NP-010622

3GPP TSG CN Plenary Meeting #14 Kyoto, JAPAN, 12^{th –}14th December 2001

Source:	TSG CN WG4
Title:	CRs on Rel-4 Security Enhancement
Agenda item:	8.10
Document for:	APPROVAL

Introduction:

This document contains a CR on Rel-4 Work Item "SEC1", that have been agreed by TSG CN WG4, and are forwarded to TSG CN Plenary meeting #14 for approval.

Spec	CR	Rev	Doc-2nd-Level	Phase	Subject		Ver_C
29.002	360	1	N4-011423	Rel-4	Aligning the security header elements with TS33.200	F	4.5.0

3GPP TSG CN WG4 Meeting #11 N4-0 1 Cancun, Mexico, 26 th - 30 th November 2001					011423				
	CHANGE REQUEST							CR-Form-v5	
ж	29.0	0 <mark>2</mark> CR	360	ж rev	1 [₽]	& Currer	nt version:	4.5.0	ж
For <u>HELP</u> on	using th	is form, se	e bottom of	this page or	look at	the pop-u	ıp text ove	r the ¥ syr	mbols.
Proposed change	e affects	: ¥ (U)	SIM	ME/UE	Radio	Access N	etwork	Core Ne	etwork X
Title: ៖	€ <mark>Align</mark>	ing the sea	curity heade	r elements w	ith TS3	33.200			
Source: ៖	€ CN4								
Work item code:	TEI- 4	1				Da	ate: ೫ 28	-11-2001	
Category: ३	f F Use <u>or</u> F A B C D Detaile be four	ne of the foll (correction (correspor (addition o (functional (editorial n ed explanation nd in 3GPP	owing catego) ds to a correc f feature), modification nodification) ons of the abo <u>TR 21.900</u> .	ries: ction in an ear of feature) ove categories	<i>lier rele</i> s can	Relea Use 2 ase) R R R R R R	se: % RE one of the f 96 (Rel 97 (Rel 98 (Rel 99 (Rel 99 (Rel EL-4 (Rel EL-5 (Rel	EL-4 ollowing relo M Phase 2) ease 1996) ease 1997) ease 1998) ease 1999) ease 4) ease 5)	eases:
Reason for chang	ye: #	To align 29 redundanc	0.002 with T y in the secu	S 33.200. Cl urity header.	nanges	in SA3 ha	ave been n	nade to rei	move
Summary of chan	nge: #	Security he (Initialisation elements (the Initialis	eader eleme on Vector an TVP, NE-Id, ation Vector	nts are mod d Sending F Prop). Thes	ified to PLMN Io se new	remove ty dentity) ar elements	vo existing od add thre contain sir	elements e optional milar inform	nation to
Consequences if not approved:	ж	Specificati	ons are not a	aligned and	interop	erability m	ay be affe	cted.	
Clauses affected:	ж	7.6.12.1, 1	7.7.8, 17.7.1	14					
Other specs affected:	ж)	C Other co Test spo O&M Sp	ore specifica ecifications pecifications	tions ೫	TS33	3.200			
Other comments:	ж								

How to create CRs using this form:

Comprehensive information and tips about how to create CRs can be found at: <u>http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm</u>. Below is a brief summary:

- 1) Fill out the above form. The symbols above marked **#** contain pop-up help information about the field that they are closest to.
- 2) Obtain the latest version for the release of the specification to which the change is proposed. Use the MS Word "revision marks" feature (also known as "track changes") when making the changes. All 3GPP specifications can be downloaded from the 3GPP server under <u>ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/specs/</u> For the latest version, look for the directory name with the latest date e.g. 2001-03 contains the specifications resulting from the March 2001 TSG meetings.
- 3) With "track changes" disabled, paste the entire CR form (use CTRL-A to select it) into the specification just in front of the clause containing the first piece of changed text. Delete those parts of the specification which are not relevant to the change request.

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7.6.12 Secure Transport Parameters

7.6.12.1 Security Header

This parameter carries the security header information, which is required by a receiving entity in order to extract the protected information from a securely transported MAP message. The components of the security header are shown in table 7.6.12/1.

See 3GPP TS 33.200 for the use of these parameters.

Component name	Presence requirement	Description
Initialisation vector	M	An initialisation vector for the message protection function. The TVP part of the IV is mandatory. The other parts shall be present if required for the current Protection Mode.
Sending PLMN identity	H	The Mobile Country Code and the Mobile Network Code of the PLMN which sent the secure MAP message.
Security Parameters Index	М	Identifies the Security Association for the component.
Original component identifier	М	Identifies the type of component to be securely transported – one of: - Operation, identified by the operation code; - Error, defined by the error code; - User information.
TVP	<u>0</u>	A parameter based on time that is used to ensure the current message is fresh. This is only present if required for the current Protection Mode.
NE-Id	<u>0</u>	The identity of the Network Element sending the message. This is only present if required for the current Protection Mode.
Prop	<u>0</u>	Bytes used to ensure the IV is unique for a given TVP and NE-Id. This is only present if required for the current Protection Mode.

Table 7.6.12/1: Components of the Security Header

**** NEXT MODIFIED SECTION ****

17.7.8 Common data types

MAP-CommonDataTypes {

ccitt identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0)
gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-CommonDataTypes (18) version7 (7)}

DEFINITIONS

IMPLICIT TAGS

::=

BEGIN

EXPORTS

-- general data types and values AddressString, ISDN-AddressString, maxISDN-AddressLength, FTN-AddressString, ISDN-SubaddressString, ExternalSignalInfo, Ext-ExternalSignalInfo, AccessNetworkSignalInfo, SignalInfo, maxSignalInfoLength, AlertingPattern, -- data types for numbering and identification IMSI, TMSI, Identity, SubscriberId, TMET. HLR-List, LMSI, GlobalCellId, NetworkResource, NAEA-PreferredCI, NAEA-CIC, ASCI-CallReference, SubscriberIdentity, -PLMN-Id, -- data types for CAMEL CellGlobalIdOrServiceAreaIdOrLAI, -- data types for subscriber management BasicServiceCode, Ext-BasicServiceCode, EMLPP-Info, EMLPP-Priority, MC-SS-Info, MaxMC-Bearers, MC-Bearers, Ext-SS-Status, -- data types for geographic location AgeOfLocationInformation, LCSClientExternalID, LCSClientInternalID ; Unmodified ASN.1 ...

LCSClientInternalID ::= ENUMERATED {									
broadcastService	(0)	,							
o-andM-HPLMN	(1)	,							
o-andM-VPLMN	(2)	,							
anonymousLocation	(3)	,							
targetMSsubscribedService	(4)	,							
}									
for a CAMEL phase 3 PLMN operator	client,	the val	lue tar	getMSsubs	cribedSei	rvice	shall	be	used

PLMN-Id ::= TBCD STRING (SIZE (3)) digits of MCC, MNC, are concatenated in this order.

-- data types for CAMEL

**** NEXT MODIFIED SECTION ****

17.7.14 Secure transport data types

```
MAP-ST-DataTypes {
    ccitt identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0)
    gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-ST-DataTypes (27) version7 (7)}
```

DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN EXPORTS SecureTransportArg, SecureTransportRes, SecurityHeader, ProtectedPayload ; IMPORTS IMSI-PLMN-Id FROM MAP-CommonDataTypes { ccitt identified-organization (4) etsi (0) mobileDomain (0) gsm-Network (1) modules (3) map-CommonDataTypes (18) version7 (7)} ; SecureTransportArg ::= SEQUENCE { securityHeader SecurityHeader, protectedPayload ProtectedPayload OPTIONAL -- The protectedPayload carries the result of applying the security function -- defined in 3G TS 33.200 to the encoding of the argument of the securely -- transported operation SecureTransportRes ::= SEQUENCE { securityHeader SecurityHeader, ProtectedPayload protectedPayload OPTIONAL -- The protectedPayload carries the result of applying the security function -- defined in 3G TS 33.200 to the encoding of the result of the securely transported operation SecurityHeader ::= SEQUENCE { initialisationVector InitialisationVector, sendingPLMN Id PLMN-Id. securityParametersIndex SecurityParametersIndex originalComponentIdentifier OriginalComponentIdentifier, initialisationVector OPTIONAL, InitialisationVector ...} ProtectedPayload ::= OCTET STRING(SIZE(1.. 3438)) -- In protection mode 0 (noProtection) the ProtectedPayload carries the transfer -- syntax value of the component parameter identified by the -- originalComponentIdentifier. -- In protection mode 1 (integrityAuthenticity) the protectedPayload carries -- the transfer syntax value of the component -- parameter identified by the originalComponentIdentifier, followed by -- the 32 bit integrity check value. -- The integrity check value is the result of applying the hash algorithm -- to the concatenation of the transfer syntax value of the SecurityHeader, -- and the transfer syntax value of the component parameter. -- In protection mode 2 (confidentialityIntegrityAuthenticity) the protected - payload carries the encrypted transfer syntax -- value of the component parameter identified by the -- originalComponentIdentifier, followed by the 32 bit integrity check value. -- The integrity check value is the result of applying the hash algorithm -- to the concatenation of the transfer syntax value of the SecurityHeader, -- and the encrypted transfer syntax value of the component parameter. -- See 33.200. -- The length of the protectedPayload is adjusted according to the capabilities of -- the lower protocol layers

SecurityParametersIndex ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(4))

I

InitialisationVector ::= OCTET STRING (SIZE(4-14))
the internel structure is defined as follows:
the internal structure is defined as follows.
Octets 1 to 4 : TVP. The TVP is a 32 bit time stamp. Its value is binary coded
and indicates the number of intervals of 100 milliseconds
elapsed since 1st January 2002, 0:00:00 UTC
Octets 5 to 10: NE-Id. The NE-Id uniquely identifies the sending network entity
within the PLMN. It is the entity's E.164 number without CC and
NDC. It is TBCD-coded, padded with zeros.
Octets 11 to 14: PROP. This 32 bit value is used to make the
InitialisationVector unique within the same TVP period.
The content is not standardized.

OriginalComponentIdentifier ::= CHOICE	{
operationCode	[0] OperationCode,
errorCode	[1] ErrorCode,
userInfo	[2] NULL}
OperationCode ::= CHOICE {	
localValue	INTEGER,
globalValue	OBJECT IDENTIFIER}
ErrorCode ::= CHOICE {	
localValue	INTEGER,
globalValue	OBJECT IDENTIFIER}

END