**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #118 S3-244311**

Hyderabad, India 14 – 18 October 2024

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| *CR-Form-v12.1* |
| **DRAFT CHANGE REQUEST** |
|  |
|  | **3** | **CR** | **draftCR** | **rev** |  | **Current version:** | **18.1.0** |  |
|  |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME | **X** | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network | **X** |

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|  |
| ***Title:***  | Living document for CryptoSP: draftCR to TS 33.203, Updates to cryptographic profiles |
|  |  |
| ***Source to WG:*** | Deutsche Telekom AG, Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 |
|  |  |
| ***Work item code:*** | CryptoSP |  | ***Date:*** | 2024-10-03 |
|  |  |  |  |  |
| ***Category:*** | **B** |  | ***Release:*** | Rel-19 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:****F*** *(correction)****A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)****B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)****D*** *(editorial modification)*Detailed explanations of the above categories canbe found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | *Use one of the following releases:Rel-8 (Release 8)Rel-9 (Release 9)Rel-10 (Release 10)Rel-11 (Release 11)…Rel-15 (Release 15)Rel-16 (Release 16)Rel-17 (Release 17)Rel-18 (Release 18)* |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | TS 33.203 describes that "Hmac-sha-1-96" and "aes-cbc" are not recommended. But SHA-1 is no longer secure. Computing collisions is affordable, even for academic adversaries. It should never be used for cryptographic hashing. To increase security this CR proposes to add the HMAC-SHA2-256-128 according to RFC 6234. This algorithm is state of the art and recommended by national security agencies like NIST or BSI. There exist already end devices which support SHA2. **From SA3#117:**Updating baseline as approved in S3-243173**From SA3#118:**Name of the algorithmHMAC-SHA-256-128 has a typo, The correct name of the algorithm is HMAC-SHA2-256-128. |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | Add HMAC-SHA2-256-128 algorithm according to RFC 6234**From SA3#118:**Algorithm name HMAC-SHA2-256-128 is correctly written. |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | Security requirements according to national security agencies canot be aplied.**From SA3#118:**Confusion in implementation. |
|  |  |
| ***Clauses affected:*** | 2, Annex H, Annex I |
|  |  |
|  | **Y** | **N** |  |  |
| ***Other specs*** |  | **X** |  Other core specifications  | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***affected:*** |  | **X** |  Test specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
| ***(show related CRs)*** |  | **X** |  O&M Specifications | TS/TR ... CR ...  |
|  |  |
| ***Other comments:*** |  |
|  |  |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** | SA3#116: S3-242415SA3#117: S3-243173SA3#118: S3-244312 |

## \*\*\*\*\*\* BEGIN OF CHANGE 1 **\*\*\*\***

# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.

- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

[1] 3GPP TS 33.102: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Security Architecture".

[2] Void.

[3] 3GPP TS 23.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem".

[4] Void.

[5] 3GPP TS 33.210: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; 3G Security; Network domain security; IP network layer security".

[6] IETF RFC 3261 "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol".

[7] 3GPP TS 21.905: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Vocabulary for 3GPP specifications".

[8] 3GPP TS 24.229: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Core Network; IP Multimedia Call Control Protocol based on SIP and SDP".

[9] 3GPP TS 23.002: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, Network Architecture".

[10] 3GPP TS 23.060: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects, General Packet Radio Service (GPRS); Service Description".

[11] 3GPP TS 24.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Core Network; Signalling flows for the IP multimedia call control based on SIP and SDP".

[12]-[16] Void.

[17] IETF RFC 3310 (2002): "HTTP Digest Authentication Using AKA". April, 2002.

[18] Void

[19] Void.

[20] Void

[21] IETF RFC 3329 (2003): "Security Mechanism Agreement for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".

[22] Void

[23] IETF RFC 3263 (2002): "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP): Locating SIP Servers".

[24] 3GPP TS 33.310: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; Network Domain Security (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)".

[25] Void.

[26] ETSI ES 282 001: "TISPAN - Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Functional Architecture for NGN Release 1".

[27] IETF RFC 3947 (2005): "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE".

[28] IETF RFC 3948 (2005): "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets".

[29] IETF RFC 3323 (2002): "A Privacy Mechanism for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".

[30] IETF RFC 3325 (2002): "Private Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity within Trusted Network".

[31] 3GPP TS 23.167: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects; IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) emergency sessions”.

[32] IETF RFC 5626 (2009): "Managing Client Initiated Connections in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)".

[33] Void.

[34] Void

[35] Void.

[36] ETSI ES 282 004: “NGN Functional Architecture; Network Attachment Sub-System (NASS)”

[37] ETSI TS 187 001: " Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN SECurity (SEC); Requirements"

[38] Void.

[39] 3GPP TS 29.228: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; IP Multimedia (IM) Subsystem Cx and Dx interfaces; Signalling flows and message contents".

[40] 3GPP2 X.S0011: "cdma2000 Wireless IP Network Standard".

[41] 3GPP2 C.S0023: "Removable User Identity Module for Spread Spectrum Systems".

[42] Void.

[43] 3GPP2 S.S0055: "Enhanced Cryptographic Algorithms".

[44] 3GPP2 S.S0078: "Common Security Algorithms".

[45] 3GPP2 C.S0065: "cdma2000 Application on UICC for Spread Spectrum Systems".

[46] 3GPP TS 23.003: "3rd Generation Partnership Project; Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Numbering, addressing and identification".

[47] Void

[48] Void

[49] Void

[50] 3GPP TS 23.292: "IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) Centralized Services; Stage 2".

[51] 3GPP TS 31.103: "3rd Generation Partnership Project: Technical Specification Group Core Network and Terminals; Characteristics of the IP Multimedia Services Identity Module (ISIM) application".

[52] IETF RFC 5280: "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile".

[53] IETF RFC 4301: "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol".

[54] IETF RFC 4303: "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)".

[55] Void

[56] 3GPP TS 23.401: "General Packet Radio Service (GPRS) enhancements for Evolved Universal Terrestrial Radio Access Network (E-UTRAN) access".

[57] ETSI TS 187 003 v3.4.1: "Telecommunications and Internet converged Services and Protocols for Advanced Networking (TISPAN); NGN Security; Security Architecture".

[58] Void.

[59] Void

[60] IETF RFC 6544: "TCP Candidates with Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) ".

[61] Void

[62] IETF RFC 6062: "Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) Extensions for TCP Allocations".

[63] IETF RFC 2817: "Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1".

[64] IETF RFC 6623: "Indication of Support for Keep-Alive".

[65] IETF RFC 4169: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) Digest Authentication Using Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) Version-2”.

[66] 3GPP TS 33.220: "Generic Authentication Architecture (GAA); Generic Bootstrapping Architecture (GBA)".

[67] IETF RFC 6750: "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage".

[68] IETF RFC 7376: "Problems with Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Long-Term Authentication for Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN)".

[69] Void

[70] IETF RFC 7635: "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Extension for Third Party Authorization".

[71] Void

[72] IETF RFC 6749: "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization framework".

[73] IETF RFC 4106: "The Use of Galois/Counter Mode (GCM) in IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)".

[74] IETF RFC 4543: "The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH".

[75] IETF RFC 7800: "Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs)".

[76] IETF RFC 7616: " HTTP Digest Access Authentication ".

[77] IETF RFC 8489: "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)".

[78] IETF RFC 8656: " Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN): Relay Extensions to Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)".

[79] IETF RFC 8445: "Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal".

[80] IETF RFC 8839: "Session Description Protocol (SDP) Offer/Answer Procedures for Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE)".

[81] IETF RFC 8981: "Temporary Address Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6".

[82] IETF RFC 7296: "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)".

[83] IETF RFC 7235: "Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Authentication".

[XX] IETF RFC 4868: "Using HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-384, and HMAC-SHA-512 with IPsec".

\*\*\*END OF CHANGE 1 \*\*\*

\*\*\* BEGIN OF CHANGE 2 \*\*\*

Annex H (normative):
The use of "Security Mechanism Agreement for SIP Sessions" [21] for security mode set-up

The BNF syntax of RFC 3329 [21] is defined for negotiating security associations for semi-manually keyed IPsec or TLS in the following way:

 security-client = "Security-Client" HCOLON sec-mechanism \*(COMMA sec-mechanism)

 security-server = "Security-Server" HCOLON sec-mechanism \*(COMMA sec-mechanism)

 security-verify = "Security-Verify" HCOLON sec-mechanism \*(COMMA sec-mechanism)

 sec-mechanism = mechanism-name \*(SEMI mech-parameters)

 mechanism-name = "ipsec-3gpp" / "tls"

 mech-parameters = ( preference / algorithm / protocol / mode / encrypt-algorithm / spi‑c / spi‑s / port‑c / port‑s )

 preference = "q" EQUAL qvalue

 qvalue = ( "0" [ "." 0\*3DIGIT ] ) / ( "1" [ "." 0\*3("0") ] )

 algorithm = "alg" EQUAL ("hmac-sha-1-96" / "hmac-sha2-256-128" / "aes-gmac" / "aes-gmac-us " / "null" )

 protocol = "prot" EQUAL ( "ah" / "esp" )

 mode = "mod" EQUAL ( "trans" / "tun" / "UDP-enc-tun" )

 encrypt-algorithm = "ealg" EQUAL ("aes-cbc" / "aes-gcm" / "aes-gcm-us" / "null" )

 spi‑c = "spi‑c" EQUAL spivalue

 spi‑s = "spi‑s" EQUAL spivalue

 spivalue = 10DIGIT; 0 to 4294967295

 port‑c = "port‑c" EQUAL port

 port‑s = "port‑s" EQUAL port

 port = 1\*DIGIT

The changes compared to RFC 3329 [21] are:

 "alg" parameter: Addition of "hmac-sha2-256-128","aes-gmac","aes-gmac-us" and "null". Removal of "hmac-md5-96"

 "ealg" parameter: Addition of "aes-cbc, "aes-gcm-us", and "aes-gcm".
 Removal of "des-ede3-cbc"

 "mod" parameter: Addition of "UDP-enc-tun"

"Hmac-sha-1-96" and "aes-cbc" are not recommended.

The use of security association parameters is specified in clauses 7.1, 7.2, M.7.1 and M.7.2 of the present document. The parameters described by the BNF above have the following semantics:

 Mechanism-name: For manually keyed IPsec, this field includes the value "ipsec-3gpp". "ipsec‑3gpp" mechanism extends the general negotiation procedure of RFC 3329 [21] in the following way:

1 The server shall store the Security-Client header received in the request before sending the response with the Security-Server header.

2 The client shall include the Security-Client header in the first protected request. In other words, the first protected request shall include both Security-Verify and Security-Client header fields.

3 The server shall check that the content of Security-Client headers received in previous steps (1 and 2) are the same.

Mech-parameters: Of the mech-parameters, only preference is relevant when the mechanism-name has the value "tls".

 Preference: As defined in RFC 3329 [21].

 Algorithm: Defines the authentication algorithm. The algorithm parameter is mandatory. The value "hmac-sha2-256-128" refers to the authentication algorithm AUTH\_HMAC\_SHA2\_256\_128 defined in IETF RFC 4868 [XX]. The value "aes-gmac" refers to the authentication algorithm ENCR\_NULL\_AUTH\_AES\_GMAC defined in IETF RFC 4543 [74]. The value "aes-gmac-us" refers to the same autentication algorithm ENCR\_NULL\_AUTH\_AES\_GMAC as "aes-gmac" but with a different salt value generation method — "us" standing for unique salt. The value "null" shall only be used with either encryption algorithm "aes-gcm" or "aes-gcm-us".

 Protocol: Defines the IPsec protocol. May have a value "ah" or "esp". If no Protocol parameter is present, the value will be "esp".

NOTE 1: According to clause 6 only "esp" (RFC 4303 [54]) is allowed for use in IMS.

 Mode: Defines the mode in which the IPsec protocol is used. May have a value "trans" for transport mode, and value "tun" for tunneling mode. If no Mode parameter is present, the value will be "trans".

NOTE 2: Void.

 Encrypt-algorithm: If present, defines the encryption algorithm. The value "aes-cbc" refers to the algorithm defined in IETF RFC 3602 [22]. The value "aes-gcm-us" also refers to the encryption algorithm AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV defined in IETF RFC 4106 [73]. The value "aes-gcm-us" refers to the same encryption algorithm AES-GCM with a 16 octet ICV as "aes-gcm" but with a different salt value generation method — "us" standing for unique salt. If no Encrypt-algorithm parameter is present, the algorithm will be "null". The values "aes-gcm" or "aes-gcm-us" shall shall only be used with authentication algorithm value equal to "null".

 Spi‑c: Defines the SPI number of the inbound SA at the protected client port.

 Spi‑s: Defines the SPI number of the inbound SA at the protected server port.

 Port‑c: Defines the protected client port.

 Port‑s: Defines the protected server port.

It is assumed that the underlying IPsec implementation supports selectors that allow all transport protocols supported by SIP to be protected with a single SA.

\*\*\* END OF CHANGE 2 \*\*\*

\*\*\* BEGIN OF CHANGE 3 \*\*\*

Annex I (normative):
Key expansion functions for IPsec ESP

**Integrity Keys:**

If the selected authentication algorithm is HMAC-SHA-1-96 then IKESP is obtained from IKIM by appending 32 zero bits to the end of IKIM to create a 160‑bit string.

If the selected authentication algorithm is HMAC-SHA2-256-128 then IKESP shall be derived using the key derivation function KDF defined in Annex B of TS 33.220 [66]. The input Key to the KDF function shall be equal to the concatenation of CKIM and IKIM: CKIM || IKIM. The input S to the KDF function shall be formed from the following parameters:

- FC = 0x5A.

- P0 = "HMAC-SHA2-256-128".

- L0 = length of the string "HMAC-SHA2-256-128" (i.e. 0x00 0x11).

IKESP shall be the 256 bits of the KDF output.

If selected authentication algorithm is AES-GMAC as specified in RFC 4543 [74] with 128 bit key then IKESP = IKIM.

The salt value specified in Section 3.2 of RFC 4543 [74] shall be derived using the key derivation function KDF defined in Annex B of TS 33.220 [66]. The input Key to the KDF function shall be equal to the concatenation of CKIM and IKIM: CKIM || IKIM.

If the " algorithm " value is set to "aes-gmac" when negotiating the SA using RFC 3329[21] as shown in Annex H, the input S to the KDF function shall be formed from the following parameters:

- FC = 0x58.

- P0 = "AES\_GMAC\_SALT" .

- L0 = length of the string “AES\_GMAC\_SALT” (i.e. 0x00 0x0D).

The salt value shall consist of the 32 least significant bits of the 256 bits of the KDF output. This salt value derivation method is not recommended.

If the "algorithm" value is set to "aes-gmac-us" when negotiating the SA [21] as shown in Annex H, salt value for each IPsec SA shall consist of the 32 least significant bits of the 256 bits of the KDF output XOR’d with the 2 bits — one bit representing for the direction of the SA ("0" for UE to P-CSCF, "1" for P-CSCF to UE) and one bit representing for the role of the source (UE or P-CSCF) of the SA ("0" for client, "1" for server). The direction bit will be XOR’d with the LSB of the 32-bit string, which is extracted from the 256-bit output of the KDF. The role bit will be XOR’d with the second LSB of the 32-bit string, which is extracted from the 256-bit output of the KDF.

"Hmac-sha-1-96" and "aes-gmac" are not recommended.

**Encryption Keys:**

If selected encryption algorithm is AES‑CBC as specified in RFC 3602 [22] with 128 bit key then CKESP = CKIM .

If selected encryption algorithm is AES‑GCM as specified in RFC 4106 [73] with 128 bit key then CKESP = CKIM. The salt value specified in Section 4 of RFC 4106 [73] shall be derived using the key derivation function KDF defined in Annex B of TS 33.220 [66]. The input Key to the KDF function shall be equal to the concatenation of CKIM and IKIM: CKIM || IKIM.

When the " algorithm " value is "aes-gcm" when negotiating the SA[21] as shown in Annex H, the input S to the KDF function shall be formed from the following parameters:

- FC = 0x59

- P0 = “AES\_GCM\_SALT”

- L0 = length of the string “AES\_GCM\_SALT” (i.e. 0x00 0x0C)

The salt value shall consist of the 32 least significant bits of the 256 bits of the KDF output. This salt value derivation method is not recommended.

When the "algorithm" value is "aes-gcm-us" when negotiating the SA [21] as shown in Annex H, the salt value for each IPsec SA shall consist of the 32 least significant bits of the 256 bits of the KDF output XOR’d with the 2 bits — one bit representing for the direction of the SA ("0" for UE to P-CSCF, "1" for P-CSCF to UE) and one bit representing for the role of the source (UE or P-CSCF) of the SA ("0" for client, "1" for server). The direction bit will be XOR’d with the LSB of the 32-bit string, which is extracted from the 256-bit output of the KDF. The role bit will be XOR’d with the second LSB of the 32-bit string, which is extracted from the 256-bit output of the KDF.

"aes-cbc" and "aes-gcm" are not recommended.

\*\*\* END OF CHANGE 3 \*\*\*