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Presentation of TR 33.978 to TSG SA

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Abstract of document:

It is expected that there will be a need to deploy some IMS-based services before products are available which fully support the IMS security features defined in TS 33.203. Therefore, there is a need to ensure that mechanisms are in place to secure these early IMS implementations. TR 33.878 specifies an interim security solution for early IMS. The full detail of the interim security solution is contained within the TR. No other 3GPP specifications are impacted.

Changes since last presentation to TSG SA:

1. The TR is upgraded from TR 33.878 to a TR 33.978, as agreed by SA#26.
2. The changes in S3-050109 (LS from CN1) are added with the exception that the new text on compression in section 6.2.3.2.1 is added as a new paragraph rather than as a numbered item at the end of the list.
3. The changes in S3-050019 (ZTE) are added with some clarifications to interworking case 10.
4. The changes in S3-050061 (Ericsson) are added with no modifications.
5. The changes in S3-050063 (Ericsson) are added with the exception that the second sentence in the new paragraph is not added. Also, the new text is added as a NOTE and introduced in a more appropriate part of the section 6.1.
6. The changes in S3-050100 (Siemens) are added with some minor clarifications to the proposed text. The NOTE at the end of section 6.2.4 is not added because this text has already been added into section 6.1.3 by S3-050109. Furthermore, the text on compression is not added since similar text on compression in S3-050109 has been added instead.
7. In section 6.2.4 the text “shall be barred in the HSS for all procedures” is changed to “shall be barred for all procedures” for alignment with TS 23.228.
8. Updated version, date, document history and table of contents.
9. Various editorial changes and improvements throughout the TR.

A version incorporating revision marks from the previous version seen at TSG SA #26 is also attached, to clarify the changes made.

Outstanding Issues:

None.

Contentious Issues:

None.

3GPP TR 33.978 V2.0.0 (2005-03)

Technical Report

3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Aspects of Early IMS (Release 6)



The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP.

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Foreword

This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

Version x.y.z

where:

- x the first digit:
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Introduction

3GPP IMS provides an IP-based session control capability based on the SIP protocol. IMS can be used to enable services such as push-to-talk, instant messaging, presence and conferencing. It is understood that "early" implementations of these services will exist that are not fully compliant with 3GPP IMS. For example, it has been recognized that although 3GPP IMS uses exclusively IPv6, as specified in clause 5.1 of TS 23.221 [13], there will exist IMS implementations based on IPv4 (TR 23.981 [1]).

Non-compliance with IPv6 is not the only difference between early IMS implementations and fully 3GPP compliant implementations. In particular, it is expected that there will be a need to deploy some IMS-based services before products are available which fully support the 3GPP IMS security features defined in TS 33.203 [2]. Non-compliance with TS 33.203 security features is expected to be a problem mainly at the UE side, because of the potential lack of support of the USIM/ISIM interface (especially in 2G-only devices) and because of the potential inability to support IPsec on some UE platforms.

Although full support of 3GPP TS 33.203 security features is preferred from a security perspective, it is acknowledged that early IMS implementations will exist which do not support these features. Therefore, there is a need to ensure that simple, yet adequately secure, mechanisms are in place to protect against the most significant security threats that will exist in early IMS implementations.

1 Scope

The present document documents an interim security solution for early IMS implementations that are not fully compliant with the IMS security architecture specified in TS 33.203 [2].

2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TR 23.981: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Interworking aspects and migration scenarios for IPv4 based IMS Implementations".
- [2] 3GPP TS 33.203: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G security; Access security for IP-based services".
- [3] 3GPP TS 23.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2".
- [4] 3GPP TS 29.061: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Interworking between the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) supporting packet based services and Packet Data Networks (PDN)".
- [5] 3GPP TS 23.060: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description; Stage 2".
- [6] IETF RFC 3261: "Session Initiation Protocol".
- [7] 3GPP TS 24.229: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3".
- [8] 3GPP TS 23.003: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Numbering, addressing and identification".
- [9] 3GPP TS 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
- [10] 3GPP TS 29.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Cx and Dx interfaces; Signalling flows and message contents".
- [11] draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17.txt (July 2004), "Diameter Network Access Server Application", work in progress.

Editor's note: The above document cannot be formally referenced until it is published as an RFC.

- [12] 3GPP TS 29.229: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Cx and Dx interfaces based on the Diameter protocol; Protocol details".

- [13] 3GPP TS 23.221: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Architectural requirements".

3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations

3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TS 21.905 [9] and the following apply.

Early IMS: a UE or network element implementing the early IMS security solution specified in the present document.

Fully compliant IMS: a UE or network element implementing the IMS security solution specified in TS 33.203 [2].

3.2 Symbols

For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:

Cx	Reference Point between a CSCF and an HSS.
Gi	Reference point between GPRS and an external packet data network

3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

AAA	Authentication Authorisation Accounting
ABNF	Augmented Backus-Naur Form
APN	Access Point Name
AVP	Attribute-Value Pair
CSCF	Call/Session Control Function
GGSN	Gateway GPRS Support Node
HSS	Home Subscriber Server
I-CSCF	Interrogating CSCF
ICID	IM CN subsystem Charging Identifier
IM	IP Multimedia
IMPI	IM Private Identity
IMPU	IM Public Identity
IMS	IP Multimedia Subsystem
IP	Internet Protocol
IPSec	IP Security protocol
ISIM	IMS Subscriber Identity Module
NAT	Network Address Translation
P-CSCF	Proxy-CSCF
PDP	Packet Data Protocol
RFC	Request For Comments
S-CSCF	Serving-CSCF
SGSN	Serving GPRS Support Node
SIP	Session Initiation Protocol
SLF	Server Locator Function
UE	User Equipment
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier

4 Requirements

Low impact on existing entities: Any early IMS security mechanisms should be such that impacts on existing entities, especially on the UE, are minimised and would be quick to implement. It is especially important to minimise impact on the UE to maximise interoperability with early IMS UEs. The mechanisms should be quick to implement so that the window of opportunity for the early IMS security solution is not missed.

Adequate level of security: Although it is recognised that the early IMS security solution will be simpler than the fully compliant IMS security solution, it should still provide an adequate level of security to protect against the most significant security threats that will exist in early IMS implementations. As a guide, the strength of subscriber authentication should be comparable to the level of authentication provided for existing chargeable services in mobile networks.

Smooth and cost effective migration path to fully compliant solution: Clearly, any security mechanisms developed for early IMS systems will provide a lower level of protection compared with that offered by the fully compliant IMS security solution. The security mechanisms developed for early IMS systems should therefore be considered as an interim solution and migration to the fully compliant IMS security solution should take place as soon as suitable products become available at an acceptable cost. In particular, the early IMS security solution should not be used as a long-term replacement for the fully compliant IMS security solution. It is important that the early IMS security solution allows a smooth and cost-effective migration path to the fully compliant IMS security solution.

Co-existence with fully compliant solution: It is clear that UEs supporting the early IMS security solution will need to be supported even after fully compliant IMS UEs are deployed. The early IMS security solution should therefore be able to co-exist with the fully compliant IMS security solution. In particular, it shall be possible for the SIP/IP core to differentiate between a subscription using early IMS security mechanisms and a subscription using the fully compliant IMS security solution.

Protection against bidding down: It should not be possible for an attacker to force the use of the early IMS security solution when both the UE and the network support the fully compliant IMS security solution.

No restrictions on the type of charging model: Compared with fully compliant IMS security solution, the early IMS security solution should not impose any restrictions on the type of charging model that can be adopted.

A single early IMS security solution: Interfaces that are impacted by the early IMS security solution should be adequately documented to ensure interoperability between vendors.

Support access over 3GPP PS domain: It is a requirement to support secure access over the 3GPP PS domain (including GSM/GPRS and UMTS access).

Low impact on provisioning: The impact on provisioning should be low compared with the fully compliant IMS security solution.

5 Threat scenarios

To understand what controls are needed to address the security requirements, it is useful to describe some of the threat scenarios.

NOTE: There are many other threats, which are outside the scope of this TR.

5.1 Impersonation on IMS level using the identity of an innocent user

The scenario proceeds as follows:

- Attacker A attaches to GPRS, GGSN allocates IP address, IP_A
- Attacker A registers in the IMS using his IMS identity, ID_A
- Attacker A sends SIP invite using his own source IP address (IP_A) but with the IMS identity of B (ID_B).

If the binding between the IP address on the bearer level, and the public and private user identities is not checked then the attacker will succeed, i.e. A pays for IP connectivity but IMS service is fraudulently charged to B. The fraud situation is made worse if IP flow based charging is used to 'zero rate' the IP connectivity.

The major problem is however that without this binding multiple users within a group "of friends" could sequentially (or possibly simultaneously) share B's private/public user identities, and thus all get (say) the push-to-talk service by just one of the group paying a monthly subscription. Without protection against this attack, operators could be restricted to IP connectivity based tariffs and, in particular, would be unable to offer bundled tariffs. This is unlikely to provide sufficiently flexibility in today's market place.

5.2 IP spoofing

The scenario proceeds as follows:

- User B attaches to GPRS, GGSN allocates IP address, IP_B
- User B registers in the IMS using his IMS identity, ID_B
- Attacker A sends SIP messages using his own IMS identity (ID_A) but with the source IP address of B (IP_B)

If the binding between the IP address that the GGSN allocated the UE in the PDP context activation and the source IP address in subsequent packets is not checked then the attacker will succeed, i.e. A pays for IMS service but IP connectivity is fraudulently charged to B. Note that this attack only makes sense for IMS services with outgoing traffic only because the attacker will not receive any incoming packets addressed to the IMS identity that he is impersonating.

5.3 Combined threat scenario

The scenario proceeds as follows:

- User B attaches to GPRS, GGSN allocates IP address, IP_B
- User B registers in the IMS using his IMS identity, ID_B
- Attacker A sends SIP messages using IMS identity (ID_B) and source IP address (IP_B)

If the bindings mentioned in the scenarios in clause 5.1 and 5.2 are not checked then the attacker will succeed, i.e. A fraudulently charges both IP connectivity and the IMS service to B. Note this attack only makes sense for IMS services with outgoing traffic only because the attacker will not receive any incoming packets addressed to the IMS identity that he is impersonating.

6 Specification

6.1 Overview

6.1.1 Security mechanism

The early IMS security solution works by creating a secure binding in the HSS between the public/private user identity (SIP-level identity) and the IP address currently allocated to the user at the GPRS level (bearer/network level identity). Therefore, IMS level signaling, and especially the IMS identities claimed by a user, can be connected securely to the PS domain bearer level security context.

The GGSN, terminates each user's PDP context and has assurance that the IMSI used within this PDP context is authenticated. The GGSN shall provide the user's IP address, IMSI and MSISDN to a RADIUS server in the HSS over the Gi interface when a PDP context is activated towards the IMS system. The HSS has a binding between the IMSI and/or MSISDN and the IMPI and IMPU(s), and is therefore able to store the currently assigned IP address from the GGSN against the user's IMPI and/or IMPU(s). The precise way of the handling of these identities in the HSS is outside the scope of standardization. The GGSN informs the HSS when the PDP context is deactivated/modified so that the stored IP address can be updated in the HSS. When the S-CSCF receives a SIP registration request or any subsequent

requests for a given IMPU, it checks that the IP address in the SIP header (verified by the network) matches the IP address that was stored against that subscriber's IMPU in the HSS.

The mechanism assumes that the GGSN does not allow a UE to successfully transmit an IP packet with a source IP address that is different to the one assigned during PDP context activation. In other words, the GGSN must prevent "source IP spoofing". The mechanism also assumes that the P-CSCF checks that the source IP address in the SIP header is the same as the source IP address in the IP header received from the UE (the assumption here, as well as for the full security solution, is that no NAT is present between the GGSN and the P-CSCF).

The mechanism prevents an attacker from using his own IP address in the IP header but spoofing someone else's IMS identity or IP address in the SIP header, so that he pays for GPRS level charges, but not for IMS level charges. The mechanism also prevents an attacker spoofing the address in the IP header so that he does not pay for GPRS charges. It therefore counters the threat scenarios given in clause 5 above.

NOTE: Implementations need also to supplement the early IMS security solution with a security solution for HTTP traffic in order to provide user access to various potential self-customization services, e.g. to Presence Server. It is also possible that solutions similar to early IMS security solution are re-used to protect HTTP traffic, however, this does not require any new functionality from the UE side for interoperability.

6.1.2 Restrictions imposed by early IMS security

The mechanism assumes that only one contact IP address is associated with one IMPI. Furthermore, the mechanism supports the case that there may be several IMPUs associated with one IMPI, but one IMPU is associated with only one IMPI.

In early IMS security the IMS user authentication is performed by linking the IMS registration (based on an IMPI) to a PDP context (based on an authenticated IMSI). The mechanism here assumes that there is a one-to-one relationship between the IMSI for bearer access and the IMPI for IMS access.

For the purposes of this present document, an APN, which is used for IMS services, is called an IMS APN. An IMS APN may be also used for non-IMS services. The mechanism described in this present document further adds the requirement on the UE that it allows only one APN for accessing IMS for a PLMN and that all active PDP contexts, for a single UE, associated with that IMS APN use the same IP address at any given time.

The early IMS security mechanism relies on the Via header remaining unchanged between the UE and the S-CSCF, therefore topology hiding cannot be used.

Early IMS security requires the GGSN to be in the home network.

The interim solution works with UEs that contain a SIM or a USIM, whereas full IMS security requires a USIM or ISIM. The interim solution does not authenticate at the IMS level. Instead, it relies on bearer level security at the GPRS or UMTS PS level. Because there is no key agreement, IPsec security associations are not set up between UE and P-CSCF, as they are in the full IMS security solution.

The solution works by binding the IMS level transactions to the GPRS or UMTS PS domain security association established at a GPRS or UMTS PS domain level. In doing so, it creates a dependency between SIP and the PS bearer, which does not exist with the full IMS security solution. This means that the interim solution does not provide as high a degree of access network independency as the full solution. In particular, the solution does not currently support scenarios where IMS services are offered over WLAN. If support for WLAN access is required then the full solution must be used or the interim solution must be extended to cover WLAN access.

Early IMS security derives the public user identity used in the REGISTER request from the IMSI. Consequently, the same public user identity cannot be simultaneously registered from multiple terminals, using only early IMS security registration procedures. However, simultaneous registration of a public user identity from one terminal using early IMS security, and from other terminals using fully compliant IMS security is not precluded.

NOTE: The early IMS mechanism for security is completely independent of early IMS implementations based on IPv4. For example, an IPv4 based implementation may use the full IMS security solution in TS 33.203 [2].

6.1.3 Early IMS security and logical entities

In the following we use the terms P-CSCF and S-CSCF in a general sense to refer to components of an early IMS system. We note however that early IMS solutions may not have the same functionality split between SIP entities as defined in TS 23.228 [3]. Therefore, the requirements imposed on the SIP/IP core are specified in such a way that they are independent of the functionality split between SIP entities as far as possible. While the exact functionality split of the SIP/IP core may be left open, it is important that any changes to the Cx interface towards the HSS and changes to the interface towards the UE are standardised for vendor interoperability reasons.

6.2 Detailed specification

6.2.1 GGSN-HSS interaction

When receiving an Activate PDP Context Request message, based on operator policy, a GGSN supporting early IMS security shall send a RADIUS "Accounting-Request START" message to a AAA server attached to the HSS. The message shall include the mandatory fields defined in clause 16.4.3 of TS 29.061 [4] and the UE's IP address, MSISDN and IMSI. On receipt of the message, the HSS shall use the IMSI and/or the MSISDN to find the subscriber's IMPI (derived from IMSI) and then store the IP address against a suitable identity, e.g. the IMPI.

NOTE 1: It is assumed here that the RADIUS server attached to the HSS is different to the RADIUS server that the GGSN may use for access control and IP address assignment. However, according to TS 23.060 [5] there is no limitation on whether RADIUS servers for Accounting and Access control have to be separate or combined.

NOTE 2: It is also possible to utilize RADIUS to DIAMETER conversion in the interface between GGSN and HSS. This makes it possible to utilize the existing support for DIAMETER in the HSS. One possibility to implement the conversion is to re-use the AAA architecture of I-WLAN i.e. the 3GPP AAA Proxy or Server and its capability to perform RADIUS to DIAMETER conversion. It should be noted that the GGSN shall always use RADIUS for this communication. Furthermore, it should be noted that DIAMETER is not mandatory to support in the HSS for communication with the GGSN.

GGSN shall not accept the activation of the PDP context if the accounting start request is not successfully handled by the HSS (e.g. a positive Create PDP Context Response should not be sent by the GGSN until the "Accounting-Request START" message is received or a negative Create PDP Context Response is sent after some RADIUS response timeout occurs). In particular, it shall not be possible to have an active PDP context associated with the IMS APN if the corresponding IP address is not stored in the HSS.

When the UE establishes a PDP context for an IMS APN, which is not a secondary PDP context, a new IP address is obtained, and the GGSN shall send an "Accounting-Request START" to the HSS with the assigned IP address. Depending on the status of the HSS the following steps have to be executed:

1. If an IP address is stored in the HSS and this IP address is different from the IP address received from the GGSN, the HSS shall (i) start the 3GPP IMS HSS-initiated de-registration procedure, if the UE is IMS registered, using a Cx-RTR/Cx-RTA exchange, and (ii) delete the old IP address.
2. The HSS stores the new IP address and confirms the "Accounting-Request START" to the GGSN. In case step 1 was executed, confirmation is sent either when the de-registration procedure is successfully completed or after a suitable time-out.
3. The UE starts the IMS initial registration procedure.
4. In case step 1 was executed, the HSS shall abandon the de-registration procedure when a new successful authentication for this user is signalled by the S-CSCF in a Cx-SAR message.

When all the PDP contexts are de-activated at the IMS APN of the GGSN, the GGSN sends an "Accounting-Request STOP" request to the HSS. The HSS checks the IP address indicated by the "Accounting-Request STOP" message against the IP address stored in the HSS. If they are the same, the HSS shall delete the IP address and an HSS-initiated de-registration procedure shall be started, if the UE is registered, using a Cx-RTR/Cx-RTA exchange. In the case they are different, the HSS shall ignore the message.

6.2.2 Protection against IP address spoofing in GGSN

All GGSNs that offer connection to IMS shall implement measures to prevent source IP address spoofing. Specifically, a UE attached to the GGSN shall not be able to successfully transmit an IP packet with a source IP address that is different to the one assigned by the GGSN during PDP context activation. If IP address spoofing is detected the GGSN shall drop the packet. It shall be possible for the GGSN to log the event in its security log against the subscriber information (IMSI/MSISDN), e.g. based on operator configuration.

6.2.3 Impact on IMS registration and authentication procedures

A UE shall not be able to spoof its assigned IP address and successfully receive service from the IMS. The mechanisms in the following clauses shall be supported to prevent IP address spoofing in the IMS domain. The changes to the IMS registration and authentication procedures are detailed in the following clauses.

6.2.3.1 Procedures at the UE

On sending a REGISTER request in order to indicate support for early IMS security procedures, the UE shall not include an Authorization header field and not include header fields or header field values as required by RFC3329. The From header, To header, Contact header, Expires header, Request URI and Supported header shall be set according clause 5.1.1.2 of TS 24.229 [7].

On receiving the 200 (OK) response to the REGISTER request, the UE shall handle the expiration time, the P-Associated-URI header field, and the Service-Route header field according clause 5.1.1.2 of TS 24.229 [7].

The UE shall support SIP compression as described in TS 24.229 [7] subclause 8.1.1 with the exception that no security association exists between the UE and the P-CSCF. Therefore, when the UE creates the compartment is implementation specific.

NOTE 1: Early IMS security does not allow SIP requests to be protected using an IPsec security association because it does not perform a key agreement procedure.

NOTE 2: The UE shall not use the temporary public user identity used for registration in any subsequent SIP requests.

6.2.3.2 Procedures at the P-CSCF

NOTE: As specified in RFC 3261 [6], when the P-CSCF receives a SIP request from an early IMS UE, the P-CSCF checks the IP address in the "sent-by" parameter of the Via header field provided by the UE. If the "sent-by" parameter contains a domain name, or if it contains an IP address that differs from the packet source IP address, the P-CSCF adds a "received" parameter to that Via header field value. This parameter contains the source IP address from which the packet was received.

6.2.3.2.1 Registration

When the P-CSCF receives a REGISTER request from the UE that does not contain an Authorization header and does not contain a Security-Client header, the P-CSCF shall handle the Path header, the Require header, the P-Charging-Vector header and the P-Visited-Network-ID header as described in clause 5.2.12 of TS 24.229 [7]. Afterwards the P-CSCF shall determine the I-CSCF of the home network and forward the request to that I-CSCF.

When the P-CSCF receives a 200 (OK) response to a REGISTER request, the P-CSCF shall check the value of the Expires header field and/or Expires parameter in the Contact header. When the value of the Expires header field and/or expires parameter in the Contact header is different than zero, then the P-CSCF shall:

- 1) handle the Service-Route header, the public user identities, the P-Associated-URI header, the P-Charging-Function-Address header as described in clause 5.2.2 of TS 24.229 [7] for the reception of a 200 (OK) response; and
- 2) forward the 200 (OK) response to the UE.

The P-CSCF shall support SIP compression as described in TS 24.229[7] subclause 8.2.1 with the exception that no security association exists between the UE and the P-CSCF. Therefore, when the P-CSCF creates the compartment is implementation specific.

6.2.3.2.2 General treatment for all dialogs and standalone transactions excluding REGISTER requests

As the early IMS security solution does not offer IPsec, the P-CSCF shall implement the procedures as described in clause 5.2.6 of TS 24.229 [7] with the following deviations.

For requests initiated by the UE, when the P-CSCF receives a 1xx or 2xx response, the P-CSCF shall not use a protected server port number to rewrite its own Record Route entry. Instead, it shall use the number of an unprotected port where it awaits subsequent requests from the UE.

For requests terminated by the UE, when the P-CSCF receives a request, prior to forwarding the request, the P-CSCF shall not include a protected server port in the Record-Route header and in the Via header. Instead, it shall include the number of an unprotected port where it expects subsequent requests from the UE, and the number of an unprotected port where it expects responses to the current request, respectively.

6.2.3.3 Procedures at the I-CSCF

If the I-CSCF receives an initial REGISTER request with no Authorization header included, the I-CSCF shall not reject the message. Instead, it shall behave as described in section 6.2.5.1.

Early IMS security requires that the I-CSCF between a P-CSCF and S-CSCF does not alter the Via header. An I-CSCF between an S-CSCF and another S-CSCF is unaffected by early IMS security.

Topology hiding is not available between a P-CSCF and a S-CSCF with early IMS security because it alters the Via header.

6.2.3.4 Procedures at the S-CSCF

6.2.3.4.1 Registration

Upon receipt of an initial REGISTER request without an Authorization header, the S-CSCF shall:

- 1) identify the user by the public user identity as received in the To header of the REGISTER request;
- 2) check if the P-Visited-Network header is included in the REGISTER request, and if it is included identify the visited network by the value of this header;
- 3) if no IP address is stored for the UE, query the HSS, as described in clause 6.2.5 with the public user ID as input and store the received IP address of the UE;

NOTE: At this point the S-CSCF informs the HSS, that the user currently registering will be served by the S-CSCF by passing its SIP URI to the HSS. This will be indicated by the HSS for all further incoming requests to this user, in order to direct all these requests directly to this S-CSCF.

- 4) check whether a "received" parameter exists in the Via header field provided by the UE. If a "received" parameter exists, S-CSCF shall compare the IP address recorded in the "received" parameter against the UE's IP address stored during registration. If no "received" parameter exists in the Via header field provided by the UE, then S-CSCF shall compare IP address recorded in the "sent-by" parameter against the stored UE IP address. In both cases, if stored IP address and the IP address recorded in the Via header provided by the UE do not match, the S-CSCF shall query the HSS, as described in clause 6.2.5 with the public user ID as input and store the received IP address of the UE. If the stored IP address and the IP address recorded in the Via header provided by the UE still do not match the S-CSCF shall reject the registration with a 403 (Forbidden) response and skip the following steps.
- 5) handle the Cx Server Assignment procedure, the ICID, each non-barred registered public user identity, the Path header, the registration duration as described in clause 5.4.1.2.2 of TS 24.229 [7]; and send a 200 (OK) response to the UE as described in clause 5.4.1.2.2 of TS 24.229 [7].

6.2.3.4.2 General treatment for all dialogs and standalone transactions excluding REGISTER requests

On the reception of any request other than an initial REGISTER request, the S-CSCF shall check whether a "received" parameter exists in the Via header field provided by the UE. If a "received" parameter exists, S-CSCF shall compare the

IP address received in the "received" parameter against the UE's IP address stored during registration. If no "received" parameter exists in the Via header field provided by the UE, then S-CSCF shall compare IP address received in the "sent-by" parameter against the IP address stored during registration. If the stored IP address and the IP address received in the Via header field provided by the UE do not match, the S-CSCF shall reject the request with a 403 (Forbidden) response.

In case the stored IP address and the IP address received in the Via header field provided by the UE do match, the S-CSCF shall proceed as described in clause 5.4.3 of TS 24.229 [7].

6.2.4 Identities and subscriptions

When early IMS security is supported, the HSS shall include for each subscription an IMPI and IMPU derived from the IMSI of the subscription according to the rules in TS 23.003 [8]. If the network supports both early IMS security and fully compliant IMS security, the IMSI-derived IMPI and IMPU shall be stored in addition to other IMPIs and IMPUs that may have been allocated to the subscription.

If a UE attempts a registration using early IMS security, the REGISTER shall include an IMPU that is derived from the IMSI that is used for bearer network access according to the rules in TS 23.003 [8]. The UE shall apply this rule even if a UICC containing an ISIM is present in the UE.

In the case that a UE is registering using early IMS security with an IMSI-derived IMPU, implicit registration shall be used as a mandatory function to register the subscriber's public user identity(s) using the rules defined in clause 5.2.1a.1 of TS 23.228 [3]. By applying these rules the IMSI-derived IMPU shall be barred for all procedures other than SIP registration.

6.2.5 Impact on Cx Interface

Early IMS Security mechanism affects the use of the protocol defined for the Cx interface. In particular, the User-Authorisation-Request/Answer (Cx-UAR/UAA), the Multimedia-Auth-Request/Answer (Cx-MAR/MAA) and the Server-Assignment-Request/Answer (Cx-SAR/SAA) messages are impacted.

Because in Early IMS Security the Private User Identity of the subscriber is not made available to the IMS domain in SIP messages, it is necessary to derive a Private User Identity from the Temporary Public User Identity to use as the content of the User-Name AVP in certain Cx messages (most notable UAR and MAR).

6.2.5.1 User registration status query

The UAR command, when implemented to support Early IMS Security follow the description in clause 6.1.1 of TS 29.228 [10], with the following exception:

- the Private User Identity (User-Name AVP) in the UAR command shall be derived from the temporary Public User Identity URI being registered by removing URI scheme and the following parts of the URI if present: port number, URI parameters, and headers.

6.2.5.2 S-CSCF registration/deregistration notification

The SAR command, when implemented to support early IMS Security follows the description in clause 6.1.2 of TS 29.228 [10], with the following exception:

- the Private User Identity (User-Name AVP) in the SAR command shall be derived from the temporary Public User Identity URI being registered by removing URI scheme and the following parts of the URI if present: port number, URI parameters, and headers.

6.2.5.3 Authentication procedure

The MAR and MAA commands, when implemented to support Early IMS Security follow the description in clause 6.3 of TS 29.228 [10], with the following exceptions:

- the Private User Identity (User-Name AVP) in the MAR command shall be derived from the temporary Public User Identity URI being registered by removing URI scheme and the following parts of the URI if present: port number, URI parameters, and headers.

- In the MAR and MAA commands, the Authentication Scheme (Authentication-Scheme AVP described in clause 7.9.2 of TS 29.228 [10]) within the SIP-Auth-Data-Item grouped AVP shall contain "Early-IMS-Security".
- In the MAA command, the SIP-Auth-Data-Item grouped AVP shall contain the user IP address. If the address is IPv4 it shall be included within the Framed-IP-Address AVP as defined in draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17.txt [11]. If the address is IPv6 it shall be included within the Framed-IPv6-Prefix AVP and, if the Framed-IPv6-Prefix AVP alone is not unique for the user it shall also contain Framed-Interface-Id AVP.

This results in SIP-Auth-Data-Item as depicted in table 6.3.4 of TS 29.228 [10], being replaced when Early IMS Security is employed by a structure as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Authentication Data content for Early IMS Security

Information element name	Mapping to Diameter AVP	Cat.	Description
Authentication Scheme (See 7.9.2)	SIP-Authentication-Scheme	M	Authentication scheme. For Early IMS Security it will indicate "Early-IMS-Security"
User IPv4 Address	Framed-IP-Address	C	If the IP Address of the User is an IPv4 address, this AVP shall be included. For a description of the AVP see draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17.txt [11].
User IPv6 Prefix	Framed-IPv6-Prefix	C	If the IP Address of the User is an IPv6 address, this AVP shall be included. For a description of the AVP see draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17.txt [11].
Framed Interface Id	Framed-Interface-Id	C	If the IP Address of the User is an IPv6 address and the Framed-IPv6-Address AVP alone is not unique for the user this AVP shall be included. For a description of the AVP see draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17.txt [11].

The ABNF description of the AVP as given in clause 6.3.13 of TS 29.229 [12] is replaced with that given below.

```
SIP-Auth-Data-Item ::= < AVP Header : TBD >
  [ SIP-Authentication-Scheme ]
  [ Framed-IP-Address ]
  [ Framed-IPv6-Prefix ]
  [ Framed-Interface-Id ]
  * [AVP]
```

- Step 5 of clause 6.3.1 of TS 29.229 [12] shall apply with the following exception:
 - HSS shall return only one SIP-Auth-Data-Item

6.2.6 Interworking cases

For the purposes of the interworking considerations in this clause, it is assumed that the IMS entities P-CSCF, I-CSCF, S-CSCF and HSS reside in the home network and all support the same variants of IMS, i.e. all support either only early IMS security, or only fully compliant IMS security, or both.

NOTE: It is compatible with the considerations in this document that the UE uses different APNs to indicate the IMS variant currently used by the UE, in case the P-CSCF functionality is split over several physical entities.

It is expected that both fully compliant UEs implementing the security mechanisms in TS 33.203 [2] (denoted "fully compliant IMS security" in the following) and UEs implementing the early IMS security solution specified in the

present document (denoted "early IMS security" in the following) will access the same IMS. In addition, IMS networks will support only fully compliant IMS UEs, early IMS UEs, or both. Both UEs and IMS networks must therefore be able to properly handle the different possible interworking cases.

Since early IMS security does not require the security headers specified for fully compliant IMS UEs, these headers shall not be used for early IMS security. The REGISTER request sent by an early IMS UE security to the IMS network shall not contain the security headers specified by TS 33.203 (Authorization and Security-Client).

As a result, early IMS security UEs shall not add an explicit indication for the security used to the IMS signaling. An IMS network supporting both early IMS security and fully 3GPP compliant IMS security UEs shall use early IMS security for authenticating the UE during registrations that do not contain the security headers specified by TS 33.203 (Authorization and Security-Client).

Without sending an Authorization Header in the initial REGISTER request, early IMS UEs only provide the IMS public identity (IMPU), but not the IMS private identity (IMPI) to the network (this is only present in the Authorization header for fully compliant IMS security UEs).

During the process of user registration for early IMS security, the Cx interface carries the public user identity in Cx-UAR requests (sent by I-CSCF) and Cx-MAR as well as Cx-SAR requests (sent by S-CSCF). The private user identity within these requests shall be generated according to section 6.2.5.1. This avoids changes to the message format on the Cx interface.

If the S-CSCF receives an indication that the UE is an early IMS UE, then it shall be able to select the "Early-IMS-Security" authentication scheme in the Cx-MAR request.

For interworking between early IMS security and fully compliant IMS security implementations during IMS registration, the following cases shall be supported:

1. Both UE and IMS network support early IMS security only

IMS registration shall take place as described by the present document.

2. UE supports early IMS security only, IMS network supports both early IMS security and fully compliant IMS security

Early IMS security according to this annex shall be used for authenticating the UE for all registrations from UEs that do not provide the fully compliant IMS security headers.

3. UE supports both, IMS network supports early IMS security only

If the UE already has knowledge about the IMS network capabilities (which could for example be preconfigured in the UE), the appropriate authentication method shall be chosen. The UE shall use fully compliant IMS security, if the network supports this, otherwise the UE shall use early IMS security.

If the UE does not have such knowledge it shall start with the fully compliant IMS Registration procedure. The early IMS P-CSCF shall answer with a 420 (Bad Extension) failure, since it does not recognize the method mandated by the Proxy-Require header that is sent by the UE in the initial REGISTER request.

NOTE: The Proxy-Require header cannot be ignored by the P-CSCF.

The UE shall, after receiving the error response, send an early IMS registration, i.e., shall send a new REGISTER request without the fully compliant IMS security headers.

4. UE and IMS network support both

The UE shall start with the fully compliant IMS security registration procedure. The network, with receiving the initial REGISTER request, receives indication that the IMS UE is fully compliant and shall continue as specified by TS 33.203 [2].

5. Mobile equipment and IMS network support both, UE contains a SIM

The UE might start with the fully compliant IMS security registration procedure. However, when the S-CSCF requests authentication vectors from the HSS, the HSS will discover that the UE contains a SIM and return an error.

The S-CSCF shall answer with a 401 (Unauthorized) with a Warning: header containing a warn-code 399 and the warning text "Early security required". The UE then retries using early IMS security.

6. UE supports early IMS security only, IMS network supports fully compliant IMS security only

The UE sends a REGISTER request to the IMS network that does not contain the security headers required by fully compliant IMS security. The fully compliant IMS security P-CSCF will detect that the Security-Client header is missing and return a 4xx responses, as described in clause 5.2.2 of TS 24.229 [7].

7. UE supports fully compliant IMS security only, IMS network supports early IMS security only

The UE shall start with the fully compliant IMS security registration procedure. The early IMS P-CSCF shall answer with a 420 (Bad Extension) failure, since it does not recognize the method mandated by the Proxy-Require header that is sent by the UE in the initial REGISTER request. After receiving the error response, the UE shall stop the attempt to register with this network, since the fully compliant IMS security according to TS 33.203 [2] is not supported.

8. UE supports fully compliant IMS access security only, IMS network supports both

The UE shall start with the fully compliant IMS registration procedure. The network, with receiving the initial REGISTER request, receives indication that the IMS UE is fully compliant and shall continue as specified by TS 33.203 [2].

9. UE supports both, IMS network supports fully compliant IMS access security only

The UE shall start with the fully compliant IMS registration procedure. The network, with receiving the initial REGISTER request, receives indication that the IMS UE is fully compliant and shall continue as specified by TS 33.203 [2].

10. UE supports both, IMS network supports fully compliant IMS access security only, UE contains a SIM

The UE might start with the fully compliant IMS registration procedure. However, when the S-CSCF requests authentication vectors from the HSS, the HSS will discover that the UE contains a SIM and return an error. The S-CSCF shall answer with a 403 (Forbidden). After receiving the 403 response, the UE shall stop the attempt to register with this network.

11. Both UE and IMS network support fully compliant IMS access security only.

IMS registration shall take place as described by TS 33.203 [2].

6.2.7 Message flows

6.2.7.1 Successful registration

Figure 1 below describes the message flow for successful registration to the IMS that is specified by the early IMS security solution.

NOTE: The "received" parameter is only sent from P-CSCF to S-CSCF under the conditions given in clause 6.2.3.2.




Figure 1: Message sequence for early IMS security showing a successful registration

6.2.7.2 Unsuccessful registration

Figure 2 below gives an example message flow for the unsuccessful attempt of an attacker trying to spoof the IMS identity of a valid IMS user.

Again, the "received" parameter is only present between P-CSCF to S-CSCF under the conditions given in clause 6.2.3.2.




Figure 2: Message sequence for early IMS security showing an unsuccessful identity theft

6.2.7.3 Successful registration for a selected interworking case

Figure 3 below describes the message flow for successful registration to the IMS in the case that the UE supports both fully compliant IMS and early IMS access security and the network supports early IMS security only. This case is denoted as case 3 in clause 6.2.6.

NOTE: The "received" parameter is only sent from P-CSCF to S-CSCF under the conditions given in clause 6.2.3.2.




Figure 3: Message sequence for early IMS security showing interworking case where UE supports both fully compliant IMS and early IMS access security and network supports early IMS security only

Annex A: Comparison with an alternative approach - HTTP Digest

An alternative approach would have been to use password-based authentication for early IMS implementations. For example, HTTP Digest (IETF RFC 2617) could have been used for authenticating the IMS subscriber. The HTTP Digest method is a widely supported authentication mechanism. It is not dependent of the GPRS network and it does not require new functional elements or interfaces in IMS network. However, this method would have required a subscriber-specific password to be provisioned on the IMS UE. This alternative is not adopted for use in early IMS systems.

The HTTP Digest method has the following advantages and disadvantages:

Advantages:

- Fully standardized and supported by RFC 3261 [6] compliant implementations and therefore by TS 24.229 [7] compliant implementations (SIP protocol mandates support of HTTP Digest).
- HTTP Digest can support partial message integrity protection for those parts of the message used in the calculation of the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization header field response directive values (when qop=auth-int).
- HTTP Digest implementations can employ methods to protect against replay attacks (e.g. using server created nonce values based on user ID, time-stamp, private server key, or using one-time nonce values).

Disadvantages:

- HTTP Digest may impose restrictions on the type of charging schemes that can be adopted by an operator. In particular, if a subscriber could find out his or her own password from an insecure implementation on the UE, then he or she could share the IMS subscription with friends. This could impact revenue for the operator if bundled or partly subscription based tariffs are used rather than purely usage based tariffs. For example, a subscriber could take out a subscription for 100 instant messages and then share this with his or her friends. Although contractual obligations could be imposed on customers to prohibit this behaviour, in practice this would be difficult to enforce without employing special protection mechanisms, e.g. disallow multiple binding to a single IP address. If charging were purely usage based then there would be no incentive for the subscriber to do this, therefore using HTTP Digest may not impact on operator's revenue. The solution specified in clause 6 is flexible in allowing a range of different charging models including bundled or partly subscription based tariffs.
- HTTP Digest provides a weaker form of subscriber authentication when compared with the levels of authentication used for other services offered over 3GPP networks, where authentication is typically based directly or indirectly on the (U)SIM. Subscription authentication depends, among other things, on the strength of the password used as well as on the password provisioning methods, such as bootstrapping passwords into the IMS capable UE. A weak subscriber authentication, vulnerable to dictionary attacks, has implications on the reliability of charging, and on the level of assurance that can be given to the customer that their communications cannot be masqueraded. In the solution specified in clause 6, authentication of the IMS subscriber is indirectly based on (U)SIM authentication at the GPRS level. The level of security is similar to that currently used for certain WAP services, where the user's MSISDN is provided by the GGSN to the WAP gateway. Security does not rely on the UE securely storing any long-term secret information (e.g. passwords).
- HTTP Digest provisioning is more complex since subscriber-specific information (i.e. passwords) must be installed or bootstrapped into each IMS UE.

Annex B: Change history

Change history							
Date	TSG #	TSG Doc.	CR	Rev	Subject/Comment	Old	New
29/6/04					First version based on input from S3-040264 and S3-040265.	-	0.0.1
8/7/04					Incorporates comments received at SA3#34.	0.0.1	0.0.2
8/10/04					Incorporates changes agreed at SA3#35.	0.0.2	0.0.3
25/11/04					S3-041091: Incorporates changes agreed at SA3#36.	0.0.3	0.0.4
03/12/04	SP-26	SP-040866	-	-	Production of version 1.0.0 for presentation to TSG SA for approval.	0.0.4	1.0.0
25/02/05					Upgraded to 33.9xx series TR. S3-050138: Incorporates changes agreed at SA3#37.	33.878 v1.0.0	33.978 v1.1.0
11/03/05	SP-27	SP-050136	-	-	Creation of version 2.0.0 for presentation to TSG SA for approval	1.1.0	2.0.0

3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Aspects of Early IMS (Release 6)



The present document has been developed within the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP™) and may be further elaborated for the purposes of 3GPP.

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Foreword

This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

Version x.y.z

where:

- x the first digit:
 - 1 presented to TSG for information;
 - 2 presented to TSG for approval;
 - 3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.
- y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.
- z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.

Introduction

3GPP IMS provides an IP-based session control capability based on the SIP protocol. IMS can be used to enable services such as push-to-talk, instant messaging, presence and conferencing. It is understood that "early" implementations of these services will exist that are not fully compliant with 3GPP IMS. For example, it has been recognized that although 3GPP IMS uses exclusively IPv6, as specified in clause 5.1 of TS 23.221 [13], there will exist IMS implementations based on IPv4 (TR 23.981 [1]).

Non-compliance with IPv6 is not the only difference between early IMS implementations and fully 3GPP compliant implementations. In particular, it is expected that there will be a need to deploy some IMS-based services before products are available which fully support the 3GPP IMS security features defined in TS 33.203 [2]. Non-compliance with TS 33.203 security features is expected to be a problem mainly at the UE side, because of the potential lack of support of the USIM/ISIM interface (especially in 2G-only devices) and because of the potential inability to support IPsec on some UE platforms.

Although full support of 3GPP TS 33.203 security features is preferred from a security perspective, it is acknowledged that early IMS implementations will exist which do not support these features. Therefore, there is a need to ensure that simple, yet adequately secure, mechanisms are in place to protect against the most significant security threats that will exist in early IMS implementations. ~~Furthermore, to maximise interoperability, it is important that these mechanisms are adequately standardised.~~

1 Scope

The present document [specifies documents](#) an interim security solution for early IMS implementations that are not fully compliant with the IMS security architecture specified in TS 33.203 [2].

2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.
- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.
- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

- [1] 3GPP TR 23.981: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Interworking aspects and migration scenarios for IPv4 based IMS Implementations".
- [2] 3GPP TS 33.203: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G security; Access security for IP-based services".
- [3] 3GPP TS 23.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS); Stage 2".
- [4] 3GPP TS 29.061: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Interworking between the Public Land Mobile Network (PLMN) supporting packet based services and Packet Data Networks (PDN)".
- [5] 3GPP TS 23.060: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service description; Stage 2".
- [6] IETF RFC 3261: "Session Initiation Protocol".
- [7] 3GPP TS 24.229: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Session Description Protocol (SDP); Stage 3".
- [8] 3GPP TS 23.003: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Numbering, addressing and identification".
- [9] 3GPP TS 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".
- [10] 3GPP TS 29.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Cx and Dx interfaces; Signalling flows and message contents".
- [11] draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17.txt (July 2004), "Diameter Network Access Server Application", work in progress.

Editor's note: The above document cannot be formally referenced until it is published as an RFC.

- [12] 3GPP TS 29.229: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network; Cx and Dx interfaces based on the Diameter protocol; Protocol details".

- [13] 3GPP TS 23.221: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Architectural requirements".

3 Definitions, symbols and abbreviations

3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in TS 21.905 [9] and the following apply.

Early IMS: a UE or network element implementing the early IMS security solution specified in the present document.

Fully compliant IMS: a UE or network element implementing the IMS security solution specified in TS 33.203 [2].

3.2 Symbols

For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:

Cx	Reference Point between a CSCF and an HSS.
Gi	Reference point between GPRS and an external packet data network

3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the following abbreviations apply:

AAA	Authentication Authorisation Accounting
ABNF	Augmented Backus-Naur Form
APN	Access Point Name
AVP	Attribute-Value Pair
CSCF	Call/Session Control Function
GGSN	Gateway GPRS Support Node
HSS	Home Subscriber Server
I-CSCF	Interrogating CSCF
ICID	IM CN subsystem Charging Identifier
IM	IP Multimedia
IMPI	IM Private Identity
IMPU	IM Public Identity
IMS	IP Multimedia Subsystem
IP	Internet Protocol
IPSec	IP Security protocol
ISIM	IMS Subscriber Identity Module
NAT	Network Address Translation
P-CSCF	Proxy-CSCF
PDP	Packet Data Protocol
RFC	Request For Comments
S-CSCF	Serving-CSCF
SGSN	Serving GPRS Support Node
SIP	Session Initiation Protocol
SLF	Server Locator Function
UE	User Equipment
URI	Uniform Resource Identifier

4 Requirements

Low impact on existing entities: Any early IMS security mechanisms should be such that impacts on existing entities, especially on the UE, are minimised and would be quick to implement. It is especially important to minimise impact on the UE to maximise interoperability with early IMS UEs. The mechanisms should be quick to implement so that the window of opportunity for the early IMS security solution is not missed.

Adequate level of security: Although it is recognised that the early IMS security solution will be simpler than the fully compliant IMS security solution, it should still provide an adequate level of security to protect against the most significant security threats that will exist in early IMS implementations. As a guide, the strength of subscriber authentication should be comparable to the level of authentication provided for existing chargeable services in mobile networks.

Smooth and cost effective migration path to fully compliant solution: Clearly, any security mechanisms developed for early IMS systems will provide a lower level of protection compared with that offered by the fully compliant IMS security solution. The security mechanisms developed for early IMS systems should therefore be considered as an interim solution and migration to the fully compliant IMS security solution should take place as soon as suitable products become available at an acceptable cost. In particular, the early IMS security solution should not be used as a long-term replacement for the fully compliant IMS security solution. It is important that the early IMS security solution allows a smooth and cost-effective migration path to the fully compliant IMS security solution.

Co-existence with fully compliant solution: It is clear that UEs supporting the early IMS security solution will need to be supported even after fully compliant IMS UEs are deployed. The early IMS security solution should therefore be able to co-exist with the fully compliant IMS security solution. In particular, it shall be possible for the SIP/IP core to differentiate between a subscription using early IMS security mechanisms and a subscription using the fully compliant IMS security solution.

Protection against bidding down: It should not be possible for an attacker to force the use of the early IMS security solution when both the UE and the network support the fully compliant IMS security solution.

No restrictions on the type of charging model: Compared with fully compliant IMS security solution, the early IMS security solution should not impose any restrictions on the type of charging model that can be adopted.

~~Standardisation of a single early IMS security solution: Interfaces that are impacted by the early IMS security solution should be adequately standardised to ensure interoperability between vendors. To avoid unnecessary complexity, a single early IMS security solution should be standardised.~~ **A single early IMS security solution:** Interfaces that are impacted by the early IMS security solution should be adequately documented to ensure interoperability between vendors.

Support access over 3GPP PS domain: It is a requirement is to support secure access over the 3GPP PS domain (including GSM/GPRS and UMTS access).

Low impact on provisioning: The impact on provisioning should be low compared with the fully compliant IMS security solution.

5 Threat scenarios

To understand what controls are needed to address the security requirements, it is useful to describe some of the threat scenarios.

NOTE: There are many other threats, which are outside the scope of this TR.

5.1 Impersonation on IMS level using the identity of an innocent user

The scenario proceeds as follows:

- Attacker A attaches to GPRS, GGSN allocates IP address, IP_A

- Attacker A registers in the IMS using his IMS identity, ID_A
- Attacker A sends SIP invite using his own source IP address (IP_A) but with the IMS identity of B (ID_B).

If the binding between the IP address on the bearer level, and the public and private user identities is not checked then the attacker will succeed, i.e. A pays for IP connectivity but IMS service is fraudulently charged to B. The fraud situation is made worse if IP flow based charging is used to 'zero rate' the IP connectivity.

The major problem is however that without this binding multiple users within a group "of friends" could sequentially (or possibly simultaneously) share B's private/public user identities, and thus all get (say) the push-to-talk service by just one of the group paying a monthly subscription. Without protection against this attack, operators could be restricted to IP connectivity based tariffs and, in particular, would be unable to offer bundled tariffs. This is unlikely to provide sufficiently flexibility in today's market place.

5.2 IP spoofing

The scenario proceeds as follows:

- User B attaches to GPRS, GGSN allocates IP address, IP_B
- User B registers in the IMS using his IMS identity, ID_B
- Attacker A sends SIP messages using his own IMS identity (ID_A) but with the source IP address of B (IP_B)

If the binding between the IP address that the GGSN allocated the UE in the PDP context activation and the source IP address in subsequent packets is not checked then the attacker will succeed, i.e. A pays for IMS service but IP connectivity is fraudulently charged to B. Note that this attack only makes sense for IMS services with outgoing traffic only because the attacker will not receive any incoming packets addressed to the IMS identity that he is impersonating.

5.3 Combined threat scenario

The scenario proceeds as follows:

- User B attaches to GPRS, GGSN allocates IP address, IP_B
- User B registers in the IMS using his IMS identity, ID_B
- Attacker A sends SIP messages using IMS identity (ID_B) and source IP address (IP_B)

If the bindings mentioned in the scenarios in clause 5.1 and 5.2 are not checked then the attacker will succeed, i.e. A fraudulently charges both IP connectivity and the IMS service to B. Note this attack only makes sense for IMS services with outgoing traffic only because the attacker will not receive any incoming packets addressed to the IMS identity that he is impersonating.

6 Specification

6.1 Overview

[6.1.1 Security mechanism](#)

The early IMS security solution works by creating a secure binding in the HSS between the public/private user identity (SIP-level identity) and the IP address currently allocated to the user at the GPRS level (bearer/network level identity). Therefore, IMS level signaling, and especially the IMS identities claimed by a user, can be connected securely to the PS domain bearer level security context.

The GGSN, terminates each user's PDP context and has assurance that the IMSI used within this PDP context is authenticated. The GGSN shall provide the user's IP address, IMSI and MSISDN to a RADIUS server in the HSS over the Gi interface when a PDP context is activated towards the IMS system. The HSS has a binding between the IMSI and/or MSISDN and the IMPI and IMPU(s), and is therefore able to store the currently assigned IP address from the

GGSN against the user's IMPI and/or IMPU(s). The precise way of the handling of these identities in the HSS is outside the scope of standardization. The GGSN informs the HSS when the PDP context is deactivated/modified so that the stored IP address can be updated in the HSS. When the S-CSCF receives a SIP registration request or any subsequent requests for a given IMPU, it checks that the IP address in the SIP header (verified by the network) matches the IP address that was stored against that subscriber's IMPU in the HSS.

The mechanism assumes that the GGSN does not allow a UE to successfully transmit an IP packet with a source IP address that is different to the one assigned during PDP context activation. In other words, the GGSN must prevent "source IP spoofing". The mechanism also assumes that the P-CSCF checks that the source IP address in the SIP header is the same as the source IP address in the IP header received from the UE (the assumption here, as well as for the full security solution, is that no NAT is present between the GGSN and the P-CSCF).

The mechanism prevents an attacker from using his own IP address in the IP header but spoofing someone else's IMS identity or IP address in the SIP header, so that he pays for GPRS level charges, but not for IMS level charges. The mechanism also prevents an attacker spoofing the address in the IP header so that he does not pay for GPRS charges. It therefore counters the threat scenarios given in clause 5 above.

NOTE: Implementations need also to supplement the early IMS security solution with a security solution for HTTP traffic in order to provide user access to various potential self-customization services, e.g. to Presence Server. It is also possible that solutions similar to early IMS security solution are re-used to protect HTTP traffic, however, this does not require any new functionality from the UE side for interoperability.

6.1.2 Restrictions imposed by early IMS security

The mechanism assumes that only one contact IP address is associated with one IMPI. Furthermore, the mechanism supports the case that there may be several IMPUs associated with one IMPI, but one IMPU is associated with only one IMPI.

In early IMS security the IMS user authentication is performed by linking the IMS registration (based on an IMPI) to a PDP context (based on an authenticated IMSI). The mechanism here assumes that there is a one-to-one relationship between the IMSI for bearer access and the IMPI for IMS access.

For the purposes of this present document, an APN, which is used for IMS services, is called an IMS APN. An IMS APN may be also used for non-IMS services. The mechanism described in this present document further adds ~~a~~ restriction ~~the requirement on the UE~~ that it allows ~~there is~~ only one APN for accessing IMS for a PLMN and that all active PDP contexts, for a single UE, associated with that IMS APN use the same IP address at any given time.

The early IMS security mechanism relies on the Via header remaining unchanged between the UE and the S-CSCF, therefore topology hiding cannot be used.

Early IMS security requires the GGSN to be in the home network.

The interim solution works with UEs that contain a SIM or a USIM, whereas full IMS security requires a USIM or ISIM. The interim solution does not authenticate at the IMS level. Instead, it relies on bearer level security at the GPRS or UMTS PS level. Because there is no key agreement, IPsec security associations are not set up between UE and P-CSCF, as they are in the full IMS security solution.

The solution works by binding the IMS level transactions to the GPRS or UMTS PS domain security association established at a GPRS or UMTS PS domain level. In doing so, it creates a dependency between SIP and the PS bearer, which does not exist with the full IMS security solution. This means that the interim solution does not provide as high a degree of access network independency as the full solution. In particular, the solution does not currently support scenarios where IMS services are offered over WLAN. If support for WLAN access is required then the full solution must be used or the interim solution must be extended to cover WLAN access.

Early IMS security derives the public user identity used in the REGISTER request from the IMSI. Consequently, the same public user identity cannot be simultaneously registered from multiple terminals, using only early IMS security registration procedures. However, simultaneous registration of a public user identity from one terminal using early IMS security, and from other terminals using fully compliant IMS security is not precluded.

NOTE: The early IMS mechanism for security is completely independent of early IMS implementations based on IPv4. For example, an IPv4 based implementation may use the full IMS security solution in TS 33.203 [2].

6.1.3 Early IMS security and logical entities

In the following we use the terms P-CSCF and S-CSCF in a general sense to refer to components of an early IMS system. We note however that early IMS solutions may not have the same functionality split between SIP entities as defined in TS 23.228 [3]. Therefore, the requirements imposed on the SIP/IP core are specified in such a way that they are independent of the functionality split between SIP entities as far as possible. While the exact functionality split of the SIP/IP core may be left open, it is important that any changes to the Cx interface towards the HSS and changes to the interface towards the UE are standardised for vendor interoperability reasons.

6.2 Detailed specification

6.2.1 GGSN-HSS interaction

When receiving an Activate PDP Context Request message, based on operator policy, a GGSN supporting early IMS security shall send a RADIUS "Accounting-Request START" message to a AAA server attached to the HSS. The message shall include the mandatory fields defined in clause 16.4.3 of TS 29.061 [4] and the UE's IP address, MSISDN and IMSI. On receipt of the message, the HSS shall use the IMSI and/or the MSISDN to find the subscriber's IMPI (derived from IMSI) and then store the IP address against a suitable identity, e.g. the IMPI.

NOTE 1: It is assumed here that the RADIUS server attached to the HSS is different to the RADIUS server that the GGSN may use for access control and IP address assignment. However, according to TS 23.060 [5] there is no limitation on whether RADIUS servers for Accounting and Access control have to be separate or combined.

NOTE 2: It is also possible to utilize RADIUS to DIAMETER conversion in the interface between GGSN and HSS. This makes it possible to utilize the existing support for DIAMETER in the HSS. One possibility to implement the conversion is to re-use the AAA architecture of I-WLAN i.e. the 3GPP AAA Proxy or Server and its capability to perform RADIUS to DIAMETER conversion. It should be noted that the GGSN shall always uses RADIUS for this communication. Furthermore, it should be noted that DIAMETER is not mandatory to support in the HSS for communication with the GGSN.

GGSN shall not accept the activation of the PDP context if the accounting start request is not successfully handled by the HSS (e.g. a positive Create PDP Context Response should not be sent by the GGSN until the "Accounting-Request START" message is received or a negative Create PDP Context Response is sent after some RADIUS response timeout occurs). In particular, it shall not be possible to have an active PDP context associated with the IMS APN if the corresponding IP address is not stored in the HSS.

When the UE establishes ~~its first~~ a PDP context for an IMS APN, which is not a secondary PDP context, a new IP address is obtained, and the GGSN shall send an "Accounting-Request START" to the HSS with the assigned IP address. Depending on the status of the HSS the following steps have to be executed:

1. If an IP address is stored in the HSS and this IP address is different from the IP address ~~already stored in the HSS (i.e. the "old" IP address)~~ received from the GGSN, the HSS shall (i) start the 3GPP IMS HSS-initiated de-registration procedure, if the UE is IMS registered, using a Cx-RTR/Cx-RTA exchange, and (ii) delete the old IP address.
2. The HSS stores the new IP address and confirms the "Accounting-Request START" to the GGSN. In case step 1 was executed, confirmation is sent either when ~~either~~ the de-registration procedure is successfully completed or after a suitable time-out.
3. The UE starts the IMS initial registration procedure.
4. In case step 1 was executed, the HSS shall abandon the de-registration procedure when a new successful authentication for this user is signalled by the S-CSCF in a Cx-SAR message.

When all the PDP contexts are de-activated at the IMS APN of the GGSN, the GGSN sends an "Accounting-Request STOP" request to the HSS. The HSS checks the IP address indicated by the "Accounting-Request STOP" message

against the IP address stored in the HSS. If they are the same, [the HSS shall delete the IP address and](#) an HSS-initiated de-registration procedure shall be started, if the UE is registered, using a Cx-RTR/Cx-RTA exchange. In the case they are different, the HSS shall ignore the message.

6.2.2 Protection against IP address spoofing in GGSN

All GGSNs that offer connection to IMS shall implement measures to prevent source IP address spoofing. Specifically, a UE attached to the GGSN shall not be able to successfully transmit an IP packet with a source IP address that is different to the one assigned by the GGSN during PDP context activation. If IP address spoofing is detected the GGSN shall drop the packet. It shall be possible for the GGSN to log the event in its security log against the subscriber information (IMSI/MSISDN), e.g. based on operator configuration.

6.2.3 Impact on IMS registration and authentication procedures

A UE shall not be able to spoof its assigned IP address and successfully receive service from the IMS. The mechanisms in the following clauses shall be supported to prevent IP address spoofing in the IMS domain. The changes to the IMS registration and authentication procedures are detailed in the following clauses.

6.2.3.1 Procedures at the UE

On sending a REGISTER request in order to indicate support for early IMS security procedures, the UE shall not include an Authorization header field and not include [header fields or header field values as required by RFC3329a](#)-~~Security-Client header field~~. The From header, To header, Contact header, Expires header, Request URI, [and](#) Supported header ~~and a P-Asserted-Id header~~ shall be set according clause 5.1.1.2 of TS 24.229 [7].

On receiving the 200 (OK) response to the REGISTER request, the UE shall handle the expiration time, the P-Associated-URI header field, and the Service-Route header field according clause 5.1.1.2 of TS 24.229 [7].

[The UE shall support SIP compression as described in TS 24.229 \[7\] subclause 8.1.1 with the exception that no security association exists between the UE and the P-CSCF. Therefore, when the UE creates the compartment is implementation specific.](#)

NOTE 1: Early IMS security does not allow SIP requests to be protected using an IPsec security association because it does not perform a key agreement procedure.

NOTE 2: The UE shall not use the temporary public user identity used for registration in any subsequent SIP requests.

6.2.3.2 Procedures at the P-CSCF

NOTE: As specified in RFC 3261 [6], when the P-CSCF receives a SIP request from an early IMS UE, the P-CSCF checks the IP address in the "sent-by" parameter of the Via header field provided by the UE. If the "sent-by" parameter contains a domain name, or if it contains an IP address that differs from the packet source IP address, the P-CSCF adds a "received" parameter to that Via header field value. This parameter contains the source IP address from which the packet was received.

6.2.3.2.1 Registration

When the P-CSCF receives a REGISTER request from the UE that does not contain an Authorization header and does not contain a Security-Client header, the P-CSCF shall handle the Path header, the Require header, the P-Charging-Vector header and the P-Visited-Network-ID header as described in clause 5.2.12 of TS 24.229 [7]. Afterwards the P-CSCF shall determine the I-CSCF of the home network and forward the request to that I-CSCF.

When the P-CSCF receives a 200 (OK) response to a REGISTER request, the P-CSCF shall check the value of the Expires header field and/or Expires parameter in the Contact header. When the value of the Expires header field and/or expires parameter in the Contact header is different than zero, then the P-CSCF shall:

- 1) handle the Service-Route header, the public user identities, the P-~~Associated-URI~~~~Asserted-Identity~~ header, the P-Charging-Function-Address header as described in clause 5.2.2 of TS 24.229 [7] for the reception of a 200 (OK) response; and

- 2) forward the 200 (OK) response to the UE.

The P-CSCF shall support SIP compression as described in TS 24.229[7] subclause 8.2.1 with the exception that no security association exists between the UE and the P-CSCF. Therefore, when the P-CSCF creates the compartment is implementation specific.

6.2.3.2.2 General treatment for all dialogs and standalone transactions excluding REGISTER requests

As the early IMS security solution does not offer IPsec, the P-CSCF shall implement the procedures as described in clause 5.2.6 of TS 24.229 [7] with the following deviations.

For requests initiated by the UE, when the P-CSCF receives a 1xx or 2xx response, the P-CSCF shall not use a protected server port number to rewrite its own Record Route entry. Instead, it shall use the number of an unprotected port where it awaits subsequent requests from the UE.

For requests terminated by the UE, when the P-CSCF receives a request, prior to forwarding the request, the P-CSCF shall not include a protected server port in the Record-Route header and in the Via header. Instead, it shall include the number of an unprotected port where it expects subsequent requests from the UE, and the number of an unprotected port where it expects responses to the current request, respectively.

6.2.3.3 Procedures at the I-CSCF

If the I-CSCF receives an initial REGISTER request with no Authorization header included, the I-CSCF shall not reject the message. Instead, it shall behave as described in section 6.2.5.1.

Early IMS security requires that the I-CSCF between a P-CSCF and S-CSCF does not alter the Via header. An I-CSCF between an S-CSCF and another S-CSCF is unaffected by early IMS security.

NOTE:—Topology hiding is not available between a P-CSCF and a S-CSCF with early IMS security because ~~topology hiding~~ it alters the Via header.

6.2.3.4 Procedures at the S-CSCF

6.2.3.4.1 Registration

Upon receipt of an initial REGISTER request without an Authorization header, the S-CSCF shall:

- 1) identify the user by the public user identity as received in the To header of the REGISTER request;
- 2) check if the P-Visited-Network header is included in the REGISTER request, and if it is included identify the visited network by the value of this header;
- 3) if no IP address is stored for the UE, query the HSS, as described in clause 6.2.5 with the public user ID as input and store the received IP address of the UE. ~~Prior to contacting the HSS, the S-CSCF decides which HSS to query, possibly as a result of a query to the Subscription Locator Functional (SLF) entity as specified in TS 29.228 [10];~~

NOTE: At this point the S-CSCF informs the HSS, that the user currently registering will be served by the S-CSCF by passing its SIP URI to the HSS. This will be indicated by the HSS for all further incoming requests to this user, in order to direct all these requests directly to this S-CSCF.

- 4) check whether a "received" parameter exists in the Via header field provided by the UE. If a "received" parameter exists, S-CSCF shall compare the IP address recorded in the "received" parameter against the UE's IP address stored during registration. If no "received" parameter exists in the Via header field provided by the UE, then S-CSCF shall compare IP address recorded in the "sent-by" parameter against the stored UE IP address. In both cases, if stored IP address and the IP address recorded in the Via header provided by the UE do not match, the S-CSCF shall query the HSS, as described in clause 6.2.5 with the public user ID as input and store the received IP address of the UE. If the stored IP address and the IP address recorded in the Via header provided by the UE still do not match the S-CSCF shall reject the registration with a 403 (Forbidden) response and skip the following steps.

- 5) handle the Cx Server Assignment procedure, the ICID, each non-barred registered public user identity, the Path header, the registration duration as described in clause 5.4.1.2.2 of TS 24.229 [7]; and send a 200 (OK) response to the UE as described in clause 5.4.1.2.2 of TS 24.229 [7].

6.2.3.4.2 General treatment for all dialogs and standalone transactions excluding REGISTER requests

On the reception of any request other than an initial REGISTER request, the S-CSCF shall check whether a "received" parameter exists in the Via header field provided by the UE. If a "received" parameter exists, S-CSCF shall compare the IP address received in the "received" parameter against the UE's IP address stored during registration. If no "received" parameter exists in the Via header field provided by the UE, then S-CSCF shall compare IP address received in the "sent-by" parameter against the IP address stored during registration. If the stored IP address and the IP address received in the Via header field provided by the UE do not match, the S-CSCF shall reject the request with a 403 (Forbidden) response.

In case the stored IP address and the IP address received in the Via header field provided by the UE do match, the S-CSCF shall proceed as described in clause 5.4.3 of TS 24.229 [7].

6.2.4 Identities and subscriptions

When early IMS security is supported, the HSS shall include for each subscription an IMPI and IMPU derived from the IMSI of the subscription according to the rules in TS 23.003 [8]. If the network supports both early IMS security and fully compliant IMS security, the IMSI-derived IMPI and IMPU shall be stored in addition to other IMPIs and IMPUs that may have been allocated to the subscription.

If a UE attempts a registration using early IMS security, the REGISTER shall include an IMPU that is derived from the IMSI that is used for bearer network access according to the rules in TS 23.003 [8]. The UE shall apply this rule even if a UICC containing an ISIM is present in the UE.

In the case that a UE is registering using early IMS security with an IMSI-derived IMPU, implicit registration shall be used as a mandatory function to register the subscriber's public user identity(s) using the rules defined in clause 5.2.1a.1 of TS 23.228 [3]. By applying these rules the IMSI-derived IMPU shall be barred ~~in the HSS~~ for all procedures other than SIP registration.

6.2.5 Impact on Cx Interface

Early IMS Security mechanism affects the use of the protocol defined for the Cx interface. In particular, the User-Authentification-Request/Answer (Cx-UAR/UAA), the ~~and~~ Multimedia-Auth-Request/Answer (Cx-MAR/MAA) and the Server-Assignment-Request/Answer (Cx-SAR/SAA) messages are impacted.

Because in Early IMS Security the Private User Identity of the subscriber is not made available to the IMS domain in SIP messages, it is necessary to derive a Private User Identity from the Temporary Public User Identity to use as the content of the User-Name AVP in certain Cx messages (most notable UAR and MAR).

6.2.5.1 User registration status query

The UAR command, when implemented to support Early IMS Security follow the description in clause 6.1.1 of TS 29.228 [10], with the following exception:

- the Private User Identity (User-Name AVP) in the UAR command shall be derived from the temporary Public User Identity URI being registered by removing URI scheme and the following parts of the URI if present port number, URI parameters, and headers.

6.2.5.2 S-CSCF registration/deregistration notification

The SAR command, when implemented to support early IMS Security follows the description in clause 6.1.2 of TS 29.228 [10], with the following exception:

- the Private User Identity (User-Name AVP) in the SAR command shall be derived from the temporary Public User Identity URI being registered by removing URI scheme and the following parts of the URI if present port number, URI parameters, and headers.

6.2.5.3~~2~~ Authentication procedure

The MAR and MAA commands, when implemented to support Early IMS Security follow the description in clause 6.3 of TS 29.228 [10], with the following exceptions:

- the Private User Identity (User-Name AVP) in the MAR command shall be derived from the temporary Public User Identity URI being registered by removing URI scheme and the following parts of the URI if present: port number, URI parameters, and headers.
- In the MAR and MAA commands, the Authentication Scheme (Authentication-Scheme AVP described in clause 7.9.2 of TS 29.228 [10]) within the SIP-Auth-Data-Item grouped AVP shall contain "Early-IMS-Security".
- In the MAA command, the SIP-Auth-Data-Item grouped AVP shall contain the user IP address. If the address is IPv4 it shall be included within the Framed-IP-Address AVP as defined in draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17.txt [11]. If the address is IPv6 it shall be included within the Framed-IPv6-Prefix AVP and, if the Framed-IPv6-Prefix AVP alone is not unique for the user it shall also contain Framed-Interface-Id AVP.

This results in SIP-Auth-Data-Item as depicted in table 6.3.4 of TS 29.228 [10], being replaced when Early IMS Security is employed by a structure as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Authentication Data content for Early IMS Security

Information element name	Mapping to Diameter AVP	Cat.	Description
Authentication Scheme (See 7.9.2)	SIP-Authentication-Scheme	M	Authentication scheme. For Early IMS Security it will indicate "Early-IMS-Security"
User IPv4 Address	Framed-IP-Address	C	If the IP Address of the User is an IPv4 address, this AVP shall be included. For a description of the AVP see draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17.txt [11].
User IPv6 Prefix	Framed-IPv6-Prefix	C	If the IP Address of the User is an IPv6 address, this AVP shall be included. For a description of the AVP see draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17.txt [11].
Framed Interface Id	Framed-Interface-Id	C	If the IP Address of the User is an IPv6 address and the Framed-IPv6-Address AVP alone is not unique for the user this AVP shall be included. For a description of the AVP see draft-ietf-aaa-diameter-nasreq-17.txt [11].

The ABNF description of the AVP as given in clause 6.3.13 of TS 29.229 [12] is replaced with that given below.

```
SIP-Auth-Data-Item ::= < AVP Header : TBD >
```

```
[ SIP-Authentication-Scheme ]
```

```
[ Framed-IP-Address ]
```

```
[ Framed-IPv6-Prefix ]
```

```
[ Framed-Interface-Id ]
```

```
* [ AVP ]
```

- Step 5 of clause 6.3.1 of TS 29.229 [12] shall apply with the following exception:
 - HSS shall return only one SIP-Auth-Data-Item

6.2.6 Interworking cases

For the purposes of the interworking considerations in this clause, it is assumed that the IMS entities P-CSCF, I-CSCF, S-CSCF and HSS reside in the home network and all support the same variants of IMS, i.e. all support either only early IMS [security](#), or only fully compliant IMS [security](#), or both.

NOTE: It is compatible with the considerations in this document that the UE uses different APNs to indicate the IMS variant currently used by the UE, in case the P-CSCF functionality is split over several physical entities.

It is expected that both fully compliant UEs implementing the security mechanisms in TS 33.203 [2] (denoted "fully compliant IMS [security](#)" in the following) and UEs implementing the early IMS security solution specified in the present document (denoted "early IMS [security](#)" in the following) will access the same IMS. In addition, IMS networks will support only fully compliant IMS UEs, early IMS UEs, or both. Both UEs and IMS networks must therefore be able to properly handle the different possible interworking cases.

Since early IMS security does not require the security headers specified for fully compliant IMS UEs, these headers shall not be used for early IMS [security](#). The REGISTER request sent by an early IMS UE [security](#) to the IMS network shall not contain the security headers specified by TS 33.203 (Authorization and Security-Client).

As a result, early IMS [security](#) UEs shall not add an explicit indication for the security used to the IMS signaling. An IMS network supporting both early IMS [security](#) and fully 3GPP compliant IMS [security](#) UEs shall use early IMS security for authenticating the UE during registrations that do not contain the security headers specified by TS 33.203 (Authorization and Security-Client).

Without sending an Authorization Header in the initial REGISTER request, early IMS UEs only provide the IMS public identity (IMPU), but not the IMS private identity (IMPI) to the network (this is only present in the Authorization header for fully compliant IMS [security](#) UEs).

During the process of user registration for early IMS [security](#), the Cx interface carries ~~only~~ the public user identity in Cx-~~M~~UAR requests (sent by I-CSCF) and Cx-MAR as well as Cx-SAR requests (sent by S-CSCF-~~HSS~~). The private user identity within these requests shall ~~be generated according to section 6.2.5.1 contain the IMPI as received by the UE~~. This avoids changes to the message format on the Cx interface.

If the S-CSCF receives an indication that the UE is ~~an~~ early IMS UE, then it shall be able to select the "Early-IMS-Security" authentication scheme in the Cx-MAR request. ~~The Cx interface shall support the error case that the S-CSCF selects the "Digest-AKAv1-MD5" authentication scheme based on UE indication, but the HSS detects that the subscriber has a SIM instead of a USIM or ISIM. In this case the HSS shall respond with an appropriate error command. The S-CSCF will then respond to the UE with a 403 (Forbidden) response. If the UE is capable of early IMS then, according to step 5, the UE will take this as an indication to attempt registration using early IMS.~~

For interworking between early IMS [security](#) and fully compliant IMS [security](#) implementations during IMS registration, the following cases shall be supported:

1. Both UE and IMS network support early IMS [security](#) only

IMS registration shall take place as described by the present document.

2. UE supports early IMS [security](#) only, IMS network supports both early IMS [security](#) and fully compliant IMS ~~access~~ security

Early IMS security according to this annex shall be used for authenticating the UE for all registrations from UEs that do not provide the fully compliant IMS security headers.

3. UE supports both, IMS network supports early IMS [security](#) only

If the UE already has knowledge about the IMS network capabilities (which could for example be preconfigured in the UE), the appropriate authentication method shall be chosen. The UE shall use fully compliant IMS security, if the network supports this, otherwise the UE shall use early IMS security.

If the UE does not have such knowledge it shall start with the fully compliant IMS Registration procedure. The early IMS P-CSCF shall answer with a 420 (Bad Extension) failure, since it does not recognize the method mandated by the Proxy-Require header that is sent by the UE in the initial REGISTER request.

NOTE: The Proxy-Require header cannot be ignored by the P-CSCF.

The UE shall, after receiving the error response, send an early IMS registration, i.e., shall send a new REGISTER request without the fully compliant IMS security headers.

4. UE and IMS network support both

The UE shall start with the fully compliant IMS [security](#) registration procedure. The network, with receiving the initial REGISTER request, receives indication that the IMS UE is fully compliant and shall continue as specified by TS 33.203 [2].

5. Mobile equipment and IMS network support both, UE contains a SIM

The UE might start with the fully compliant IMS [security](#) registration procedure. However, when the S-CSCF requests authentication vectors from the HSS, the HSS will discover that the UE contains a SIM and return an error.

The S-CSCF shall answer with a 401 (Unauthorized) with a ~~Warning~~~~Error-info~~: header containing a [warn-code 399](#) and the [warning](#) text "Early security required". The UE then retries using early IMS security.

6. UE supports early IMS [security](#) only, IMS network supports fully compliant IMS ~~access~~-security only

The UE sends a REGISTER request to the IMS network that does not contain the security headers required by fully compliant IMS [security](#). The fully compliant [IMS security](#) P-CSCF will detect that the Security-Client header is missing and return a 4xx responses, as described in clause 5.2.2 of TS 24.229 [7].

7. UE supports fully compliant IMS ~~access~~-security only, IMS network supports early IMS [security](#) only

The UE shall start with the fully compliant IMS [security](#) registration procedure. The early IMS P-CSCF shall answer with a 420 (Bad Extension) failure, since it does not recognize the method mandated by the Proxy-Require header that is sent by the UE in the initial REGISTER request. After receiving the error response, the UE shall stop the attempt to register with this network, since the fully compliant IMS security according to TS 33.203 [2] is not supported.

[8. UE supports fully compliant IMS access security only, IMS network supports both](#)

[The UE shall start with the fully compliant IMS registration procedure. The network, with receiving the initial REGISTER request, receives indication that the IMS UE is fully compliant and shall continue as specified by TS 33.203 \[2\].](#)

[9. UE supports both, IMS network supports fully compliant IMS access security only](#)

[The UE shall start with the fully compliant IMS registration procedure. The network, with receiving the initial REGISTER request, receives indication that the IMS UE is fully compliant and shall continue as specified by TS 33.203 \[2\].](#)

[10. UE supports both, IMS network supports fully compliant IMS access security only, UE contains a SIM](#)

[The UE might start with the fully compliant IMS registration procedure. However, when the S-CSCF requests authentication vectors from the HSS, the HSS will discover that the UE contains a SIM and return an error. The S-CSCF shall answer with a 403 \(Forbidden\). After receiving the 403 response, the UE shall stop the attempt to register with this network.](#)

[11. Both UE and IMS network support fully compliant IMS access security only.](#)


[IMS registration shall take place as described by TS 33.203 \[2\].](#)

6.2.7 Message flows

6.2.7.1 Successful registration

Figure 1 below describes the message flow for successful registration to the IMS that is specified by the early IMS security solution.

NOTE: The "received" parameter is only sent from P-CSCF to S-CSCF under the conditions given in clause 6.2.3.2.






Figure 1: Message sequence for early IMS security showing a successful registration

6.2.7.2 Unsuccessful registration

Figure 2 below gives an example message flow for the unsuccessful attempt of an attacker trying to spoof the IMS identity of a valid IMS user.

Again, the "received" parameter is only present between P-CSCF to S-CSCF under the conditions given in clause 6.2.3.2.




Figure 2: Message sequence for early IMS security showing an unsuccessful identity theft

6.2.7.3 Successful registration for a selected interworking case

Figure 3 below describes the message flow for successful registration to the IMS in the case that the UE supports both fully compliant IMS and early IMS access security and the network supports early IMS security only. This case is denoted as case 3 in clause 6.2.6.

NOTE: The "received" parameter is only sent from P-CSCF to S-CSCF under the conditions given in clause 6.2.3.2.




Figure 3: Message sequence for early IMS security showing interworking case where UE supports both fully compliant IMS and early IMS access security and network supports early IMS security only

Annex A:

Comparison with an alternative approach - HTTP Digest

An alternative approach would have been to use password-based authentication for early IMS implementations. For example, HTTP Digest (IETF RFC 2617) could have been used for authenticating the IMS subscriber. The HTTP Digest method is a widely supported authentication mechanism. It is not dependent of the GPRS network and it does not require new functional elements or interfaces in IMS network. However, this method would have required a subscriber-specific password to be provisioned on the IMS UE. This alternative is not adopted for use in early IMS systems.

The HTTP Digest method has the following advantages and disadvantages:

Advantages:

- Fully standardized and supported by RFC 3261 [6] compliant implementations and therefore by TS 24.229 [7] compliant implementations (SIP protocol mandates support of HTTP Digest).
- HTTP Digest can support partial message integrity protection for those parts of the message used in the calculation of the WWW-Authenticate and Authorization header field response directive values (when qop=auth-int).
- HTTP Digest implementations can employ methods to protect against replay attacks (e.g. using server created nonce values based on user ID, time-stamp, private server key, or using one-time nonce values).

Disadvantages:

- HTTP Digest may impose restrictions on the type of charging schemes that can be adopted by an operator. In particular, if a subscriber could find out his or her own password from an insecure implementation on the UE, then he or she could share the IMS subscription with friends. This could impact revenue for the operator if bundled or partly subscription based tariffs are used rather than purely usage based tariffs. For example, a subscriber could take out a subscription for 100 instant messages and then share this with his or her friends. Although contractual obligations could be imposed on customers to prohibit this behaviour, in practice this would be difficult to enforce without employing special protection mechanisms, e.g. disallow multiple binding to a single IP address. If charging were purely usage based then there would be no incentive for the subscriber to do this, therefore using HTTP Digest may not impact on operator's revenue. The solution specified in clause 6 is flexible in allowing a range of different charging models including bundled or partly subscription based tariffs.
- HTTP Digest provides a weaker form of subscriber authentication when compared with the levels of authentication used for other services offered over 3GPP networks, where authentication is typically based directly or indirectly on the (U)SIM. Subscription authentication depends, among other things, on the strength of the password used as well as on the password provisioning methods, such as bootstrapping passwords into the IMS capable UE. A weak subscriber authentication, vulnerable to dictionary attacks, has implications on the reliability of charging, and on the level of assurance that can be given to the customer that their communications cannot be masqueraded. In the solution specified in clause 6, authentication of the IMS subscriber is indirectly based on (U)SIM authentication at the GPRS level. The level of security is similar to that currently used for certain WAP services, where the user's MSISDN is provided by the GGSN to the WAP gateway. Security does not rely on the UE securely storing any long-term secret information (e.g. passwords).
- HTTP Digest provisioning is more complex since subscriber-specific information (i.e. passwords) must be installed or bootstrapped into each IMS UE.

Annex B: Change history

Change history							
Date	TSG #	TSG Doc.	CR	Rev	Subject/Comment	Old	New
29/6/04					First version based on input from S3-040264 and S3-040265.	-	0.0.1
8/7/04					Incorporates comments received at SA3#34.	0.0.1	0.0.2
8/10/04					Incorporates changes agreed at SA3#35.	0.0.2	0.0.3
25/11/04					S3-041091: Incorporates changes agreed at SA3#36.	0.0.3	0.0.4
03/12/04	SP-26	SP-040866	-	-	Production of version 1.0.0 for presentation to TSG SA for approval.	0.0.4	1.0.0
25/02/05					Upgraded to 33.9xx series TR. S3-050138: Incorporates changes agreed at SA3#37.	33.878 v1.0.0	33.978 v1.1.0