Tdoc List

2025-06-02 15:16

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑251810 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251812 Process for SA3#122 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251813 Detailed agenda planning SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
2 Meeting Reports                      
2.1 Previous SA3 meeting report/s and SA report S3‑251811 Report from SA3#121 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252105  
    S3‑252105 Report from SA3#121 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251811
2.2 SA3-LI Report                      
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups                      
3.1 Reports and Liaisons S3‑251815 LS on Device Subscription Data S2-2501242 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑251992 reply LS on Device Subscription Data Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252259  
    S3‑252259 reply LS on Device Subscription Data Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251992
    S3‑252035 LS reply on Device Subscription Data Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252259  
    S3‑251817 LS on the scope attribute of the access token standard claims S5-251112 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑251968 Reply LS to SA5 on token scope Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252260  
    S3‑251818 Reply LS on secure storage and processing of credentials for AIoT ETSI TC SET LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑252034 Reply to: Reply LS on secure storage and processing of credentials for AIoT Nokia LS out Approval Yes
YesORANGE: not prepared to answer the LS of SET. We need to progress our TS to provide proper answers.There is a related LS to RAN1 that could help. It was decided to keep it open. Huawei supported this LS.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251819 Reply LS on including the HPLMN ID in the PC5 discovery messages for 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay C1-252256 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251828 LS on Management of secure backhaul for NTN S5-251990 LS in   Yes
YesNokia commented that there was no need to reply to this LS. Huawei argued that security work had to be done exclusively in SA3, not a good working practice to do security work in another WG. Security requirement and security solutions must be done in SA3. Ericsson: this is about managing aspects, not in SA3's scope.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251969 Reply LS on Management of secure backhaul for NTN Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesEricsson and Nokia objected to this LS. Huawei commented that they may raise this issue in Plenary given that the CRs were sent there for approval.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251832 LS on Towards a common definition of Zero Trust ITU-T Study Group 17 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑252225 LS reply on a common definition of Zero Trust MITRE-FFRDC LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252261  
    S3‑252261 LS reply on a common definition of Zero Trust Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252225
    S3‑251842 O-RAN ALLIANCE – 3GPP collaboration on PQC O-RAN LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑251970 Reply LS on 3GPP collaboration on PQC Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia, Ericsson: let's wait for advance of PQC work.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252256 LS to 3GPP about the external data channel content access requirements GSMA LS in discussion Yes
YesEricsson: no key issue about this in SA3. The Chair asked how 3GPP could authenticate this if this is external. NTT-Docomo, Qualcomm: response that there is nothing now in SA3. CMCC supported this.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑252257 LS from GSMA TSG IMSDCAS to 3GPP SA3 on the data channel security study and the security requirements GSMA LS in discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251839 LS on establishment of a new work item Technical Report ITU-T TR.FMSC-IMT2030 “Security technologies of fixed, mobile and satellite convergence for IMT-2030 networks” ITU-T SG17 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251840 LS on the establishment of a new work item ITU-T X.s-isac “Security guidelines for integrated sensing and communication in IMT-2020 networks and beyond” ITU-T SG17 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251841 LS on the establishment of a new work item ITU-T X.uc-zt-5g “Security threats associated with use cases for applying zero trust to IMT-2020 private network deployments” ITU-T SG17 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251837 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital Finland other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251820 LS on feedback for IMS resiliency study C4-251492 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251822 LS on AI/ML UE sided data collection R2-2503168 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251823 Reply LS on signalling feasibility of dataset and parameter sharing R2-2503169 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251830 LS on LP-WUS subgrouping progress R2-2503182 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251826 LS on AIoT device identifier length S2-2504296 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251827 Reply LS on OSAppID usage by AppToken use case S2-2504468 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251843 LS on LI requirements on IMS Data Channel s3i250185 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252258 LS on the creation of the Getting Ready for Energy-Efficient Networking Working Group in the IETF IETF LS in discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
3.2 Follow up topics from LSs S3‑251831 Reply LS to S3-251226 LS on the scope attribute of the access token standard claims Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑251671
    S3‑252255 Update proposal to S3-251831 Nokia LS out   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252260  
    S3‑252260 Reply to: LS on the scope attribute of the access token standard claims Nokia LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252255
4 Work areas                      
4.1 Maintenance (Rel-15/16/17/18/19)                      
4.1.1 Security Assurance                      
4.1.2 Service Based Architecture S3‑251834 Living document for TEI19: Token-based authorization for indirect communication scenarios when NF is selected at target PLMN Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251835 Token-based authorization for indirect communication scenarios when NF is selected at target PLMN Ericsson, Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252139 Discussion on the NF consumer PLMN ID check Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252140 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson, Nokia Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252141 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252142 Checking PLMNID of NF Service Consumer in interconnect scenario Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252143 LS on Checking PLMNID of NFc in interconnect scenario Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252144 LS on PLMN ID checks in interconnect scenarios when NFc supports multiple PLMN IDs Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252264  
    S3‑252264 LS on PLMN ID checks in interconnect scenarios when NFc supports multiple PLMN IDs Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252144
    S3‑252254 Clarification on verification of NFc for discovery in roaming scenario MITRE-FFRDC CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: the check is not mandatory in non-roaming scenario; it is strange that it is mandatory in roaming scenario. It should always be mandatory.
 		revised No S3‑252421  
    S3‑252421 Clarification on verification of NFc for discovery in roaming scenario MITRE-FFRDC,Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252254
    S3‑252237 Implementation correction of CR2040 Nokia CR   Yes
YesEricsson: don’t add other changes not related to the implementation correction.
 		revised No S3‑252265  
    S3‑252265 Implementation correction of CR2040 Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252237
4.1.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe                      
4.1.4 Mission Critical                      
4.1.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G S3‑251934 Add clause 6.3 in the Kaf derivation descriptions - R17 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251935 Add clause 6.3 in the Kaf derivation descriptions - R18Mirror ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252014 Update service disabling procedure China Mobile, ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252393  
    S3‑252393 Update service disabling procedure China Mobile, ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252014
4.1.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS                      
4.1.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services                      
4.1.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.1.9 Security Aspects of eNPN                      
4.1.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC S3‑251936 update to AKMA based mechanism ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: this should be an additional approach, but we don’t agree with removing the current approach. Ericsson:
 		not pursued No    
4.1.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems                      
4.1.12 Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning                      
4.1.13 Security Aspects of eNA.                      
4.1.14 Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G                      
4.1.15 All other maintenance topics (not listed above or below) S3‑251872 ZUC number of initialisation rounds Nokia CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: we shouldn’t have approved this in Rel-18, it should have been published once companies can actually access it.
 		revised No S3‑252266  
    S3‑252266 ZUC number of initialisation rounds Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251872
    S3‑251884 Correction to f5** description Thales, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251889 AIMLE Security Alignment Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251998 Clarification for CMP over TLS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252267  
    S3‑252267 Clarification for CMP over TLS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251998
    S3‑251999 Clarification for certificate lifecycle management Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia, Ericsson didn’t see the need for this change.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252000 Discussion paper for certificate lifecycle management Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252002 Clarification for CMP over TLS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252268  
    S3‑252268 Clarification for CMP over TLS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252002
    S3‑252101 Removal of the terminology “AS root key” Apple, NTT DOCOMO, Qualcomm Incorporated CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252115 Changing DC to Data Channel Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: just add the abbreviation DC in the abbreviations clause.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252145 New JWS profiles for CCA tokens and access tokens Ericsson CR Discussion Yes
YesEricsson commented that this CR was submitted for discussion, not for agreement.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252155 Fix issues on SEAL security framework Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson didn’t find this agreable. MCC: clauses affected must be added:5.2.4, 5.2.5
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252180 Correcting inconsistencies to clause 6.2.3 of 33.210 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252394  
    S3‑252394 Correcting inconsistencies to clause 6.2.3 of 33.210 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252180
    S3‑252183 Multiple Editorial corrections Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252184 Multiple Editorial correction Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252189 Making NF type as pre-registered parameter in CA/RA for IAK method Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252211 Issues about user consent for exposure and a proposal to address them Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
YesVivo: this causes problems in stage 3.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252212 Clarification of the intended applicability and requirements for Annex V Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252269  
    S3‑252269 Clarification of the intended applicability and requirements for Annex V Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑252212
    S3‑252220 Clarification on client credential flow – Rel-18 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: don’t update this until we finish the discussions in CAPIF phase 3.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252221 Clarification on client credential flow Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252230 Clarification on naming of purposes for user consent Nanjing vivo Software Tech. CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this CR.
 		not pursued No    
4.2 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR).                      
4.3 SCAS for Rel-18 features on existing functions.                      
4.4 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF).                      
4.5 Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms.                      
4.6 Mission critical security enhancements for release 19 S3‑251866 [33.180] Alignment of Logging Recording and Audit Airbus CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252348  
    S3‑252348 [33.180] Alignment of Logging Recording and Audit Airbus CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251866
    S3‑252008 Clarification about security for MC over IOPS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesMotorola: this is adding a feature that is not present in the specification. It should be cat-B. Add it to Rel-20 given that the new mission critical is bringing IOPS in Rel-20. Huawei: make it cat-B.and TEI19. ORANGE: no IOPS for 5G core in SA3. Huawei clarified that this CR was enough for Rel-19, but Motorola didn’t agree. This was taken offline.
 		not pursued No    
4.7 Addition of Milenage-256 algorithm                      
4.8 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols                      
4.9 Security aspects of the 5GMSG Service phase 3                      
4.10 R19 SCAS WID S3‑251821 LS to 3GPP SA3 re Adoption of TS 33.520, 33.528, 33.529, 33.530 and 33.537 as NESAS SCASes GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑252114 Reply LS on adoption of newly published 3GPP SCASes Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252325  
    S3‑252325 Reply LS on adoption of newly published 3GPP SCASes Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252114
    S3‑251844 Add a new clause in annexure to Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) threats and critical assets in 3GPP network product classes specific to SMSF MCC CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251846 Minor editorial corrections and clean-up IIT Bombay CR Approval Yes
YesMCC: Clauses affected missing on the cover page. Category should be F. Clauses shown are not complete.
 		merged No S3‑252319  
    S3‑251847 Correction of test names and clean up of 33.117 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252320  
    S3‑252320 Correction of test names and clean up of 33.117 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251847
    S3‑251848 Clean up and correction of test names in 33.216 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252321  
    S3‑252321 Clean up and correction of test names in 33.216 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251848
    S3‑251849 Addition of test names and Clean up of 33.511 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252322  
    S3‑252322 Addition of test names and Clean up of 33.511 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251849
    S3‑251850 Correction of test names and clean up of 33.513 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251851 Clean up of 33.514 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251852 Correction of test names and clean up of 33.515 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251853 Addition of test name and clean up of 33.517 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251854 Clean up of 33.523 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251855 Clean up of 33.527 and correction of test names BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251856 Clean up of 33.529 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251857 Correction of test case and clean up of 33.512 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252323  
    S3‑252323 Correction of test case and clean up of 33.512 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251857
    S3‑251858 Living Document to 33.512 AMF BSI (DE), Montsecure draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251867 Minor editorial modification IIT Bombay CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251899 Wrong test steps for IPSec testing in N2/Xn Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251924 Correction of TC on replay protection MITRE-FFRDC CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑251937 Add PCAP traces in clause 4.2.2.1 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252324  
    S3‑252116 Solving issues to TS 33.529 according to LS from GSMA NESASG Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252319  
    S3‑252319 Solving issues to TS 33.529 according to LS from GSMA NESASG Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252116
    S3‑252119 Solving the improvement point to TS 33.537 according to LS from GSMA NESASG Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252324  
    S3‑252324 Solving the improvement point to TS 33.537 according to LS from GSMA NESASG Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252119
4.11 TEI19 topics (restricted to agreed topics only) S3‑251836 Living document for TEI19: Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NCSC draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252270  
    S3‑252270 Living document for TEI19: Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NCSC draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251836
    S3‑252422 Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, NCSC CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252146 Public key distribution service support both raw key and certificate Ericsson, NCSC, KDDI, AT&T, BT, Deutsche Telekom, Huawei, Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252271  
    S3‑252271 Public key distribution service support both raw key and certificate Ericsson, NCSC, KDDI, AT&T, BT, Deutsche Telekom, Huawei, Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252229 Updates to key retrieval service Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252271  
    S3‑252147 OAuth Tokens for NF Type level access Ericsson, NCSC other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252148 WID on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, NCSC, Huawei, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, BT WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252397  
    S3‑252397 WID on Public key distribution and Issuer claim verification of the Access Token Ericsson, NCSC, Huawei, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, BT,Nokia WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252148
    S3‑252001 Discussion paper of the certificate identifier for public key distribution Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
4.12 Security aspects of NR mobility enhancement Phase 4 S3‑251824 Reply LS for Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases R3-252449 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251930 Security mechanism and procedures for inter-CU LTM in non-DC OPPO draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252272  
    S3‑251939 Update security machanism and procedures for inter-CU LTM ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252272  
    S3‑251988 Updates for the handling of mismatched UE security context handling in non-DC cases Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252272  
    S3‑251989 Updates for the NCC transmission in LTM procedure Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252272  
    S3‑251990 security handling where CU is acting as MN and SN is unchanged Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252272  
    S3‑252017 Procedure for security handling for LTM vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252272  
    S3‑252054 Security procedure for inter-CU LTM Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252272  
    S3‑252272 Security procedure for inter-CU LTM Samsung other Approval Yes
YesLiving document for LTM. This is the final version. It was agreed that the CR will not contain the Annex.
 		approved No   S3‑252054
    S3‑252071 Security Handling for inter-CU LTM Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252272  
    S3‑252104 LTM - Security procedures Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252272  
    S3‑252187 Security mechanism and procedure for inter-CU-LTM LG Electronics draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252272  
    S3‑251938 Update conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252284  
    S3‑252284 Update conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251938
    S3‑252103 LTM - Conclusions Apple other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252284  
    S3‑252188 Conclusion update for Key issue #1 LG Electronics other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252284  
    S3‑251991 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252398  
    S3‑252398 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251991
    S3‑252070 Reply LS on security handling for inter-CU LTM in non-DC cases Xiaomi EV Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252398  
    S3‑252053 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252285  
    S3‑252285 Living document on NR mobility enhancement Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252053
    S3‑252423 Security procedure for inter-CU LTM Samsung CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.13 Security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication                      
4.14 Security for MonStra                      
4.15 Security Aspects of Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 S3‑252009 Fix the figures of CP-based multi-hop U2NW link setup Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252010 Clarification and editorial for multi-hop Relay scenarios Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252273  
    S3‑252273 Clarification and editorial for multi-hop Relay scenarios Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252010
    S3‑252131 Discussion paper on security of ProSe in SNPN China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252132 Add note for security of prose in npns China Telecom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252171 Addressing the Editor’s Notes in multi-hop U2N relay discovery security Qualcomm Incorporated, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Telecom, Beijing Xiaomi, InterDigital CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251793
4.16 Security aspects of 5G NR Femto S3‑252011 Clarification to clause 4.1 Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia, ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252274  
    S3‑252274 Clarification to clause 4.1 Huawei, Hisilicon,Nokia, ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252011
4.17 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC — phase 3                      
4.18 Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) S3‑251863 Living document for Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco Systems, Huawei, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications, Google, Johns Hopkins University APL draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252275  
    S3‑252275 Living document for Automatic Certificate Management Environment (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco Systems, Huawei, US National Security Agency, Charter Communications, Google, Johns Hopkins University APL draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251863
    S3‑251901 IANA registrations Cisco Systems other Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with incluing this information in the TS. This wasn’t an issue of the procedure.This was taken offline.
 		revised No S3‑252399  
    S3‑252399 IANA registrations Cisco Systems other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251901
    S3‑251902 Acquiring an authority token Cisco Systems other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252400 Automatic certificate management (ACME) for the Service Based Architecture (SBA) Cisco CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.19 Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 3 S3‑252118 Living document for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252277  
    S3‑252277 Living document for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252118
    S3‑252424 Security aspects of 5G satellite access CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252106 Living document to TS 33.401 for adding abbreviations and definitions Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252276  
    S3‑252276 Living document to TS 33.401 for adding abbreviations and definitions Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252106
    S3‑252110 Update the Security aspects of Full EPC in each satellite China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252127 Update security aspects of Full EPC in each satellite CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252156 Removing normative phrasing by referring to SA2 text Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
YesPhilips had concerns with this. Qualcomm: currently it is a problematic wording for SA2. SA2 makes the decision that the NAS security will be there, it's an architectural decision to be taken by them. Thales supported Qualcomm. Nokia summarised the issue: Keep the NOTE --> text should be informative. Change the NOTE --> text can be normative.
 		revised No S3‑252401  
    S3‑252401 Removing normative phrasing by referring to SA2 text Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252156
    S3‑252228 pCR against living draft CR on S&F THALES draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251964 A summary report from offline calls for Rel-19 WI on 5GSAT_Ph3_SEC Nokia discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252117 Discussion on resolving EN in annex of Split MME by implementation Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252007 Resolving EN in Annex of split MME by implementation Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252278  
    S3‑252278 Resolving EN in Annex of split MME by implementation Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252007
    S3‑252080 Addressing EN in store and forward satellite operation Xiaomi Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252275  
    S3‑252120 Remove the EN about DDoS attack China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252278  
    S3‑252122 Way forward for DoS attack topic CATT discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252126 Update security aspects of Split MME architecture CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252278  
    S3‑252157 Proposal for DDoS editor’s note resolution Qualcomm Incorporated other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252278  
    S3‑251903 Security Environment, Living document for security aspects of 5G satellite access phase 3 InterDigital Finland Oy, Samsung, T-Mobile USA draftCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252278  
    S3‑252043 DoS attack remediation in S&F operation Samsung, Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab, Philips, Intel, Interdigital other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252278  
4.20 UAS security enhancements Phase 3 S3‑252055 Adding support for multiple USSs Qualcomm Incorporated, InterDigital, Ericsson, Huawei CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252314  
    S3‑252314 Adding support for multiple USSs Qualcomm Incorporated, InterDigital, Ericsson, Huawei CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252055
    S3‑251971 SA2 on UUAA during USS changeover Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252263  
    S3‑252185 LS on USS changeover procedure Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252263  
    S3‑252263 LS on USS changeover procedure Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252185
4.21 Security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services S3‑251941 resolving EN for Authentication and authorization for spatial localization services ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251940 resolving EN for Authentication and authorization for digital asset services ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252315  
    S3‑252073 Correction on the Authorization of DA services using CAPIF Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252315  
    S3‑252315 Correction on the Authorization of DA services using CAPIF Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252073
    S3‑252074 Correction on the Authentication of Digital Representation using SEAL Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252317  
    S3‑252317 Correction on the Authentication of Digital Representation using SEAL Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252074
    S3‑251942 resolving EN for Privacy protection for user information exposure ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252316  
    S3‑252316 resolving EN for Privacy protection for user information exposure ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251942
    S3‑252072 Editor’s Note Resolution for Privacy Protection Xiaomi EV Technology other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252316  
    S3‑252036 Living document on Metaverse_Sec Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252318  
    S3‑252318 Living document on Metaverse_Sec Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No   S3‑252036
    S3‑252425 Security procedures for mobile metaverse services Samsung CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.22 Security aspects of CAPIF Phase3 S3‑251870 Living CR on RO authorization Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Xiaomi, Lenovo, CATT, China Telecom, Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252402  
    S3‑252396 CR on RO authorization Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Xiaomi, Lenovo, CATT, China Telecom, Ericsson CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251972 KI#1.2 update RO authorization to address EN Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252290  
    S3‑252290 KI#1.2 update RO authorization to address EN Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251972
    S3‑251888 Updates to Living CR on RO authorization Lenovo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252290  
    S3‑251933 Updates to living Draft CR on RO authorization CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252290  
    S3‑252077 pCR against Living CR on RO management Xiaomi communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252290  
    S3‑252216 Updates to the living CR on RO authorization Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252290  
    S3‑252219 Clarification on resource owner ID in the token Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesContent is merged into 2290.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252247 RO definition Nokia, Lenovo CR   Yes
YesContent is merged in 2290.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑252250 Update to S3-251870 on RO management Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252290  
    S3‑251894 Living CR on revocation China Telecom Corporation Ltd. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252403  
    S3‑252403 Living CR on revocation China Telecom Corporation Ltd. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251894
    S3‑252426 Resource Owner authentication revocation China Telecom Corporation Ltd. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑251959 Baseline pCR against Draft CR for KI#1.2 on revocation China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252291  
    S3‑252291 Baseline pCR against Draft CR for KI#1.2 on revocation China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251959
    S3‑251931 Addition on revocation procedure CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252291  
    S3‑251945 resolving EN for Resource Owner authentication revocation ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252291  
    S3‑251973 KI#1.2 update revocation to address EN Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252291  
    S3‑252040 Resolving Editor's Note in Revocation clause Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252291  
    S3‑252076 pCR against Living CR on revocation Xiaomi communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252291  
    S3‑252218 Updates to the living CR on Revocation Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252291  
    S3‑252233 Updates to Living CR on revocation Lenovo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252291  
    S3‑252252 Update to S3-251894 on revocation Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252291  
    S3‑251845 Living CR on Finer level authorization Nokia, Huawei draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252404  
    S3‑252404 Living CR on Finer level authorization Nokia, Huawei draftCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251845
    S3‑252427 Authorization for finer level service API access Nokia, Huawei CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252248 Update to S3-251845 on Finer level of authorization Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252292  
    S3‑251974 KI#1.3 updating text for finer level authorization Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252292  
    S3‑252292 KI#1.3 updating text for finer level authorization Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251974
    S3‑252213 Updates to the living CR on finer level authorization Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252292  
    S3‑252232 Updates to Living CR on Finer level of authorization Lenovo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252292  
    S3‑251890 Living CR on Interconnection Samsung, China Telecom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252405  
    S3‑252402 Living CR on RO authorization Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Xiaomi, Lenovo, CATT, China Telecom, Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251870
    S3‑252405 Living CR on Interconnection Samsung, China Telecom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251890
    S3‑252428 Security procedures for CAPIF interconnection Samsung, China Telecom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252037 Updates to security procedure for CAPIF interconnection Samsung, Xiaomi, China Telecom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252293  
    S3‑252293 Updates to security procedure for CAPIF interconnection Samsung, Xiaomi, China Telecom, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252037
    S3‑251887 Updates to security procedure for CAPIF interconnection Lenovo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252293  
    S3‑251944 resolving EN for Method 3 TLS with OAuth Token ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252293  
    S3‑251943 pCR against draft CR on Authentication and Authorization for CAPIF RNAA interconnection ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252293  
    S3‑251960 KI#2 pCR on top of the baseline pCR- interconnect China Telecom Corporation Ltd. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252293  
    S3‑252038 Resolving EN on API invoker authentication during access token request Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252293  
    S3‑252039 pCR for authentication and authorization for RNAA in CAPIF interconnection scenario Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252293  
    S3‑252078 pCR against interconnection baseline Xiaomi communications other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252293  
    S3‑252214 Updates to the baseline document on CAPIF interconnection Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252293  
    S3‑252251 Update to S3-251890 on CAPIF-interconnection Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252293  
    S3‑251869 Living CR on Cross UE authorization Xiaomi Communications draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252406  
    S3‑252406 Living CR on Cross UE authorization Xiaomi Communications draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251869
    S3‑252429 Cross UE authorization Xiaomi Communications CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252406
    S3‑252075 pCR against Living CR on Cross UE authorization Xiaomi communications, Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252295  
    S3‑252295 pCR against Living CR on Cross UE authorization Xiaomi communications, Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252075
    S3‑252215 Updates to the living CR on Cross UE authorization Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252295  
    S3‑251868 Living CR on Nested API Ericsson, Samsung, Xiaomi, Nokia draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252407  
    S3‑252407 Living CR on Nested API Ericsson, Samsung, Xiaomi, Nokia,CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251868
    S3‑252430 CR on Nested API Ericsson, Samsung, Xiaomi, Nokia,CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252217 Updates to the living CR on Nested API Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252294  
    S3‑252294 Updates to the living CR on Nested API Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252217
    S3‑251932 Updates to living Draft CR on CAPIF nested API CATT other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252294  
    S3‑252041 pCR to update CAPIF nested API authorization procedure Samsung other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252294  
    S3‑252249 Update to S3-251848 on Nested API Nokia other   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252294  
    S3‑251883 Living CR for Onboarding API Invoker Residing in the UE Lenovo, Nokia, Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252408  
    S3‑252408 Living CR for Onboarding API Invoker Residing in the UE Lenovo, Nokia, Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251883
    S3‑252431 Onboarding API Invoker Residing in the UE Lenovo, Nokia, Ericsson CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252408
    S3‑251885 Discussion paper on Security threats with Onboarding Procedure Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251886 Onboarding API Invoker Residing in the UE Lenovo, Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252311  
    S3‑252311 Onboarding API Invoker Residing in the UE Lenovo, Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251886
4.23 Security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 S3‑251825 Reply LS on Privacy and security aspects regarding DC management by the network S2-2504207 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251816 Reply to LS on IMS support for AF authorization and IMS avatar communication S2-2502434 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑252108 Reply LS on authorization and authentication in Avatar communication Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252297  
    S3‑252297 Reply LS on authorization and authentication in Avatar communication Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252108
    S3‑251833 LS on Avatar Security Aspects S4-250715 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑251898 LS on Avatar Security Aspects Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252296  
    S3‑252296 LS on Avatar Security Aspects Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251898
    S3‑251963 LS reply on Avatar Security Aspects CATT LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252296  
    S3‑252107 Reply LS on Avatar Security Aspects Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252296  
    S3‑252197 Discussion about the LS on Avatar Security Aspects from SA4 Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252198 Reply LS on Avatar Security Aspects Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252296  
    S3‑252199 Living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.203, Signing and verification of third party user identity information in IMS Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252200 Signing and verification of third party user identity information in IMS Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC: Clauses need to be in order.
 		revised No S3‑252300  
    S3‑252300 Signing and verification of third party user identity information in IMS Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252200
    S3‑252201 Proposal for a living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.328, Security of IMS avatar communication Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
YesSamsung: not fine with the procedures.It depends on the conclusions.
 		revised No S3‑252301  
    S3‑252301 Proposal for a living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.328, Security of IMS avatar communication Ericsson draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252201
    S3‑252109 Security of Avatar Communication Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252301  
    S3‑252202 Living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.328, Security and privacy of IMS capability exposure Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252302  
    S3‑252302 Living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.328, Security and privacy of IMS capability exposure Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252202
    S3‑252411 Security and privacy of IMS capability exposure Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252113 Addressing EN for Data Channel Exposure Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252302  
    S3‑252203 Changes to the Living document for NG_RTC_SEC_Ph2: draftCR to TS 33.328, Security and privacy of IMS capability exposure Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252302  
4.24 Security aspects of Core Network Enhanced Support for AIML S3‑252056 Living document for AIML_CN_SEC China Mobile, vivo,Huawei, HiSilicon,OPPO,Ericsson,Nokia, Xiaomi,ZTE, CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252306  
    S3‑252306 Living document for AIML_CN_SEC China Mobile, vivo,Huawei, HiSilicon,OPPO,Ericsson,Nokia, Xiaomi,ZTE, CATT draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No   S3‑252056
    S3‑252432 Living document for AIML_CN_SEC China Mobile, vivo,Huawei, HiSilicon,OPPO,Ericsson,Nokia, Xiaomi,ZTE, CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252306
    S3‑251929 Update security for data collection for the LMF-based AIML positioning OPPO draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252409  
    S3‑252409 Update security for data collection for the LMF-based AIML positioning OPPO draftCR Approval Yes
YesThe Chair asked for a show of hands: Support: AT&T, Vivo, ORANGE, Lenovo, T-Mobile, CMCC, NTT-Docomo, Ericsson, BT, BSI,Deutsche Telekom, Xiaomi, OPPO,Sectra. No Support: Apple, Huawei. Apple objected to this contributiion. They gave the following technical reasons to be minuted: 1. There is no technical justification to indicate use consent is not needed for inference procedure. The current positioning procedure is not clear to be the basis of SA3's decision. 2. User consent and privacy profile are independent procedures, they cover different aspects. SA3 is lack of information and sufficient input to change the previous decison which is to appply user consent to the full ALML positioning. 3. The current document (S3-252409) brings confusion on how should SA2 decide on the privacy profiles, we need more time to do the whole study and then to provide a full picture to other groups. Therefore, it is not mature to approve it right now. The Chair declared this document as approved as working agreement. The content will go to the Living CR and converted to a CR that will go to Plenary. The CR can be challenged by Apple in Plenary.
 		approved No   S3‑251929
    S3‑252025 Clarification on X.12.2 vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252303  
    S3‑252303 Clarification on X.12.2 vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252025
    S3‑252004 Update NEF security requirement for Secure NF Instance ID Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251946 Update figures of the living document for AIML_CN_SEC ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252304  
    S3‑252304 Update figures of the living document for AIML_CN_SEC ZTE Corporation other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251946
    S3‑251962 Alignment CR Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252305  
    S3‑252305 Alignment CR Nokia other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251962
    S3‑252003 Various Editorial changes to the living CR Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252305  
    S3‑252057 Editorial changes for Living document China Mobile other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252305  
4.25 Security for PLMN hosting a NPN S3‑251984 Security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecom, ZTE CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.26 Security Aspects of Ambient IoT Services in 5G S3‑252097 AIoT TS- Authentication - General clause Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252067 AIoT Authentication Procedure for Inventory OPPO draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252279  
    S3‑252279 AIoT Authentication Procedure for Inventory OPPO draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252067
    S3‑252098 AIoT TS- Authentication procedure for Inventory Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252279  
    S3‑251950 Update the clause 5.2 Authentication procedure ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252279  
    S3‑252091 pCR to TS33.369 AIoT Device authentication procedure CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252279  
    S3‑252068 AIoT authentication procedure for Command OPPO draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252279  
    S3‑251993 Authentication procedure in AIoT service Huawei, HiSilicon, Vivo other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252279  
    S3‑252083 Authentication procedure for AIoT service Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252279  
    S3‑252164 Authentication procedures Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252279  
    S3‑251907 AIoT authentication procedure based on stored nonces KPN N.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252279  
    S3‑252170 AIoT specific key bootstrapping procedure Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252136 Protection of AIoT data in command message Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesORANGE: no requirements on the algorithms.What preconfigured algorithm is in the ADM? There are other missing issues here and a security evaluation is not possible at this point before addressing them.
 		revised No S3‑252280  
    S3‑252280 Protection of AIoT data in command message Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252136
    S3‑251951 Update the clause 5.3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252280  
    S3‑252125 PCR on Protection of information during AIoT service communication OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252280  
    S3‑252084 Protection of information during AIoT service communication Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252280  
    S3‑252092 pCR to TS33.369 AIoT Device communication security procedure CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesSony: some of the parameters listed are not needed for the procedure. There may be misalignment with other WGs. Qualcomm: not clear which keys are used.
 		merged No S3‑252280  
    S3‑252165 Security procedure on the information protection in command procedure Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252280  
    S3‑252024 communication secuirty procedure vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252280  
    S3‑251927 Content to 5.5 protection between AIOT network elements OPPO draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252281  
    S3‑251952 Update the clause 5.5 Protection between AIoT network element ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252281  
    S3‑252281 Update the clause 5.5 Protection between AIoT network element ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251952
    S3‑251994 Security protection between AIoT network elements Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252281  
    S3‑251897 Procedure for Protection of AIoT device identifier privacy Sony, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252326  
    S3‑252326 Procedure for Protection of AIoT device identifier privacy Sony, OPPO other Approval Yes
YesDiscussions on making this document as a living document. Huawei commented that the Chair should communicate to the Plenary that there has been some progress even mentioning the existence of this living document. Lenovo wanted to have the draft CR approved. Huawei: note it and indicate that these are the solutions on the table. This document is to record the solutions, the main point is to work on the TS. ORANGE preferred to have a living document. This was converted into a living document.
 		endorsed No   S3‑251897
    S3‑252208 Handling of Temporary Identity for the initial Individual Inventory Request Lenovo discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252064 Update clause 5.4  of TS 33.369 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: support should be mandatory, use is optional.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252158 Discussion on issues in temporary ID based approaches and way forward proposal Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Lenovo discussion Discussion Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: we need to look at what kind of network control we can have here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252169 Device security requirements regarding inventory with filtering information Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: portion of the AIoT device? Where is that defined?
 		merged No S3‑252328  
    S3‑252159 Protection of AIoT device identifier privacy Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesKPN, Lenovo: not happy with this solution.
 		revised No S3‑252327  
    S3‑252327 Protection of AIoT device identifier privacy Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252326 S3‑252159
    S3‑252093 pCR to TS33.369 AIoT Device privacy protection CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252327  
    S3‑252210 Network assigned Temporary Group Identity Lenovo discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252094 pCR to TS33.369 AIoT Device group privacy protection CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252151 Pseudo-CR on Privacy for group paging Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: sufficient anonimity is hard to quantify.
 		revised No S3‑252328  
    S3‑252328 Pseudo-CR on Privacy for group paging Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesNTT-Docomo didn’t agree with this approach.
 		noted No   S3‑252151
    S3‑252061 Update clause 5.1 of TS 33.369 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252410  
    S3‑252410 Update clause 5.1 of TS 33.369 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252061
    S3‑251908 AIoT baseline requirements KPN N.V. pCR Approval Yes
YesThales: this looks like content for a TR. Sony, ORANGE: improve the wording.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252329 AIoT baseline requirements KPN N.V. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑252086 Discussion on AIoT security principles CATT discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252062 Update clause 4.1 of TS 33.369 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252032 Proposal regarding AIOT device requirements. Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251914 Pseudo-CR on AIoT temporary ID requirement NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252283  
    S3‑252283 Pseudo-CR on AIoT temporary ID requirement NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
YesAdding an editor's note.
 		approved No   S3‑251914
    S3‑251926 Content to 4.2.1 requirement on the device OPPO draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252282  
    S3‑251948 Update the clause 4.2.1 Requirements on the device ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252282  
    S3‑252051 Security requirements on AIoT device Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252282  
    S3‑252082 Security requirements on the AIoT device Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252282  
    S3‑252088 pCR to TS33.369 Security requirements on the device CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252282  
    S3‑252095 AIoT TS - Security Requirements for AIoT devices Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252282  
    S3‑252168 Confidentiality and integrity protection requirements on device Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252282  
    S3‑252137 security requirement on device Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
YesORANGE: selection procedure for the algorithms? Huawei: indicated in the command.
 		revised No S3‑252282  
    S3‑252282 security requirement on device Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252137
    S3‑252138 Discussion paper on credential storage in Ambinet IoT device Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
YesThales: we discussed this in Maastricht. We proposed to send an LS to RAN to know what constraints in AioT we have for these features. We can work on the characteristcis of the UICC now. ORANGE: Integrated UICCs exist in the market created specifically for AiOT applications, although they are not standardised. We need that AiOT vendors choose what electrical parameters they need, which is more than it is analysed here. This is advancing a solution. We need to figure out the storage requirements and then we can discuss the solutions, as we did in 5G. Vodafone: different requirements for UICC vendors, so it is up to implementation to decide whether it is UICC or another thing? ORANGE replied that 3GPP wasn't in that stage yet. ORANGE: several bodies define different parts of the UICC. The electrical interfaces are just one part.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251918 AIoT - Subscription Credentials Storage and Processing Orange Belgium pCR Approval Yes
YesDeutsche Telekom supported this contribution. Interdigital commented that this clause applied to UE, so the reference was not correct. Vodafone didn’t find it applicable either.
 		revised No S3‑252262  
    S3‑252150 AIoT Device Secure Storage Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252262  
    S3‑252227 Credential storage requirement for device Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252262  
    S3‑252262 Credential storage requirement for device Orange Belgium, THALES, Deutsche Telekom, IDEMIA, T-Mobile US, AT&T, Ericsson,Huawei other Approval Yes
YesORANGE: secure storage in this context is not clear. Deutsche Telekom: operators being liable from the security point of view, we need to know how it is implemented. The note should go away. Thales: tamper resistant means logical and physical attacks are contained. Secure storage means only logical attacks are contained. IDEMIA: this looks like a SA1 requirement, not in our scope. T-Mobile: tamper resistance is not defined in 3GPP. Huawei (Georg): you need something out of this meeting to communicate SA where you are.
 		approved No   S3‑252227
    S3‑251916 LS on power and energy consumption budget for security features in AioT ORANGE LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252335  
    S3‑252335 LS on power and energy consumption budget for security features in AioT ORANGE LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251916
    S3‑252167 Storage and processing of credentials requirements on the device Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252262  
    S3‑252149 Pseudo-CR on AIoT device security requirements related to cryptographic algorithms Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252308  
    S3‑252308 Pseudo-CR on AIoT device security requirements related to cryptographic algorithms Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252149
    S3‑252031 Proposal regarding AIOTF requirements. Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252309  
    S3‑251949 Update the clause 4.2.2 Requirements on the AIOTF ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252309  
    S3‑252023 Security requirements on the AIOTF vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252309  
    S3‑252309 Security requirements on the AIOTF vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252023
    S3‑251922 Content to 4.2.2 requirement on the AIOTF OPPO draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252309  
    S3‑252052 Security requirements on AIoTF Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252309  
    S3‑252089 pCR to TS33.369 Security requirements on the AIOTF CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252309  
    S3‑252081 Security requirements on the AIoTF Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252309  
    S3‑252096 AIoT TS - Security Requirements for AIOTF Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252309  
    S3‑252063 Update clause 4.2.2  of TS 33.369 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252309  
    S3‑252033 Proposal regarding ADM requirements. Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: premature.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252090 pCR to TS33.369 Security requirements on the ADM CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252166 Addressing EN in the requirements on the ADM Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252412  
    S3‑252412 Addressing EN in the requirements on the ADM Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252166
    S3‑251947 Add a clause about requirement on AIoT Reader ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252310  
    S3‑252310 Add a clause about requirement on AIoT Reader ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251947
    S3‑251917 AIoT - Subscription Credentials Storage and Processing Orange Belgium pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑252287 Draft TS 33.369 OPPO draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.27 Protection of XRM Media related information S3‑252182 Comparison of AES-CCM, AES-GCM, and AES-GCM-SST for protection of XRM Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251865 Selection of authentication mode for MRI in forwarded mode Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252307  
    S3‑252121 Addressing the EN on the concrete modes of AES for protecting XRM Media related information when using connect-UDP forwarded mode Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252307  
    S3‑252181 Providing security details for forwarding mode in XRM Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252307  
    S3‑252307 Providing security details for forwarding mode in XRM Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252181
    S3‑252124 Addressing the EN on the length of the protected MRI content Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252307  
    S3‑252123 Addressing the ENs of Key derivation, Nonce and counter values, and VCID uniqueness in the forwarding mode. Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252307  
5 Rel-19 Studies                      
5.1 Study on enablers for Zero Trust Security                      
5.2 Study on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services phase 2 S3‑251913 Avatar Identification and mapping within BAR Vodafone Ireland Plc pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: this solution comes very late. I guess that this is related with the LS from CT4. The Chair agreed that there was no time to discuss new solutions and it was better to bring this back in Rel-20.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252044 Resolving EN in KI#2 conclusion Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252298  
    S3‑252045 Resolving EN related to impersonation Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252298  
    S3‑252111 Update conclusion of KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252298  
    S3‑252298 Update conclusion of KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252111
    S3‑252193 Conclusion update for KI#2: Security of IMS based Avatar Communication Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei, Nokia,Samsung: this doesn’t address the problem.
 		merged No S3‑252298  
    S3‑252112 Addressing EN in conclusion of KI#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252299  
    S3‑252194 Conclusion update for KI#3: Security and privacy aspects of IMS DC capability exposure Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252299  
    S3‑252299 Conclusion update for KI#3: Security and privacy aspects of IMS DC capability exposure Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252194
    S3‑252195 TR cleanup Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252196 Presentation of Specification/Report to TSG: TR 33.790 Study on the security support for the next generation real time communication services phase 2, Version 1.3.0 Ericsson TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252286 Draft TR 33.790 Ericsson draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.3 Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN                      
5.4 Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA                      
5.5 Study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256-bits                      
5.6 Study on mitigations against bidding down attacks                      
5.7 Study on security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2                      
5.8 Study on security for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication                      
5.9 Study on security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G S3‑251895 KI#3, New Merged Solution Sony, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251954 new solution to KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑252018 New Sol KI#3, Combine UE-generated temp ID with network-assigned temp ID vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑252234 Pseudo-CR Solution for KI#3: Paging with AIOT group ID NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252380  
    S3‑252380 Pseudo-CR Solution for KI#3: Paging with AIOT group ID NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252234
    S3‑251896 KI#3, Update Conclusions Sony, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252019 Conclusion update on KI#3 for AIoT privacy vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252381  
    S3‑252381 Conclusion update on KI#3 for AIoT privacy vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252019
    S3‑251921 Update AIOT conclusion#3 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252381  
    S3‑252099 AIoT TR - Clean up on the KI#3 Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252160 Update on KI#3 conclusion Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252381  
    S3‑251915 Update of KI#3 NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252390  
    S3‑252390 Update of KI#3 NTT DOCOMO INC. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251915
    S3‑251919 update AIOT KI#3 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252382 update AIOT KI#3 OPPO pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑252100 AIoT TR - Clean up on the KI#4 Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252128 Update AIoT conclusion #4 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252383  
    S3‑252383 Update AIoT conclusion #4 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252128
    S3‑252161 Proposed addition to general conclusion related to credential storage Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252384  
    S3‑252384 Proposed addition to general conclusion related to credential storage Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252161
    S3‑252205 General conclusion: network layer THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252385  
    S3‑252385 General conclusion: network layer THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252205
    S3‑252207 General conclusion: security capabilities THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252209 General conclusion: authentication THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252222 Conclusion KI#5: credentials THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252386  
    S3‑252386 Conclusion KI#5: credentials THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252222
    S3‑252223 Conclusion KI#5: authentication THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252224 Conclusion KI#5: solutions THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252387  
    S3‑252387 Conclusion KI#5: solutions THALES, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252224
    S3‑252030 Refinement of EN in KI#5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252388  
    S3‑252388 Refinement of EN in KI#5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252030
    S3‑251995 removing the editor's note in solution 4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251953 update sol#6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251923 pCR to TR33.713 Remove EN in solution#9 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252363  
    S3‑252363 pCR to TR33.713 Remove EN in solution#9 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251923
    S3‑252020 Remove EN for Sol#10 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252364  
    S3‑252364 Remove EN for Sol#10 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252020
    S3‑252162 Updates on solution 15 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252085 Remove Editor’s Notes in solution 16 of TR 33.713 Xiaomi Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252129 Update Solution #17 in TR 33.713 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252365  
    S3‑252365 Update Solution #17 in TR 33.713 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252413 S3‑252129
    S3‑252413 Update Solution #17 in TR 33.713 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252365
    S3‑252046 pCR on resolving EN on solution #22 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252047 pCR on evaluation update on solution #22 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252366  
    S3‑252366 pCR on evaluation update on solution #22 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252047
    S3‑252048 pCR on converting EN into NOTE in solution #22 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251920 Update AIOT sol#24 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252367  
    S3‑252367 Update AIOT sol#24 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251920
    S3‑251955 resolving ENs in sol#25 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252368  
    S3‑252368 resolving ENs in sol#25 in TR 33.713 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251955
    S3‑252152 Addressing EN in AIoT Solution #29 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251925 pCR to TR33.713 Remove EN in solution#30 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252369  
    S3‑252369 pCR to TR33.713 Remove EN in solution#30 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251925
    S3‑252130 Remove ENs in Solution #32 and #33 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252370  
    S3‑252370 Remove ENs in Solution #32 and #33 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252130
    S3‑252163 Addressing ENs in solution 34 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252371  
    S3‑252371 Addressing ENs in solution 34 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252163
    S3‑252029 Resolution of EN in solution 35 concerning device constrains Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251906 Pseudo-CR on Update AIOT sol#37 Xidian University pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252372  
    S3‑252372 Pseudo-CR on Update AIOT sol#37 Xidian University pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251906
    S3‑252049 pCR on resolving EN on solution #38 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252373  
    S3‑252373 pCR on resolving EN on solution #38 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252049
    S3‑252050 pCR on evaluation update on solution #38 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252374  
    S3‑252374 pCR on evaluation update on solution #38 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252050
    S3‑252231 Resolution of ENs in solution #39 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252375  
    S3‑252375 Resolution of ENs in solution #39 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252231
    S3‑252021 Remove EN for Sol#40 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252376  
    S3‑252376 Remove EN for Sol#40 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252021
    S3‑252022 Remove EN for Sol#41 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252377  
    S3‑252377 Remove EN for Sol#41 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252022
    S3‑251909 Resolving ENs in Solution #42 KPN N.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252414  
    S3‑252414 Resolving ENs in Solution #42 KPN N.V. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251909
    S3‑252153 Addressing EN in AIoT Solution #43 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252059 Resolve EN of sequence number of figure in Sol#45 in TR 33.713 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252058 Evaluation for Sol#45 in TR 33.713 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252379  
    S3‑252379 Evaluation for Sol#45 in TR 33.713 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252058
    S3‑252060 Resolve ENs  in Sol#45 of TR 33.713 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252378  
    S3‑252378 Resolve ENs  in Sol#45 of TR 33.713 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252060
    S3‑252226 Resolution of ENs in solution #39 THALES pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑252288 Draft TR 33.713 OPPO draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252389 Cover sheet TR 33.713 OPPO TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252392 LS on security parameter in paging message Huawei LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.10 Study on security aspects of Usage of User Identities                      
5.11 Study on UAS security enhancement                      
5.12 Study on security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3                      
5.13 Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements                      
5.14 Study on EdgeComputing                      
5.15 Study on security aspects for Multi-Access                      
5.16 Study on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving                      
5.17 Study on security aspects of 5G NR Femto                      
5.18 Study on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services                      
5.19 Study on security aspects of CAPIF Phase 3 S3‑252239 Miscellaneous updates in introductionary part Xiaomi, Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252312  
    S3‑252312 Miscellaneous updates in introductionary part Xiaomi, Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252239
    S3‑252240 Missing clarifications and typos correction Xiaomi, Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252241 Implementation of original figures Xiaomi, Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252313  
    S3‑252313 Implementation of original figures Xiaomi, Nokia CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252241
    S3‑252242 Solution 11 editorial updates Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252243 Solution 13 figure update and FFS resolution Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252244 Solution 19 figure update and formatting issues Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252245 Solution 20 figure update and formatting issues Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑252246 Solution 21 restructuring and formatting Nokia CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
5.20 Study on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory S3‑251880 Editorial Modifications Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251881 Terms and Definitions Nokia, NIST pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252330  
    S3‑252330 Terms and Definitions Nokia, NIST pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251881
    S3‑251975 missing references and abbreviations Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252331  
    S3‑252331 missing references and abbreviations Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251975
    S3‑252177 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Abbreviations Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252331  
    S3‑252175 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Clause Restructuring Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252332  
    S3‑252332 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Clause Restructuring Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252175
    S3‑251860 Cryptographic Inventory Table update for MIKEY-SAKKE NIST pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: change hash to hash functions.
 		revised No S3‑252333  
    S3‑252333 Cryptographic Inventory Table update for MIKEY-SAKKE NIST pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251860
    S3‑251874 Tables Content for ECIES Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252334  
    S3‑252334 Tables Content for ECIES Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251874
    S3‑251875 Tables Content for PKI Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
YesAlex (SA3-LI Chair): add LI stuff in a separate Annex. MCC: the study may have to be revised if LI is not considered in the objectives.
 		revised No S3‑252336  
    S3‑252336 Tables Content for PKI Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251875
    S3‑251876 Tables Content for OCSP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252337  
    S3‑252337 Tables Content for OCSP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251876
    S3‑251877 Tables Content for COSE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252415  
    S3‑252415 Tables Content for COSE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251877
    S3‑251878 Tables Content for KDF Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252334  
    S3‑251879 Tables Content for EAP-TLS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252338  
    S3‑252338 Tables Content for EAP-TLS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251879
    S3‑251978 Table content for EAP-TTLS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252416  
    S3‑252416 Table content for EAP-TTLS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251978
    S3‑251979 Table content for OAuth 2.0 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252339  
    S3‑252339 Table content for OAuth 2.0 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251979
    S3‑251980 Table content for IKEv2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252340  
    S3‑252340 Table content for IKEv2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251980
    S3‑251981 Table content for PDCP Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251982 Table content for NAS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252042 pCR on Tables Content for IPsec ESP protocol Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252341  
    S3‑252341 pCR on Tables Content for IPsec ESP protocol Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252042
    S3‑252206 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Table for EAP-AKA’/EAP-5G Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252342  
    S3‑252342 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Table for EAP-AKA’/EAP-5G Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252206
    S3‑252172 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Table for DTLS Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252343  
    S3‑252343 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Table for DTLS Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252172
    S3‑252173 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Table for TLS Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252344  
    S3‑252344 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Table for TLS Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252173
    S3‑252174 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Table for JWE and JWS Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252345  
    S3‑252345 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory Table for JWE and JWS Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252174
    S3‑251976 descriptioin of EAP-TTLS Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251977 description of OAuth 2.0 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252346  
    S3‑252346 description of OAuth 2.0 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑251977
    S3‑252176 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory EAP-TLS Details Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑252178 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory OCSP Details Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252347  
    S3‑252347 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory OCSP Details Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑252178
    S3‑252179 Pseudo-CR on 3GPP Cryptographic Inventory QUIC Details Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑251882 Coverpage for TR Cryptographic Inventory Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell TS or TR cover Approval Yes
YesEricsson: one meeting cycle to take a look at it before sending it for approval. ORANGE: send it at least for information. Ericsson wanted to have more time to review the document and they didn’t consider that the email approval wouldn’t give them enough time to review the document.
 		revised No S3‑252417  
    S3‑252417 Coverpage for TR Cryptographic Inventory Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell TS or TR cover Approval Yes
YesIt was decided to send it for approval. MCC commented that this would have to go through a review by EditHelp.
 		approved No   S3‑251882
    S3‑252289 Draft TR 33.938 Huawei draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
6 New Study/Work item & Rel-20 planning                      
6.1 Rel-20 Planning S3‑251912 Summary of NWM discussion on R-20 planning NTT DOCOMO INC. discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252026 Discussion Paper on 6G NWM process and questions vivo discussion Endorsement Yes
YesORANGE doubted whether the NWM was the right tool, something more interactive would be better. Nokia: NWM is good to capture what every company wants, so we can better focus on the discussions. Intel: define the process, what we are trying to achieve in this meeting. Prioritization of 5GA topics will happen in the next SA plenary in June depending on SA2 decision. Huawei: what kind of submissions do we expect? Ericsson: NWM can help for input colllection, and then we can have conference calls or other more interactive discussions. Let's endorse now the questions applicable for the next NWM. The Chair commented that there should be a clear plan for 6G, but an agreement needed to be made for the 5GA split with 6G. NTT-Docomo: next meeting will be surely 80% 5GA topics because there are not so many 6G topics now. The Chair commented that the number of topics would be to be limited. Ericsson: time allocation will depend on the number of documents. Nokia: we need to agree on the timeline for calculating the tiem units. The Chair suggested to go through the 5GA WIDs proposals and decide on a priority list for 5GA. SA3 independent topics will also be taken.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252102 Discussion paper on SA3 R20 work plan Apple discussion   Yes
YesORANGE didn’t agree on starting from security areas defined back in 5G. The Chair commented that there were only 5 topics proposed in the contribution. ORANGE: organize the areas in the SID firstly. Apple: this proposal is like a framework and the proposals from companies can be categorised in different areas.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252186 LGE View on 6G study LG Electronics discussion Discussion Yes
YesApple: AI based framework? LG: some features will rely on AI. This is a generic term.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252204 Revised WID on security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson WID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252349  
    S3‑252349 Revised WID on security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson WID revised Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252204
    S3‑252253 6G security SID discussion NTT DOCOMO INC. discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
6.2 5G-Advance SID/WIDs S3‑251829 New WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 20 Motorola Solutions Germany WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252353  
    S3‑252353 New WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 20 Motorola Solutions Germany WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251829
    S3‑251838 Security related Events Handling Vodafone, AT&T, BT, Charter Communications, Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, IIT Bombay, KDDI, Nokia, NTT DOCOMO, Orange, Telecom Italia, Telefonica, T-Mobile USA, Verizon WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑251131
    S3‑251859 Discussion on threats for CNF products and CNF SCAS Test Cases BSI (DE), Montsecure discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252191  
    S3‑251864 Study on Transition of 3GPP Cryptographic Algorithms to PQC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252360  
    S3‑251873 Discussion on Transition to PQC Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251891 New SID on AIMLE Service Security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252395  
    S3‑252395 New SID on AIMLE Service Security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No   S3‑251891
    S3‑251900 Draft Technical Specification; Security related Events Handling Pairpoint other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251904 Discussion on Security Aspects for IMS resiliency study KDDI, Boost Mobile Network discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251905 New SID on Security Aspects for IMS resiliency KDDI, AT&T, Boost Mobile Network, Deutsche Telekom, SK Telecom, SoftBank, TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, Rakuten Mobile, Verizon, vivo, Vodafone SID new Approval Yes
YesThe Chair commented that signal congestion seemed to be more in scope of RAN4 and that specific work for SA3 was not clear. The time budget for this needed to be clarified. ORANGE: avoid doing something before knowing what SA2 will do about it. I'm in favour of this but let's wait for their feedback. This is related to the LS in tdoc 1820, which they will reply to during this week. AT&T supported this and considered a high priority for 5GA based on network performance issues. ORANGE: the objectives need to reduce the scope. Mark "no" on the UICC apps impact.
 		revised No S3‑252352  
    S3‑252352 New SID on Security Aspects for IMS resiliency KDDI, AT&T, Boost Mobile Network, Deutsche Telekom, SK Telecom, SoftBank, TOYOTA MOTOR CORPORATION, Rakuten Mobile, Verizon, vivo, Vodafone SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No   S3‑251905
    S3‑251910 New WID on PRINS Refinement CableLabs WID new Agreement Yes
YesTelecom Italia, Vodafone: we will support once we have a clear agreement in GSMA.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251911 New SID on Security Plane for collection and transport of security data OTD_US SID new Approval Yes
YesHuawei: not clear what gaps we have currently have in SBA/SBIs. Is the objective to have a new interface? Vodafone: better to wait for the next generation to study how the new framework for this sensitive secure data would work for all interfaces. Charter:delivering secure data in a secure manner to secure locations makes sense.
 		revised No S3‑252361  
    S3‑252361 New SID on Security Plane for collection and transport of security data OTD_US SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑251911
    S3‑251928 New Study on Indirect Communication Security MITRE-FFRDC SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251956 New SID on Security Aspect for NR Femto Phase 2 ZTE Corporation SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252419  
    S3‑252419 New SID on Security Aspect for NR Femto Phase 2 ZTE Corporation SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No   S3‑251956
    S3‑251957 discussion paper on the MAC layer security ZTE Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
YesZTE: normative work would go for 6G, not 5GA. NTT-Docomo: this should be discussed as an independent 6G Study Item.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251958 New SID on MAC layer security ZTE Corporation SID new Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: there is a RAN dependency that needs to be taken into account. Intel: protocol stack may look different in 6G.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251965 New SID on Security aspects of WAB nodes for NR Nokia, ZTE SID new   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252418  
    S3‑252418 New SID on Security aspects of WAB nodes for NR Nokia, ZTE SID new - Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No   S3‑251965
    S3‑251967 Discussion on Security Aspect for NR Femto Phase 2 ZTE Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251983 Discussion paper on PQC migration Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251985 Discussion paper on security for PLMN hosting a NPN phase 2 China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251986 New SID on security for PLMN hosting a NPN phase 2 China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE, China Unicom, China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252420  
    S3‑252420 New SID on security for PLMN hosting a NPN phase 2 China Telecommunications Corp.,ZTE, China Unicom, China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No   S3‑251986
    S3‑251987 New SID on Security Aspects for Evolved Residential Gateways Accessing to 5G Core Network China Unicom, Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
YesNokia: this requires a change in architecture.This was brought into SA2 and it was not agreed in there. Huawei: This study is needed because there are SA1 security requirements. AT&T: premature, we would be working on something that could be changed by SA2. China Unicom: our proposal in SA2 wasn’t agreed because it was said that work should be started in SA3. Thales: wait for SA2 work. Let's not work on an architecture that will be changed later.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251996 new SID on security aspects for QUIC or TLS Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
YesNCSC: we don’t see the work in WT2. CableLabs: SA2 introduced this feature in Rel-18. Roaming is not being considered here. Nokia supported this SID. NTT-Docomo: why the two alternatives? CableLabs: we can live without WT1 but we want WT2.
 		revised No S3‑252354  
    S3‑252354 new SID on security aspects for QUIC or TLS Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No   S3‑251996
    S3‑251997 Discussion paper on security aspects for QUIC or TLS Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252005 New SID on security aspect of Sensing Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑252355  
    S3‑252006 Discussion on security aspects of Sensing Huawei, HiSilicon, Xiaomi discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252012 New WID on SCAS Huawei, HiSilicon,Huawei, HiSilicon, BSI (DE), China Telecom, China Mobile, Keysight Technologies UK Ltd., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Unicom, CATT, CAICT WID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: keep the WID open more time in Rel-20. Rel-20 will go all the way to 2027. Huawei: we prefer to leave more space to other topics. NESAS relies on this and they cannot be waiting for so long. Nokia: we closed too early our last SCAS WID and we couldn’t put new things in, let's learn from this. Huawei: we agreed to close the WID, it wasn’t forced. We can always change the deadlines.
 		revised No S3‑252350  
    S3‑252350 New WID on SCAS Huawei, HiSilicon,Huawei, HiSilicon, BSI (DE), China Telecom, China Mobile, Keysight Technologies UK Ltd., Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, China Unicom, CATT, CAICT WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252012
    S3‑252027 New SID on Security of AIML_Ph2 vivo, CMCC SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: consider user consent here.
 		revised No S3‑252356  
    S3‑252356 New SID on Security of AIML_Ph2 vivo, CMCC SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No   S3‑252027
    S3‑252065 New SID on enhanced security management service about security policy provisioning China Mobile, ZTE, CATT, Johns Hopkins University APL, CAICT, CableLabs, Nokia, China Unicom, China Telecom SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252357  
    S3‑252357 New SID on enhanced security management service about security policy provisioning China Mobile, ZTE, CATT, Johns Hopkins University APL, CAICT, CableLabs, Nokia, China Unicom, China Telecom SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑252065
    S3‑252069 New SID on security aspects of Integrated Sensing and Communication Xiaomi, China Telecom, China Mobile, ZTE, Lenovo, CableLabs SID new Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: the rescoping of the whole project should be done at Plenary level. Huawei: this should go for June Plenary, otherwise it will be too late.
 		revised No S3‑252355  
    S3‑252355 New SID on security aspects of Integrated Sensing and Communication Xiaomi, China Telecom, China Mobile, ZTE, Lenovo, CableLabs SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No   S3‑252069
    S3‑252079 Discussion on R20 5G-A CAPIF security enhencements Xiaomi communications discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑252087 New SID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Container-based Products Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, BSI SID new Agreement Yes
YesHuawei was concerned with the timeline. It should be consistent with the Rel-20 SCAS.
 		revised No S3‑252358  
    S3‑252358 New SID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Container-based Products Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, BSI SID new Agreement Yes
YesIt was clarified that the TU estimate (Normative) had to be zero in this and other SIDs endorsed.
 		endorsed No   S3‑252087
    S3‑252133 New SID on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 4 CATT, China Unicom SID new Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: time units are not realistic. NTT-Docomo: More details are needed for WT2 to limit the scope. It was commented by Novamint that Store and forward is implemented already in satellites. One issue is to scale it so as not to use always the same satellite for the UE. Ericsson didn’t agree with WT1: it was premature and speculative.
 		revised No S3‑252359  
    S3‑252359 New SID on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 4 CATT, China Unicom SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No   S3‑252133
    S3‑252134 New WID on Security Aspects of Proximity based Services in NPNs China Telecom Corporation Ltd. WID new   Yes
YesORANGE: discussion is needed to know what will be informative and will be normative.
 		noted No    
    S3‑252154 Study on Post-Quantum Cryptography in 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols Ericsson SID new Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm, ORANGE supported this SID. Cisco: reuse the inventory from the study. There were two overlapping studies on PQC (2154 and 864) and the Chair asked the companies to agree on a merge.
 		merged No S3‑252360  
    S3‑252191 Discussion on threats for CNF products and CNF SCAS Test Cases BSI (DE) discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑251859
    S3‑252235 Discussion on work split SA3 and SA6 on user consent topic Nokia discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252236 DP related to FS_5GSAT_Ph4_SEC concerning NAS counters handling in multi-satellite S&F operation Sateliot, Novamint discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252238 Mini WID for Roaming and interconnect authorization aspects in indirect communication Nokia WID new   Yes
YesMCC commented that the two CRs associated should have the DUMMY WID code on the cover pages to link them to this mini WID. The cover pages need to be changed. The table on 2.2 is also wrong.
 		revised No S3‑252351  
    S3‑252351 Mini WID for Roaming and interconnect authorization aspects in indirect communication Nokia WID new - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑252238
    S3‑252360 Study on Preparing for Transition to Post Quantum Cryptography in 3GPP Nokia, Ericsson SID new Agreement Yes
YesDiscussions on whether this is applicable for 5GA or 6G. The Chair proposed to have that decision at the end of the study considering the SID as a diagnostics.
 		agreed No    
6.3 6G SID/WIDs S3‑251861 New SID on Security Infrastructure Support for 6G Core Network Johns Hopkins University APL discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251862 New Study on Security Infrastructure Support for 6G Core Network Johns Hopkins University APL SID new Endorsement Yes
YesEricsson: objectives are too broad. GSMA: we are not keen on this in 3GPP. We are concerned that this will produce market fragmentation and it shouldn’t be done in 3GPP. This could interfere with the carrier roaming agreement process.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251892 New SID on Secure UE Identification and Network Access Lenovo, Motorola Mobility SID new Approval Yes
YesORANGE: concerned if we started having a single identifier for the UE. Nokia: it should be part of a 6G set. We did some part of WT2 a few years back. Apple: it should be part of the 6G study.Huawei agreed with this. Ericsson: WT2 is too open ended.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251893 Discussion on Secure UE Identification and Network Access Lenovo, Motorola Mobility SID new Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑251961 New SID on inter-PLMN and intra-PLMN security in 6G China Mobile SID new   Yes
YesAigned with John Hopkins proposal.
 		noted No    
    S3‑251966 Discussion paper on security of RRC initial access Nokia discussion   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑252013 6G Security SID process and scope discussion Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252015 New SID on supporting AEAD algorithms KDDI Corporation SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑252066  
    S3‑252016 Discussion paper on supporting AEAD algorithms KDDI Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252028 Discussion Paper on Potential 6G Independent Security Areas vivo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252066 New SID on supporting AEAD algorithms KDDI Corporation SID new Approval Yes
YesQualcomm:separate the MAC, focus on the AEAD implementation.
 		revised No S3‑252362 S3‑252015
    S3‑252362 New SID on supporting AEAD algorithms KDDI Corporation SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No   S3‑252066
    S3‑252135 Security Consideration for Integrated Sensing and Communication OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252190 Security consideration for MAC CE and lower layers OPPO discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑252192 Study on Security Aspects of Lower Layers OPPO SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
7 CVD and research                      
8 Any Other Business S3‑251814 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑251871 Handling of ETSI-SAGE documents Rapporteur of the 256-Algo WI, MCC discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑252391 SA3 initial plan for 6G study WG Chair (Samsung) other Discussion Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No