Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects Meeting #2, Fort Lauderdale, 2-4 March 1999

Source:TSG SA WG3 ConvenorTitle:Report of Meeting Number 1 (Presentation slides)Agenda Item:9.3

3GPP TSG-SA WG3 (Security)

Report of Meeting Number 1 London, Docklands, UK 2-4 February 1999 Convenor - Professor Michael Walker



Meeting Objectives

- Terms of Reference detailed TOR to be proposed to TSG-SA
 Agreed principles for 3G security
 Deliverables list of specifications & other documents we will produce with scopes
 Work Programme timetable milestones
- Work Programme timetable, milestones, meeting schedule, support



Principles for 3G Security

- Build on 2G security adopt security features from GSM and other 2G systems that have proved to be needed and robust
- Correct problems with 2G security 3G must address real & perceived weaknesses in 2G
- New features where differences in 3G call for security features not needed in 2G



GSM Security Features to Retain

- Subscriber authentication but the algorithm has been a problem
- Air-interface encryption key length is now too short & support for multiple algorithms has caused problems
- Subscriber identity confidentiality but a better mechanism is probably needed



GSM Security Features to Retain (continued)

- SIM security module, manageable by operator & independent of terminal
- SIM application toolkit security features
 providing a secure application layer channel
 between SIM & home network server
- Transparency but visibility is also needed



Security Problems to Address

False base stations possible
 Clear transmission of cipher keys & authentication values - triples are transmitted in clear across within and between networks
 Encryption terminated too soon - user

traffic in clear on microwave links



Security Problems to Address (continued)

- Authentication tied to encryption authentication relies upon encryption being on, and not all recognise this
- Data integrity is not provided
- IMEI this is an unsecured identity, which has not been treated as such



Security Problems to Address (continued 2)

- Fraud & LI should be considered at design phase (now addressed for GSM)
- Trust GSM security was designed to minimise trust between operators, but controls to monitor trust are inadequate (e.g. checking use of a triple)
 Flexibility too little (e.g. key lengths)



Context for 3G Security

More players - new players (e.g. content providers), more operators (so more roaming)
 Preferred means of communication - 3G will promote wireless as preferred access
 Prepaid services - do not tie security to subscription model



Context for 3G Security (continued)

- Customer access to profiles customers will set-up and modify profiles etc. over Internet
- More Data consideration should be given to security of non-voice services
- 'Active attacks' security must be robust against attackers impersonating network elements



3G Security Specifications

 Security Objectives & Principles - 3G context, what we intend to achieve (i.e. better security than on fixed networks) & basis for achieving it (i.e. build on 2G); crisp & easy to read

 Security Threats & Requirements adaptation of ETSI UMTS 33.21 & ARIB 'Requirements.....System' version 0.8



3G Security Specifications (continued)

- Security Architecture this to define all security features and mechanisms, starting point to be ETSI UMTS 33.23 (Security Mechanisms), & ETSI UMTS 33.22 (Security Features)
- Security Implementation Requirements requirements on SIM, infrastructure, terminal, etc,



3G Security Specifications (continued 2)

Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements

 one part for each algorithm needed, standard algorithms & those which may be operator specific

 Cryptographic Algorithm Specifications

 this will only cover standardised algorithms, they are most likely to be designed by another party, paper considering options being produced



3G Security Specifications (continued 3)

- Lawful Interception Requirements
 Lawful Interception Architecture & Functions
- A Guide to the 3G Security Features guidelines on the use and limitations of security features, impact on personal data protection, etc.



Timescales & Deliverables for 3GPP Security

Document	Meeting Dates	Editor	Doc. No.	Due by	Status
Objectives and Principles	Email	Tim Wright	28	1 st Draft by 12/2/99. 1 st release for TSG one week afterwards. Complete by 1/3/99.	Scope agreed as 021 subject to changes to references.
Threats and Requirements	By Email	Per Christoffersson	29	1 st list of scope and contents by 12/ 2/ 99. 1 st draft by end of February. 1 st release end March 1999.	Changes to 33.21 for UM TS proposed. Scope agreed as 026. 3G Threats and Requirements.



Timescales & Deliverables for 3GPP Security (continued 1)

Document	Meeting Dates	Editor	Doc. No.	Due by	Status
Architecture	23/ 02/ 99 Stockholm	Bart Vinck & Stefan Pütz	30	1 st list of scope and contents by 12/ 2/ 99. 1 st draft by end of February. Complete end March 1999.	To be combined with Security Features as the first chapter. Scope agreed as 023.
Integration Requirements		Colin Blanchard	31	1 st list of scope and contents in Document 020.	List of scope and contents ready Document 020. Updated by document 025.
				1 st draft by end of March. 1 st release end of May.	Change to '3G Security, Integration Guidelines'.



Timescales & Deliverables for 3GPP Security (continued 2)

Document	Meeting	Editor	Doc.	Due by	Status
	Dates		No.		
Cryptographic Algorithm Requirements		Takeshi Chikawaza	32	1 st list of scope and contents end of February. 1 st draft by end of March. 1 st release end of May.	Gert Roelofsen to provide ETSI documents. List of scope and contents given in 024. Modification required supporting encryption, user authentication and use. Some algorithms may need to be standard, som e proprietary.
Cryptographic Algorithm Specifications		Gert Roelofsen responsible for work item.	34 Work- ing Doc 37	1 ^s list of scope and contents by 12/ 2/ 99. 1 st release end of May.	Study of possibilities for acquiring algorithms: For internal circulation to the working group.



Timescales & Deliverables for 3GPP Security (continued 3)

Document	Meeting Dates	Editor	Doc. No.	Due by	Status
Lawful Interception requirements		Berthold Wilhelm	35	1 st list of scope and contents end of February. 1 st draft by end of March. 1 st release end of May.	Should reference documents that exist. Charles Brookson to provide GSM Association document.
Lawful Interception architecture and functions		Berthold Wilhelm (Provisional)	36	Scope by June 1999	
Guide to the 3G security		Charles Brookson	33	1 ^s list of scope and contents end of February. 1 st draft by end of March. 1 st release by September.	



Meeting Schedule

- March
- April
- June 17-18

23-26

27-28

- August 3-6
- October 26-27
- November 16-19
- December 7-8

Stockholm (with SMG10) Bonn London TBD(with SMG10) The Hague TBD(with SMG10) Helsinki

