27- 30 November, 2001

Sophia Antipolis, France

CHANGE REQUEST				
*	35.201 CR			
For HELP on us	sing this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the X symbols.			
Proposed change a	affects: ### (U)SIM ME/UE Radio Access Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network X Core Network			
Title: 第	Correct the maximum input message length for f8 and f9			
Source: #	Siemens Atea			
Work item code: ₩	Security Date: # 29 November 2001			
	F Use one of the following categories: F (correction) A (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) B (addition of feature), C (functional modification of feature) D (editorial modification) D (editorial modification) C (functional modification) R98 (Release 1998) R99 (Release 1999) R99 (Release 1999) Ret4 (Release 4) REL-5 (Release 5)			
Reason for change	# The f8 maximum input message length is too low. There is no message size limitation for f9.			
Summary of chang	e: # Bring TS 35.201 inline with TS 33.105			
Consequences if not approved:	# Inconsistent specifications and risk of f8/f9 implementations that take 5114 bit as an upper limit.			
Clauses affected:	% 2.1; 2.3; 3; 4			
Other specs affected:	# Other core specifications # Test specifications O&M Specifications			
Other comments:	ж			

2 Introductory information

2.1 Introduction

Within the security architecture of the 3GPP system there are two standardised algorithms: A confidentiality algorithm f8, and an integrity algorithm f9. These algorithms are fully specified here. Each of these algorithms is based on the **KASUMI** algorithm that is specified in a companion document[4]. **KASUMI** is a block cipher that produces a 64-bit output from a 64-bit input under the control of a 128-bit key.

The confidentiality algorithm f8 is a stream cipher that is used to encrypt/decrypt blocks of data under a confidentiality key **CK**. The block of data may be between 1 and 200005114 bits long. The algorithm uses **KASUMI** in a form of output-feedback mode as a keystream generator.

The integrity algorithm f9 computes a 32-bit MAC (Message Authentication Code) of a given input message using an integrity key **IK.** The approach adopted uses **KASUMI** in a form of CBC-MAC mode.

***** Next Modification *****

2.3 List of Variables

A, B are 64-bit registers that are used within the f8 and f9 functions to hold intermediate

values.

BEARER a 5-bit input to the *f8* function.

BLKCNT a 64-bit counter used in the **f8** function.

BLOCKS an integer variable indicating the number of successive applications of **KASUMI** that

need to be performed, for both the f8 and f9 functions.

CK a 128-bit confidentiality key.

COUNT a 32-bit time variant input to both the *f*8 and *f*9 functions.

DIRECTION a 1-bit input to both the f8 and f9 functions indicating the direction of transmission

(uplink or downlink).

FRESH a 32-bit random input to the **f9** function.

IBS the input bit stream to the f8 function.

IK a 128-bit integrity key.

KM a 128-bit constant that is used to modify a key. This is used in both the f8 and f9

functions. (It takes a different value in each function).

KS[i] is the ith bit of keystream produced by the keystream generator.

KSB_i is the ith block of keystream produced by the keystream generator. Each block of

keystream comprises 64 bits.

LENGTH is an input to the *f*8 and *f*9 functions. It specifies the number of bits in the input

bitstream (1-5114).

MAC-I is the 32-bit message authentication code (MAC) produced by the integrity function

f9.

MESSAGE is the input bitstream of LENGTH bits that is to be processed by the f9 function.

OBS the output bit streams from the *f8* function.

PS is the input padded string processed by the *f9* function.

REGISTER is a 64-bit value that is used within the f8 function.

3 Confidentiality algorithm f8

3.1 Introduction

The confidentiality algorithm f8 is a stream cipher that encrypts/decrypts blocks of data between 1 and $\underline{200005114}$ bits in length.

3.2 Inputs and Outputs

The inputs to the algorithm are given in table 1, the output in table 2:

Table 1: f8 inputs

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
COUNT	32	Frame dependent input
		COUNT[0]COUNT[31]
BEARER	5	Bearer identity BEARER[0]BEARER[4]
DIRECTION	1	Direction of transmission DIRECTION[0]
CK	128	Confidentiality key CK[0]CK[127]
LENGTH	X18 ¹	The number of bits to be encrypted/decrypted
		(1- <u>20000</u> 5114)
IBS	1- <u>20000</u> 5114	Input bit stream IBS[0]IBS[LENGTH-1]

Table 2: f8 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
OBS	1- <u>20000</u> 5114	Output bit stream OBS[0]OBS[LENGTH-1]

3.3 Components and Architecture

(See fig 1 Annex A)

1 X18 is a parameter whose value is yet to be defined. In the sample C-code we treat LENGTH as a 32-bit integer.

The keystream generator is based on the block cipher **KASUMI** that is specified in [4]. **KASUMI** is used in a form of output-feedback mode and generates the output keystream in multiples of 64-bits.

The feedback data is modified by static data held in a 64-bit register **A**, and an (incrementing) 64-bit counter **BLKCNT**.

3.4 Initialisation

In this section we define how the keystream generator is initialised with the key variables before the generation of keystream bits.

We set the 64-bit register A to COUNT \parallel BEARER \parallel DIRECTION \parallel 0...0

(left justified with the right most 26 bits set to 0).

i.e. A = COUNT[0]...COUNT[31] BEARER[0]...BEARER[4] DIRECTION[0] 0...0

We set counter **BLKCNT** to zero.

We set KSB_0 to zero.

One operation of **KASUMI** is then applied to the register **A**, using a modified version of the confidentiality key.

 $A = KASUMI[A]_{CK \oplus KM}$

3.5 Keystream Generation

Once the keystream generator has been initialised in the manner defined in section 3.4, it is ready to be used to generate keystream bits. The plaintext/ciphertext to be encrypted/decrypted consists of **LENGTH** bits (1-200005114) whilst the keystream generator produces keystream bits in multiples of 64 bits. Between 0 and 63 of the least significant bits are discarded from the last block depending on the total number of bits required by **LENGTH**.

So let **BLOCKS** be equal to (**LENGTH**/64) rounded up to the nearest integer. (For instance, if **LENGTH** = 128 then **BLOCKS** = 2; if **LENGTH** = 129 then **BLOCKS** = 3.)

To generate each keystream block (**KSB**) we perform the following operation:

For each integer **n** with $1 \le \mathbf{n} \le \mathbf{BLOCKS}$ we define:

 $KSB_n = KASUMI[A \oplus BLKCNT \oplus KSB_{n-1}]_{CK}$

where BLKCNT = n-1

The individual bits of the keystream are extracted from KSB_1 to KSB_{BLOCKS} in turn, most significant bit first, by applying the operation:

For $\mathbf{n} = 1$ to **BLOCKS**, and for each integer i with $0 \le i \le 63$ we define:

 $KS[((n-1)*64)+i] = KSB_n[i]$

3.6 Encryption/Decryption

Encryption/decryption operations are identical and are performed by the exclusive-OR of the input data (IBS) with the generated keystream (KS).

For each integer i with $0 \le i \le LENGTH-1$ we define:

 $OBS[i] = IBS[i] \oplus KS[i]$

4 Integrity algorithm f9

4.1 Introduction

The integrity algorithm f9 computes a Message Authentication Code (MAC) on an input message under an integrity key **IK**. The message may be between 1 and 5114 bits in length. There is no limitation on the input message length of the f9 algorithm.

For ease of implementation the algorithm is based on the same block cipher (**KASUMI**) as is used by the confidentiality algorithm *f8*.

4.2 Inputs and Outputs

The inputs to the algorithm are given in table 3, the output in table 4:

Table 3: f9 inputs

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
COUNT-I	32	Frame dependent input COUNT-I[0]COUNT-I[31]
FRESH	32	Random number FRESH[0]FRESH[31]
DIRECTION	1	Direction of transmission DIRECTION[0]
IK	128	Integrity key IK[0]IK[127]
LENGTH	X19 ²	The number of bits to be 'MAC'd
MESSAGE	LENGTH	Input bit stream

Table 4: f9 output

Parameter	Size (bits)	Comment
MAC-I	32	Message authentication code MAC-I[0]MAC-I[31]

4.3 Components and Architecture

(See fig 2 Annex A)

The integrity function is based on the block cipher **KASUMI** that is specified in [4]. **KASUMI** is used in a chained mode to generate a 64-bit digest of the message input. Finally the leftmost 32-bits of the digest are taken as the output value **MAC-I**.

² X19 is a parameter whose value is yet to be defined. In the sample C-code we treat LENGTH as a 32-bit integer.

4.4 Initialisation

In this section we define how the integrity function is initialised with the key variables before the calculation commences.

We set the working variables: A = 0 and B = 0

We concatenate **COUNT**, **FRESH**, **MESSAGE** and **DIRECTION**. We then append a single '1' bit, followed by between 0 and 63 '0' bits so that the total length of the resulting string **PS** (padded string) is an integral multiple of 64 bits, i.e.:

Where 0* indicates between 0 and 63 '0' bits.

4.5 Calculation

We split the padded string **PS** into 64-bit blocks PS_i where:

$$PS = PS_0 || PS_1 || PS_2 || || PS_{BLOCKS-1}$$

We perform the following operations for each integer **n** with $0 \le \mathbf{n} \le \mathbf{BLOCKS-1}$:

$$\begin{array}{ll} A &= KASUMI[\ A \oplus PS_n\]_{IK} \\ B &= B \oplus A \end{array}$$

Finally we perform one more application of KASUMI using a modified form of the integrity key IK.

$$B = KASUMI[B]_{IK \oplus KM}$$

The 32-bit **MAC-I** comprises the left-most 32 bits of the result.

i.e. For each integer i with $0 \le i \le 31$ we define:

$$MAC-I[i] = B[i].$$

Bits B[32]...B[63] are discarded.