Tdoc List

2023-11-10 15:02

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑234400 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234402 Process for SA3#113 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234403 Detail agenda planning for SA3#113 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234985  
    S3‑234985 Detail agenda planning for SA3#113 SA WG3 Chair other - No
No
 		reserved No   S3‑234403
2 Meeting Reports S3‑234401 Report from SA3#112 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234986  
    S3‑234986 Report from SA3#112 MCC report - Yes
YesIncorporating comments from Qualcomm.
 		approved No   S3‑234401
    S3‑234405 Report to SA3 from SA SA WG3 Chair report   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups S3‑234978 SAGE-23-02 Resynchronisation protection f5** for MILENAGE-128 and Tuak. ETSI SAGE LS in   Yes
YesIt was queried whether this should be incorporated in a new specification or be part of an existing specification. This needed some moe time to be analised.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234471 Reply LS on security for selective SCG activation R2-2309268 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234979 Reply LS on security for selective SCG activation R2-2311618 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234437 Reply LS on Security Solution for Selective SCG Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235051  
    S3‑235051 Reply LS on Security Solution for Selective SCG Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234437
    S3‑234647 Draft LS reply on security for selective SCG activation Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234649 Update on the procedures of Security of Selective SCG Activation Huawei, HiSilicon other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234441 LS reply to S3-233786 and S3-234296 on the introduction of the domain ""ipxnetwork.org"" and clarifications of the Outsourced SEPP and Hosted SEPP deployment scenarios GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234693 LS reply on SCPAC security OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234442 N32-f Lifetime and Reconnection GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234443 N32-f N32-c correlation GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234444 LS on Educational paper on N32 connection establishment for bilateral TLS GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234861 DP on Educational Paper N32 connection establishment for bilateral TLS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235112  
    S3‑235112 DP on Educational Paper N32 connection establishment for bilateral TLS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑234861
    S3‑234862 LS-Reply on N32 connection establishment for bilateral TLS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235068  
    S3‑235068 LS-Reply on N32 connection establishment for bilateral TLS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234862
    S3‑234445 LS on Handling of SOR counter and the UE parameter update counter if stored in NVM C1-232696 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234656 Draft reply LS on NVM issue Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235053  
    S3‑234658 Agenda and notes of conference call on the storage of UPU and SoR counters in NVM Huawei, HiSilicon other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234670 Reply LS on Handling of SOR counter and the UE parameter update counter if stored in NVM Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235053  
    S3‑235053 Reply LS on Handling of SOR counter and the UE parameter update counter if stored in NVM Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234670
    S3‑234682 Handling of SoR counter and UE parameter update counter in NVM THALES discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234837 Discussion paper on handling of SOR and UPU counter if stored in NVM Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234446 Reply LS on UPU enhancement C1-235532 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234447 Reply LS on Mitigation of Downgrade attacks C1-236517 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234878 LS reply for Reply LS on Mitigation of Downgrade attacks Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
YesEricsson: legacy equipment turned off so the network no longer offers 2G/3G service, it’s actually better this way.
 		revised No S3‑234991  
    S3‑234906 [Draft] Reply LS on supporting resource owner-aware northbound API access Xiaomi communications LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235003  
    S3‑234991 LS reply for Reply LS on Mitigation of Downgrade attacks Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234878
    S3‑234448 LS on providing a new 5G-GUTI in the REGISTRATION REJECT message to the UE C1-236521 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑235071 Reply to: LS on providing a new 5G-GUTI in the REGISTRATION REJECT message to the UE Nokia LS out approval No
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234483 LS on providing a new 5G-GUTI in the REGISTRATION REJECT message to the UE S2-2311800 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234535 Reply LS on providing a new 5G-GUTI in the REGISTRATION REJECT message to the UE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234453 LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay C1-234362 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234520 Reply LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay InterDigital Finland Oy LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235098  
    S3‑234712 Draft Reply LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235098  
    S3‑234729 LS reply on LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235098  
    S3‑234904 Reply LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: there are other proposals on the table. This solution opens up to attacks and is not efficient at all.
 		revised No S3‑235098  
    S3‑235098 Reply LS on Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234904
    S3‑234454 LS on security for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay discovery C1-237900 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234692 LS reply on security for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay discovery OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234992  
    S3‑234992 LS reply on security for 5G ProSe UE-to-network relay discovery OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234692
    S3‑234905 Reply LS on Security for 5G ProSe UE-to-Network Relay Discovery Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑234992  
    S3‑234455 LS on key and security materials used for Ranging_SL C1-237928 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234760 LS reply on key and security materials used for Ranging_SL OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235075  
    S3‑234883 [Draft] Reply LS on key and security materials used for Ranging_SL Xiaomi Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235075  
    S3‑235075 [Draft] Reply LS on key and security materials used for Ranging_SL Xiaomi Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234883
    S3‑234456 LS on supporting resource owner-aware northbound API access C3-234640 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234613 LS-reply to CT3 on SNAAPPY Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235003  
    S3‑235003 LS-reply to CT3 on SNAAPPY Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234613
    S3‑234457 LS on AKMA service restrictions in Rel-17 C3-232563 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234988 Reply to: LS on AKMA service restrictions in Rel-17 Nokia LS out approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234531 LS reply on AKMA service restrictions in Rel-17 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234748 [draft] LS on Draft Reply LS on AKMA service restrictions China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234840 Reply LS on AKMA service restrictions in Rel-17 NDRE, NTAC, PIDS, Security Service LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234458 IETF HTTP RFCs obsoleted by RFCs 9110, 9111 and 9113 C4-233513 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234659 HTTP RFC obsoleted by IETF RFC 9110 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesIt was commented that there may be remaining specifications that are impacted by this. Companies were requested to check it out for the next meeting cycle. It was asked if it was appropriate to replace the reference like this instead of voiding, but Nokia replied that this is the way CT4 had done it.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234660 HTTP RFC obsoleted by IETF RFC 9113 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234661 HTTP RFCs obsoleted by IETF RFC 9110 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234662 HTTP RFC obsoleted by IETF RFC 9113 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234459 Reply LS on Authorization of NF service consumers for data access via DCCF C4-233596 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234792 Discussion on the authentication result removal operation Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234462 LS on Authentication Result Removal C4-224418 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234793 Reply LS on Authentication Result Removal Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235099  
    S3‑235099 Reply LS on Authentication Result Removal Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234793
    S3‑234463 LS on Removal of the uavAuthenticated IE from Create SM Context Request C4-230790 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234937 Response LS to C4-230790 Lenovo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234478 Reply LS on Clarification on Removal of the Indicator of UUAA result from AMF S2-2309697 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234610 reply to CT4 on removal of uavAuthenticated IE Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234745 [draft] Reply LS for C4-230790 on Removal of the uavAuthenticated IE from Create SM Context Request_LS China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234468 LS on a Framework for Network Slices in Networks Built from IETF Technologies Submission IETF LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234469 LS on user consent for SON/MDT for NB-IoT UEs R2-2309030 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234851 LS reply for LS on user consent for SON/MDT for NB-IoT UEs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235004  
    S3‑235004 LS reply for LS on user consent for SON/MDT for NB-IoT UEs Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234851
    S3‑234473 LS on Reporting of Relay UE C-RNTI and NCGI R2- 2306693 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234836 Draft_LS reply for R2- 2306693 on Reporting of Relay UE C-RNTI and NCGI Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235005  
    S3‑234646 Draft LS reply on Reporting of Relay UE C-RNTI and NCGI Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235005  
    S3‑235005 Draft LS reply on Reporting of Relay UE C-RNTI and NCGI Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234646
    S3‑234683 LS reply on Reporting of Relay UE C-RNTI and NCGI OPPO LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235005  
    S3‑234903 Reply LS on Reporting of Relay UE C-RNTI and NCGI Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235005  
    S3‑234476 LS on Roaming Hub Requirements S1-232654 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234500 Reply LS on Roaming Hubs SP-231203 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234866 LS on PRINS security profiling Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
YesHuawei preferred to prepare a CR for the next meetng.
 		revised No S3‑235067  
    S3‑235067 LS on PRINS security profiling Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234866
    S3‑234461 LS on modifications for PRINS middle box C4-234666 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234477 DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) S2-2306210 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234780 [Draft] Reply LS on DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234948 Reply LS on DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
YesHuawei,Samsung and Qualcommsupported this approach.
 		revised No S3‑235073  
    S3‑235073 Reply LS on DNS over TLS (DoT) and DNS over HTTPS (DoH) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234948
    S3‑234479 Clarification related to reliable location S2-2309698 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234547 Reply LS on Clarification related to reliable location Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia commented that there were new solutions proposed in SA2 for Rel-17. They proposed to just to refer to what is written currently in the SA3 specificaitons. OPPO: we don’t agree with any UE-based solution.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234628 Reply LS on Clarification related to reliable location Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234480 Reply LS on LS on UE Ranging/SL Positioning privacy profile S2-2309830 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234778 [Draft] Reply LS on Clarification related to reliable location Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234813 3 - Reply LS on UE Ranging SL Positioning privacy profile Philips International B.V. LS out Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234481 Reply LS on Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning S2-2310025 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234636 Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235078  
    S3‑234812 3 - Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging Sidelink Positioning Philips International B.V. LS out Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235078  
    S3‑234894 [Draft] Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning Xiaomi Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235078  
    S3‑235078 Reply LS on security aspects for Ranging/Sidelink Positioning Xiaomi Technology LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234894
    S3‑234485 Reply LS on NSWO support in SNPN using CH AAA server S2-2311815 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234486 LS on MSISDN exposure to trusted AF S2-2311893 LS in   Yes
YesIt was decided to wait for GSMA's reply before acting on this.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234771 Reply LS on MSISDN exposure to trusted AF Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234783 [Draft] Reply LS on LS on MSISDN exposure to trusted AF Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234488 Non-Support of Ciphering Algorithm GEA2 GCF LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234962 Prohibiting GEA1 and GEA2 in devices (Response to LS in S3-234488) VODAFONE discussion Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234975  
    S3‑234963 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234993  
    S3‑234993 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234963
    S3‑234964 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns VODAFONE CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234994  
    S3‑234994 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns VODAFONE CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234964
    S3‑234965 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234995  
    S3‑234995 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234965
    S3‑234966 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234996  
    S3‑234996 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234966
    S3‑234967 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234997  
    S3‑234997 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234967
    S3‑234969 Prohibition of GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234998  
    S3‑234998 Prohibition of GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234969
    S3‑234970 Prohibition of GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234999  
    S3‑234999 Prohibition of GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234970
    S3‑234971 Prohibition of GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235000  
    S3‑235000 Prohibition of GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234971
    S3‑234972 Prohibition of GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235001  
    S3‑235001 Prohibition of GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234972
    S3‑234974 Prohibition of GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235002 S3‑234968
    S3‑234975 Prohibiting GEA1 and GEA2 in devices (Response to LS in S3-234488) VODAFONE discussion Agreement Yes
YesGSMA: it is sensible to do this, but we can't force manufacturers to implement specific versions of the specifications. Maybe this can be tied to handset testing work done in GSMA instead. Ericsson: 21st December 2023 too early? Qualcomm: by the time these CRs are implemented we already have passed this date. Apple: we don’t mention dates MCC agreed that there was no need to put any dates. The prohibition would apply as the specifications were published. GSMA: consequences if not approved need to be better justified on the cover pages. MCC commented that Rel-6 and Rel-7 were closed and making CRs for these releases was against 3GPP Working procedures. MCC also commented that the use of the word "prohibited" was more appropriate for regulators but not for standards. Wording such as "shall not be supported" would have been more appropriate. Since the word "prohibited" had been in the spec since very early releases MCC conceded to leave it as it is. It was decided to agree on the CRs but MCC warned that SA would have to decide on the Rel-6 and Rel-7 issue.
 		noted No   S3‑234962
    S3‑235002 Prohibition of GEA2 due to security concerns Vodafone CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234974
    S3‑234489 LS on LI for AKMA in roaming s3i230421 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234987 Reply to: LS on LI for AKMA in roaming Nokia LS out approval No
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234749 Rely LS on LI for AKMA in roaming China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234846 Response LS on LI for AKMA in roaming NDRE, NTAC, PIDS, Security Service LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234493 Security for AI ML management capabilities S5-234776 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234849 LS reply for Security for AI ML management capabilities Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235101  
    S3‑235101 LS reply for Security for AI ML management capabilities Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234849
    S3‑234495 LS on developing a security solution for PINAPP architecture S6-233112 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234564 DRAFT LS Reply on developing a security solution for PINAPP architecture InterDigital Communications LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235074  
    S3‑235074 LS Reply on developing a security solution for PINAPP architecture InterDigital Communications LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234564
    S3‑234565 Discussion Paper on PINAPP Security Approach InterDigital Communications discussion Endorsement Yes
YesHuawei: TLS is enough. Mike (T-Mobile): CT groups don’t know what to do, that is the issue here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234496 LS to SA, SA3 and SA5 on potential collaboration between 3GPP SA3/SA5 and ETSI SAI ISG ETSI ISG SAI LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234751 Reply LS on potential collaboration between 3GPP SA3/SA5 and ETSI SAI ISG China Mobile LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235007  
    S3‑234506 DRAFT Reply LS on potential collaboration between 3GPP SA3 and ETSI InterDigital Communications LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235007  
    S3‑235007 Reply LS on potential collaboration between 3GPP SA3 and ETSI InterDigital Communications LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234506
    S3‑234497 LS on the proposal for a new work item: Guidelines for increasing security of the AKA protocols in IMT-2020 and beyond ITU-T LS in   Yes
YesGSMA: we need to respond before next ITU-SG17's meeting, otherwise it will be too late as they impact on GSMA and 3GPP's work (modified AKA protocol and countries implementing it causing a possible market fragmentation).
 		replied to No    
    S3‑235006 Reply to: LS on the proposal for a new work item: Guidelines for increasing security of the AKA protocols in IMT-2020 and beyond Huawei LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234498 LS on work progress on X.1818 (ex. X.5Gsec-ctrl) “Security controls for operation and maintenance of IMT-2020/5G network systems” ITU-T LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234499 LSOut Reply to 3GPP Reply LS on Authenticated Vulnerability Testing ETSI ISG NFV LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑235008 Reply to: LSOut Reply to 3GPP Reply LS on Authenticated Vulnerability Testing Nokia LS out approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234507 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital Communications other Information Yes
Yes1. TCG – Highlights Publication of new or revised deliverables (incremental changes from the status reported at SA3#112) • TCG Storage Component Class Registry v1.0 – public review September 2023 • TCG Registry of Reserved TPM 2.0 Handles & Localities v1.2 – public review September 2023 • TCG Storage Opal Family Feature Set: Datastore Tables v1.01 – public review August 2023 • TCG DICE Concise Evidence Binding for SPDM v 1.0 – public review August 2023 • TCG DICE Attestation Architecture v1.1 – public review August 2023 • TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile v1.06 – public review July 2023 • TCG Mobile Reference Architecture v2.0 – publication approved by TC July 2023 • TCG CPU to TPM Bus Protection for Passive Attacks v1.0 – public review July 2023 • TCG Storage App Note: Encrypting Drives with Key Per I/O SSC – public review July 2023 2. Meetings • TCG Members Meeting Hybrid F2F (Tokyo, Japan) – 27-29 February 2024 • TCG Members Meeting Hybrid F2F (TBD Location) – June 2024 • MP WG meets every Monday at 10-11 ET • TMS WG meets every Monday and Friday at 12-13 ET CyRes WG meets every Wednesday at 11-12:30 ET
 		noted No    
    S3‑234467 LS to 3GPP re Monitoring of Encrypted 5GS Signalling Traffic GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234875 Reply LS on Monitoring of Encrypted 5GS Signalling Traffic Ericsson LS out   Yes
YesNokia: not an interoperability topic for 3GPP. It’s between the operator and hhoever is providing the product.
 		revised No S3‑235009  
    S3‑235009 Reply LS on Monitoring of Encrypted 5GS Signalling Traffic Ericsson LS out - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234875
    S3‑234475 LS on QMC support in RRC_IDLE and RRC_INACTIVE R3-234745 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234472 Reply LS on QMC support in RRC_IDLE and RRC_INACTIVE R2-2311409 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234852 LS reply for LS on QMC support in RRC_IDLE and RRC_INACTIVE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235102  
    S3‑235102 LS reply for LS on QMC support in RRC_IDLE and RRC_INACTIVE Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234852
    S3‑234482 Reply LS on procedures for UE discovery for Ranging_SL S2-2311767 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑234716 Draft Reply LS on procedures for UE discovery for Ranging_SL Qualcomm Incorporated LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235075  
    S3‑234490 Reply LS on Security Context Transfer between MBSF and MBSTF S4-231485 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234440 N32 Race conditions and recovery GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234980 Reply LS on N32 Race conditions and recovery C4-234663 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234449 LS on procedures for UE discovery for Ranging_SL C1-236527 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234450 LS on LPP message and supplementary service event report over a user plane connection between UE and LMF C1-236562 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234451 LS on Trigger for secure user plane establishment via user plane C1-237891 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234452 LS on 5G ProSe UE-to-UE relay discovery with security aspects C1-237897 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234470 Reply LS to SA2 on Sidelink positioning procedure R2-2309119 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234474 Reply LS on DTLS for SCTP next steps and request for input R3-234497 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234484 LS on the progress of 5WWC_Ph2 normative work S2-2311801 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234491 Reply to LS on 3GPP work on energy efficiency S5-235778 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234492 Reply LS on user consent of Non-public Network S5-236928 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234494 LS reply on Support of multiple UEs in Northbound APIs S6-233104 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234487 Reply LS on ProSe Secondary Authentication S2-2307743 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234976 LS to include Source and Destination Interface Type for Indirect DL Data Forwarding Tunnel related N4 requests s3i230618 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234977 LS on NAS Cause Value - Unspecified s3i230621 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234460 Reply LS on N32 Race conditions and recovery C4-234663 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234940 Discussion on UUAA Determination Lenovo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234968 Prohibition of GEA1 and GEA2 due to security concerns VODAFONE CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234974  
    S3‑234989 Elaborated LS reply to S3-234350 on Roaming Hub requirements as applicable to the Modified PRINS solution GSMA LS in discussion Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234990 Elaborated LS reply to S3-234350 on IPX Service Hub requirements as applicable to the Modified PRINS solution GSMA LS in discussion Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
4 Work areas                      
4.1 Maintenance (Rel-15/16/17/18)                      
4.1.1 Security Assurance S3‑234407 To replace RRC connection reconfiguration by RRC reconfiguration ISSDU CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234408  
    S3‑234408 To replace RRC connection reconfiguration by RRC reconfiguration ISSDU CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes   S3‑234407
    S3‑234409 To replace RRC connection reconfiguration by RRC reconfiguration ISSDU CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234410 To replace RRC connection reconfiguration by RRC reconfiguration ISSDU CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234411 Clarification on SCAS Modal Text T-Mobile USA Inc., Deutsche Telekom, ZTE Corporation, BSI, Nokia, Ericson, Huawei, Telus, MITRE Corporation CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234412 Clarification on SCAS Definitions and abbreviations T-Mobile USA Inc.T-Mobile US, Deutsche Telekom, ZTE Corporation, BSI, Nokia, Ericson, Huawei, Telus, MITRE Corporation CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235108  
    S3‑235108 Clarification on SCAS Definitions and abbreviations T-Mobile USA Inc.T-Mobile US, Deutsche Telekom, ZTE Corporation, BSI, Nokia, Ericson, Huawei, Telus, MITRE Corporation CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234412
    S3‑234413 To replace RRC connection reconfiguration by RRC reconfiguration ISSDU CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234982  
    S3‑234982 To replace RRC connection reconfiguration by RRC reconfiguration ISSDU CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234413
    S3‑234414 To replace RRC connection reconfiguration by RRC reconfiguration ISSDU CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234983  
    S3‑234983 To replace RRC connection reconfiguration by RRC reconfiguration ISSDU CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234414
    S3‑234415 To replace RRC connection reconfiguration by RRC reconfiguration ISSDU CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234984  
    S3‑234984 To replace RRC connection reconfiguration by RRC reconfiguration ISSDU CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234415
    S3‑234423 Clarification of Test Cases in TS 33.117 Deutsche Telekom AG, T-Mobile US, Telecom Italia Mobile, Telus,China Mobile,Ericsson, Huawei, Nokia, ZTE, BSI (Germany), MITRE Corporation discussion Decision Yes
YesEricsson clarified that this showed the changes in TS 33.117 that needed to be brought in future meetings. GSMA asked to endorse this document and ask formally SA3 companies to resolve these issues by bringing CRs for the next meeting cycle if possible. The Chair suggested to find volunteers to make that the job was done in time.
 		endorsed No    
    S3‑234435 Basic Editorial Updates to TS 33.117 ZTE Corporation, Deutsche Telekom, T-Mobile USA, BSI, Huawei, Nokia, Ericsson, Telus, MITRE Corporation CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: in the threat references it is not mentioned what threat we are talking about, we are just putting the whole document TR 33.926.The clause should be added as well. About the requirement reference, it should be added some reference instead of something like "industry best practice". GSMA: accept these changes, but we need to be more precise or we will get issues with the labs.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234436 Inconsistent use of terms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR   Yes
YesNokia commented that these changes came from the NESAS group. MCC commented that this needed to be converted into a CR.
 		approved No    
    S3‑235049 Inconsistent use of terms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Deutsche Telekom, T-mobile, ZTE, Ericsson, BSI, Huawei, TELUS, MITRE Corporation CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234438 Specification mismatch is leading to inconsistent certification result Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234439 Disclaimer for Indirect Communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235050  
    S3‑235050 Disclaimer for Indirect Communication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR - Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234439
    S3‑234738 Clarification EMS interface China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234739 Correction for VNF package and VNF image integrity of clause 4.2.3.3.5.2 China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234842 Correction of protocol in Expected format of evidence BSI (DE) CR Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234950  
    S3‑234844 Added missing Test Name and Expected format of evidence BSI (DE) CR Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234952  
    S3‑234845 Correction of IE and protocol BSI (DE) CR   No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234951  
    S3‑234847 Added UDM threat reference for use of an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE) CR Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234953  
    S3‑234848 Added UDM SCAS test cases for checking an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE) CR Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234954  
    S3‑234929 Add UDM SCAS test case for checking the authentication verification of a synchronization failure message BSI (DE) CR Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234955  
    S3‑234930 Add UDM threat reference for missing verification of synchronization failure messages. BSI (DE) CR Agreement No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234956  
    S3‑234950 Correction of protocol in Expected format of evidence BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234842
    S3‑234951 Correction of IE and protocol BSI (DE) CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234845
    S3‑234952 Added missing Test Name and Expected format of evidence BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234844
    S3‑234953 Added UDM threat reference for use of an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234847
    S3‑234954 Added UDM SCAS test cases for checking an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235043 S3‑234848
    S3‑235043 Added UDM SCAS test cases for checking an invalid and uncompressed point in ECIES protection scheme for SUCI decryption BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234954
    S3‑234955 Add UDM SCAS test case for checking the authentication verification of a synchronization failure message BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑234929
    S3‑234956 Add UDM threat reference for missing verification of synchronization failure messages. BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑234930
4.1.2 Service Based Architecture S3‑234718 Use "visited PLMN" in the roaming description Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234719 Use "visited PLMN" in the roaming description Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234720 Validation of the parameters in the access token request in hierarchial NRF deployment Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234721 Validation of the parameters in the access token request in roaming scenarios Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234722 Validation of the parameters in the access token request in interconnect scenarios Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234723 Use "visited PLMN" in the roaming description Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234917 Correcting the UUID example in SBA certificates Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234918 Non-critical X.509 subjectAltName and unique DN following RFC 5280 Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234919 Correcting the UUID example in SBA certificates Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234921 Non-critical X.509 subjectAltName and unique DN following RFC 5280 Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234922 Correcting the UUID example in SBA certificates Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234924 Non-critical X.509 subjectAltName and unique DN following RFC 5280 Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234928 Correcting the UUID example in SBA certificates Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234931 Correcting the UUID example in SBA certificates Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234935 Correcting the UUID example in SBA certificates Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234943 Non-critical X.509 subjectAltName and unique DN following RFC 5280 Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234947 Non-critical X.509 subjectAltName and unique DN following RFC 5280 Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.1.3 Security Aspects of Proximity based services in 5GS ProSe S3‑234511 Key identification for decryption of protected IEs for UE-to-Network Relay Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234521 Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs in DCR for U2N relay Interdigital CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234522 Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs in DCR for U2N relay Interdigital CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234728 Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234732 Retrieving keys for decryption of protected IEs for U2N relay Ericsson, Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234698 CR to TS33.503 Clarification on the use of 5GPKMF service operations Release 17 CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235054  
    S3‑235054 CR to TS33.503 Clarification on the use of 5GPKMF service operations Release 17 CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234698
    S3‑234699 CR to TS33.503 Clarification on the use of 5GPKMF service operations Release 18 (mirror) CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235055  
    S3‑235055 CR to TS33.503 Clarification on the use of 5GPKMF service operations Release 18 (mirror) CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234699
    S3‑234509 Security of 5G ProSe PC5 Communication – clarification Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson, Qualcomm: the new sentence is not needed.
 		revised No S3‑235066  
    S3‑235066 Security of 5G ProSe PC5 Communication – clarification Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234509
    S3‑234700 CR to TS33.503 Correction U2U Relay Communication CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235010  
    S3‑235010 CR to TS33.503 Correction U2U Relay Communication CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234700
    S3‑234841 Incorrect clause reference OPPO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235010  
    S3‑234897 Clarification on UE-to-UE Relay coverage status in the U2U discovery model B procedure Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t agree with the last sentence added.Ericsson agreed with this.
 		merged No S3‑235010  
    S3‑234641 Clairification and editorial changes to clause 6.6.3.3 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesInterdigital: reference is wrong.
 		merged No S3‑235010  
    S3‑234731 Corrections Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234512 4.1.3 - Clause 6.1.3.3 - Clarification DDS Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235056  
    S3‑235056 4.1.3 - Clause 6.1.3.3 - Clarification DDS Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234512
    S3‑234727 CR to TS33.503 Clarification on the process of protecting U2U relay discovery message CATT CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: not inline with what we have specified in SA2 and SA3.
 		merged No S3‑235056  
    S3‑234896 Clarification on protection on the direct discovery set in the U2U discovery Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234642 Clarification about key derivation in CP procedures and edtiorial changes R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234643 Clarification about key derivation in CP procedures and edtiorial changes R18 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234710 Rel17 ProSe: Updates on U2N relay security over control plane Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234839 Hop-by-hop security policy OPPO CR Agreement Yes
YesIt was clarified that this was for layer 3. Qualcomm didn’t agree with adding this note.Ericsson felt also sceptic about this and didn’t agree.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234856 4.1.3 - Clause 6.1.3.3 - Clarification UE-to-UE Relay discovery key provisioning Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: this is not correct. Qualcomm didn’t support this either.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234942 Rel18 ProSe: Updates on U2N relay security over control plane Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234714
    S3‑234688 Update clause 6.1.1, 6.6.1, 6.6.3.3 and 6.6.4.1 OPPO, Xidian CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235011  
    S3‑234711 Rel18 ProSe – Adding security for U2U Relay communication with integrated discovery Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235011 Update clause 6.1.1, 6.6.1, 6.6.3.3 and 6.6.4.1 OPPO, Xidian CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234688
    S3‑234843 UE-to-UE Relay Communication with integrated discovery Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑234730
    S3‑234895 Add the general clause for UE-to-UE Relay Communication Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235011  
    S3‑234923 Update discovery key response of U2N discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑234855
    S3‑235012 Update discovery key response of U2N discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234709 Rel17 ProSe - Updates on U2N relay discovery key request procedure Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234941 Rel18 ProSe - Updates on U2N relay discovery key request procedure Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑234713
    S3‑235013 Update discovery key response of U2N discovery security procdure Nokia,Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234898 Clarification on the discovery security parameters in the U2N discovery Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235012  
    S3‑234899 Clarification on the discovery security parameters in the U2N discovery (mirror) Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234510 UTC-based Counter Reconciliation Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: this is not a security requirement, and it's new.Philips replied that this was not new.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234713 Rel18 ProSe - Updates on U2N relay discovery key request procedure Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234941  
    S3‑234714 Rel18 ProSe: Updates on U2N relay security over control plane Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234942  
    S3‑234730 UE-to-UE Relay Communication with integrated discovery Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234843  
    S3‑234855 Update discovery key response of U2N discovery security procdure Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234923 S3‑233614
    S3‑235076 Ls on uniqueness of Prose U2NRSC Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.1.4 Mission Critical S3‑234501 [33.180] Clarification on SIP core access authentication UK Home Office CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑233591
    S3‑234775 [Draft] LS on authentication and authorization aspects in usage of MC Gateway UE Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t support this LS.
 		noted No    
4.1.5 Authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G S3‑234523 Correction in UDM and GPSI related requirements Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235014  
    S3‑235014 Correction in UDM and GPSI related requirements Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234523
    S3‑234524 Correction in UDM and GPSI related requirements Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235015  
    S3‑235015 Correction in UDM and GPSI related requirements Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234524
    S3‑234525 A-KID privacy related requirments Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234526 A-KID privacy related requirments Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234527 Editorial alignment Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235016  
    S3‑235016 Existing AKMA procedure alignment Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234527
    S3‑234528 Editorial alignment Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235017  
    S3‑235017 Existing AKMA procedure alignment Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234528
    S3‑234529 Discussion paper on AKMA service restriction in VPLMN Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234530 AKMA service restriction in VPLMN Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: not a security solution solved by SA3. Ericsson share the same view. Nokia: AKMA is defined by SA3, nobody else will clarify this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234532 AKMA Service disable or withdrawn Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE, ChinaMobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234939 Non-critical X.509 subjectAltName and unique DN following RFC 5280 Ericsson CR   Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.1.6 Enhancements to User Plane Integrity Protection Support in 5GS                      
4.1.7 Security Aspects of Enhancements for 5G Multicast-Broadcast Services S3‑234637 Clarification about the NOTE in MOCN Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234838 5MBS Annex W.4.2 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235106  
    S3‑235106 5MBS Annex W.4.2 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234838
    S3‑234850 5MBS Annex W.4.2 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235107  
    S3‑235107 5MBS Annex W.4.2 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234850
4.1.8 Security for enhanced support of Industrial IoT                      
4.1.9 Security Aspects of eNPN S3‑234571 NSWO support in SNPN using CH with AAA server CableLabs, Charter Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235077 S3‑234290
    S3‑235077 NSWO support in SNPN using CH with AAA server CableLabs, Charter Communications CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234571
    S3‑234572 Reply LS on NSWO support in SNPN using CH AAA server CableLabs LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235109  
    S3‑235109 Reply LS on NSWO support in SNPN using CH AAA server CableLabs LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234572
    S3‑234653 Delete Editor's Note in trusted non-3GPP access Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234756 Resolving EN about AN parameters Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234857 Resolution of EN concerning the content of AN-parameters. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
YesCableLabs: last change is not needed. Refer to IETF. Nokia: we discussed it before; we don’t agree with the threat here.Some proprietary solution can take care of this. We don’t see a need for this. Qualcomm: not convinced that there is a massive threat here.I need to see more details on how the network checks all these identities coming.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235083 Resolution of EN concerning the content of AN-parameters. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234626 Discussion on security issue for NSWO Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234627 Security for NSWO support in SNPN Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234757 Correction of CR implementation Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235018  
    S3‑235018 Correction of CR implementation Ericsson,Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234757
    S3‑234859 Reintroduction of agreed changes not merged to TS 33.501 v 18.3.0 Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235018  
    S3‑234758 Editorial correction of CR implementation Ericsson,Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesAdding Nokia as co-source since the CR in 858 is a duplication.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234858 Editorial correction of incorrectly formatted text. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Approval Yes
YesSame change as previous document.
 		not pursued No    
4.1.10 Security Aspects of Enhancement of Support for Edge Computing in 5GC S3‑234562 Adding conclusions for KI#2.6 InterDigital, Inc. draftCR   No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234761 CR of fixing references Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235019  
    S3‑235019 CR of fixing references Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234761
    S3‑234762 CR of terms, abbreviations and symbols Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234779 Security of EAS discovery Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: postpone this. We need time to study this more in SA2.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235061 Security of EAS discovery Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234781 33.501 Rel-17 Correction: Reverting Annex P back to informative Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree with making this Annex normative again.There are other references to Annex P that may imply that this cannot be normative.There was other CR touching the same annex, so the decision was postponed until that CR was opened.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235062 33.501 Rel-17 Correction: Reverting Annex P back to informative Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234782 33.501 Rel-18 Correction: Reverting Annex P back to informative Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235063 33.501 Rel-18 Correction: Reverting Annex P back to informative Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234788 Correction on the GPSI verification Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia disagreed with the note.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234789 Clarification on EDGE-10 interface to cover the ECS-ER security Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235023  
    S3‑235023 Clarification on EDGE-10 interface to cover the ECS-ER security Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234789
4.1.11 Security aspects of Uncrewed Aerial Systems S3‑234611 Align UUAA with TS23.256 due to removal of uavAuthenticated IE Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: this is aligned with the LS answer from SA2.They don’t support this in step 6 anymore. Lenovo disagreed with Qualcomm.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235024 Align UUAA with TS23.256 due to removal of uavAuthenticated IE Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234612 Align UUAA with TS23.256 due to removal of uavAuthenticated IE Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235025 Align UUAA with TS23.256 due to removal of uavAuthenticated IE Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234746 Removal of the indicator of UUAA-MM result from AMF CMCC CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235024  
    S3‑234747 Removal of the indicator of UUAA-MM result from AMF CMCC CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235025  
    S3‑234944 Updates to Clause 5.2.1.1 Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235025  
    S3‑234629 Clarification related to reliable location Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234630 Clarification related to reliable location Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234776 R17-Clarification on reliable location information Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234777 Rel18-Clarification on reliable location information Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234644 Editorial changes and clarification about identity mapping R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234645 Editorial changes and clarification about identity mapping R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234606 Direct C2 security for unicast Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm didn’t agree with this CR. Interdigital supported this CR.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234949 Clarify the use of UUAA-MM for pairing authorisation Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234707
    S3‑234707 Clarify the use of UUAA-MM for pairing authorisation Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234949  
4.1.12 Security Aspects of Ranging Based Services and Sidelink Positioning S3‑234584 Update the abbreviations in 33.533 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235026  
    S3‑235026 Update the abbreviations in 33.533 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234584
    S3‑234880 Update to the Reference Points in Clause 4.2.2 Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234881 Update to Common Security in Clause 5 Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234580 Allocate FC Value for 33.533 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234581 Update the FC Value in 33.533 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234715 Rel18 SL positioning - Updates on UE discovery procedure Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235027  
    S3‑234807 Update clause 6.2.3 in TS 33.533 OPPO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235027  
    S3‑234882 Add differences between Ranging discovery and ProSe discovery Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235027  
    S3‑235027 Add differences between Ranging discovery and ProSe discovery Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234882
    S3‑234884 Update to failure handling for authorization of UE role included in DCR Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234901 Clarification on the Ranging/SL Positioning service exposure Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234885 Update to AF authorization procedure for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235028  
    S3‑235028 Update to AF authorization procedure for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234885
    S3‑234631 Clarification on the authorization procedure of AF or 5GC NF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234633 Location_PrivacyCheck service from GMLC for UEs belonging to different PLMNs Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234900 Clarification on the authorization for UEs belonging to different PLMNs Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234632 Location_PrivacyCheck service from AMF Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234886 Add privacy handing for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure through 5GC CP Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235029  
    S3‑235029 Add privacy handing for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure through 5GC CP Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234886
    S3‑234888 Update to authorization for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure through PC5 Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234733 UE Privacy handling for service exposure through PC5 Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234734 UE Privacy handling for service exposure through PC5 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235030  
    S3‑234887 Add privacy handing for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure through PC5 Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235030 Add privacy handing for Ranging/SL positioning service exposure through PC5 Xiaomi CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234516 Clarification to 6.3.7 on discovery Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm and Ericsson didn’t understand the proposal.Check during the discovery, then after the discovery it is not necessary anymore. Huawei: we think it is not necessary, but we are open to discussion.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234893 Update to the procedure of UE privacy verification for UE-only operation Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234514 Additions to enable secure network based SL positioning for UE without NAS connection Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: this is a new procedure, Rel-18 s frozen. Philips: we are answering to an SA2's concern. Huawei: we need more time to discuss this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234811 4.1.12 - Discussion on privacy of sharing location of Located UEs Philips International B.V. discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234515 Addition of Ranging/SL Positioning privacy profile Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson had several issues with this contribution and proposed sending an LS to SA2 for furtherclarifications.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234582 Remove the Note in clause 6.3.5 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234735 UE Privacy handling for Ranging/SL positioning Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234736 UE Privacy profile for Ranging SL positioning Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234902 Clarification on the UE Ranging/SL Positioning privacy profile Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234889 Update to the title for unicast direct communication with long-term credential Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235031  
    S3‑235031 Update to the title for unicast direct communication with long-term credential Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234889
    S3‑234717 Rel18 SL positioning - Updates on unicast direct communication security Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234890 Resolve the Editor's Note on SL Positioning service identifier Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
YesSame content as 717.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234891 Update to unicast communication for SL positioning service provided by network Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson didn’t support this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234892 Unicast communication security supported by V2X UEs for SL positioning service provided by network Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm and Ericsson didn’t support this.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234513 4.1.12 - Clause 6.4.4 - clarification Philips International B.V. CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234583 Resolve the issue when SLPTK ID is about to wrap around ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235079  
    S3‑235079 Resolve the issue when SLPTK ID is about to wrap around ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234583
4.1.13 Security Aspects of eNA S3‑234752 EN resolving in TS33.501 X.2(R17) China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235034  
    S3‑234753 EN resolving in TS33.501 X.2(R18) China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235035  
    S3‑234560 Conveying the CCA of the source NF service consumer Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235034  
    S3‑235034 Conveying the CCA of the source NF service consumer Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234560
    S3‑234553 Conveying the CCA of the source NF service consumer Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235035  
    S3‑235035 Conveying the CCA of the source NF service consumer Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234553
    S3‑234554 Adding service area for authorization in FL Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234665 Updates to Federated Learning Intel draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234686 Update Service Area in FL Authorization Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234687 Discussion paper on Service Area in FL Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234555 Removing EN in X.10 clause of TS 33.501 related to allowed NF consumers list Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235036  
    S3‑235036 Removing EN in X.10 clause of TS 33.501 related to allowed NF consumers list Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234555
    S3‑234816 Resolution of one Editor's Note (Transaction ID) for Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235036  
    S3‑234814 Resolution of one EN (storage request update) in Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234754 Vendor ID EN resolving in TS33.501 X.10_Rel 17 China mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234755 Vendor ID EN resolving in TS33.501 X.10_Rel 18 China mobile CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234960 Resolution of one Editor's Note (Interoperability ID) for Security for AI/ML model storage and sharing Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell,China Mobile CR Agreement Yes
YesChina Mobile added as co-signer as 755 is identical.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234815 Update flow of Nnwdaf_MLModelProvision Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235037  
    S3‑235037 Update flow of Nnwdaf_MLModelProvision Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234815
    S3‑234817 Correction on allowed NFc list for model storage and sharing in indirect communication scenarios Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia couldn’t agree with this.Huawei couldn’t agree either with the statement on the SCP.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234818 Clarify ADRF usage to be optional Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234819 Authorization of Model Sharing with MTLF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: this came up in SA2 quite late. We still believe that this needs to be properly studied. There is a security issue but we need more time. Huawei supported this with modifications in the note. It was commented that this was not a correction. Given that it would bring a new security solution MCC advised to bring this to Rel-19.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234820 LS on Model Sharing With MTLF Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235110  
    S3‑235110 LS on Model Sharing With MTLF Ericsson LS out Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234820
    S3‑234684 Discussion paper on the DataSetTag Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234685 Procedure for secured and authorized AIML model data sharing Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: threats are not evident here.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234664 Updates to ML Model Storage and Sharing Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235036  
    S3‑234625 Correction on protection of data and analytics exchange in roaming case Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234638 withdrawn Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
4.1.14 Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G S3‑234615 Defining Roaming Hub NTT DOCOMO, Vodafone CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235070 Defining Roaming Hub NTT DOCOMO, Vodafone CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234764 Editorial modifications on PRINS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234973 Updating intermediary originated error message procedure NTT DOCOMO, Vodafone CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235069 S3‑234614
    S3‑234694 Resolving Editor's Note on N32 and/or SBA layers for Modified PRINS Vodafone, Verizon, T-Mobile USA, NTT DOCOMO, Telefonica CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235069  
    S3‑235069 Resolving Editor's Note on N32 and/or SBA layers for Modified PRINS Vodafone, Verizon, T-Mobile USA, NTT DOCOMO, Telefonica CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234694
    S3‑234863 SEPP requirement for error handling from Roaming Intermediaries Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235069  
    S3‑234767 Editorial modifications on PRINS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235069  
    S3‑234768 Addressing ENs on reformattedData and N32-f context Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235069  
    S3‑234769 Addressing EN on error message layers Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235069  
    S3‑234833 Updating security procedure to enable Roaming Hubs Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234770 Deleting Note 3 in clause 5.9.3.2 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234826 Correction of N32-f terminology Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235069  
    S3‑234864 N32f and N32c correlation issue Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234865 Security profiles for PRINS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234556 Discussion paper on data control by roaming hubs with modified PRINS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234557 LS on data control by Roaming Hubs with PRINS Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia highlighted that GSMA has been asking for several times already. There was a lack of response to GSMA and SA2 on the need for roaming hub to control the PDU session. Telecom Italia supported Nokia and stated that SA3 needed to draft something to SA2 to let them aware of the problem. Verizon: this has architecture impact and it’s out of scope of SA3.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234614 Updating intermediary originated error message procedure NTT DOCOMO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234973  
4.1.15 All other maintenance topics (not listed above) S3‑234868 Detailed functional security model description for support of RNAA Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235104  
    S3‑235104 Detailed functional security model description for support of RNAA Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234868
    S3‑234907 Clarification for CAPIF-8 Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235111  
    S3‑235111 Clarification for CAPIF-8 Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234907
    S3‑234961 Resolving stage 2 editor's notes NTT DOCOMO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑234945
    S3‑234616 Revocation procedures invoked by API invoker Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234617 Revocation procedure invoked by resource owner client Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234910 Update for authorization revocation procedure for RNAA Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234832 Revocation procedure for RNAA Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234911 Resolve EN related to API invoker ID and GPSI Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234786 Clarification on resource owner ID Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235059  
    S3‑235059 Clarification on resource owner ID Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234786
    S3‑234618 Correction on authentication and authorization for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235113  
    S3‑235113 Correction on authentication and authorization for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234618
    S3‑234619 Security negotiation for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235114  
    S3‑234620 Access token profile for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235115  
    S3‑235115 Access token profile for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234620
    S3‑234621 Obtaining Tokens Procedure for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235115  
    S3‑234622 Refreshing Token for RNAA Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235115  
    S3‑234784 Identification of RNAA token Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235113  
    S3‑235064 Identification of RNAA token Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234908 Resolve EN related to authorization flow Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235114  
    S3‑235114 Resolve EN related to authorization flow Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234908
    S3‑234790 Optimization in the authorization code flow usage Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234785 Optimizations for accessing own resources Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235065 Optimizations for accessing own resources Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234909 Streamline the Editor's Notes for RNAA Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234787 Clarification on the scope of the Rel-18 RNAA specification Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235060 Clarification on the scope of the Rel-18 RNAA specification Ericsson CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234550 Updates to the SBA certificate profile Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: this is related to a draft, not a finished RFC.We can wait until it is finished, no rush. Nokia: it is in a mature status, only editorial changes expected. Nokia commented that they had received comments to improve this and that they would bring it back next meeting.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234639 Update to Set up of initial trust Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234640 Update to Validation of usage of X.509 certificate Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234652 CR to update certificate lifecycle management Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: this may be seen as mandatory to implement if it’s a normative clause. Huawei: everything in this clause is a guideline for implementation.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234589 A-KID update after UPU ZTE CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this CR.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234590 Adding SUPI/GPSI as an option in KAF request message ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234591 Editorial corrections to TS 33.535 in R17 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235080  
    S3‑235080 Editorial corrections to TS 33.535 in R17 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234591
    S3‑234592 Editorial corrections to TS 33.535 in R18 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235081  
    S3‑235081 Editorial corrections to TS 33.535 in R18 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234592
    S3‑234593 Update AKMA key lifetimes ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234594 Update AKMA related UDM services ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234595 Adding indication to inform UE of A-KID refresh ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234912 Routing indicator update issue in the A-KID construction procedure Release 17 Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with this contribution. Qualcomm: this clarification is necessary.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234913 Routing indicator update issue in the A-KID construction procedure Release 18 (mirror) Xiaomi CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234599 Dummy WID for R18 eNS Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, LGE, Xiaomi, ZTE WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234605 NSSAA procedure update for multiple registration Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei commented that the current specification was broken and requested the operators to check it out. Ericsson commented that this was the 4th time that they saw this contribution and that they still didn’t agree. The Chair commented that a Working Agreement could be necessary to put an end to it. Ericsson commented that not pursuing this would be a solution and that the working agreement could be avoided. Ericsson added this was a new feature and not a correction.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234600 Home control for Network Slice Admission Control procedures Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, LGE, Xiaomi, ZTE CR Agreement Yes
YesThe Chair commented that there was no exception for Rel-18 topics. Huawei wanted to include this content and recurring to a technical vote if necessary, It was commented that stage 2 for Rel-18 was frozen already, so little chance to have this approved in Plenary. This was taken offline.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234596 Reuse error code during home network triggered primary authentication procedure ZTE CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: we don’t need to refer to CT4. This is not purely aligned with them either.Nokia supported this. Nokia and Huawei agreed on the second change. Ericsson: the second change may not be correctly placed.
 		revised No S3‑235038  
    S3‑235038 Reuse error code during home network triggered primary authentication procedure ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234596
    S3‑234597 Clarify AMF responses in HONTRA procedure. ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235039 Clarify AMF responses in HONTRA procedure. ZTE Corporation CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234598 HONTRA procedure corrections ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235040  
    S3‑234655 clarification for HONTRA procedure Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235040  
    S3‑235040 clarification for HONTRA procedure Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234655
    S3‑234680 Clarification on signalling overload in Home Network Triggered Authentication LG Electronics CR Approval Yes
YesNokia: not convinced with the text. Ericsson: not needed.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234794 Implementation corrections Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235040  
    S3‑234795 Clarifications of the AMF and UDM behaviour Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235039  
    S3‑234534 Callback URI clarification and API correction Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: not necessary. Huawei: it needs rewording.
 		merged No S3‑235040  
    S3‑235041 Callback URI clarification and API correction Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234704 Establishing IPsec SAs for IAB inter-CU topology adaptation and backhaul RLF recovery procedure Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234772 Guidance on mitigating privacy risk of variable length NAI based SUPIs Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC comment: dangerous to mention a study when introducing a CR, even if the change is not normative. The NOTE should not have a recommendation, so better to have NOTE 0 as plain text instead.
 		revised No S3‑235058  
    S3‑235058 Guidance on mitigating privacy risk of variable length NAI based SUPIs Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234772
    S3‑234828 [IAB][Rel-17] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Intel, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235032  
    S3‑235032 [IAB][Rel-17] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Intel, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234828
    S3‑234829 [IAB][Rel-18] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Intel, Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235033  
    S3‑235033 [IAB][Rel-18] IAB inter-CU topology adaptation procedure Samsung, Intel, Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234829
    S3‑234925 Guidance on mitigating privacy risk of variable length NAI-based SUPIs InterDigital Communications, Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC comment: dangerous to mention a study when introducing a CR, even if the change is not normative. The NOTE should not have a recommendation, so better to have NOTE 0 as plain text instead.
 		merged No S3‑235058 S3‑234854
    S3‑234933 Establishing IPsec SAs for IAB inter-CU topology adaptation and backhaul RLF recovery procedure Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑234703
    S3‑234936 Updating the FC values Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑234705
    S3‑234938 Updating the FC values Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑234706
    S3‑234538 N3IWF procedure clarification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234539 N3IWF procedure clarification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234540 N3IWF procedure clarification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234541 N3IWF procedure clarification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235082  
    S3‑235082 N3IWF procedure clarification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234541
    S3‑234577 AUSF sends back MSK to W-AGF after successful EAP authentication CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: is this a correction or a functional modification? Rel-18 is frozen. Huawei: alignment with CT4 definitions, so it can be cat-F. Nokia wasn’t sure about this. Huawei: this should be done in Rel-17 as well.
 		revised No S3‑235048  
    S3‑235048 AUSF sends back MSK to W-AGF after successful EAP authentication CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234577
    S3‑234585 Remove the EN on I.10.3.1 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235083  
    S3‑234545 SOR UPU NVM issue Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234708 Handling of SoR/UPU Counter stored in NVM Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235052 S3‑233892
    S3‑235052 Handling of SoR/UPU Counter stored in NVM Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234708
    S3‑234419 Correction in trusted non-3GPP access authentication Lenovo CR Approval Yes
YesSame change in 4759.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234669 CR on Security vulnerability fix for use of AES-GCM and AES-GMAC in 33.203 Apple CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei: fine with the original proposal from Apple but this is different. Nokia: issues with the first change.Huawei agreed that it wasn’t needed.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234879 Correction of reference and related text Orange CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235020  
    S3‑235020 Correction of reference and related text Orange CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234879
    S3‑234915 Correction of reference and related text Orange CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235021  
    S3‑235021 Correction of reference and related text Orange CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234915
    S3‑234916 Correction of reference and related text Orange UK CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235022  
    S3‑235022 Correction of reference and related text Orange UK CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234916
    S3‑234920 Correction to Figure 16.4-1 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: no change, it’s an editorial change because the figure is not visible in TS 33.501. This had to be checked. MCC commented that they could check this during CR implementation.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234927 Correction to Figure 16.4-1 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234542 Discussion paper on security aspect of NF accessing the external AF services Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234543 Framework for NF accessing the external AF data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234544 Framework for NF accessing the external AF data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234575 Replace reference to IETF draft-emu-eap-tls13 in annex B with RFC 9190 CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
YesQualcomm: it's the same document, we don’t need to void the existing reference.
 		revised No S3‑235042  
    S3‑235042 Replace reference to IETF draft-emu-eap-tls13 in annex B with RFC 9190 CableLabs CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234575
    S3‑234650 Update the abbreviation list to include CPA and CPC R17 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234651 Update the abbreviation list to include CPA and CPC R18 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234766 Authentication result removal Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234957 Add the case of a failed AUTS verification in the UDM/ARPF to the synchronization failure recovery of the Home Network BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: privacy attack is not clear. Nokia: fine with the text, the justification can be adjusted.
 		not pursued No   S3‑234932
    S3‑234959 Add the case of a failed AUTS verification in the HE/AuC to the re-synchronisation procedure BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No   S3‑234958
    S3‑234551 Discussion paper on automated additions of root CAs certificates using CMP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234552 Automated additions of root CAs certificates using CMP Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
YesMCC commented that this looked like a rel-19 change,there was no correction being made. It was commented that this was no addition of a feature or a functional modification. Ericsson: no rush, let's postpone this. Ericsson commented that this was considered as an expansion.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234566 Rel-18 Work Item Exception for FS_PIN_Sec InterDigital Communications WI exception request Approval Yes
YesMCC: we don’t need exception sheets for studies.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234587 Update the clause 6.6.3.3 in 33.503 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with the changes in the first paragraph.Qualcomm supported this comment.
 		merged No S3‑235010  
    S3‑234796 Update UE terminating procedures for e2DCe Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234797 Change of the abbreviation "DCMF to "MF" and related changes to the text and figures Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234798 Add the abbreviation "IMS AS" Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234799 Remove "DC Application Server" in Figure N.3.4-1 and add a NOTE Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234800 Editorial changes to clause 7.2.5 Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234801 Change the "P-CSCF(IMS AS)" to "IMS AS via the P-CSCF" Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234821 Handling of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header in the SNPN case Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234822 Handling of 3gpp-Sbi-Originating-Network-Id header in the SNPN case Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234823 Discussion of the Verification of the serving network name by the AUSF Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234824 Verification of the serving network name by the AUSF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234825 Verification of the serving network name by the AUSF Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234433 Evaluation of different options of security for selective SCG Activation. Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234434 Security for Selective SCG Activation Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234648 draftCR on Securtiy of Selective SCG Activation Huawei, HiSilicon, Qualcomm Incorporated, Ericsson, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Samsung draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235100  
    S3‑234666 Updates to Security for Selective SCG Activation Intel draftCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235100  
    S3‑235100 Updates to Security for Selective SCG Activation Intel draftCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑234666
    S3‑234696 Security for subsequent CPAC OPPO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234737 Security for Subsequent Conditional PSCell Addition or Change Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234830 Discussion paper on Selective SCG activation Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234831 Security for Selective SCG Activation Samsung CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234420 Discussion on UPU Header Security Lenovo discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234421 UPU Header Security Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑235047 UPU Header Security Lenovo CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234548 Discussion paper of UPU implementation gaps Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234549 Enhancement in UPU procedure to protect UPU header Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235047  
    S3‑234586 Remove the 5G-GUTI in the Registration Reject message in clause 7.2.1 and 7A.2.1 ZTE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235045  
    S3‑234667 Remove the 5G-GUTI in the Registration Reject message in clause 7.2.1 and 7A.2.1 Intel CR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235045  
    S3‑234654 Update step 8 in AUN3 devices supporting 5G key hierarchy procedure Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234759 Correction of Figure 7A.2.1-1 Ericsson,Lenovo CR Agreement Yes
YesSame change in 4419. Lenovo added as a co-signer.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234867 Discussion SNAAPP-CAPIF RNAA authorization methods and related interfaces Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234536 Removing GUTI from Registration Reject Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235045  
    S3‑235045 Removing GUTI from Registration Reject Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234536
    S3‑234537 NULL encryption clarification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235046  
    S3‑235046 NULL encryption clarification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234537
    S3‑234561 Guidance on mitigating privacy risk of variable length NAI-based SUPIs InterDigital Communications, Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234854  
    S3‑234588 Discussion on the AKMA context removal and A-KID update after UPU ZTE Corporation discussion Discussion No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234701 Discussion on protecting header information in UPU Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑233869
    S3‑234702 Protection of UPU header Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235047 S3‑233870
    S3‑234703 Establishing IPsec SAs for IAB inter-CU topology adaptation and backhaul RLF recovery procedure Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234933  
    S3‑234705 Updating the FC values Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234936  
    S3‑234706 Updating the FC values Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234938  
    S3‑234724 Guidance on mitigating privacy risk of variable length NAI based SUPIs Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234854 Guidance on mitigating privacy risk of variable length NAI-based SUPIs InterDigital Communications, Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234925 S3‑234561
    S3‑234926 Discussion paper on 33.122 updates and responses for reply-LS on SNAAPPY Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234932 Add the case of a failed AUTS verification in the UDM/ARPF to the synchronization failure recovery of the Home Network BSI (DE) CR Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234957  
    S3‑234934 Add the case of a failed AUTS verification in the HE/AuC to the re-synchronisation procedure BSI (DE) CR Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234958  
    S3‑234945 resolving RNA stage 2 editor's notes NTT DOCOMO INC. CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234961  
    S3‑234958 Add the case of a failed AUTS verification in the HE/AuC to the re-synchronisation procedure BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234959 S3‑234934
4.2 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Unified Data Repository (UDR).                      
4.3 New WID on SCAS for Rel-18 features on existing functions. S3‑234422 Evidence correction for 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon, Deutsche Telecom, T-mobile, ZTE, Nokia, Ericsson, China Mobile, Federal Office for Information Security (BSI), TELUS, MITRE CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234519 SCAS AUSF - Serving network management Keysight Technologies UK Ltd CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
4.4 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Short Message Service Function (SMSF). S3‑234674 TS 33.529 Skeleton for Security Assurance Specification for Short Message Service Function (SMSF) IIT Bombay draft TS   Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑234675 Scope of Security Assurance Specification for Short Message Service Function (SMSF) IIT Bombay pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234676 References of Security Assurance Specification for Short Message Service Function (SMSF) IIT Bombay pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑234808 Definitions of terms, symbols and abbreviations of Security Assurance Specification for Short Message Service Function (SMSF) IIT Bombay pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑235044 Draft TS 33.529 IIT Bombay draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
4.5 New WID on Addition of 256-bit security Algorithms. S3‑234424 Introduction of the Snow 5G 256-bits algorithm specification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS   Yes
YesNokia commented that this implied a change in what was planned in the WID. Qualcomm was concerned on the decision about using the combined algorithm. The Chair clarified that this wasn’t for Rel-18 anyway and no decision had been made yet. Qualcomm thought that it might be better to go back and ask SAGE to separate the algorithms and have a new naming. They also pointed out the difficulty of discussing non public documents when comments needed to be made. The Chair commeanted that a call with SAGE could be arranged and take a new meeting cycle. Qualcomm: the link to the ETSI website doesn’t work now because the algorithm is not approved. It was suggested to have it as an editor's note. Nokia commented that SAGE replied that the algorithms couldn’t be split.They asked if it was possible to have a call with SAGE by the end of January, before the Athens meeting.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234425 Introduction of the Snow 5G 256-bits implementers’ test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234426 Introduction of the Snow 5G 256-bits design conformance test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234427 Introduction of the AES 256-bits algorithm specification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234428 Introduction of the AES 256-bits implementers’ test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234429 Introduction of the AES 256-bits design conformance test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234430 Introduction of the ZUC based 256-bits algorithm specification Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234431 Introduction of the ZUC 256-bits implementers’ test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234432 Introduction of the ZUC 256-bits design conformance test data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell draft TS   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
5 Rel-19 Studies                      
6 New Study/Work item proposals                      
6.1 Release/TU management S3‑234568 5G PQC Planning and Threats U.S. National Security Agency discussion Information Yes
YesDell commented that more use cases needed to be introduced. Is the work done in other standards groups being considered? NSA replied that this was not a 3GPP problem only, so groups like IETF are also involved. GSMA is also looking at quantum for 5G threats.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234827 Input to Rel-19 prioritization and time planning Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
YesMotorola: security related to the work in other WGs is not here. Ericsson: we always have to do that. Huawei: we have concerns on the simplistic view of "we don’t know what RAN or SA is doing". The Chair had a proposal in tdoc 853.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234853 Rel-19 TU management SA WG3 Chair other Discussion Yes
YesHuawei: concerned about not having a meeting in April. 2024 This is a big gap of 6 months not doing anything. We ended up being overwhelmed by waiting for progress from other groups, we need to be more proactive. NTT-Docomo: harder to have many small WIDs than fewer bigger WIDs. Lenovo: we need help from other WGs about the timeline of their work. OPPO: anticipate the big items coming from SA2 and RAN.Have some additional adhocs, conference calls. Nokia: endorse studies can be endorsed and sent to SA and RAN groups. Qualcomm: not comfortable endorsing. Interdigital: there is work that can be separately in separate streams (e.g. SCAS). Apple: we need to evaluate whether the work started in other WGs needs security work.
 		noted No    
6.2 SID/WID proposals for SA3 prime topics S3‑234416 Discussions for Rel-19 Study on enablers for ZTS Lenovo, Motorola Mobility discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3ah‑230011
    S3‑234417 New SID on enablers for Zero Trust Security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, MITRE, Interdigital, Motorola Solutions, Charter Communications, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, NCSC, OTD_US, Deutsche Telekom, Keysight Technologies, Center for Internet Security, SID new Approval Yes
YesHuawei: WT3 is more about the next step, not key issues and solutions. This is not in scope of the study.There was no agreement in the previous study, so the outcome shouldn’t be referred here. We still have concerns about WT1, we believe that it will lead to the same discussions we had in the previous study. John Hopkins: the outcome refers to the gap analysis we did in that study. Ericsson: the objectives are not clear, it needs further work.
 		revised No S3‑235089 S3ah‑230012
    S3‑235089 New SID on enablers for Zero Trust Security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, MITRE, Interdigital, Motorola Solutions, Charter Communications, Johns Hopkins University APL, Intel, US National Security Agency, Telefonica, NCSC, OTD_US, Deutsche Telekom, Keysight Technologies, Center for Internet Security, SID new Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234417
    S3‑234418 Rel-19 eZTS Proposal_Oflline Call Minutes Lenovo, Motorola Mobility discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234502 Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA Cisco Systems, Google, Mavenir, CableLabs, Charter Communications, AT&T, Microsoft, TELUS, DISH Network, Deutsche Telekom, Johns Hopkins University APL SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: Trust in Cloud native platforms should also be studied. Google: yes, it's part of the study. Nokia: impact of virtualization impact on certificate management is not being considered here. In addition, is it good to have a new protocol in Rel-19? It was commented that life cycle management of certificates need to be considered. Huawei: justification reads that this is the best alternative due to virtualization is a bit far fetched. Please remove this part. AT&T: SBA will be here for many releases, no issue with having a new protocol for certificate management.
 		revised No S3‑235090  
    S3‑235090 Study of ACME for Automated Certificate Management in SBA Cisco Systems, Google, Mavenir, CableLabs, Charter Communications, AT&T, Microsoft, TELUS, DISH Network, Deutsche Telekom, Johns Hopkins University APL SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234502
    S3‑234504 Discussion on the Study on enabling 256-bits cryptographic algorithms Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion   Yes
YesHuawei: this can be done in parallel with the creation of the 256-bit specs. Coexistence of current algorithms and these algorithms will have to be studied. GSMA: we have done this in 3GPP before. From 64 to 128 bits, without a massive study. Let's check what we did before. Focus on the symmetric 256-bit algorithms, not the asymmetric ones.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234505 Study on Alternative Authentication without Access to a Centralized 5G Core US Department of Homeland Security, The MITRE Corporation, Dell Technologies, AT&T, Apple, InterDigital, Cable Labs, Keysight Technologies SID new Approval Yes
YesORANGE: it describes a service that is not addressed in SA1. It should be first be treated in SA1 and SA2 firstly. Huawei: this was discussed in IOPS back in 4G, but it has an architectural impact that is not in scope of SA3. IDEMIA: mission critical networks, private networks are in scope? It needs to be clarified. KPN: it should be studied in the context of IOPS, consider what has been done there. Thales supported this, adding that SA1 and SA2 should be involved first. Lenovo: disaster roaming work in SA2 could be related. Dell: these are solid requirements that are worth working on. The Chair commented that these were new scenarios to be taken into account firstly in SA1, currently out of scope of SA3.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234517 New SID on study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256 bits KDDI Corporation SID new Approval Yes
YesApple supported this SID. Maybe no impact on the RAN interface but on the products.
 		revised No S3‑235091  
    S3‑235091 New SID on study on enabling a cryptographic algorithm transition to 256 bits KDDI Corporation SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234517
    S3‑234518 Discussion paper on transition to 256-bit cryptographic algorithms KDDI Corporation discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234533 New mini WID on AKMA service disabling Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE, ChinaMobile WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234546 Discussion on AKMA privacy issue Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
YesHuawei didn’t think this was correct.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234558 Discussion paper on certificate bound access token in SBA OAuth framework Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
YesSupported by Ericsson.They proposed to add it to the SBA study.MITRE supported this as well. It was agreed that this was acceptable and Nokia was invited to bring a concrete WID or proposal for the next meeting.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234563 New SID on security enhancement for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs, Charter Communications, Broadcom, Lenovo, Xiaomi, ChinaMobile, Google, ZTE, Apple Keysight Technologies, LGE, Rogers Communications, Philips International B.V., IIT Delhi, Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd SID new Approval Yes
YesORANGE: what is the delay described here? What’s the gain? The justification is not enough for me. Qualcomm: lot of new scenarios. They didn’t see the need for this SID. Lenovo supported the SID.
 		revised No S3‑235105  
    S3‑235105 New SID on security enhancement for mobility over non-3GPP access to avoid full primary authentication Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CableLabs, Charter Communications, Broadcom, Lenovo, Xiaomi, ChinaMobile, Google, ZTE, Apple Keysight Technologies, LGE, Rogers Communications, Philips International B.V., IIT Delhi, Intel Corporation (UK) Ltd SID new Approval No
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234563
    S3‑234567 Discussion on R19 priorities MITRE Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234981 Discussion on R19 priorities MITRE Corporation discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234569 NIST Post Quantum Cryptography Update NIST discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234576 Discussion paper supporting Rel-19 study on enablers for Zero Trust Security Johns Hopkins University APL discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234578 New SID on application login via IMS China Telecom Corporation Ltd. SID new Agreement Yes
YesORANGE: you need to go to SA1 first. Google supported this SID. Nokia didn’t support it.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234579 Discussion paper on application login via IMS China Telecom Corporation Ltd. discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234601 Discussions for R19 security enhancement of network slicing Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234602 R19 SID on security enhancement of network slicng Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: this is not needed. Google: clarification on how this will be used is needed. Nokia: concerns on WT2.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234603 Discussions for R19 UAS security Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234604 R19 SID on UAS security enhancement Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234623 Discussion on Mitigations on Bidding Down Attack Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234624 New study proposal on Mitigations on Bidding Down Attack Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Approval Yes
YesCableLabs: there isn't much we can do about mittigating the bidding down attacks. Nokia: restrict to decomission of 2G and 3G base stations, we have other comments but we support the study. GSMA: in Rel-15 we decided to allow backwards compatibility with 3G. We deliberately chose to allow this, so I'm not convinced to come back to this. However, we think this must be avoided in 6G. Not much can be done in 5G but definitely something to avoid in 6G. Apple: impact only on UE. We don’t need WT1.1 and WT1.2. ORANGE: on the impact we usually write "don’t know".
 		revised No S3‑235096  
    S3‑235096 New study proposal on Mitigations on Bidding Down Attack Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234624
    S3‑234634 Discussion on NEF–AF Exposure Security Enhancement Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234635 New SID on 5G Security Enhancement for NEF Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: we support this because we had a similar proposal (tdoc 4774). We need clear definitions and clear assumptions. Lenovo: objectives and justification need to be refined.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234657 Discussion on key misalignment Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234668 SERP-revised WID for R19 SERP Apple WID new Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: we spent long time on this, we don’t agree. Ericsson supported the WID.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234672 SERP-Discussion paper on SERP feature summary Apple discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234673 SERP-LS on security protection on RRCResumeRequest message Apple LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234678 New SID on Security Enhancements for URSP in Roaming Scenarios Lenovo, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Philips, Intel, Interdigital SID new Approval Yes
YesGoogle: is this a problem that the operators are facing? Not sure we are solving the problem of misbehaving VPLMNs. NTT-Docomo: if we don’t trust the VPLMN we are in a much bigger problem that we are considering here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234679 New SID on Double Layer Security Optimization Lenovo, BROADCOM CORPORATION, CableLabs, CATT, Charter Communications, Inc, China Mobile, CISCO, Deutsche Telekom, InterDigital, Inc., LG Electronics, Nokia, Tencent, vivo Mobile Communication Co., Xiaomi, ZTE Corporation SID new Approval Yes
YesWrong WID template used. It was commented that this needed to have further analysis on the Impact on the UPF.
 		noted No    
    S3‑235092 New SID on Double Layer Security Optimization Lenovo, BROADCOM CORPORATION, CableLabs, CATT, Charter Communications, Inc, China Mobile, CISCO, Deutsche Telekom, InterDigital, Inc., LG Electronics, Nokia, Tencent, vivo Mobile Communication Co., Xiaomi, ZTE Corporation SID new Approval No
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234689 Discussion on the A-KID update after UPU ZTE Corporation. discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234681 New WID on Milenage-256 algorithm THALES, Idemia, NIST, ORANGE, Nokia, Telecom Italia WID new Agreement Yes
YesEricsson: we believe that these specifications should be made publicly available, no license required. Qualcomm: there may be some encryption here, not only authentication. Not clear that this should be made public.
 		revised No S3‑235072  
    S3‑235072 New WID on Milenage-256 algorithm THALES, Idemia, NIST, ORANGE, Nokia, Telecom Italia WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234681
    S3‑234690 Study on privacy aspects of collection and sharing management data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, IIT Delhi, Interdigital, Lenovo, AT&T, CMCC, Apple SID new   Yes
YesCOMCAST provided inputs for Nokia. They supported the SID. Apple: not sure about impact on UICC. Huawei: not clear enough. It may be purely OAM. The TU may not be enough for these topics. Not sure about the protection of the interfaces. NTT-Docomo: super set of the radio identity privacy study? The number of TU doesn’t reflect the amount of work required for this. It’s very complex.
 		noted No    
    S3‑235093 Study on privacy aspects of collection and sharing management data Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, IIT Delhi, Interdigital, Lenovo, AT&T, CMCC, Apple SID new - No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234691 New mini WID on AKMA identifier update ZTE Corporation. WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234725 New WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesCable Labs, Apple supported this WID. Qualcomm: remove the last paragraph of the objectives. Huawei: There is no rush for this. GBA not related to crypto maintenance, it can be dealt with a mini WID. This is a new feature. It would also be nice to see what is going to be changed. It looks like speculation now. Deutsche Telekom supported this WID. Ericsson commented that the CRs were brought in Berlin and it was asked to bring a WID. NTT-Docomo supported having this as early as possible.
 		revised No S3‑235094  
    S3‑235094 New WID on 3GPP profiles for cryptographic algorithms and security protocols Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: pleae bring CRs early because there is a lot of background to be done.
 		agreed No   S3‑234725
    S3‑234726 Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture Phase 2 Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, Verizon, ZTE, China Telecom SID new Agreement Yes
YesCable Labs: we don’t need a study for this, it can be done with a WID and CRs. Nokia: most of the text here is providing solutions, the study is not needed. Huawei: we don’t mind having a study. Avoid reopening issues that were not agreed. CableLabs: make it a WID, nthing to study here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑235097 Study on enhanced Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture Phase 2 Ericsson, Deutsche Telekom, Verizon, ZTE, China Telecom SID new Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234740 Discussion on Security Management Serives Study China Mobile discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234741 New SID on security management service China Mobile SID new Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234773  
    S3‑234742 New SID on Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements China Mobile SID new Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234805  
    S3‑234743 Discussion on security for XR China Mobile discussion Discussion No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234791  
    S3‑234744 New SID on security for XR services China Mobile SID new Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234804  
    S3‑234750 New SID on security support for next generation real time communication services Phase 2 China Mobile SID new Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234806  
    S3‑234773 New SID on security management service China Mobile, ZTE, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, CATT, CableLabs, China Telecom SID new Approval Yes
YesAdrian (MITRE): a lot of overlap with topics like Zero Trust. OPPO wanted to be added as supporting company. NTT-Docomo: I don’t understand the outcome of this SID.
 		noted No   S3‑234741
    S3‑234774 New SID on NEF - AF Exposure security enhancements Ericsson SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234803 Proposal for a living document for the Protection of the RRC Resume Request message Ericsson, Apple draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234873 SID on Security considerations for 5G SA roaming Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell SID new Agreement Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: address it as a one shot SID. Verizon supported this SID. Huawei: we can take this a bit later, we cannot commit to study this topic in this meeting. Cable Labs: support hop by hop and end to end, they are not mutually esclusive.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234874 SID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Cloud Native Products (CNP) Ericsson SID new Agreement Yes
YesNokia found this very challenging. Huawei didn’t agree with this SID.They wondered: can current specs be reused to test this product? Too broad, cloud native is not defined in 3GPP. GSMA: ITU-T SG17 has started work on this, ISO will do so as well. 3GPP is taking the risk of missing something that will likely be mandatory in Europe.There is a gap that we keep failing to fill. NTT-Docomo: in TS 33.117 we had opposition against issues like password use that proved to be useful. We need test cases for issues we see in actualy deployments.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234876 discussion on resource isolation enforcement for application in 5G network Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3ah‑230020
    S3‑234877 Study on resource isolation enforcement for application in 5G network Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, U.S. National Security Agency, NIST, CableLabs, China Telecommunications, Google SID new Agreement Yes
YesORANGE didn’t have the scope very clear.
 		noted No   S3ah‑230021
    S3‑235095 Study on resource isolation enforcement for application in 5G network Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, U.S. National Security Agency, NIST, CableLabs, China Telecommunications, Google SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
6.3 SID/WID proposals for feature security dependent on other WGs S3‑234406 New WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19 Motorola Solutions Germany WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑234946  
    S3‑234503 Modified PRINS for roaming service providers in 5G Verizon UK Ltd WID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   SP‑231190
    S3‑234508 New SID on security aspects of Usage of User Identifiers in the 5G System InterDigital Finland Oy SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234559 New SID on security aspects for Multi-Access Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, ZTE Corporation, China Telecom, OPPO, China Unicom, CATT, CableLabs, Lenovo SID new Information Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234570 Study on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2 CATT, Nokia, Xiaomi, CAICT, China Mobile, China Unicom, ZTE, Deutsche Telekom, Thales, China Telecommunications, Samsung, Sectra Communications SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: no satellite representatives in SA3, although they are present in other WGs like SA2 and RAN2. We need to requrest to them their participation since I don't see them in the supporting companies. Spoofing, jamming still apply to satellite and should be included. If we study these things here, will the satellite stakeholders will implement our solutions to prevent those? Otherwise there will be much effort for something that will never see the daylight. The Chait was concerned that these new issues would utilise many more TU. Interdigital: send an LS to SA2,RAN to ask for satellite stakeholders' assistance. Ericsson supported this.
 		revised No S3‑235103  
    S3‑235103 Study on Security Aspects of 5G Satellite Access Phase 2 CATT, Nokia, Xiaomi, CAICT, China Mobile, China Unicom, ZTE, Deutsche Telekom, Thales, China Telecommunications, Samsung, Sectra Communications SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234570
    S3‑234573 Discussion on security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecommunications discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234574 New SID on security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecommunications, CableLabs, ZTE, CATT, China Unicom, Apple, China Mobile, Oppo, Lenovo SID new Approval Yes
YesSamsung: this is considering the core network? CableLabs: we are not considering the radio network. MITRE: PLMN may be a threat to the private network as well. It should be looked at. ORANGE: I don’t understand the justification and whether there are other WGs involved.
 		revised No S3‑235087  
    S3‑235087 New SID on security for PLMN hosting a NPN China Telecommunications, CableLabs, ZTE, CATT, China Unicom, Apple, China Mobile, Oppo, Lenovo SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234574
    S3‑234663 Discussion on Security Aspects on Ambient IoT Service Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234671 New WID on MASSS security Apple SID new Discussion No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234677 New SID on Security Aspects of Indirect Network Sharing China Unicom SID new Approval Yes
YesEricsson: let SA2 the work and they will contact us if there is any help from SA3 needed. MITRE: is there any rush to address this? It is being addressed there as TEI19 work.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234695 New SID on Study on Security Aspects of Enhancement for Proximity Based Services in 5GS Phase 3 CATT SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234697 Discussion on security for LTM OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234763 New_SID_EdgeComputing Huawei, HiSilicon SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234765 Dummy WID for Authentication result removal Huawei, HiSilicon WID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234791 Discussion on security for XR China Mobile discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑234743
    S3‑234802 New SID on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson SID new Agreement Yes
YesCabkeLabs: the first objective is not needed if we read the justification. Huawei: we prefer the CMCC version. MITRE: confused with the justification and objectives. Are we starting IMS 3rd party security from scratch? Ericsson agreed to change the justification to clarify that it wouldn’t be needed. Nokia preferred Ericsson's version with an update on the justification.
 		revised No S3‑235085  
    S3‑235085 New SID on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 2 Ericsson SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234802
    S3‑234804 New SID on security for XR services China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑234744
    S3‑234805 New SID on Study on security aspects of AIML enhancements China Mobile, Interdigital, AT&T, Apple, Xiaomi, Oppo, Lenovo, Philips, ZTE SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑234742
    S3‑234806 New SID on security support for next generation real time communication services Phase 2 China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑235085 S3‑234750
    S3‑234809 Discussion paper on security aspects of 5G support for Femto (HgNB) Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234810 Study on Security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G OPPO, Cable Labs, Apple, ZTE, Xiaomi, Verizon, Intel, T-Mobile USA, Philips International B.V., China Telecom, Lenovo, Xidian, BUPT, Vivo, China Unicom, Inter Digital, KPN, Huawei, HiSilicon, CATR, CATT, Samsung, China Mobile SID new Approval Yes
YesHuawei: SA3 is caught in negotiations between other WGs and it is creating a heavy burden for us. The Chair commented that approving all SIDs and WIDs by March would delay the work in SA3, that's why it was being prioritised to have WIDs and SIDs that were approved already in other WGs. NTT-Docomo: the TU may not be accurate; in case that there are massive changes in architecture in SA2 it would cause an increase of the work in SA3. Make it clear in SA the kind of impact we may have. Huawei: this is a good example where SA3 wouldn’t want to be the bottleneck. We need to send the message to Plenary. Qualcomm: we can start doing this now. MITRE supported Qualcomm. NTT-Docomo: reserve an agenda item for next meeting to discuss this stuff. Huawei asked to be minuted: "Huawei has concerns on postponing these studies which in our view will require considerable work. Based on the current schedule, by postponing the agreement on the topic we are delaying the work by half a year. "
 		noted No    
    S3‑235088 Study on Security Aspect of Ambient IoT Services in 5G OPPO, Cable Labs, Apple, ZTE, Xiaomi, Verizon, Intel, T-Mobile USA, Philips International B.V., China Telecom, Lenovo, Xidian, BUPT, Vivo, China Unicom, Inter Digital, KPN, Huawei, HiSilicon, CATR, CATT, Samsung, China Mobile SID new Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234834 Discussion on study for security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse Samsung discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑234835 New SID on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, OPPO SID new Approval Yes
YesInterdigital: remove WT1 as there is overlapping work in SA2. NTT-Docomo: the TU estimation is not achievable, this is massive work. Huawei: objectives related to SA6 are not clear. Philips: we agree that this requires much more work than predicted in the TU here.
 		noted No    
    S3‑235086 New SID on security aspects of 5G Mobile Metaverse services Samsung, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Lenovo, OPPO SID new Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑234860 New SID on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Telecom Italia, OPPO SID new Approval Yes
YesHuawei: we did a study on the user consent already. We don’t understand the relation here. Google: we don’t know at this point whether user consent will be an issue, we want to keep it here. AT&T: we addressed user consent for the network, we don’t need to include it here. NTT-Docomo: no urgency for this WID. NTT-Docomo: user consent is a potential solution. We don’t want to exclude it. Huawei: user consent is part of the privacy. It is in scope because it's part of the privacy. If the solution requires user consent there is nothing in the WID that prevents from writing that in the spec. Google: user consent is not excluded, it needs to be evaluated. This was agreed to have it minuted as proposed by Google. Ericsson: the first three objectives are not clear. What is the difference between them?
 		revised No S3‑235084  
    S3‑235084 New SID on 5GS enhancements for Energy Saving Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell, Telecom Italia, OPPO SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑234860
    S3‑234914 New SID on security aspects of Integrated Sensing and Communication Xiaomi, OPPO, China Telecom, Apple, ZTE, Lenovo, vivo, Cable Labs, Huawei, HiSilicon, Intel SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234946 New WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19 Motorola Solutions Germany WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑235057 S3‑234406
    S3‑235057 New WID on mission critical security enhancements for release 19 Motorola Solutions Germany WID new Agreement Yes
YesAdding Nokia and Samsung.
 		agreed No   S3‑234946
7 CVD and research S3‑234464 CVD-2023-0075 - Certificate validation on IMS access interface GSMA LS in   Yes
YesPostponed to bring a CR to address this LS. GSMA commented that there was an effort to involve researchers in the standardization work, and there may be a feeling that 3GPP is not interested in addressing these issues. Alex asked the SA3 delegates to take these CVDs seriously and address them properly.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234465 Invalid Curve Attack on the 5G SUCI Privacy GSMA LS in   Yes
YesAddressed in SCAS already.
 		noted No    
    S3‑234466 CVD-2023-0069 - 5G Core Network Attacks GSMA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑234607 reply to GSMA CVD (5G Core Network Attacks) Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234869 LS-reply to CVD-2023-0069 - 5G Core Network Attacks Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑234608 Clarification on SBI service request procedures Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia had an alternate proposal in 4871.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234609 Clarification on SBI service request procedures Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234870 CVD-0069 Cross check on NF discovery request Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234871 CVD-0069 Condition of including allowed sNSSAIs in access token Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑234872 CVD-0069 Access token validity time Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
8 Any Other Business S3‑234404 SA3 meeting calendar SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
YesProposed to have an adhoc meeting with decision power on SCAS in January. SCAS will still be in the agenda in the Athens meeting. It was agreed to have the Adhoc meeting on SCAS for 22 - 26 January 2024. Possibility of adhoc in June or July? OPPO: have a f2f meeting in April Key issues are very hard to discuss electronically. NTT-Docomo supported that. Nokia: emeeting in April for us. We can learn from experience and be more efficient. Thales: we have learnt that emeetings don’t work. F2f meetings can be hybrid. Interdigital: emeetings don’t work at all in some areas.F2F is the best way for making progress. The Chair commented that he got feedback from other companies asking for not having more f2f meetings. AT&T: make it an online wokrshop or whatever necessary to make progress. Philips supported the emeeting for April. The Chair noted the feedback.
 		noted No