**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #108-e *draft\_S3-222092-r1***

**e-meeting, 22nd – 26th August, 2022** Revision of S3-22xxxx

**Source: Huawei, HiSilicon, Philips International B.V., Xiaomi**

**Title: Update Key Issue on User Consent for NTN**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 5.22**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***This contribution proposes to address 2 ENs in key issue #2.***

# 2 References

# 3 Rationale

This contribution proposes to address the ENs in key issue #2.

For EN1 “whether access to NTN service implies consent to NTN requesting location is ffs.”, since NTN service is not the madantory service for the operator, NTN service is an optional feature, and it is also agreed in S3-214349 that “Depending on the local jurisdiction and its regulations, NTN specific user consent may be needed before gNB can configure the UE to report the UE location information.”, thus, the EN is deleted.

For EN2, it is proposed to add the new requirement.

# 4 Detailed proposal

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* Start of 1st Change \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

## 5.2 Key Issue #2: User consent for NTN

### 5.2.1 Key issue details

NTN features are specified in clause 5.4.11 of 3GPP TS 23.501 [4] and clause 16.14 of 3GPP TS 38.300 [5]. In such features, the NG-RAN in NTN may require UE’s location information for selecting the AMF.

The way it works now is that after AS security is activated, the NG-RAN in NTN can request the UE to report its accurate location or coarse location. However, both types of location reports may require user consent depending on local regulations.

This key issue is intended to study whether there is any need to enhance the current user consent framework specified in Annex V in 3GPP TS 33.501 [3].

### 5.2.2 Security threats

If the NG-RAN in NTN is not aware of user consent status, then the NG-RAN in NTN may collect user’s location information without consent which could lead to a compromise of the user privacy.

If the NG-RAN in NTN is not aware that user consent for NTN use case has been revoked, then the NG-RAN in NTN may continue to collect user’s location information which could lead to a compromise of user privacy.

### 5.2.3 Potential security requirements

The 5GS shall prevent the NG-RAN from accessing the UE location before user consent has been granted.

The 5GS shall provide the means for user consent revocation for NTN.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* End of 1st Change \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*