**3GPP TSG-CT WG1 Meeting #137-eC1-22xxxx**

**E-Meeting, 18th – 26th August 2022**

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| *CR-Form-v12.1* |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** |
|  |
|  | **24.554** | **CR** | **0150** | **rev** | **1** | **Current version:** | **17.1.0** |  |
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| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME | **X** | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network |  |

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| ***Title:***  | Integrity protection of the DCR message for UE-to-network relay |
|  |  |
| ***Source to WG:*** | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | C1 |
|  |  |
| ***Work item code:*** | 5G\_ProSe |  | ***Date:*** | 2022-07-06 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Category:*** | **B** |  | ***Release:*** | Rel-17 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:****F*** *(correction)****A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)****B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)****D*** *(editorial modification)*Detailed explanations of the above categories canbe found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | *Use one of the following releases:Rel-8 (Release 8)Rel-9 (Release 9)Rel-10 (Release 10)Rel-11 (Release 11)...Rel-15 (Release 15)Rel-16 (Release 16)Rel-17 (Release 17)Rel-18 (Release 18)* |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | SA3 has specified in TS 33.503 the following requirements for integrity protection of the DCR message:*6.3.5.3 Integrity protection of DCR**The 5G ProSe Remote UE integrity protects the DCR message using the code-receiving security parameters used for discovery. The integrity protection of the DCR message is performed after the privacy protection of PRUK ID and RSC.**The 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay, on receiving the DCR message, verifies the integrity of the received DCR message using the code-sending security parameters used for discovery. If the integrity verification of the DCR fails, the 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay shall abort the PC5 direct link establishment procedure.**…etc.*The abnormal case when integrity verification of the DCR fails at the target UE (the Relay UE) needs to be reflected into stage-3 spec. |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | Specifying the abnormal case when integrity verification of the DCR fails at the target UE, where the DCR procedure shall be aborted. |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | No stage-3 handling for the abnormal case when integrity verification of the DCR fails. |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | 7.2.2.6.2 |
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|  | **Y** | **N** |  |  |
| ***Other specs*** |  | **X** |  Other core specifications  | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***affected:*** |  | **X** |  Test specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***(show related CRs)*** |  | **X** |  O&M Specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
|  |  |
| ***Other comments:*** |  |
|  |  |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** |  |

\*\*\*\*\* First change \*\*\*\*\*

##### 7.2.2.6.2 Abnormal cases at the target UE

For a received PROSE DIRECT LINK ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST message from a source layer-2 ID (for unicast communication), if the target UE already has an existing link established to the UE known to use the same source layer-2 ID, the same source user info, the same type of data (IP or non-IP) and the same security policy, the UE shall process the new request. However, the target UE shall only delete the existing 5G ProSe direct link context after the new link establishment procedure succeeds.

NOTE: The type of data (e.g., IP or non-IP) is indicated by the optional IP address configuration IE included in the corresponding PROSE DIRECT LINK SECURITY MODE COMPLETE message, i.e., the type of data for the requested link is IP type if this IE is included and the type of data for the requested link is non-IP if this IE is not included.

If the PROSE DIRECT LINK ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST message is for 5G ProSe direct communication between the 5G ProSe remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay UE, after the target UE decrypts the encrypted relay service code using the DUIK, DUSK, or DUCK with the associated encrypted bitmask used for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay discovery, if the relay service code does not match with the one that the target UE has sent during 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay discovery procedure, then the target UE shall abort the 5G ProSe direct link establishment procedure.

If the PROSE DIRECT LINK ESTABLISHMENT REQUEST message is for 5G ProSe direct communication between the 5G ProSe remote UE and the 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay UE, the message is integrity protected and the integrity verification of the message fails at the target UE, then the target UE shall abort the 5G ProSe direct link establishment procedure.

\*\*\*\*\* End of changes \*\*\*\*\*