TSGS#23(04)0154

Source:	**SA WG3 (Security)**
Title:	**CR to 33.203: Deploying TLS (sips:) for interoperation between IMS and non-IMS network (Rel-6)**
Document for:	**Approval**
Agenda Item:	**7.3.3**

SA Doc number	Spec	CR	Rev	Phase	Subject	Cat	Version-Current	SA WG3 Doc number	Workitem
SP-040154	33.203	065	-	Rel-6	Deploying TLS (sips:) for interoperation between IMS and non-IMS network	B	6.1.0	S3-040184	IMS-ASEC

3GPP TSG SA WG3 Security — S3#32
09 - 13 February 2004, Edinburgh, Scotland, UK

S3-040184

CR-Form-v7

CHANGE REQUEST

| ⌘ | **TS 33.203 CR 065** | ⌘ **rev** | **-** | ⌘ | Current version: | **6.1.0** | ⌘ |

*For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.*

Proposed change affects: UICC apps⌘ ☐   ME ☐   Radio Access Network ☐   Core Network **X**

Title:	⌘	Deploying TLS (sips:) for interoperation between IMS and non-IMS network
Source:	⌘	SA WG3

Work item code:	⌘	IMS-ASEC		**Date:** ⌘	12/2/2004

Category: ⌘ **B**

Use <u>one</u> of the following categories:
   F *(correction)*
   A *(corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)*
   B *(addition of feature),*
   C *(functional modification of feature)*
   D *(editorial modification)*
Detailed explanations of the above categories can
be found in 3GPP TR 21.900.

Release: ⌘ Rel-6

Use <u>one</u> of the following releases:
   2   *(GSM Phase 2)*
   R96   *(Release 1996)*
   R97   *(Release 1997)*
   R98   *(Release 1998)*
   R99   *(Release 1999)*
   Rel-4   *(Release 4)*
   Rel-5   *(Release 5)*
   Rel-6   *(Release 6)*

Reason for change:	⌘	The IMS openness in REL-6 must be secured with protection mechanisms. TLS (sips:) is specified in the CR because it is a part of SIP standard in RFC 3261. Also the RFC 3263 for indicating sip: capability is part of SIP standard.
Summary of change:	⌘	TLS (sips:) mechanism is specified in a new section 6.5. The corresponding reference of resolving sips: URI is added to the specification.
Consequences if not approved:	⌘	There is open link (Mm interface) without security mechanism protection. Attack in IP layer or SIP layer could be mounted to the ongoing SIP sessions, the IMS network elements and UAs.

Clauses affected:	⌘	2, 6.5

		Y	**N**		
Other specs affected:	⌘	X		Other core specifications ⌘	24.229
			X	Test specifications	
			X	O&M Specifications	

Other comments:	⌘	

--- Change starts---

2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non-specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.

- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document.*

[1]   3GPP TS 33.102: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture".

[2]   3GPP TS 22.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Service Requirements for the IP Multimedia Core Network".

[3]   3GPP TS 23.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem".

[4]   3GPP TS 21.133: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; T Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Security Threats and Requirements ".

[5]   3GPP TS 33.210: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Network domain security; IP network layer security".

[6]   IETF RFC 3261 "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol".

[7]   3GPP TS 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP specifications".

[8]   3GPP TS 24.229: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Core Network; IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on SIP and SDP".

[9]   3GPP TS 23.002: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, Network Architecture".

[10]   3GPP TS 23.060: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service Description".

[11]   3GPP TS 24.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Core Network; Signalling flows for the IP multimedia call control based on SIP and SDP".

[12]   IETF RFC 2617 (1999) "HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication".

[13]   IETF RFC 2406 (1998) "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)".

[14]   IETF RFC 2401 (1998) "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol".

[15]   IETF RFC 2403 (1998) "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH".

[16]   IETF RFC 2404 (1998) "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH".

[17]   IETF RFC 3310 (2002): "HTTP Digest Authentication Using AKA". April, 2002.

[18]   IETF RFC 3041 (2001): "Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6".

[19]   IETF RFC 2402 (1998): "IP Authentication Header".

[20]   IETF RFC 2451 (1998): "The ESP CBC-Mode Cipher Algorithms ".

[21]   IETF RFC 3329 (2002): "Security Mechanism Agreement for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".

[22]   IETF RFC3263 (2002): "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers ".

--- Next change ---

6.4   Hiding mechanisms

The Hiding Mechanism is optional for implementation. All I-CSCFs in the HN shall share the same encryption and decryption key Kv. If the mechanism is used and the operator policy states that the topology shall be hidden the I-CSCF shall encrypt the hiding information elements when the I-CSCF forwards SIP Request or Response messages outside the hiding network's domain. The hiding information elements are entries in SIP headers, such as Via, Record-Route, Route and Path, which contain addresses of SIP proxies in hiding network. When I-CSCF receives a SIP Request or Response message from outside the hiding network's domain, the I-CSCF shall decrypt those information elements that were encrypted by I-CSCF in this hiding network domain.

The purpose of encryption in network hiding is to protect the identities of the SIP proxies and the topology of the hiding network. Therefore, an encryption algorithm in confidentiality mode shall be used. The network hiding mechanism will not address the issues of authentication and integrity protection of SIP headers. The AES in CBC mode with 128-bit block and 128-bit key shall be used as the encryption algorithm for network hiding. In the CBC mode under a given key, if a fixed IV is used to encrypt two same plaintexts, then the ciphertext blocks will also be equal. This is undesirable for network hiding. Therefore, random IV shall be used for each encryption. The same IV is required to decrypt the information. The IV shall be included in the same SIP header that includes the encrypted information.

6.5   CSCF interoperating with proxy located in non-IMS network

SIP signalling protected by TLS specified in RFC 3261 [6] may be used for protecting the SIP interoperation between an IMS CSCF with a proxy located in non-IMS network. The CSCF may request the TLS connection with a foreign Proxy by publishing sips: URI in DNS server, that can be resolved via NAPTR / SRV mechanism specified in RFC 3263 [22]. The TLS session could be inititiated from either the CSCF or the foreign proxy. A TLS connection is capable of carrying multiple SIP dialogs.

Applying this method is to prevent attacks on SIP level, but it does not prohibit other security methods to be applied so as to strengthen the security for IP based networks. This part is specified in TS 33.210 Annex A [5].

Note: the key management and certificate management for TLS is out of scope of the present specification.

Note: The security mechanism between the CSCFs within IMS is covered by NDS/IP security specified in TS 33.210 [5].

--- Change completes---

7   Security association set-up procedure

The security association set-up procedure is necessary in order to decide what security services to apply and when the security services start. In the IMS authentication of users is performed during registration as specified in clause 6.1. Subsequent signaling communications in this session will be integrity protected based on the keys derived during the authentication process.