3GPP TSG-RAN WG3 Meeting #107bis-e R3-202586

Online, 20th-30th April 2020

Source: CATT

**Title:** **Summary of email discussion on CB: # 99\_AS\_re-keying**

Agenda Item: 9.3.6

Document for: Discussion and decision

# Introduction

This contribution address the issue on the following CB

**CB: # 99\_AS\_re-keying**

**- keep 1st paragraph of LS**

**- revise CATT CR as needed**

**- clarify scenario w.r.t. E/// proposals**

(CATT - moderator)

Summary of offline disc [R3-202586](file:///D:\3gpp会议\RAN3\RAN3%23107BIS\inbox\Drafts\CB%20%23%2097_SgNBinit_SgNBmod\Inbox\R3-202586.zip)

# For the Chairman’s Notes

Propose the following:

R3-20xxxa, R3-20xxxc merged

R3-20xxxc rev [in xxxg] – agreed

R3-20xxxd rev [in xxxh] – agreed

R3-20xxxe rev [in xxxi] – agreed

R3-20xxxf rev [in xxxj] – endorsed

Propose to capture the following:

**Agreement text…**

**Agreement text…**

**WA: carefully crafted text…**

Issue 1: no consensus

**Issue 2: issue is acknowledged; need to further check the impact on the gNB-CU. May be possible to address with a pure st2 change. To be continued…**

# Discussion

**3.1 Correction on the successful operation**

During the online discussion, it seems there is no objection to agree the CR on successful case in R3-201982/R3-201983,so we propose to agree the CR in R3-201982/R3-201983

**Proposal 1:It is proposed to agree the CR in R3-201982/R3-201983**

If a company has different view, input in the following is appreciated.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Company | Comment |
| NEC | With adding the TS 33.501 [13], then the CR is OK |
| Huawei | ok |
| Ericsson | OK |
| Nokia | Need some small correction. |

**3.2 Scenario that AMF includes both *emergency fallback indicator* and *security key* in UE context Modification Request message**

During the online discussion, it seems there is no objection to send a LS to SA2/SA3 to ask whether the scenario would be prevent from AMF side.

**Proposal 2: It is proposed to agree the update LS which only include the first question**.

If a company has different view, input in the following is appreciated.

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Company | Comment |
| NEC | OK. |
| Huawei | Ok to send LS, please find our updates in the draft LS. |
| Ericsson | YES, please find Ericsson updates. |
| Nokia | OK |

**For your convenience, the CR and update LS are also in the draft inbox.**

**3.3**  **How NG-RAN node inform AMF of the AS Re-keying failure.**

**In NR,AMF could include new security context indicator in both UE context Modify request message and Path switch request ACK message. According to the following description in 33.501,it seems NG-RAN node need to feedback to AMF whether the AS re-keying failed or not.**

*If the AS level re-keying fails, then the AMF shall complete another NAS security mode procedure before initiating a new AS level re-keying.*

**However,it is not clear in the RAN3 spec how NG-RAN node could inform AMF whether the AS re-keying procedure is performed successfully or not.**

**Two options are foreseen**

**Option1:Discuss in RAN3 via which message NG-RAN node inform AMF whether the AS re-keying procedure is performed successfully or not.**

**Option 2:Before the discussion in RAN3,send a LS to SA3 to confirm the necessity .**

**Companies are invited to provide view in the table**

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Company | Comment |
| CATT | Both options are OK to us |
|  |  |
|  |  |
|  |  |

# Conclusion

Based on the discussion, observations and discussions are provided as below:

# Reference