**3GPP TSG-SA5 Meeting #144-e *S5-224213***

**e-meeting, 27 June - 1 July 2022**

**Source: Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell**

**Title: pCR TR 28.830 Add clause Background**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 6.7.7.2 - FS\_FSEV\_WoP#2**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***The group is requested to discuss and approve the pCR below***

# 2 References

None.

# 3 Rationale

This pCR adds background information on the current state of the art as to alarm management and oulines the study scope.

# 4 Detailed proposal

The following changes are proposed for TR 28.830 [1].

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| **Begin of modifications** |

# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

[1] TR 28.830 “Fault Supervision Evolution”

[2] ITU-T Recommendation X.731 (1992) | ISO/IEC 10164-2 : 1992, Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Systems Management – State management function.

[3] TS 28.625 State Management Data Definitions

[4] ITU-T Recommendation X.733 (1992) | ISO/IEC 10164-4 : 1992, Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Systems Management – Alarm reporting function.

[5] TS 28.532 Generic management srvices

[6] ITU-T Recommendation X.739 (1993), Information technology – Open Systems Interconnection – Systems Management – Metric Objects and attributes.

[7] ITU-T Recommendation E.880 (1993), Telephone network and ISDN Quality of service, network management and traffic engineering. Field data collection and evaluation on the performance of equipment, networks and services

[8] TS 28.552 5G performance measurements

[9] TS 28.554 5G end to end Key Performance Indicators (KPI)

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| **Next modification** |

### 4 Background

Since several decades the telecommunication management network offers a multitude of possibilities to inform about specific states of the system [2, 3], errors and faults by using alarms [4, 5], and about the performance related indications like counters, KPIm gauges, aggregations, statistics, and thresholds, e.g [6 - 9].

Already the first paragraph on the model of alarm reporting [4, clause 7] describes the importance to use thresholds and to detect trends in order to provide warnings to the managers. This means the managed systems are encouraged to use means to detect abnormal conditions as early as possible in order to inform the management system by standardized means about the situation.

[4, clause 7] also highlights the importance to correlate multiple events. While the correlation is an internal function of management systems, the interfaces are supporting the correlation by specific fields to associate multiple events to each other. This also is true for the corresponding 3GPP specifications, which to a large extent are based on the specifications by ITU-T. The correlation in existing specification mainly concern alarm notifications, other type of data e.g. normal performance measurements, KPIs, historical data etc could also be considered for more comprehensive analysis.

The combination of alarm reporting and state managent is able to reduce the number of alarm messaged very efficiently if certain best practices are followed: If alarms are used to indicate that a resource requires maintenance, and states are used to inform about the well-being of a resource.

For example, in case a backhaul link towards a gNB has a problem, many logical and physical interfaces of the gNB, many protocol layers, and all cells will experience certain abnormal conditions. If all these resources are raising alarms, then the management system will choke in alarms -although none of these alarms requires any maintenance, since the problem is caused by the link, while the base station as such has no problem at all.

If in such situation the resources would consider the rule to issue alarms only in case they require maintenance, then the base station would not send any alarm, while all affected resources would set their operational state to “disabled” and the availability state to “dependency”. In this case the human operator would be aware that the base station does not work as expected and would be also aware of the fact that the base station as such does not require any maintenance. However such operation may be risky because the base station may not be aware the nature of the real issue by itself, and filtering of alarms may hide potential faults in the resources. In this case, a higher level management is helpful to correlate alarms and other related data to identify the anomaly issue.

It is an unfortunate fact that -since ever- the management systems as well as the human operators are choking in alarms, although a combination of alarm reporting and state management would offer a technical means to reduce the number of alarms. As a matter of fact that the decision whether an abnormal behavior is caused by another entity (or subsystem) requires sophisticated correlation functions across the subsystems of e.g. a base station. In contrast, for any subsystem it is much easier to simply throw an alarm upon any detection of an abnormal situation than to implement complex correlation functions. A higher layer management could take responsible for the further handling, e.g. identification of the anomaly event and try to recover it and indicate the issues and status to the MnS consumer.

An additional problem is that TS 28.532, clause 11.2, which defines the Fault Supervision MnS, does not provide the necessary definitions and descriptions required to understand the current state of art as to alarm management. This is because much of the material specified and available for the IRP Framework was not moved to SBMA.

For that reason, this study investigates which definitions and descriptions need to be added to TS 28.532, clause 11.2 to make this clause understandable without need to consult other specifications. Besides descriptions for alarm management, the role and importance of state management shall be highlichted as well

It is also in scope of this study to look at possibilities to clarify in TS 28.532 that internal behaviour of functions is not subject to standardization. For example, the algorithm used to accomplish alarm correlation is outside the scope of standards. This implies that deliberations on if AI/ML is used for correlation or not is also outside the scope of standards. It is a vendor decision to use AI/ML or not.

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| **End of modifications** |