
Source: SA WG3
Title: CR to 33.203: Clean-up of section 6.1.1 (Rel-5)
Document for: Approval
Agenda Item: 7.3.3

SA doc#	Spec	CR	R	Phase	Subject	Cat	Current Version	WI	SA WG3 doc#
SP-020348	33.203	005		Rel-5	Clean-up of section 6.1.1	D	5.1.0	IMS-ASEC	S3-020286

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Victoria, Canada

CR-Form-v5

CHANGE REQUEST

⌘ **TS33.203 CR 005** ⌘ rev **-** ⌘ Current version: **5.1.0** ⌘

For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.

Proposed change affects: ⌘ (U)SIM ME/UE Radio Access Network Core Network

Title:	⌘ Clean-up of section 6.1.1		
Source:	⌘ SA WG3		
Work item code:	⌘ IMS-ASEC	Date:	⌘ 09/05/02
Category:	⌘ D	Release:	⌘ Rel-5
	Use <u>one</u> of the following categories:		Use <u>one</u> of the following releases:
	F (correction)		2 (GSM Phase 2)
	A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release)		R96 (Release 1996)
	B (addition of feature),		R97 (Release 1997)
	C (functional modification of feature)		R98 (Release 1998)
	D (editorial modification)		R99 (Release 1999)
	Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900 .		REL-4 (Release 4)
			REL-5 (Release 5)

Reason for change:	⌘ Currently section 6.1.1 contains an inaccuracy and some of the text is out of order.
Summary of change:	⌘ The changes are to removes the inaccuracy that authenticated re-registrations are the same as initial registrations, except possibly the need to fetch AVs, which is not compulsory for initial registrations. Some of the text is also re-ordered to provide a better flow to the section.
Consequences if not approved:	⌘ An inaccuracy will be left in section 6.1.1. These could lead to incompatible implementations.

Clauses affected:	⌘ 6.1.1		
Other specs affected:	⌘ <input type="checkbox"/> Other core specifications	⌘	
	<input type="checkbox"/> Test specifications		
	<input type="checkbox"/> O&M Specifications		
Other comments:	⌘		

6.1.1 Authentication of an IM-subscriber

Before a user can get access to the IM services at least one IMPU needs to be registered and the IMPI authenticated in the IMS at application level. In order to get registered the UE sends a SIP REGISTER message towards the SIP registrar server i.e. the S-CSCF, cf. Figure 1, which will perform the authentication of the user. The message flows are the same regardless of whether the user has an IMPU already registered or not.




Figure 4: The IMS Authentication and Key Agreement for an unregistered IM subscriber and successful mutual authentication with no synchronization error

The detailed requirements and complete registration flows are defined in [8] and [11].

SMn stands for SIP Message n and CMm stands for Cx message m which has a relation to the authentication process:

SM1:
REGISTER(IMPI, IMPU)

In SM2 and SM3 the P-CSCF and the I-CSCF respectively forwards the SIP REGISTER towards the S-CSCF.

After receiving SM3, if the IMPU is not currently registered at the S-CSCF, the S-CSCF needs to set the registration flag at the HSS to initial registration pending. This is done in order to handle mobile terminated calls while the initial registration is in progress and not successfully completed the S-CSCF shall send a registration flag to the HSS. The registration flag is shall be stored in the HSS together with the S-CSCF name and user identity, and is used. The aim of the registration flag is to indicate whether a particular IMPU of the user is unregistered or registered at a particular S-CSCF or if the initial registration at a particular S-CSCF is pending. The registration flag is set by the S-CSCF sending a Cx-Put to the HSS. The HSS receives the information about this state (together with the S-CSCF name and the user identity) from the S-CSCF with which (re-) registration of the user is carried out only when a Cx-Put message is sent from the S-CSCF to the HSS. The registration flag shall be set to initial registration pending at the Cx-Put procedure after SM3 has been received by the S-CSCF. If the IMPU is currently registered, the S-CSCF shall leave the registration flag set to registered. At this stage the HSS has performed a check that the IMPI and the IMPU belong to the same user.

Upon receiving the SIP REGISTER the S-CSCF shall use an Authentication Vector (AV) for authenticating and agreeing a key with the user. If the S-CSCF has no valid AV then the S-CSCF shall send a request for AV(s) to the HSS in CM1 together with the number n of AVs wanted where n is at least one ~~but less than or equal to nmax~~.

[Editor's note: The maximum value of n i.e. nmax only if required by CN4.]

CM1:
Cx-AV-Req(IMPI, n)

Upon receipt of a request from the S-CSCF, the HSS sends an ordered array of n authentication vectors to the S-CSCF using CM2. The authentication vectors are ordered based on sequence number. Each authentication vector consists of the following components: a random number RAND, an expected response XRES, a cipher key CK, an integrity key IK and an authentication token AUTN. Each authentication vector is good for one authentication and key agreement between the S-CSCF and the IMS user.

CM2:
Cx-AV-Req-Resp(IMPI, RAND₁||AUTN₁||XRES₁||CK₁||IK₁,...,RAND_n||AUTN_n||XRES_n||CK_n||IK_n)

When the S-CSCF needs to send an authentication challenge to the user, it selects the next authentication vector from the ordered array, i.e. and sends the parameters RAND and AUTN to the user. Authentication vectors in a particular S-CSCF are used on a first-in / first-out basis.

At this stage the HSS has performed a check that the IMPI and the IMPU belong to the same user.

CM1:
Cx-AV-Req(IMPI, n)

If the HSS has no pre-computed AVs the HSS creates the needed AVs on-demand for that user and sends it to the S-CSCF in CM2.

CM2:
Cx-AV-Req-Resp(IMPI, n, RAND₁||AUTN₁||XRES₁||CK₁||IK₁,...,RAND_n||AUTN_n||XRES_n||CK_n||IK_n)

The S-CSCF sends a SIP 4xx Auth_Challenge i.e. an authentication challenge towards the UE including the challenge RAND, the authentication token AUTN in SM4. It also includes and the integrity key IK and optionally the cipher key CK for the P-CSCF.

[Editor's note: It is FFS if re-use and re-transmission of RAND and AUTN is allowed. If allowed the mechanisms have to be defined.]

SM4:
4xx Auth_Challenge(IMPI, RAND, AUTN, IK, (CK))

[Editor's note: The use of KSI i.e. Key Set Identifier for IMS is FFS.]

When the P-CSCF receives SM5 it shall store the key(s) and remove that information and forward the rest of the message to the UE i.e.

SM6:
4xx Auth_Challenge(IMPI, RAND, AUTN)

Upon receiving the challenge, SM6, the UE takes the AUTN, which includes a MAC and the SQN. The UE calculates the XMAC and checks that XMAC=MAC and that the SQN is in the correct range as in [1]. If both these checks are successful the UE calculates the response, RES, puts it into the Authorization header and sends it back to the registrar in SM7. It should be noted that the UE at this stage also computes the session keys CK and IK.

SM7:
REGISTER(IMPI, RES)

The P-CSCF forwards the RES in SM8 to the I-CSCF, which queries the HSS to find the address of the S-CSCF. In SM9 the I-CSCF forwards the RES to the S-CSCF.

Upon receiving [SM9 containing](#) the response, RES, the S-CSCF retrieves the active XRES for that user and checks if XRES=RES. If the check is successful then the user has been authenticated and the IMPU is registered in the S-CSCF. [If the IMPU was not currently registered, the S-CSCF shall send a Cx-Put to update the registration-flag to registered. If the IMPU was currently registered the registration-flag is not altered.](#)

~~To ensure that the S-CSCF is able to take the decision whether a subsequent registration shall trigger a new authentication and to be able to check that all INVITE messages will be sent to/from an authorized subscriber [it shall be possible to implicitly register IMPU(s). The implicitly registered IMPU(s) all belong to the same Service Profile. All the IMPU(s) being implicitly registered shall be delivered by the HSS to the S-CSCF and subsequently to the P-CSCF. The S-CSCF shall regard all implicitly registered IMPU(s) as registered IMPU(s).~~

~~At this stage the S-CSCF shall send in the Cx-Put after receiving SM9 an update of the registration flag. If the authentication of the subscriber is successful the registration flag shall take the value registered. When the authentication is unsuccessful the registration flag shall be set to unregistered.~~

When an [IMPU-subscriber](#) has been registered this registration will be valid for some period of time. Both the UE and the S-CSCF will keep track on a timer for this purpose but the expiration time in the UE is smaller than the one in the S-CSCF in order to make it possible for the UE to be registered and reachable without interruptions. [A successful registration of a previously registered IMPU \(including implicitly registered IMPUs\) means the expiry time of the registration is refreshed.](#)

[It should be noted that](#) ~~T~~the UE initiated re-registration opens up a potential denial-of-service attack. [That is in the sense that an attacker could try to re-register an already registered IMPU subscriber in an unprotected message and respond with the wrong RES and in order to make the HN could then de-register the IMPUsubscriber. For this reason a subscriber should not be de-registered if it fails an authentication.](#) It shall be defined by the policy of the operator when successfully registered IMPU(s) are to be de-registered.

~~The authenticated re-registration looks the same as the initial registration except that CM1 and CM2 can be omitted as long as the S-CSCF has valid AV(s). The P-CSCF shall forward the unprotected REGISTER to S-CSCF with an indication that the existing SA is not applied. As a consequence, the S-CSCF shall trigger a new authentication procedure. At a re-registration the registration flag has already the value registered. The policy of the home provider states whether the flag shall be changed at a re-registration based on two scenarios:~~

~~— If the re-registration is successful, the registration status keeps registered and timer for next registration is refreshed in the S-CSCF.~~

~~— The IMS subscriber remains registered after unsuccessful re-registration until timer set for next re-registration is expired. Before that the registration flag is kept in the HSS to the value registered even if the authentication was unsuccessful. The S-CSCF shall not remove the data about subscriber's registration and the P-CSCF shall keep the existing SA.~~

The lengths of the IMS AKA parameters are specified in chapter 6.3.7 in [1].