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| 3GPP TR 33.700-32 V0.2.0 (2024-05) | |
| Technical Report | |
| 3rd Generation Partnership Project;  Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects;  Study on security aspects of User Identities and Authentication  (Release 19) | |
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# Foreword

This Technical Report has been produced by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP).

The contents of the present document are subject to continuing work within the TSG and may change following formal TSG approval. Should the TSG modify the contents of the present document, it will be re-released by the TSG with an identifying change of release date and an increase in version number as follows:

Version x.y.z

where:

x the first digit:

1 presented to TSG for information;

2 presented to TSG for approval;

3 or greater indicates TSG approved document under change control.

y the second digit is incremented for all changes of substance, i.e. technical enhancements, corrections, updates, etc.

z the third digit is incremented when editorial only changes have been incorporated in the document.

In the present document, modal verbs have the following meanings:

**shall** indicates a mandatory requirement to do something

**shall not** indicates an interdiction (prohibition) to do something

The constructions "shall" and "shall not" are confined to the context of normative provisions, and do not appear in Technical Reports.

The constructions "must" and "must not" are not used as substitutes for "shall" and "shall not". Their use is avoided insofar as possible, and they are not used in a normative context except in a direct citation from an external, referenced, non-3GPP document, or so as to maintain continuity of style when extending or modifying the provisions of such a referenced document.

**should** indicates a recommendation to do something

**should not** indicates a recommendation not to do something

**may** indicates permission to do something

**need not** indicates permission not to do something

The construction "may not" is ambiguous and is not used in normative elements. The unambiguous constructions "might not" or "shall not" are used instead, depending upon the meaning intended.

**can** indicates that something is possible

**cannot** indicates that something is impossible

The constructions "can" and "cannot" are not substitutes for "may" and "need not".

**will** indicates that something is certain or expected to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**will not** indicates that something is certain or expected not to happen as a result of action taken by an agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**might** indicates a likelihood that something will happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

**might not** indicates a likelihood that something will not happen as a result of action taken by some agency the behaviour of which is outside the scope of the present document

In addition:

**is** (or any other verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

**is not** (or any other negative verb in the indicative mood) indicates a statement of fact

The constructions "is" and "is not" do not indicate requirements.

# 1 Scope

The present document studies the security and privacy aspects for the creation and usage of user identities as studied in 3GPP TR 23.700-32 [2], with the following focus:

1. Study authentication and authorization of:
   1. a user identifier associated with a subscription and used on a UE (i.e., human user) and
   2. an identifier associated with a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG.
2. Study privacy and security impacts of usage of user identifiers associated with a subscription or with a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG, including exposure of user profile related information.

# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.

- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".

[2] 3GPP TR 23.700-32: "Study on User Identities and Authentication Architecture"

[3] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G System"

[4] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedures for the 5G System (5GS)"

[5] IETF RFC 3748: "Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)".

[6] 3GPP TS 23.273: "5G System (5GS) Location Services (LCS); Stage 2"

…

[x] <doctype> <#>[ ([up to and including]{yyyy[-mm]|V<a[.b[.c]]>}[onwards])]: "<Title>".

# 3 Definitions of terms and abbreviations

## 3.1 Terms

For the purposes of the present document, the terms given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1], TR 23.700-32 [2],and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

**Non-3GPP device identifier:** an identifier of a non-3GPP device applies to a non-3GPP device connecting to network via a UE or 5G-RG.

Editor’s Note: the non-3GPP device identifier and user identifier may be updated according to the progress in TR 23.700-32 [2].

## 3.2 Symbols

For the purposes of the present document, the following symbols apply:

<symbol> <Explanation>

## 3.3 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

<ABBREVIATION> <Expansion>

# 4 Architecture and security assumptions

This study should be based on the following assumptions:

- The architecture requirements and assumptions as described in TR 23.700-32[2] apply.

- The security architecture, procedures, and security requirements for 5GS as defined in TS 33.501 [3] are used as a baseline.

- For the non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG:

- Credentials are assumed to be provisioned in the non-3GPP device by an operator, human user or a 3rd party.

NOTE: How this is performed is not in scope of this study. The authentication of the non-3GPP device is not done by the 5GC.

- For the human user of the UE:

- The user authentication and primary authentication are independent. The user authentication procedure will not impact UE primary authentication procedure.

# 5 Key issues

Editor’s Note: This clause contains all the key issues identified during the study.

## 5.1 Key Issue #1: Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID

### 5.1.1 Key issue details

TR 23.700-32 [2], *Key Issue #2: "Authentication and Authorization of Users and Restrictions on Users"* focuses on:

* authentication and authorization of a human user of a subscription and
* restriction on number of simultaneously active user identifiers of a subscription.

With the following NOTE:

*NOTE: Aspects of this key issue will depend on interaction with SA WG3. For example, authentication and Authorization methods are in the remit of SA WG3.*

The architecture assumption and requirement in TR 23.700-32 [2], clause 4.1 related to linkage and activation of user identifier with a UE subscription apply in the human user scenario.

This key issue is to study the authentication and authorization of a user identifier in the human user scenario.

### 5.1.2 Security threats

Without support for an authentication and authorization mechanism for the human user, an attacker may impersonate the human user of a subscription and gain unauthorized access to services normally available for that subscription legitimate user.

### 5.1.3 Potential security requirements

The 3GPP system shall provide means to support authentication and authorization of human user based on a User identifier linked to a 3GPP subscription.

## 5.2 Key Issue #2: User privacy

### 5.2.1 Key issue details

User identifier is a piece of information used to identify one specific User Identity, which is privacy sensitive.

In clause 5.3 of TR 23.700-32 [2], exposure of User Identity Profile information is documented as a key issue, with a NOTE as following:

"*NOTE 1: Aspects of this key issue will depend on interaction with SA WG3. For example, privacy protections related to exposure of User Identity Profile information and authorization/authentication results need to be coordinated with SA WG3.*"

This key issue focuses on the privacy aspect of User Identifier and User Identity Profile information.

### 5.2.2 Security threats

Either during the communication using User Identifier or during the exposure of User Identity Profile information, without proper protection against linkability and trackability attack, the privacy sensitive information may be leaked to undesired party so that the privacy of the user is violated.

### 5.2.3 Potential security requirements

The 5G system shall provide mechanisms for mitigating privacy attacks (e.g. trackability, linkability) against user identifier during the communication between the UE and the network, including the procedures for user authentication and service access.

The 5G system shall provide mechanisms for mitigating privacy attacks (e.g. disclosure) during the exposure of User Identity Profile information by the network to entities outside operator domain.

## 5.3 Key issue #3: Authentication and Authorization of one or more non-3GPP devices behind one gateway UE or 5G-RG

### 5.3.1 Key issue details

This key issue is going to address Authentication and Authorization of one or more non-3GPP devices behind one gateway UE or 5G-RG. It is to address the security issues related to the key issue #4 in the TR 23.700-32 [2], i.e. Identifying non-3GPP Devices Connecting behind a UE or 5G-RG.

### 5.3.2 Security Threats

If the non-3GPP devices behind one gateway UE or 5G-RG are not authenticated and authorized through means supported by the network, the attacker can access the network as a non-3GPP device via one gateway UE or 5G-RG without any authorization and restriction.

### 5.3.3 Potential security requirements

The 3GPP system shall provide means to support authentication and authorization of a non-3GPP device behind UE or 5G-RG based on a non-3GPP device identifier.

## 5.X Key Issue #X: <Key Issue Name>

### 5.X.1 Key issue details

### 5.X.2 Security threats

### 5.X.3 Potential security requirements

# 6 Solutions

Editor’s Note: This clause contains the proposed solutions addressing the identified key issues.

## 6.0 Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues

Table 6.0-1: Mapping of Solutions to Key Issues

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Solutions |  | | |
|  | <Key Issue #1> | <Key Issue #2> | <Key Issue #3> |
| #1 | x | x |  |
| #2 | x |  |  |
| #3 | x |  |  |
| #4 | x | x |  |
| #5 | x |  |  |
| #6 | x |  |  |
| #7 | x |  |  |
| #8 | x |  | x |
| #9 | x |  |  |
| #10 | x |  |  |
| #11 |  | x |  |
| #12 |  |  | x |
| #13 |  |  | x |
| #14 |  |  | x |
| #15 | x |  |  |
| #16 | x |  |  |
| #17 |  | x |  |
| #18 |  | x |  |
| #19 |  | x |  |
| #20 |  | x |  |
| #21 |  |  | x |
| #22 | x |  | x |

## 6.1 Solution #1: User authentication and authorization of human user

### 6.1.1 Introduction

The solution addresses KI#1 and KI#2.

### 6.1.2 Solution details

The UDM/UDR based on operator policy, manages user authentication requirement information along with SUPI i.e., subscription data. If user authentication is required based on operator policy, the UDM/UDR also stores and manages the user identity profile which can contain user authentication and authorization data such as user identifier, applicable user type (ie., human user or devices/applications. This is to allow restriction to use only allowed user identifier. Because in SA2 architecture assumptions in TR 23.700-32, it states, *‘When the user identifier applies to a human, only a single user identifier is active with a UE subscription at a given time and it is assumed that the specific user identifier is associated with all of the UE's traffic during the time that specific user identifier is active with the UE's subscription.’*), service information (list of services for which user identifier based user authentication is allowed), and user service access authorization information (e.g., can be a token signed by the operator for it to be verified by the service provider, whose claims can be up to normative details.

During registration, following a successful primary authentication, based on operator policy and UE subscription data fetched from the UDM, it indicates user authentication as required for the user identifier, the AMF/SEAF can initiate user authentication (e.g., like slice authentication). The UE if capable to support user authentication, it can send a related indication to the network along with the existing 5G security capabilities. In such as case, a user authentication is initiated by the network as described in the following steps, if the UE also supports user authentication.

1. The AMF/SEAF sends user identifier request in any NAS transport.
2. The UE sends the user identifier in response, it can also send user type set as ‘human user’.
3. The AMF/SEAF fetches the user authentication and authorization data from the UDM/UDR for the user identifier and user type. Based on the realm of user identifier, the user authentication and authorization data can be sent directly or via other function in the network (e.g., NSSAAF/AAA-P) to the related AAA-S/Application server/function to perform the necessary user authentication and authorization.
4. The user authentication specific messages can be exchanged between the UE and the network. The actual user identifier related user authentication and authorization data can be application level information whose generation and provisioning to UE and network is outside the scope of this present study. The user identifier can take a NAI form.
5. On a successful user authentication, the network AAA-S/Application server/function can send a successful result to the AMF/SEAF and the result is provided to the UE in a NAS transport.

Editor's Note: Whether it is suitable that the AMF initiates the user identifier authentication is FFS and depends on SA2 progress.

Editor’s Note: The operator policy relation with user identity profile and its alignment to SA2 is FFS.

Editor’s Note: How the AMF determines to initiate a user authentication without an indication from the UE is FFS.

### 6.1.3 Evaluation

TBD

## 6.2 Solution #2: User Authentication and Authorization via AMF

### 6.2.1 Introduction

This solution addresses *"Key Issue #1: Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID"* reusingan EAP based mechanism similar to Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization (NSSAA), as described in TS 33.501 [3], clause 16.

### 6.2.2 Solution details



Figure 6.2.2.1-1: User authentication and authorization during Registration procedure

1. It is assumed that the User Id is linked to a UE subscription in the UDM/UDR, and the UE is pre-configured with User Id authorization information (e.g., authorized PLMNs, access type)

Editor’s Note: Whether the user ID is linked to a UE subscription in the UDM/UDR depends on SA2 conclusions.

1. The UE checks its authorization configuration to verify if the UE is allowed to use the User Id before sending a Registration Request message including the User Id to be activated.

Editor’s Note: privacy protection of transmitted User ID is FFS.

1. The AMF checks subscription data and user profile for User Id from UDM/UDR to check whether User id is authorized for (i.e., linked to) the UE subscription. The AMF determines whether to initiate User Id authentication and authorization based on authorization data retrieved from UE context or UDM/UDR.

Editor’s Note: Whether authorization of the user ID is performed by UDM/UDR needs to be aligned with SA2.

1. If no valid authorization is found the AMF sends a Registration Accept with an indication that authentication and authorization of user id is pending, and step 4 is skipped. Otherwise, the AMF includes the authorization result information in the message. The UE refrains from requesting a network service (e.g., PDU Session, SMS) regardless of the access network, while the user id authentication and authorization is pending.
2. The AMF initiates the authentication and authorization of user id with authentication server (AAA) via an NSSAAF with User Id authentication functionality. Multiple messages (e.g., EAP) are exchanged between the UE and AAA via NSSAAF. The AMF receives from AAA an authentication and authorization result that may include a user id authorization data (e.g., validity scope such as time, location, access type, authorized PLMNs).
3. The AMF updates UDM/UDR with authorization data and indicate active state for the user id.

Editor’s Note: Whether and how the AMF updates the UDM/UDR and UE after authentication is in SA2's remit.

1. The AMF updates the UE in a UE Configuration Update (UCU) procedure providing the authorization result including an indication of successful activation of user id. Based on the authorization result, the UE can request to use a network service (e.g., setup a PDU Session with a S-NSSAI/DNN combination).

### 6.2.3 Evaluation

Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled. The evaluation of the solution should include the impact to the 3GPP system.

## 6.3 Solution #3: User Authentication and Authorization over NAS

### 6.3.1 Introduction

This solution addresses *"Key Issue #1: Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID"* reusing an EAP based mechanism similar to Secondary Authentication as described in TS 33.501 [3], clause 11.

### 6.3.2 Solution details



Figure 6.3.2.2-1: User authentication and authorization during Registration procedure

1. It is assumed that the User Id is linked to a UE subscription in the UDM/UDR, and the UE is pre-configured with User Id authorization information (e.g., authorized S-NSSAI, DNN).

NOTE: Provisioning of user id credentials is assumed to be done by means outside the scope of this solution. It is assumed in this solution that user authorization is performed for services requiring PDU Session but not for services not requiring PDU session (e.g., LCS, SMS over NAS).

Editor’s Note: Whether the user ID is linked to a UE subscription in the UDM/UDR depends on SA2 conclusions.

1. The UE checks the configuration to verify if the UE is allowed to use the User Id before sending a PDU Session Establishment Request message including the User Id to be activated.
2. The SMF checks subscription data and user profile for User Id from UDM/UDR to check whether User id is authorized for (i.e., linked to) the UE subscription. The SMF determines whether to initiate User Id secondary authentication and authorization based on authorization data retrieved from UDM/UDR.

Editor’s Note: Whether authorization of the user ID is performed by UDM/UDR needs to be aligned with SA2.

1. If no valid authorization is found the SMF initiates the authentication and authorization of user id with authentication server (AAA) via UPF. Multiple messages (e.g., EAP) are exchanged between the UE and AAA via SMF. The SMF receives from AAA an authentication and authorization result that may include an authorization data including validity scope information (e.g., location, time). If a valid authorization is found this step and step 4 are skipped.
2. The SMF updates UDM/UDR with authorization data and indicate active state for the user id.

Editor’s Note: Whether and how the SMF updates the UDM/UDR and UE after authentication is in SA2's remit.

1. The SMF sends a PDU Session Establishment Accept message to the UE providing authorization result. Based on the authorization result, the UE can start exchanging traffic over the PDU Session.

### 6.3.3 Evaluation

Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled. The evaluation of the solution should include the impact to the 3GPP system.

## 6.4 Solution #4: Security protection of human user privacy

### 6.4.1 Introduction

This solution addresses KI#1 and KI#2.

The UIA can applies a mechanism similar like AKMA to authenticate the User Identity associated with the UE subscription.

### 6.4.2 Solution details

#### 6.4.2.1 User-ID authentication and KUIA deriving

Figure 6.4.2.1-1 provides a mechanism for user-ID authentication and UIA Anchor Key (KUIA) deriving.

The UIA-Anchor is the anchor function for the UIA service. The UIA-Anchor stores the KUIA and user-ID for UIA service, which is received from the AUSF after the UE completes a successful 5G primary authentication and user authentication. The UIA-Anchor also generates the key material to be used between the UE and the UIA Application Function (UIA-AF) and maintains User UIA contexts.



Figure 6.4.2.1-1: User-ID authentication and KUIA deriving

0. Step 0 is the pre-requisites of human user identifier authentication. The primary authentication between the UE and the 5GC is successful.

1. The UE sends a User Authentication Request to AMF/SEAF to requests the human user identifier authentication for a specific user-ID.

2. The AMF/SEAF sends the User Authentication Request to the AUSF.

3. The AUSF sends the User Authentication Request to the UDM.

4. The UDM responses the user-ID list associated to the UE subscription to the AUSF. A UIA-Anchor-ID list associated with the user-ID list is also included in the response message.

5. The AUSF checks whether the user-ID is in the user-ID list received from UDM. If the user-ID is in the user-ID list, the AUSF sends a success authentication result to the AMF. The user-ID list associated with the SUPI may also be included in the response message.

6. The AMF sends the authentication result to the UE.

7a-b. After the successful user-ID authentication, the UE and the AUSF generate the KUIA from KAUSF and generate UIA-KID.

7c. The AUSF selects the UIA-Anchor function and sends a UIA Anchor Key Register request to the UIA-Anchor function with the user-ID, UIA-KID, KUIA.

7d. The UIA-Anchor function stores the received user-ID related material and sends a UIA Anchor Key Register response to the AUSF.

Editor’s Note: How the establishment of KUIA authenticates the user id is FFS.

Editor’s Note: How to conceal the user-ID is FFS.

#### 6.4.2.2 Privacy protection

Figure 6.4.2.2-1 provides a mechanism user-ID privacy protection during the session establishment.



Figure 6.4.2.2-1: User-ID privacy protection during the session establishment

1. The UE is registered and established PDU Sessions.
2. The UE generates the KUIA and the UIA-KID from the KAUSF before initiating communication with an UIA-AF. When a specific user intends to use the UE, the UE derives UIA Application Key (KUIAAF) from the KUIA, and uses KUIAAF to encrypt the user-ID. When the UE initiates communication with the UIA-AF, it includes the UIA-KID and the encrypted user-ID in the Application Session Establishment Request message.
3. If the UIA-AF does not have an active context associated with the UIA-KID, then the UIA-AF selects the UIA-Anchor Function, and sends a UIA ApplicationKey Get request to UIA-Anchor Function with the UIA-KID to request the KUIAAF for the UE. The UIA-AF also includes its identity (UIA\_AF\_ID) in the request.
4. The UIA-Anchor verifies whether the subscriber is authorized to use UIA based on the presence of the UE specific KUIA key identified by the UIA-KID.

If KUIA is present in UIA-Anchor Function, the UIA-Anchor Function derives the UIA Application Key (KUIAAF) from KUIA if it does not already have KUIAAF.

If KUIA is not present in the UIA-Anchor Function, the UIA-Anchor Function continues with step 5 with an error response.

1. The UIA-Anchor Function sends a UIA ApplicationKey Get response to the UIA-AF with KUIAAF, the KUIAAF expiration time and SUPI/GPSI.
2. The UIA-AF uses the received KUIAAF to get the plain text of user-ID. The UIA-AF then performs the user-ID based EAP authentication with the AAA-S.

Editor’s Note: Whether two user authentications are needed is FFS.

1. The UIA-AF sends the Application Session Establishment Response to the UE. If the information in step 5 or step 6 indicates failure, the UIA-AF rejects the Application Session Establishment by including a failure cause.

NOTE : If the AF is outside the operator domain, the NEF is needed between the UIA-AF and UIA-Anchor. The NEF enables and authorizes the external AF assessing UIA service and forwards the messages between UIA-AF and UIA-Anchor. The NEF will not send SUPI to the UIA-AF outside the operator domain. The NEF also performs the UIA-Anchor selection.

Editor’s Note: The involved network functions (UIA-Anchor, UIA AF) are to be aligned with SA2.

#### 6.4.2.3 Derivation of User-ID related material

When deriving the specific user-ID related key materials through the Key derivation function, the SUPI of the UE is replaced by the user-ID.

Editor’s Note: how KUIA and KUIAAF are derived is FFS.

### 6.4.3 Evaluation

## 6.5 Solution #5: User authentication and authorization

### 6.5.1 Introduction

This solution addresses the key issue #1.

The solution reuses the NSSAA procedure TS 33.501 [3] and adapts it to authenticate and authorize a human user using the UE. It allows restriction to user through authorization outcome.

### 6.5.1 Solution details

Assuming the human user with a user identifier (UID) is using a UE with a 3GPP subscription identified by the UE’s SUPI to access services via the 5GS. Before authentication of the UID, the Primary authentication for the UE needs to be performed. It is also assumed that the networks slice identified by S-NSSAI is supposed to provide the service for the UE and the user.

With reference to the figure 16.2-1 in TS 33.501 [3], the user identity authentication and authorization procedure is described as follows:

1. UE sends a Registration Request.

NOTE: How the user triggers the UE to send the registration request is out of scope.

2. For an initial Registration Request, the AMF shall invoke Primary authentication as described in TS 33.501 [3]. For a subsequent Registration Request, the Primary authentication may be skipped if the UE has already been authenticated and the AMF has valid security context.

3. The AMF shall determine whether user identifier authentication and authorization (UIAA) procedure is required, based on information stored locally or from UDM. If yes, the AMF triggers the UIAA procedure. The UIAA procedure can be adapted from NSSAA procedure as shown in 16.3 in TS 33.501 [3] with modification as follows:

NOTE: the step “3-x” is corresponding to the step “x” in clause 16.3 in TS 33.501 [3]

3-1: The AMF may trigger the start of the UIAA procedure.

Editor’s note: How the AMF knows to perform user authentication is ffs.

3-2: The AMF may request the EAP ID for EAP authentication.

3-3: The UE provides the EAP ID to the AMF. The EAP ID is included in the EAP message which is transparent to the AMF. The UE may provide UID to the AMF as well.

NOTE: UID may be the same or different from EAP ID. The UID format is out of scope of this solution.

Editor’s Note: EAP ID is used for authentication with the AAA-S. If UID is different from EAP ID, then how user authentication based on UID is performed is FFS.

3-4: The AMF sends the GPSI, EAP ID and the UID if available to the NSSAAF.

3-5: 5. The NSSAAF forwards the message to the AAA-S directly or through AAA-P if available.

3-6 to 3-11: EAP-messages are exchanged with the UE. One or more than one iterations of these steps may occur.

3-12. EAP authentication completes. The EAP-Success/Failure message is delivered to the NSSAAF/AAA-P along with GPSI and UID. The message may include any restriction information imposed to the UID, e.g. tiers of services/QoS, service duration etc.

Editor’s Note: Whether the AAA-S can provide the restriction information, e.g. tiers of services/QoS, service duration, is FFS.

3-13. The NSSAAF sends the UIAA result (Success/Failure), GPSI, UID to the AMF.

3-14. The AMF transmits the UIAA result to the UE.

3-15. Based on the UIAA result, the AMF initiates the UE Configuration Update procedure.

Editor’s note: Whether the AMF initiates UE configuration update and what to be updated should be aligned to SA2

### 6.5.3 Evaluation

## 6.6 Solution #6: Human User authentication of through NAS procedure

### 6.6.1 Introduction

This solution addresses key issue #1: "Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID". The solution focuses on the authentication procedure.

### 6.6.2 Solution Details

The user ID is sent by the UE in the Registration Request message. When the AMF receives the Registration Request message, the AMF first performs the registration procedure for the UE. The user authentication procedure will run after the Primary authentication.



Figure 6.6.2-1: User Authentication Procedure for human user

1. The UE that the user is using may or may not have registered to the 5GC.

2. A user logs onto the UE.

3. The UE sends the Registration Request message to the AMF. If the UE registered to the 5GC before, then the 5G-GUTI is included, otherwise, the SUCI is included. Additionally, the user ID will be carried in the Registration Request message.

4. The AMF continues the Registration Procedure for the UE. If the UE registration fails, the AMF will terminate the procedure the same way as in TS 23.502[4]. If the UE registration completes, the UE runs the user authentication procedure.

5. After completing the UE registration procedure, the AMF starts to run user authentication procedure.

6-10. Comparing to primary authentication procedure define in TS 33.501[3], only EAP method is used for user authentication. AUSF and UDM are reused for user authentication procedure.

Editor’s note: It is ffs to clarify the EAP method compared with primary authentication.

Editor’s note: It is ffs to clarify the credential used for user authentication.

11. The AMF sends the Registration Accept message to the UE. The Registration Accept message further contains the authentication result of the user authentication.

12. If EAP-Success is received, the UE will allow the user to use the UE. Otherwise, the UE will drop the user.

Editor’s note: It is ffs whether the UE needs to authorize the user based on the result of the UE authentication.

### 6.6.3 Evaluation

TBD

## 6.7 Solution #7: Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID

### 6.7.1 Introduction

This solution addresses the Key Issue #1 (as defined in clause 5.1) .

This solution proposes to support the authentication and authorization of human user based on a User identifier linked to a 3GPP subscription with the follow assumptions:

- The UE takes role of EAP client, and the SMF takes role of EAP authenticator, and the AUSF takes role of EAP server.

- An authentication data associated with a User identifier is stored in User Profile of UDM/UDR and is used by AUSF to authenticate a human user.

NOTE : How to pre-configure the authentication data associated with the User identifier is out of this solution. It is assumed in this solution that user authorization is performed for services requiring PDU Session but not for services requiring no PDU session (e.g., LCS, SMS over NAS).

Editor’s Note: Whether the user profile is stored in the UDM/UDR is in SA2's remit.

Editor’s Note: Whether user input is required for user authentication FFS. Without user Input, how to ensure user is actually using the device.

### 6.7.2 Solution Details



Figure 6.7.2-1 authentication and authorization of human user based on a User identifier.

1. The UE/5G-RG registers with the network performing primary authentication.

2. The UE send a PDU Session Establishment or Modification Request to SMF via AMF, which contains a User identifier.

Editor’s Note: This solution shall be aligned with the procedure agreed by SA2.

3. Upon receiving the PDU Session Establishment or Modification Request message, the SMF shall obtains the subscription data of the UE and the profile of the User identifier from the UDM. The SMF shall checks the subscription data whether the UE is allowed to use the requested User Identity service, and check the profile of the User identifier whether the User identifier links to the subscription data of the UE. If not allowed and/or not linked, the SMF shall notify the UE that the requested User Identity services is invalid and shall execute the existing PDU Session Establishment or Modification procedure as specified in clause TS 23.502 [4] instead of the rest of the current procedure.

NOTE 1: The failure of authorization verification for User Identity service shall not prevent UE to establish a default PDU Session as existing procedure as specified in clause TS 23.502 [4].

4. The SMF shall trigger EAP Authentication of the human user by sending a EAP authentication request message to AUSF. This message contains the User identifier received in step 3.

Editor’s Note: What’s the relationship of the user authentication and the UE secondary authentication (if required) is FFS.

5. The AUSF shall get the authentication data associated with the User identifier from the UDM or UDR.

6. The AUSF and the UE (human user) shall exchange EAP messages via SMF to complete mutual authentication based on the authentication data.

NOTE 2: The EAP methods and the details of the authentication data is out of this solution. The EAP message are transmit over NAS message between UE and the SMF.

7. After the successful completion of the authentication procedure, the AUSF shall send EAP Success message to the SMF. This message contains the User identifier.

8. The SMF shall store the authentication and authorization result of the human user and add the User identifier to the SM context of the UE mark as authorized by requested service.

9. The SMF may notify the authentication and authorization result of the human user to UDM and/or specific NF where stored the User profile. The SMF then may request the session policy associate with the human from PCF as specified by SA2.

Editor’s Note: Whether the SMF adds the user identifier to the SM context, and whether the SMF requests the session policy from the PCF is in SA2 remit.

10. The SMF shall perform rest of the PDU Session Establishment or Modification procedure.

11. The SMF send a NAS SM PDU Session Establishment or Modification Accept message to the UE via the AMF. This message shall include EAP success message to be sent to the UE (human user).

### 6.7.4 Evaluation

TBD

## 6.8 Solution #8: User authentication with preconfigured credential

### 6.8.1 Introduction

This solution addresses Key Issue #1 on Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID and Key Issue #3 on Authentication and Authorization of one or more non-3GPP devices behind one gateway UE or 5G-RG. Specifically, it addresses the requirements for authentication of human user based on a user identifier linked to a 3GPP subscription and authentication of a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG based on a non-3GPP device identifier. The solution applies to the cases where a credential is preconfigured in the UE and the network for user authentication.

### 6.8.2 Solution details

#### 6.8.2.1 Description

According to the requirements in KI#1 and KI#3, users (human user or non-3GPP device) are authenticated based on the identifier of a human user using a UE or non-3GPP device behind a UE/5G-RG for using operator or non-operator deployed services, i.e. the user identifier or non-3GPP device identifier needs to be sent to the network. The solution assumes the following:

NOTE: User authentication hereafter refers to both the authentication of human user and authentication of a non-3GPP device behind a UE/5G-RG.

- The user or non-3GPP device identifier is sent from the UE to the network during user activation procedure which takes place after the UE registered into the network.

- There is a User Identity Profile (UIP) containing user or non-3GPP device identifier(s) and the linked subscription(s), which is maintained by the HPLMN of the linked subscription(s). It can be used for determining whether and how to initiate user authentication. The profile is stored in a User Identity Management Function (UIMF) which can be collocated with an existing NF in HPLMN.

- There is a User Authentication and Authorization Function (UAAF) deployed by the home operator and dedicated to user authentication, which can be a standalone NF or collocated with an existing NF. When authentication is performed by 5GC, the UAAF takes the role of authentication server. When authentication is performed by a third-party service provider, the UAAF undertakes AAA protocol interworking with the third-party AAA server.

- User or non-3GPP device identifier can be made available to the UE before user activation, e.g. through input of human user or sent from the non-3GPP device which is out of 3GPP scope.

- The credential associated with the user or non-3GPP device identifier is preconfigured in the UE before user activation. The credential is also preconfigured in the third-party AAA server or the UAAF or stored in the UIP with the associated user or non-3GPP device identifier.

- EAP framework specified in IETF RFC 3748 [5] may be used for user authentication. The specific method for user authentication can be negotiated between the UE and the network based on UE capability and authentication policy configured in the network.

#### 6.8.2.2 User authentication procedure with the UAAF deployed by operator

If the pair of user or non-3GPP device identifier and the corresponding credential is created by the operator, the user authentication is performed between the UE and UAAF. The AMF takes the role of the EAP authenticator and communicates with the UAAF, which takes the role of the authentication server.



Figure 6.8.2.2: User authentication procedure with UAAF deployed by operator

0. The UE successfully registered into the network via registration procedure.

1. When a human user logs in the UE with a user identifier or a non-3GPP device connects to the gateway UE with a non-3GPP device identifier, the UE sends the User Activation Request containing user or non-3GPP device identifier in a NAS message, as well as the UE capability supporting user authentication.

2. Upon receiving user activation request from the UE containing the user or non-3GPP device identifier, the AMF retrieves the UIP associated with the user or non-3GPP device identifier from the UIMF.

3. The UIMF or AMF determines whether and how user authentication shall be triggered based on the following information in the UIP:

- If the SUPI of the UE matches one of the SUPIs indicating the linked 3GPP subscriptions, the UIMF/AMF may determine to trigger user authentication. Otherwise, the UIMF/AMF determines to reject the user activation request.

- If there is no existing successful user authentication result or the status of the user is not activated yet, the UIMF/AMF may determine to trigger user authentication. Otherwise, the UIMF/AMF determines not to trigger user authentication.

- If there is authentication policy indicating authentication method(s), the UIMF/AMF checks whether the UE capability supports the indicated authentication method(s), and then determines whether and how to trigger user authentication.

4. If user authentication needs to be triggered and authentication method (e.g. EAP method) determined, the AMF sends a User Authentication Request to the UE via NAS message to request the User ID for EAP authentication (EAP-ID). The AMF also indicates the specific authentication method (e.g. EAP-TLS) to the UE.

5. The UE provides the user or non-3GPP device identifier as the EAP-ID via EAP-Response in the User Authentication Response towards the AMF. The EAP-Response is protected with the credential associated with the user or non-3GPP device identifier.

6. The AMF forwards the EAP-Response to the UAAF in an Nuaaf\_UserAuth\_Authenticate Request message and indicates the EAP method.

7. The UAAF verifies the EAP-Response using the preconfigured credential associated with the user or non-3GPP device identifier. The UAAF may interact with the UIMF for retrieving the corresponding credential if stored in the UIP.

8. Optionally more than one iteration for EAP-message exchange between the UE and the UAAF is performed.

9. EAP authentication completes. An EAP-Success/Failure message is sent by the UAAF to the AMF in the Nuaaf\_UserAuth\_Authenticate Response message. In case of success, the UAAF may send the authentication result to the UIMF to be included in the UIP, indicating the user activation status.

10. Based on the result of user authentication (Success/Failure), the AMF returns User Activation Response to the UE via NAS message. If user authentication is successful, the user is activated on the UE, and subsequent procedures on service usage can be performed for the human user or non-3GPP device via the UE.

Editor’s Note: The involved network functions (UIMF, UAAF) and procedure for user acitivation are to be aligned with SA2 architecture and procedure.

Editor’s Note: Whether user input on the UE needs to be verified by the network for user authentication is FFS.

#### 6.8.2.3 User authentication procedure with the AAA-S deployed by third party

If the pair of user or non-3GPP device identifier and the corresponding credential is created by a third-party service provider, the user authentication is performed between a UE and an AAA server (AAA-S) owned by the third party. The AMF performs the role of the EAP Authenticator and communicates with the AAA-S via the UAAF. The UAAF undertakes AAA protocol interworking with the AAA-S.

Steps 0-6 refer to steps 0-6 in clause 6.8.2.2.

7. If the UAAF does not have the credential associated with the user or non-3GPP device identifier, or cannot retrieving the corresponding credential from the UIP, it forwards the EAP-Response/Identity message to the AAA-S via the AAA-P, routed based on the realm portion of the user or non-3GPP device identifier.

8~12. EAP-messages are exchanged with the UE. One or more than one iterations of these steps may occur.

13. EAP authentication completes. An EAP-Success/Failure message is delivered to the UAAF.

14. The UAAF forwards the EAP-Success/Failure message to the AMF via Nuaaf\_UserAuth\_Authenticate Response message. In case of success, the UAAF may send the authentication result to the UIMF to be included in the UIP, indicating the user activation status.

Step 15 refers to step 10 in clause 6.8.2.2.



Figure 6.8.2.3: User authentication procedure with AAA server deployed by third party.

### 6.8.3 Evaluation

Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled. The evaluation of the solution should include the impact to the 3GPP system.

TBA

6.9 Solution #9: User Plane Based Human User ID Authentication and Authorization

6.9.1 Introduction

This solution addresses the requirements identified in key issue #1 (Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID). It is proposed to user plane based authentication and authorization.

6.9.2 Solution details

The figure 6.9.2-1 presents the high-level authentication and authorization architecture. The Portal is a trusted entity from the HPLMN perspective, and can e.g. be managed by the HPLMN operator or a trusted partner. The UIP management procedures are performed from an authorized and authenticated entity. The User Identifier associated with the UIP is authenticated at the UIP management procedures e.g., for creating, removing an Identifier Link (link and unlink), and activating an Identifier Link. The User Identifier is authenticated and authorized by the UIP server via the Portal and the 5GC is informed if necessary by the UIP server via the Nnf/Nnef.



Figure 6.9.2-1: High-level authentication and authorization architecture

The figure 6.9.2-2 shows a flow for authentication and authorization of the User Identifier in the UIP server via the UE's UIP client.



Figure 6.9.2-2: Management of UIP via UIP Client

0. User prepares the UE e.g. downloading a UIP client, creates login, gets UIDs to be used and credentials to be used in first login, assigns a profile (to be used by PCF when user logs in) etc. This can be done via the portal and towards the UIP server, or via UIP client to UIP server.

1. User login to UE and the UIP client, possibly including a local authentication of the user. In case of new UID, the UIP client gets a new set of credentials.

2. UIP client issues an Xuips\_UIPupdate request e.g. indicating a new user login (applies to admin of UIP as well as non-admin of UIP).

3. An authentication of the user is done, via UP.

4. The UIP Server determines whether to update 5GC e.g., new user login making a User Link active.

5. The UIP server may reply with information related to the new user or simply result of login.

6. The UIP client may display options to the user, e.g. if user admin the user can add new User Links and configure what service differentiation to enable when the User Links is active.

7. The user selects an option to update the UIP information.

8. The UIP client issues an Xuips\_UIPupdate request as per user selection, admin of the UIP can e.g.:

- Adding or removing a User Link;

- Updating UIP information e.g. configure what service differentiation to enable when a certain User Link is active.

9. The UIP Server determines whether to update 5GC.

10. The UIP server replies with result of the request.

The above flow shows how to update the UIP information via a UIP client protocol, the same type of information can be updated via the Portal using web services.

Editor’s Note: Clarification on which steps are in scope and which steps are out of scope is FFS.

Editor’s Note: Removal of steps that are not related to SA3 scope is FFS.

Editor’s Note: More clarification is FFS.

Editor’s Note: Alignment with SA2 is FFS.

Editor’s Note: How to update 5GC and impact/requirements to 5GC is FFS.

Editor’s Note: Clarification on which existing mechanism is reused and how user ID is protected.

Editor’s Note: How to ensure at step 3 actual user is authenticated is FFS.

6.9.3 Evaluation

TBD.

6.10 Solution #10: Human User ID authentication and authorization

### 6.10.1 Introduction

This solution addresses KI#1 Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID and proposes an overall procedure to achieve these security goals.

### 6.10.2 Solution details




Figure 6.10.2-1: Human User ID authentication and authorization

The procedure is described in reference to figure 6.10.1-1, as follows:

* In step 1, the User accesses the UE e.g., unlocks ME and SIM.

NOTE 1: Step 1 is outside of 3GPP scope.

* In Step 2, the UE performs initial registration and primary authentication with the 5GC.
* In Step 3, based on the type of services requested/ to be provided and the UE subscription details, the 5GC (e.g., UDM) can trigger a User Identification procedure by sending a User Identity Request to the UE.
* In Step 4, Upon receiving the User Identity Request, the User may be prompted (e.g., through the user interface) to provide its User Identity and authentication information. If the User approves the request, the User Identity and authentication information (e.g., User identifier, user biometric data) is sent protected to the 5GC.

NOTE 2: In case a 3rd party User Identity Management Server (UIMS) is used, the User Identity may be protected based on security materials shared between the UE and the 3rd party UIMS, which are outside of the 3GPP scope.

* In Step 5, the 5GC processes the protected User Identity and authentication information received in step 4, and authenticates the User based on whether the User Identity is associated with the UE subscription, as stored at the 5GC (e.g., UDR). Alternatively, If the User Identity is managed by a 3rd party UIMS, the User identification and authentication is performed by the 3rd party UIMS and the identification and authentication result is then provided to the 5GC, which may subsequently check whether the identified and authenticated User is associated with a user subscription, as stored in the 5GC (e.g., UDR).

Editor’s Note: Details on how identification is triggered in step 3 and authentication is performed in step 5 are FFS.

* In Step 6, based on whether the User Identity authentication is successful, and the type of services requested by the user, the 5GC (e.g., PCF) determines whether the User is authorized for such services.

### 6.10.3 Evaluation

TBD.

6.11 Solution #11: Re-using existing mechanisms for user privacy

6.11.1 Introduction

This solution addresses the requirements identified in key issue #2 (User Privacy).

It is proposed to re-use existing mechanism to protect user identifier during the communication between the UE and the network, including the procedures for user authentication and service access, and to protect User Identity Profile information during the exposure of User Identity Profile information by the network to entities outside operator domain, to prevent privacy attacks (e.g., trackability, linkability, disclosure).

6.11.2 Solution details

For communication between the UE and the network, including the procedures for user authentication and service access, interface security mechanism is proposed to be used.

For the exposure the existing exposure security mechanism is proposed to be used.

Editor’s Note: Consideration of mobility scenario is FFS.

Editor’s Note: Clarification on existing security mechanisms is FFS.

Editor’s Note: Clarification on user ID protection with which specific mechanisms and how is FFS.

6.11.3 Evaluation

Editor’s Note: Evaluation is FFS.

6.12 Solution #12: authorization of non-3GPP devices behind 5G-RG

6.12.1 Introduction

This solution addresses Key Issue #3 on the authorization of non-3GPP devices behind 5G-RG. It is based on the authentication of FN-RG in clause 7B.3 of TS 33.501 [3], with additional authorization check that the non-3GPP device is under the control of an RG which has been successfully authenticated by 5GC. This ensures that an RG can only represent a non-3GPP device allowed by the RG subscription.

Editor’s note: Clarification of changes from clause 7B.3 is FFS.

6.12.2 Solution details




Figure 6.12.2-1. authorization of non-3GPP devices behind 5G-RG

1. A layer-2 (L2) connection is established between the non-3GPP device and the 5G-RG using local authentication (e.g., WPA personal).

2. The 5G-RG sends an AAA message to the W-AGF to indicate that a device with a non-3GPP device identifier has been successfully authenticated locally.

NOTE 1 : The identifier of the non-3GPP device is defined by BBF or CableLabs and is out of scope of 3GPP.

3. The W-AGF sends back a confirmation AAA message to the RG.

NOTE 2 : The AAA messages used between the 5G-RG and the W-AGF in steps 2-3 are defined by BBF or CableLabs and out of scope of 3GPP.

4. The W-AGF shall perform initial registration on behalf of the non-3GPP device. The W-AGF shall generate a Registration Request message and send it to the AMF over N2. The Registration Request message contains the SUCI of the non-3GPP device and the SUCI of the 5G-RG. The N2 message contains an indication that the RG has authenticated the non-3GPP device.

Editor’s Note: whether the non-3GPP device is required to register to the 5GC is ffs and depends on SA2 decisions.

Editor’s note: whether a non-3GPP device identifier needs to be reformulated into SUCI is FFS.

5. The AMF shall select an AUSF based on the received SUCI. The AMF shall send a Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Request message to the AUSF. It contains the SUCI of the non-3GPP device, the SUCI of the 5G-RG, and the SN-name. It also contains the authenticated indication generated by the W-AGF.

6. The AUSF shall send a Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_Get Request to the UDM. It contains the SUCI of the non-3GPP device, the SUCI of the 5G-RG, the SN-name, and the authenticated indication.

7. The UDM shall invoke the SIDF and maps the SUCIs to the SUPIs. The UDM shall verify that the 5G-RG has been successfully authenticated and the non-3GPP device is under the control of the RG based on the subscription profiles of the 5G-RG. The UDM decides the authentication by the home network is not required for the non-3GPP device and the non-3GPP device has been authorized.

8. The UDM shall send a Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_Get Response to the AUSF. It contains the SUPI of the non-3GPP device and an indication that authentication by the home network is not required.

9. After checking the indication set by the UDM, The AUSF shall not perform authentication and shall send a Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Response to the AMF. It contains the SUPI of the non-3GPP device and the indication that authentication by the home network is not required set by the UDM.

This response from AUSF indicates that authentication is not required, and no KSEAF is included.

10. After checking the indication to make sure that the authentication by the home network is not required, the AMF shall estabilish the NAS security for the non-3GPP device between AMF and W-AGF with NULL encryption and NULL integrity protection.

11. The AMF shall send Registration Accept message to the W-AGF. This message contains 5G-GUTI and other parameters.

12. The W-AGF shall send a Registration Complete message back to the AMF. The W-AGF shall store the 5G-GUTI for use in later NAS procedures.

13. The W-AGF and the 5G-RG may establish a PDU session for the non-3GPP device. This is defined by CableLabs and BBF and is out the scope of 3GPP.

6.12.3 Evaluation

TBD

## 6.13 Solution #13: Authentication and Authorization procedure of N3D behind gateway UE or 5G-RG

### 6.13.1 Introduction

This solution addresses the Key Issue #3 (as defined in clause 5.3).

This solution proposes to support the authentication and authorization of one or more Non-3GPP Device behind gateway UE or 5G-RG by enhancing the EAP based authentication procedure by an external DN-AAA server as specified in clause 11.1 of TS 33.501 [3]. It is assumed there is a Non-3GPP device profile stored in Core network, e.g. UDM.

Editor’s Note: Whether this solution alignment with SA2 conclusions is ffs.

6.13.2 Solution details

#### 6.13.2.1 Authentication Procedure

The authentication and authorization procedure of Non-3GPP Device behind gateway UE or 5G-RG as follow:



Figure 6.13.2.1-1 Authentication and Authorization procedure of Non-3GPP Device behind gateway UE or 5G-RG

0. The UE/5G-RG registers with the network performing primary authentication.

1. The Non-3GPP Device and the UE/5G-RG successfully established direct connection.

NOTE 1: How to establish direct connection is out of 3GPP scope.

2. During direct connection establishment procedure, the UE/5G-RG identify the Non-3GPP Device and confirm its Non-3GPP Device identifier.

NOTE 2: How to identify a Non-3GPP Device based will be specified by SA2.

3. The UE/5G-RG send a PDU Session Establishment or Modification Request to SMF via AMF, which contains the Non-3GPP Device identifier confirmed in step 2.

4. Upon receiving the PDU Session Establishment or Modification Request message, the SMF shall obtains the subscription data of the UE/5G-RG and the profile of the Non-3GPP Device from the UDM. The SMF shall checks the subscription data whether the secondary authentication for UE/5G-RG as specified in clause 11.1 of TS 33.501 [3] is required, and whether the UE/5G-RG is allowed to provide current service, and check the profile of the Non-3GPP Deivce whether the Non-3GPP Device identifier links to the subscription data of the UE or 5G-RG. If not allowed and/or not linked, the SMF will reject UE/5G-RG’s request via SM-NAS signalling and skip rest of the procedure.

NOTE 3: The SMF needs to perform the secondary authentication for UE/5G-RG if required.

5. The SMF shall trigger EAP Authentication of the Non-3GPP Device to obtain authorization from an external DN-AAA server by sending a EAP authentication request message, which contains the Non-3GPP Device identifier.

6. The DN-AAA server and the UE shall exchange EAP messages via the UPF and UE/5G-RG, as required by the EAP method. In addition, it may send additional authorization information as defined in TS 23.501 clause 5.6.6.

7. After the successful completion of the authentication procedure, DN-AAA server shall send EAP Success message to the SMF. This message contains the Non-3GPP Device identifier and a MSK (optional).

8. The SMF shall store the authentication and authorization result of Non-3GPP Device and add the Non-3GPP Device identifier to the SM context of the UE/5G-RG and mark as authorized by requested service.

9. The SMF may notify the authentication and authorization result of Non-3GPP Device to UDM and/or specific NF where store the profile of the Non-3GPP Deivce. The SMF then may request the session policy associate with the Non-3GPP Device from PCF.

Editor’s Note: What the Non-3GPP Device profile contains and where the Non-3GPP Device Profile is stored is FFS and will be defined by SA2.

10. The SMF shall perform rest of the PDU Session Establishment or Modification procedure.

11. The SMF send a NAS SM PDU Session Establishment or Modification Accept message to the UE/5G-RG via the AMF. This message shall include EAP success message to be sent to the UE/5G-RG and the Non-3GPP Device. The SMF shall also include a MSK (if received in step 7) in NAS SM message.

12. The UE/5G-RG shall store the authentication and authorization result of the Non-3GPP Device to do some operation like access control, e.g. restrict the number of devices activated simultaneously. The UE/5G-RG shall store the MSK and associated Non-3GPP Device identifier if received in NAS SM message.

13. The UE/5G-RG may Establish/Re-establish the security protection for direct connection with the Non-3GPP Device based on the received MSK. After successful complete the step 3-12, the UE/5G-RG start to forward the traffic from the Non-3GPP Device to network.

#### 6.13.2.2 Re-Authentication procedure



Figure 6.13.2.2-1 Re-Authentication procedure of Non-3GPP Device behind gateway UE or 5G-RG

0. The UE/5G-RG registers with the network performing primary authentication.

1. The authentication and authorization procedure of Non-3GPP Device was successfully executed.

2a. The SMF decides to initiate Re-Authentication procedure of the Non-3GPP Device.

2b-1. The DN AAA server decides to initiate Re-Authentication of the Non-3GPP Device.

2b-2. The DN AAA shall send a Re-Authentication request to the SMF via UPF. The Re-authentication request contains the Non-3GPP Device identifier and other parameters as specified in clause 11.1.3 of TS 33.501 [3].

3-4. The SMF shall send an EAP Request/Identity message to the UE/5G-RG, which contain the Non-3GPP Device identifier. Upon received this message, the UE/5G-RG stop forwarding the traffic of the Non-3GPP Device to network, and responds an EAP Response/Identity message to the SMF, which contain the Non-3GPP Device identifier.

5-13. Execute the same operation as step 5-13 in clause 6.13.2.

#### 6.13.2.3 Authentication and Authorization revocation

At any time, the DN-AAA server may revoke the authentication and authorization for a PDU Session associated with the Non-3GPP Device, and according to the request from the DN-AAA server, the SMF may modify or release the PDU Session associated with the Non-3GPP Device.

### 6.13.4 Evaluation

TBD

## 6.14 Solution #14: Authentication and authorization of non-3GPP devices

### 6.14.1 Introduction

The solution addresses KI#3.

### 6.14.2 Solution details

The UDM/UDR based on operator policy, manages user authentication requirement information along with SUPI i.e., subscription data. If user authentication is required based on operator policy, the UDM/UDR also stores and manages the user identity profile which can contain user authentication and authorization data such as user identifier, applicable user type (ie., human user or devices/applications. This is to allow restriction to use only allowed user identifier. Because in SA2 architecture assumptions in TR 23.700-32, it states, *‘When the user identifier applies to a human, only a single user identifier is active with a UE subscription at a given time and it is assumed that the specific user identifier is associated with all of the UE's traffic during the time that specific user identifier is active with the UE's subscription.’*).

For authentication and authorization of UEs i.e, devices behind 5G-RG, TS 33.501 [3] clause 7B.4 is reused, i.e., When the UE uses untrusted non-3GPP access, the authentication of the UE is as specified in TS 33.501 [3] clause 7.2.1 and when the UE uses trusted non-3GPP access, the authentication of the UE is as specified in TS 33.501 [3] clause 7A.2.1 with the following adaptations.

* In step 5, if user authentication is supported, the UE sends a related indication in registration request. In step 20, the UE if received user authentication required indication from the AMF in NAS registration accept, the UE sends User ID, user type and authorization information (e.g., service access token) in the NAS transport as response. AMF/SEAF verifies the received User ID, and authorization information with the user authentication and authorization data available (fetched from UDM), if it matches, the user authentication and authorization is considered as successful for non-3GPP device.

Editor’s Notes: The identification of non-3GPP device when it does not have subscription is FFS.

Editor’s Notes: The use of user id and device id is FFS.

Editor’s Notes: Whether the procedure for UE authentication in clause 7B.4 of TS 33.501 [3] can be re-used is ffs.

### 6.14.3 Evaluation

TBD

## 6.15 Solution #15: Authentication of user behind the UE

### 6.15.1 Introduction

This solution is targeted to KI#1

### 6.15.2 Solution details

### 6.15.2.1 Concept

The main concept of the solution is to authenticate the user via user identifier at the AUSF/UDM. In the authentication process, both user owned secret/credential and UE owner secret/credential should be used together to authenticate the user.

Please refer to the diagram to understand the same:



Figure 6.15.2.1-1: User, UE and 5GC secret/credential ownership

As shown in the above figure, the user bought the subscription from the operator, and the operator provides the user ID and a changeable PIN or one-time password. The user gets this information via the operator-provided portal.

The user-A and the subscribers (B) agreed for the user-A to use the UE-B. Therefore, the network provisions the TimeBoundCredential and User ID at the UE/USIM-B. So now the user-A and network know the following shared secret related to the user:

* User Id,
* PIN or one-time password

And the UE and network know the shared secret.

* User Id,
* TimeBoundCredential (any shared secret that can be used for a limited time period or a limited number of times)

The user provides a user ID and PIN to the UE, and now the network can authenticate the user via these shared secrets (PIN and TimeBoundCredential). In this way, user A and UE-B are both bound in the authentication process.

### 6.15.2.2 Solution flow



Figure 6.15.2.2-1: user authentication

1. UE-B is authenticated and registered in the network as defined in TS 33.501 [3] and TS 23502 [4].
2. User-A bought the subscription from the operator, and the operator provides the user ID and a changeable PIN or one-time password to User-A. The user gets this information via the operator-provided portal (outside the scope of 3GPP). User-A is also linked with UE#B in the subscription data.
3. UE is provisioned with credentials (out of scope of 3GPP).

Steps 2 and 3 are repeated for every UE where the user wants to be linked.

1. The user logs in to the UE-B and provides a user ID and PIN.

NOTE 1 : How users log in to the UE-B is outside the scope of 3GPP. Maybe it can be achieved via an operator-provided app.

1. Once the user logs in to the UE-B, the UE-B initiates the NAS registration request, where the existing 5G-GUTI of the UE-B is provided as is, and additionally, the user ID is also provided as an additional IE.
2. If the AMF decides to perform user authentication, the AMF initiates user authentication. For this, AMF sends Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authentication Req with SUPI of the UE-B and User ID of the User-A to AUSF.
3. The AUSF sends the Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_Authentication\_Get request to UDM with SUPI and the user ID. Based on the subscription data, the UDM authorizes that User A can use UE-B. After successful authorization, the UDM provides the TimeBoundCredential and PIN related to user-A to the AUSF.
4. The AUSF sends an EAP challenge packet to UE, which contains a TNonce value and a Message Authentication Code 1 (MAC1) derived by using the user key derived using the TimeBoundCredential, PIN, and User ID.
5. The UE derives an expected MAC1 (XMAC1) of TNonce using a user key derived in a similar fashion and compares XMAC1 with the received MAC1. If they match, the network is authenticated by the UE.

The UE generates a UNonce and derives a MAC2 using the user key, as well as UNonce and TNonce.

Editor’s Note: The network is already authenticated by the UE during primary authentication. The need for the user to authenticate the network is FFS.

1. The UE responds with an EAP Challenge containing UNonce, TNonce, and MAC2.
2. The AUSF derives an expected MAC2 (XMAC2) using the user key and with UNonce and TNonce. Compares XMAC2 with the received MAC2. If they match, the UE is authenticated by the AUSF.

Editor’s Note: Whether the UE or the user is authenticated by the AUSF is FFS.

1. The AUSF sends an EAP-SUCCESS message to UE.

NOTE 2 : User ID privacy is covered in Solution #18.

Editor’s Note: alignment related to Step 2 removal is FFS.

Editor’s Note: The complications and side-effects of overloading the registration and primary authentication procedure are ffs.

Editor’s Note: Whether an existing EAP method can be used or a new EAP method needs to be designed is FFS

Editor’s Note: Tnonce and EAP method related details are ffs.

Editor’s Note: how user-A and the subscribers (B) agreed for the user-A to use the UE-B are FFS.

Editor’s Note: how to prevent user 1 log in to user 2 as they share the UE with both PINs.

### 6.15.3 Evaluation

TBD

Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled. The evaluation of the solution should include the impact to the 3GPP system.

## 6.16 Solution #16: User Authentication and Authorization

### 6.16.1 Introduction

This solution assumes following:

* 5GC plays the role of Identity provider, responsible for identification, authentication and authorization of a (human) user behind a 5G UE.
* A 3rd party which provides services to the users requires an Identity Provider it trusts to validate the identity of (human) users.

To address possible scenarios, the solution proposes to introduce following logical network function to handle user identification, authentication and authorization:

**- User Authentication Function (UAF):** This NF is responsible for selecting and interfacing with UIDF (User Information Database Function) for triggering User Authentication.

In addition, UE subscription data, which is stored in UDM/UDR, may be enhanced to include the Allowed User Identities and/or User Domain Names.

### 6.16.2 Solution details

#### 6.16.2.1 User Initiated procedure

This solution proposes to introduce a control plane based procedure for user authentication and authorization where the UE initiates User Authentication Procedure requesting identity certificate.



**Figure 6.16.2.1-1: Control plane based User Authentication and Authorization procedure**

1. The UE is pre-configured with credentials for accessing 3GPP network, bio-metric verification of the user(s) and optionally credentials for accessing the service. The primary authentication is performed as described in clause 6.1 in 3GPP TS 33.501 [3] and the UE is authenticated with the 3GPP core network. A User (e.g. a human user) triggers the device access using implementation specific methods (e.g., by tapping on an option in an App).
2. The UE sends a User Authentication Request to the AMF. This message may include User ID or a temporary Session-ID, and optionally result/token of biometric user-verification. The UE performs the authenticity verification of the user and includes the user ID once it is successfully verified. Further step 1 to 5 could be new NAS message or re-use existing NAS message.

NOTE: How the UE authenticates the User and which user ID is used to initiate the session is based on mechanism outside the scope of 3GPP.

1. Upon receiving the User Authentication Request from the UE, the AMF forwards the User Authentication Request to the UAF.
2. Upon receiving the User Authentication Request, UAF may first authenticate the user. The authentication may involve, e.g. sending a PUSH message to an app which requires biometric validation at the UE. It may use the result/token of biometrics included in Step #1. It is assumed that such validation is done at application layer and is out of the scope of 3GPP.

Post successful validation, UAF generates a short-term identity certificate. The certificate indicates that User behind the UE has been verified by the network, and hence signed by a CA, and is valid for a certain duration.

Editor’s Note: It is FFS whether the authentication is done by PUSH mechanism or control plane message.

Editor’s Note: Further details on the authentication of user at step 3 is FFS.

1. The UAF sends the user authentication response message to the AMF. This message includes the certificate for the verified user. The message may also be sent directly to the UE over, e.g. data-path
2. Upon receiving the user authentication response message from the UAF, the AMF forwards the user authentication response message to the UE.
3. The UE sends the Application Session Establishment Request to the AF for obtaining the service. This message includes the UE-ID, certificate and the service ID.
4. Upon receiving the Application Session Establishment Request, the AF verifies the certificate provided by the UE and confirms the real user and provides the service. The AF is in possession of valid credentials (public key) to verify the certificate provided by the UAF/CA.

#### 6.16.2.2 Network Initiated procedure

This solution proposes to introduce a procedure for user authentication and authorization where the 3rd party entity or the AF retrieves the user authentication results from the 5GC network. The UDM performs the user authentication based on the request from the AF, where the UDM initiates user authentication and provides the User-ID.



**Figure 6.16.2.2-2: User Authentication and Authorization procedure**

1. The UE is pre-configured with credentials for accessing 3GPP network, bio-metric verification of the user(s) and optionally credentials for services. The primary authentication is performed as described in clause 6.1 in 3GPP TS 33.501 [3] and the UE is authenticated with the 3GPP core network.
2. The UE sends the Application Session Establishment Request to the AF (for e.g. as in AKMA). This message includes the UE ID and the user ID.
3. Based on the received Application Session Establishment Request from the UE, the AF determines that it needs to ensure that the user is indeed the one he is claiming to be (i.e. User-ID), before granting access to application. The AF sends the User Authentication Request to the UDM via NEF. This message includes UE ID and user ID.
4. Upon receiving the User Authentication Request, the UDM sends the User Authentication request to the AMF. This message includes UE ID and user ID. The User Authentication message may also include the AF ID.

Editor’s Note: Details on utilization of UE ID FFS.

1. Upon receiving the User Authentication Request, the AMF identifies the UE based on the UE ID and sends the User Authentication request to the UE. This message includes UE ID and user ID. The User Authentication message may also include the AF ID.
2. The UE performs the biometric verification (face images and the fingerprints of the user using a mechanism outside the scope of 3GPP) and generates the result.
3. The UE sends the User Authentication Response to the AMF over, e.g. a NAS message. The message includes the result of user-authentication generated by the UE during the verification process.
4. The AMF forwards the User Authentication Response to the UDM. The message includes the result of user-authentication provided by the UE.
5. Upon receiving the User Authentication Response, the UDM initiates the user verification from network side. The UDM may verify the locally stored user information with the result.

Editor’s Note: How UDM verifies auth result based on locally stored user information is FFS.

1. Once the verification at the UDM is successful, the UDM sends the User Authentication Response to the AF via NEF. This message includes the result of user authentication. Upon receiving the User Authentication Response from the UDM (via NEF) and verifying the user authentication result, the AF sends the Application Session Establishment Response to the UE.

Editor’s Note: Which part of procedure belong to application layer which is out of scope is FFS.

### 6.16.3 Evaluation

TBD

## 6.17 Solution #17: Solution for exposure privacy issue

### 6.17.1 Introduction

This solution is targeted to KI#2

### 6.17.2 Solution details

The solution believes there are two kinds of privacy issues associated with user profile exposure.

1: Exposure of User Profile Information

2: Exposure of linked UE subscription information associated with the User Identifier

**Exposure of user profile information**

Following rules would be applied:

* Each user profile is assigned a GPSI or external ID, where the GPSI or external ID can be specific to the AF (similar to a subscription-specific GPSI/external ID for a subscriber). It is the responsibility of NEF to map GPSI/external ID to user ID or vice versa.

Editor’s Note: it is FFS whether user ID is more privacy sensitive than GPSI or not.

* The user owning the user-profile can provide consent to the exposure of user-profile specific information. For this, we can reuse the consent framework defined in TS 33.501 [3] annex V.

Editor’s Note: Annex V defines user consent in UE subscription, in which the user is the subscriber, while the user using the UE may not be the subscriber. Whether TS 33.501 [3] Annex V can be reused or not is FFS.

* The NEF also has a policy to ensure only public information about the user profile will be exposed to AFs, which is similar to UE subscription exposure.

**Exposure of linked UE subscription information associated with User Identifier**

If user-profile is linked to the UE’s subscription, based on the AF request, the 5GC can expose the linked subscription information, e.g., if User A is registered to 5GC via UE-B, it means User A is using UE-B. Therefore, exposing certain information about the user may lead to a privacy issue of the UE as well. For example,

* AF requests NEF and asks for User-A linking (linked subscription) information. And NEF provides the response with User-A is linked with UE-B.
* Then AF requests NEF and asks for the user's location. NEF provides a User-A location.

Editor’s Note: How the NEF obtains the user’s location is FFS.

* AF determines the UE-B location even if AF is not allowed to get UE-B location information.

Therefore, the following rules would be applied:

* If the AF requests 5GC to provide the user location, then 5GC checks the privacy profile (similar to the consent flag) of UE as defined in TS 23.273 [6] and the consent flag of the user as defined in the user profile. When both UE and the user are allowed to share the location, then only the user’s location should be determined and shared with AF.
* The UE subscription defines what services are allowed to be used by the user. i.e., if the user can use a certain service, like slice/DNN.

NOTE: For enterprise DNN/Slice, secondary authentication is optional. So, the user can misuse the DNN or slice allocated to the user to connect to the enterprise on behalf of the subscriber.

Editor’s Note: More details are required how User can misuse the slice/DNN assigned to UE.

Editor’s Note: Which information related to user profile is exposed depends on SA2 progress.

Editor’s Note: Whether there is the requirement to expose the linked UE subscription information is FFS.

Editor’s Note: The user identity profile information should be aligned with SA2. Which info is exposed and whether any privacy concerns is ffs.

Editor’s Note: ffs on procedure call flows.

### 6.17.3 Evaluation

TBD

Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled. The evaluation of the solution should include the impact to the 3GPP system.

## 6.18 Solution #18: User privacy during the connection with 5GC

### 6.18.1 Introduction

This solution is targeted to KI#2, requirement 1.

### 6.18.2 Solution details



Figure 6.18.2.1-1: User Id privacy during the connection

1. UE-B is authenticated and registered in the network as defined in TS 33.501 [3] and TS 23.502 [4].
2. User-A is attached/linked to UE#B and provides a user ID.
3. UE-B generates the SUCIuser with UE credentials, where the currently standard SUCI mechanism is reused to generate the SUCIuser. For SUCIuser, a new SUCI type is used where SUPI and User ID are concatenated.
4. UE-B sends a NAS registration request with the 5G-GUTI of the subscriber and the SUCIuser of the user.

NOTE: If the AMF finds that the 5G-GUTI is unknown, then the AMF initiates primary authentication of the subscriber, and then, after successful completion of primary authentication, the below steps are performed.

1. AMF/SMF sends a Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate Request with the SUPI of the subscriber and the SUCIuser of the user to the AUSF selected for the UE.
2. The AUSF sends Nudm\_UEAuthentication\_Authentication\_Get request to UDM with SUPI and SUCIuser.
3. UDM deconceals the SUCIuser and retrieves the User\_ID.
4. AUSF/AAA performs the user authentication. User authentication procedure is not defined in this solution.
5. Once user authentication is successful, then AUSF provides User\_Id to the AMF.
6. Based on the successful authentication, the AMF generates a new 5G-GUTI that includes user and UE information and provides it to UE-B. UE-B uses this new 5G-GUTI for further communication.

A similar procedure can be executed if user authentication is performed at the PDU session level, where SUCIuser can be provided at the PDU session request, and accordingly, AMF/SMF performs the authentication.

Editor’s Note: Since Step 4 happens after the establishment of AS and NAS security, it is ffs if the SUCIuser is necessary.

Editor’s Note: Mobility scenario details are ffs.

Editor’s Note: ffs the format of the SUCI and how it is generated.

Editor’s Note: ffs how the AMF knows the UDM returns the correct user ID.

### 6.18.3 Evaluation

TBD

Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled. The evaluation of the solution should include the impact to the 3GPP system.

## 6.19 Solution #19: User privacy protection

### 6.19.1 Introduction

This solution addresses the key issue #2.

The solution protects a user identifier (UID) used in 3GPP system by replacing it with the concealed version, i.e. user identifier concealed (UIC). Since UID is not in the realm of 3GPP systems, the mapping between the UID and UIC is out of scope of 3GPP system, i.e. UIC and how UID is mapped to UIC is transparent to the 3GPP systems.

In addition, the mapping between UIC and UID is not fixed and changed from time to time to avoid the user being tracked or linked.

Editor’s note: ffs to clarify how and who to conceal UID.

Editor’s note: In case of PDU session request, how we will ensure the privacy of the user ID considering the mobility scenario.

### 6.19.2 Solution details

A user authentication procedure is exemplified below to illustrate how to use UIC, instead of UID to protect user privacy. It is notable that the authentication procedure is made generic as much as possible to accommodate different authentication methods (this solution is not meant to address authentication procedure).

The exemplified user identity authentication and authorization (UIAA) procedure with user privacy protection is as follows:

1.The UE sends a Registration Request to the AMF.

2. The AMF triggers the UIAA procedure.

3: The AMF sends the AAA-Server the UIAA message with GPSI included.

Editor's note: With the UIC transparent to the AMF, how the AMF determines whether, for whom, and how to trigger user authentication is FFS.

4. The AAA-S and the UE perform user authentication and authorization with respect to the user, e.g. the user is identified as UIC between AAA-S and the UE. However, the UIC is transparent to the AMF. There can be multiple message exchanges between UE and AAA-S, depending on authentication method used. The authentication method is out of scope of 3GPP.

5. The AAA-S sends the authentication results to AMF, which stores the result identifying the user by UIC, the concealed version of UID. The UIC should be changed for every authentication to avoid being tracked or linked to previous authentication.

6. The AMF sends registration accept to the UE.



Figure 6.19.2-1 illustration of user privacy protection in a user authentication procedure

### 6.19.3 Evaluation

## 6.20 Solution #20: privacy protection for user ID over the air

### 6.20.1 Introduction

This solution addresses key issue #2: "User privacy". The solution focuses on privacy protection over the air. This solution does not cover the privacy issue for non-3GPP devices behind one gateway UE or 5G-RG.

### 6.20.2 Details

The user ID sent over the air from the UE to the AMF is protected by NAS security. The user ID can be added to a NAS message when the NAS security is activated, e.g. in the ciphered part of the Registration Request message.

### 6.20.3 Evaluation

TBD

Editor’s note: It is ffs how to address mobility scenarios.

## 6.21 Solution #21: A&A of non-3GPP devices behind UE or 5G-RG based on secondary authentication

### 6.21.1 Introduction

This solution addresses the key issue #3.

The solution reuses the secondary authentication procedure in TS 33.501 [3] and adapts it to authenticate and authorize a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG.

### 6.21.1 Solution details

Assuming the non-3GPP device is identified as DN identifier (DID) behind a UE with a 3GPP subscription identified by the UE’s SUPI/GPSI to access services via the 5GS. Before authentication of the DID, the Primary authentication for the UE needs to be performed.

Editor’s note: The relation between DID and non-3GPP device identifier is FFS.

With reference to the figure 11.1.2-1 in TS 33.501 [3], the DID authentication and authorization procedure is described as follows:

1-3. UE is registered to the network after Primary authentication and security context is established as in TS 33.501 [3].

4-7. The UE sends a PDU session establishment request to the network as in TS 33.501 [3].

8. The H-SMF initiates the secondary authentication procedure for the PDU session as in TS 33.501 [3]

9-13. The EAP authentication starts and is completed after multiple rounds of message exchanges between the UE and the DN, as in TS 33.501 [3].

14. After the successful completion of the authentication procedure, DN AAA server shall send EAP Success message to the H-SMF, along with GPSI and DID. The message may include any restriction information imposed to the DID, e.g. tiers of services/QoS, service duration etc.

Editor’s note: How the DN AAA server gets aware of the linked relation between GPSI of the UE and DID of the non-3GPP device is FFS.

15. This completes the authentication procedure at the SMF. The SMF may save the DN-specific ID and DNN (or DN's AAA server ID if available) in a list for successful authentication/authorization between UE and an SMF. Alternatively, the SMF may update the list in UDM. The UE (and the non-3GPP device) is identified by the GPSI and DID.

If the authorization is successful, PDU Session Establishment proceeds as described in TS 33.501 [3].

16a-19 The UE-requested PDU Session Establishment authentication/authorization by a DN-AAA server proceeds further as described in TS 33.501 [3].

### 6.21.3 Evaluation

Editor’s note: Without indication of Device ID from UE (steps 4-7 and 8), how the SMF determines to trigger the authentication is FFS

Editor’s note: How secondary authentication of the UE authenticates the non-3GPP device behind the UE is FFS.

Editor’s note: ffs to clarify DID.

## 6.22 Solution #22: User authentication with derived credential

### 6.22.1 Introduction

This solution addresses Key Issue #1 on Authentication and Authorization of Human User ID and Key Issue #3 on Authentication and Authorization of one or more non-3GPP devices behind one gateway UE or 5G-RG. Specifically, it addresses the requirements for authentication of human user based on a user identifier linked to a 3GPP subscription and authentication of a non-3GPP device behind a UE or 5G-RG based on a non-3GPP device identifier. The solution applies to the cases where no credential is preconfigured in the UE and the network for user authentication.

### 6.22.2 Solution details

#### 6.22.2.1 Description

According to the requirements in KI#1 and KI#3, users (human user or non-3GPP device) are authenticated based on the identifier of a human user using a UE or non-3GPP device behind a UE/5G-RG for using operator or non-operator deployed services, i.e. the user identifier or non-3GPP device identifier needs to be sent to the network. The solution assumes the following:

NOTE: User authentication hereafter refers to both the authentication of human user and authentication of a non-3GPP device behind a UE/5G-RG.

- The user or non-3GPP device identifier is sent from the UE to the network during user activation procedure which takes place after the UE registered into the network.

- There is a User Identity Profile (UIP) containing user or non-3GPP device identifier(s) and linked subscription(s), which is maintained by the HPLMN of the linked subscription(s). It can be used for determining whether and how to initiate user authentication. The profile is stored in a User Identity Management Function (UIMF) which can be collocated with an existing NF in HPLMN.

- There is a User Authentication and Authorization Function (UAAF) deployed by the home operator and dedicated to user authentication, which can be a standalone NF or collocated with an existing NF.

- User or non-3GPP device identifier can be made available to the UE before user activation, e.g. through input of human user or sent from the non-3GPP device which is out of 3GPP scope.

- There is no credential preconfigured in the UE and UAAF to associate with the user or non-3GPP device identifier.

#### 6.22.2.2 User activation procedure with the AUSF and UIMF

For human users or non-3GPP devices, if there is no credential preconfigured in the UE and the network for user authentication, the credential can be derived based on KAUSF generated during primary authentication.

0. When the UE registers to the network, primary authentication is successfully performed between the UE and the network, during which the key KAUSF is derived and stored in both the UE and AUSF.

After UE registration, the first human user logs in or non-3GPP device (User-1) connects to the UE. The user activation procedure starts.

1. The UE sends a User Activation Request in a NAS message, which contains the user or non-3GPP device identifier of User-1, UE capability supporting user authentication, and optionally an indication of credential absence.

2. If the credential absence indication is sent from the UE, the AMF sends a Nausf\_UserActivation\_Authenticate Request message to the AUSF, which includes the UE’s SUPI, user or non-3GPP device identifier and UE capability supporting user authentication.

3. Upon receiving the user or non-3GPP device identifier, the AUSF sends a Nuimf\_UserActivation\_UIP Request message to the UIMF for retrieving the UIP information of User-1.

4. Based on UIP information of User-1, the UIMF determines whether and how to perform user authentication procedure. For example, when the user authentication policy stored in the UIP indicates that user authentication credential shall be generated during user activation procedure, or when the credential associated with the user or non-3GPP device identifier is not available in the UIP, the UIMF determines that the user authentication method is to generate KUIA for user authentication.

5. If the UIMF determines to trigger user authentication, it returns a Nuimf\_UserActivation\_UIP Response message to the AUSF with the selected user authentication method, which indicates that KUIA needs to be derived for user authentication.

6. If the AUSF received the user authentication method indicating that KUIA needs to be derived, the AUSF derives KUIA from KAUSF of the UE. The AUSF associates KUIA with the UE’s SUPI.

7. Based on the received user or non-3GPP device identifier of User-1, the AUSF further derives KUSER-1 from KUIA.

8. The AUSF sends the derived KUSER-1 associated with User-1 to the UIMF. The UIMF includes the KUSER-1 in the UIP associated with User-1.

9. The AUSF returns Nausf\_UserActivation\_Authenticate Response to the AMF with the user authentication method, which indicates that KUIA needs to be derived.

10. The AMF forwards the user authentication method to the UE via User Activation Response in a NAS message.

11. Upon receiving the user authentication method indicating that KUIA needs to be derived, the UE derives KUIA from KAUSF in the same way as the AUSF. The UE associates KUIA with its SUPI.

12. The UE further derives KUSER-1 from KUIA based on the user or non-3GPP device identifier of User-1. The UE associates KUSER-1 with User-1.

13. The UE initiates User Authentication for User-1 towards the UAAF over application layer, which is protected using the derived KUSER-1 (see clause 6.22.2.4).



Figure 6.22.2.2: User activation procedure with AUSF and UIMF

After the first human user logged in or the first non-3GPP device connected to the UE, other human users or non-3GPP devices (e.g. User-2, .., User-n) log in or connect to the UE one by one.

14~18. User activation procedure is repeated for each of the logged-in users or connected devices, with the user or non-3GPP device identifier of User-n.

19. If the AUSF received the user authentication method indicating KUIA needs to be derived and KUIA has already been derived, the AUSF derives KUSER-n from KUIA for User-n.

20. The AUSF sends the derived KUSER-n associated with User-n to the UIMF. The UIMF includes the KUSER-n in the UIP of User-n.

21~22. The user authentication method is delivered to the UE from the AUSF via the AMF.

23. Upon receiving the user authentication method indicating that KUIA needs to be derived and KUIA has already been derived, the UE derives KUSER-n from KUIA for User-n.

24. The UE initiates User Authentication for User-n towards the UAAF over application layer, which is protected using the derived KUSER-n (see clause 6.22.2.4).

#### 6.22.2.3 Key hierarchy for user authentication with derived credential



Figure 6.22.2.3: Key hierarchy for user authentication with derived credential

Based on the procedure in clause 6.22.2.2, KAUSF is used as the root key in the hierarchy of key derivation. KUIA is derived from KAUSF by the UE and AUSF to be used as the intermediate key for all users on the UE. Based on the intermediate key KUIA, the key KUSER can be derived by the UE and the AUSF to be used as the user authentication credential for each specific user on the UE.

#### 6.22.2.4 User authentication procedure with the UAAF

After the UE derives KUSER-n during user activation procedure, the UE is able to initiate user authentication for User-n towards the UAAF.

1. The UE sends a User Authentication Request message to the UAAF (e.g. over application layer) which is protected with the KUSER-n. The message includes the user or non-3GPP device identifier of User-n.

2. Upon receiving the User Authentication Request, the UAAF sends an Authentication Key Request to the UIMF, which contains the user or device identifier of User-n.

3. The UIMF retrieves the UIP based on the received user or device identifier, from which KUSER-n can be retrieved. If the User Authentication Result associated with User-n is stored in the UIP, the Authentication Result is also retrieved.

4. The UIMF returns the retrieved KUSER-n or Authentication Result to the UAAF.

5. If the UAAF receives Authentication Result, the UAAF proceeds to step #8.

If the UAAF receives KUSER-n, the UAAF authenticates User-n using the KUSER-n received from the UIMF.

Editor’s Note: It is FFS how bootstrapping of user credentials from UE credentials can provide user authentication.

Editor’s Note: Whether user input on the UE needs to be verified by the network for user authentication is FFS.

6. The UAAF sends the Authentication Result of User-n to the UIMM.

7. The UIMF stores the User Authentication Result associated with User-n in the UIP.

Editor’s Note: Whether and how the UAAF updates the UIMF with the authentication result is in SA2's remit.

8. The UAAF sends the User Authentication Response with the Authentication Result of User-n to the UE.



Figure 6.22.2.4: User authentication procedure with the UAAF

#### 6.22.2.5 Derivation of KUIA and KUSER

When deriving a KUIA from KAUSF, the following parameters are used to form the input S to the KDF:

- FC = TBD;

- P0 = "UIA";

- L0 = length of "UIA";

- P1 = SUPI;

- L1 = length of SUPI.

The input key KEY is the KAUSF.

When deriving a KUSER from KUIA, the following parameters are used to form the input S to the KDF:

- FC = TBD;

- P0 = User identifier or non-3GPP device identifier;

- L0 = length of user identifier or non-3GPP device identifier;

The input key KEY is the KUIA.

### 6.22.3 Evaluation

Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled. The evaluation of the solution should include the impact to the 3GPP system.

Editor’s Note: It is FFS on alignment to the human user case addressed by SA2.

TBA

## 6.Y Solution #Y: <Solution Name>

### 6.Y.1 Introduction

Editor’s Note: Each solution should list the key issues being addressed.

### 6.Y.2 Solution details

### 6.Y.3 Evaluation

Editor’s Note: Each solution should motivate how the potential security requirements of the key issues being addressed are fulfilled. The evaluation of the solution should include the impact to the 3GPP system.

# 7 Conclusions

Editor’s Note: This clause contains the agreed conclusions of the study.

Annex <A>:  
<Informative annex title for a Technical Report>

Annex <X>:  
Change history

|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Change history** | | | | | | | |
| **Date** | **Meeting** | **TDoc** | **CR** | **Rev** | **Cat** | **Subject/Comment** | **New version** |
| 2024-04 | SA3#115Adhoc-e | S3-241221 |  |  |  | Draft TR 33.700-32 skeleton | 0.0.0 |
| 2024-04 | SA3#115Adhoc-e | S3-241565 |  |  |  | Draft TR 33.700-32 skeleton (revised) | 0.0.1 |
| 2024-04 | SA3#115Adhoc-e | S3-241545 |  |  |  | S3-241565, S3-241122, S3-241556, S3-241514, S3-241515, S3-241543, S3-241566 | 0.1.0 |
| 2024-05 | SA3#116 | S3‑242515 |  |  |  | S3‑242495, S3‑242496, S3‑242497, S3‑242498, S3‑242499, S3‑242500, S3‑242501, S3‑242502, S3‑242503, S3‑242668, S3‑242504, S3‑242505, S3‑242506, S3‑242507, S3‑242508, S3‑242509, S3‑242610, 242611, 242612, S3‑242613, S3-242614, S3-242615­­­ | 0.2.0 |