**3GPP TSG RAN WG2#125bis R2-240XXXX**

**Changsha, China, 15th - 19th April 2024**

**Title: [Draft] LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases**

**Response to:**

**Release:** **Rel-19**

**Work Item: NR\_Mob\_Ph4-Core**

**Source:** **[Draft] Apple ~~RAN WG2~~**

**To: SA WG3**

**Cc:** **RAN WG3**

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**Send any reply LS to: 3GPP Liaisons Coordinator,** **mailto:3GPPLiaison@etsi.org**

**Attachment: None**

**1. Overall Description:**

Based on the following WID objective of R19 Mob enhancement, RAN2 discussed the aspect of inter-CU LTM with security key change and views the following options as possible directions (not mutually exclusive or comprehensive) for handling the key change as part of inter-CU LTM cell switch.As for reference, Rel-18 intra-CU LTM cell switch procedure at stage-2 level is specified in TS 38.300 clause 9.2.3.5.

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| --- |
| * + Specify support for subsequent LTM mobility procedures aiming to avoid RRC configuration between cell switches as per Rel-18 LTM
		- Coordination with SA3 needed with respect to security key handling
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**Option 1:** Use a new information in MAC CE to deliver the security information. Whether the UE uses horizontal or vertical key derivation is derived from this new information in MAC CE (which is currently, neither integrity protected nor ciphered).

 **Option 1A:** the NCC value to be used at inter-CU LTM execution is included in the LTM cell switch command MAC CE.

 **Option 1B:** the UE is preconfigured with a list of NCC values in a ciphered and integrity protected RRC message and the index of an NCC value in the list is included in the LTM cell switch command MAC CE.

**Option 2:** Similar to Rel-18 S-CPAC key update mechanism, the UE is preconfigured from the source gNB with a list of NCC values **per CU** using RRC signalling (that is both integrity protected and ciphered). It is expected that the participating gNBs (CUs) would need to be aware of the list and how the UE applies the list during LTM cell switches:

The UE chooses the first unused NCC value for the target CU upon an inter-CU LTM execution.

 Horizontal key derivation is used if the LTM cell switch is between the same twoCU.

**Option 3:** After the execution of inter-CU LTM cell switch, the participating gNBs are expected to be updated with new K-gNB\* to be used for the next inter-CU LTM cell switch. The UE and CN are aware of how the UE would use the next NCC value.

 **Option 3A:** The UE determines the following NCC value to use by itself (e.g., increase by 1) after subsequent inter-CU LTM execution.

 **Option 3B:** UE is pre-configured by the CN (via source gNB RRC signalling) with a list of NCC valuesand the UE chooses the first unused NCC value as the next NCC value.

**Option 4:** After every inter-CU LTM cell switch execution, the UE is provided via RRC signalling with the NCC value to be used by the UE for key derivation at the next inter-CU LTM cell switch.

RAN2 assumes that both horizontal and vertical derivation used in L3 handover could be supported for inter-CU LTM.

RAN WG2 agreed also to support mixture of subsequent inter-CU LTM and subsequent intra-CU LTM after an inter-CU or intra-CU LTM switch. Please note that the current number of candidate cells within intra CU case (release 18) is 8. RAN2 did not decide yet the maximum number of candidate cells in Rel-19.

RAN WG 2 will consider Inter-CU with DC configured at a later stage. The above directions are intended for inter-CU LTM without DC case.

**2. Actions:**

**To SA3**

**ACTION:** RAN2 respectfully asks SA3 to take the above information related to security key change for Inter-CU LTM into account and comment on the below questions:

1. RAN2 asks SA3 to consider the needed signalling between participating network nodes for each option and inform RAN2 if any of the above options is not feasible or not acceptable from security perspective, and provide modifications that could make that option feasible and acceptable.
2. RAN2 requests SA3 whether, for each solution, the change of security algorithm or the change of key set indicator is to be supported for inter-CU LTM.

**3. Date of Next RAN WG2 Meetings:**

TSG RAN WG2 Meeting #126 20 - 24 May 2024  Fukuoka, Japan

TSG RAN WG2 Meeting #127 19 - 23 Aug 2024  Maastricht, Netherlands