**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #101e *draft\_S3-203204-r5***

**e-meeting, 9 – 20 Noember 2020**

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| *CR-Form-v12.0* |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** |
|  |
|  |  | **CR** | **1007** | **rev** | 1 | **Current version:** |  |  |
|  |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME |  | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network | **x** |

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|  |
| ***Title:***  | Authorization between SCPs |
|  |  |
| ***Source to WG:*** |  Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 |
|  |  |
| ***Work item code:*** | 5G\_eSBA |  | ***Date:*** | 2020-11-20 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Category:*** |  |  | ***Release:*** | Rel-16 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:****F*** *(correction)****A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)****B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)****D*** *(editorial modification)*Detailed explanations of the above categories canbe found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | *Use one of the following releases:Rel-8 (Release 8)Rel-9 (Release 9)Rel-10 (Release 10)Rel-11 (Release 11)Rel-12 (Release 12)**Rel-13 (Release 13)Rel-14 (Release 14)Rel-15 (Release 15)Rel-16 (Release 16)* |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | In TS33.501 in clause 13.3.7 there is a Ed Note stating authorization between SCPs is ffs |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | Addition of authorization mechanism between SCPs with reference to the limitations by adding in clause 13.3.2.2 the relevant note. |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | There will be no authorization mechanism defined between SCPs and Ed Note will stay unresolved.  |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | 13.3.7, 13.3.2.2 |
|  |  |
|  | **Y** | **N** |  |  |
| ***Other specs*** |  | **x** |  Other core specifications  | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***affected:*** |  | **x** |  Test specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***(show related CRs)*** |  | **x** |  O&M Specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
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| ***Other comments:*** | Linking of reference to note in 13.3.7 with 13.3.2.2 is needed.  |
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| ***This CR's revision history:*** |  |

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Start of Changes \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

### 13.3.7 Authentication and authorization between SCPs

SCPs shall use one of the following methods as described in 13.1 to mutually authenticate each other before service layer messages can be exchanged on that interface:

- If the PLMN uses protection at the transport layer, authentication provided by the transport layer protection solution shall be used for mutual authentication of the SCPs.

- If the PLMN does not use protection at the transport layer, mutual authentication of the two SCPs may be implicit by NDS/IP or physical security.

Authorization between SCPs is based on local authorization policy. Regarding the authorization of service requests sent by an SCP on behalf of another SCP, NOTE X in clause 13.3.2.2 applies.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Next Change \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

#### 13.3.2.2 Indirect communication

In indirect communication scenarios, the NF Service Producer and NF Service Consumer shall use implicit authentication by relying on authentication between NF Service Consumer and SCP, and between SCP and NF Service Producer, provided by the transport layer protection solution, NDS/IP, or physical security.

NOTE 0: Mutual authentication between NF Service Consumer and NF Service Producer is not achieved with hop-by-hop security.

NOTE X: If only hop-by-hop security is used in a PLMN, the Service Producer is not able to verify that a service request sent by SCP on behalf of a certain NF Service Consumer or SCP, is actually authorized by this consumer or SCP.

If the PLMN uses token-based authorization as specified by clause 13.4.1.2 and the PLMN’s policy mandates that the NRF authenticates the NF Service Consumer before granting an access token, the access token indicates to the NF Service Producer that the NF Service Consumer has been authenticated by the NRF.

If additional authentication of the NF Service Consumer is required, the NF Service Producer authenticates the NF Service Consumer at the application layer using CCA based authentication as specified in clause 13.3.8.

The NF Service Consumer authentication based on CCA based authentication is optional to use, and based on operator policy.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* End of Changes \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*