |
S3‑210593 | TR 33.854 Update for solution#5 | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210093 | |
S3‑210594 | Solution for UAV location privacy | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval |
5.7Study on security aspects of Unmanned Aerial Systems
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210094 | |
S3‑210595 | Conclusion to TR 33.840 | Futurewei | pCR | Approval |
5.13Study on security aspects of the Disaggregated gNB Architecture
| Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑210062 | |
S3‑210596 | LS on conclusion of security study of disaggregated gNB architecture |