**3GPP TSG- Meeting # *draft\_-r1***

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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME |  | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network | **X** |

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| ***Category:*** |  |  | | | | | ***Release:*** | | |  |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:* ***F*** *(correction)* ***A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)* ***B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)* ***D*** *(editorial modification)*  Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | | | | | | | | *Use one of the following releases: Rel-8 (Release 8) Rel-9 (Release 9) Rel-10 (Release 10) Rel-11 (Release 11) … Rel-16 (Release 16) Rel-17 (Release 17) Rel-18 (Release 18) Rel-19 (Release 19)* | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Reason for change:*** | | UE mobility between two VPLMNs is a valid use case and is supported by TS 23.501.  4.2.4 Roaming reference architectures  The N38 references point can be between V-SMFs in the same VPLMN, or between V-SMFs in different VPLMNs (to enable inter-PLMN mobility).  But in current TS 33.501, only "Service access authorization in roaming scenarios" is defined, and it is too restrictive since it only specifies the scenario that NFc in the vPLMN and NFp in the HPLMN.  13.4.1.2 Service access authorization in roaming scenarios  13.4.1.2.1 OAuth 2.0 roles  In the roaming scenario, OAuth 2.0 roles are as follows:  a. The visiting Network Repository Function (vNRF) shall be the OAuth 2.0 Authorization server for vPLMN and authenticates the NF Service Consumer.  b. The home Network Repository Function (hNRF) shall be OAuth 2.0 Authorization server for hPLMN and generates the access token.  c. The NF Service Consumer in the visiting PLMN shall be the OAuth 2.0 client.  d. The NF Service Producer in the home PLMN shall be the OAuth 2.0 resource server.  Authorization shall be applicable for more generic inter-PLMN interconnect scenarios and not limited to roaming scenario only.  "vNRF/hNRF" and "vPLMN/hPLMN" is closely connected to UE procedure which is not a proper term for general description of NF inter-PLMN interworking. | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***Summary of change:*** | | Add definitions and abbreviations for cNRF, pNRF, cPLMN and pPLMN.  Update input parameter name for Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Service Operation to be aligned with stage 3 TS 29.510 API description.  Add a general description for service access authorization in inter-PLMN interconnect scenarios, and clarify existing "13.4.1.2 Service access authorization in roaming scenarios" as an example of inter-PLMN interconnect scenario. | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | | Usage of access token request for some UE mobility scenarios are not specified.  Roaming when OAuth 2.0 is enabled may not work for these use cases, for example, UE mobility between two VPLMNs and UE mobiliy from VPLMN to HPLMN. | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***Clauses affected:*** | | 3.1, 3.2, 13.4.1.1A (new), 14.3.2 | | | | | | | | |
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|  | | **Y** | **N** |  | | | |  | | |
| ***Other specs*** | |  | **X** | Other core specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***affected:*** | |  | **X** | Test specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***(show related CRs)*** | |  | **X** | O&M Specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
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| ***Other comments:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |
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| ***This CR's revision history:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |

### \*\*\* BEGIN CHANGES 1 \*\*\*

## 3.1 Definitions

For the purposes of the present document, the terms and definitions given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. A term defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same term, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

**5G security context:** The state that is established locally at the UE and a serving network domain and represented by the "5G security context data" stored at the UE and a serving network.

NOTE 1: The "5G security context data" consists of the 5G NAS security context, and the 5G AS security context for 3GPP access and/or the 5G AS security context for non-3GPP access.

NOTE 2: A 5G security context has type "mapped", "full native" or "partial native". Its state can either be "current" or "non-current". A context can be of one type only and be in one state at a time. The state of a particular context type can change over time. A partial native context can be transformed into a full native. No other type transformations are possible.

**5G AS security context for 3GPP access:** The cryptographic keys at AS level with their identifiers, the Next Hop parameter (NH), the Next Hop Chaining Counter parameter (NCC) used for next hop access key derivation, the identifiers of the selected AS level cryptographic algorithms, the UE security capabilities, and the UP Security Policy at the network side, UP security activation status and the counters used for replay protection.

NOTE 3: NH and NCC need to be stored also at the AMF during connected mode.

NOTE 4: UP security activation status is sent from gNB/ng-eNB in step 1b in clause 6.6.2 corresponding to the active PDU session(s).

**5G AS security context for non-3GPP access:** The key KN3IWF, the cryptographic keys, cryptographic algorithms and tunnel security association parameters used at IPsec layer for the protection of IPsec SA.

**5G AS Secondary Cell security context**: The cryptographic keys at AS level for secondary cell with their identifiers, the identifier of the selected AS level cryptographic algorithms for secondary cell, the UP Security Policy at the network side, and counters used for replay protection.

**5G** **Home Environment Authentication Vector:** authentication data consisting of RAND, AUTN, XRES\*, and KAUSF for the purpose of authenticating the UE using 5G AKA.

NOTE 3a: This vector is received by the AUSF from the UDM/ARPF in the Nudm\_Authentication\_Get Response.

**5G Authentication Vector:** authentication data consisting of RAND, AUTN, HXRES\*, and KSEAF.

NOTE 3b: This vector is received by the SEAF from the AUSF in the Nausf\_Authentication\_Authenticate Response.

**5G NAS security context:** The key KAMF with the associated key set identifier, the UE security capabilities, the uplink and downlink NAS COUNT values.

NOTE 4: The distinction between native 5G security context and mapped 5G security context also applies to 5G NAS security contexts. The 5G NAS security context is called "full" if it additionally contains the integrity and encryption keys and the associated identifiers of the selected NAS integrity and encryption algorithms.

**5G Serving Environment Authentication Vector:** a vector consisting of RAND, AUTN and HXRES\*.

**ABBA parameter:** Parameter that provides antibidding down protection of security features against security features introduced in higher release to a lower release and indicates the security features that are enabled in the current network.

**activation of security context:** The process of taking a security context into use.

**anchor key:** The security key KSEAF provided during authentication and used for derivation of subsequent security keys.

**application Layer Security:** mechanism by which HTTP messages, exchanged between a Network Function in one PLMN and a Network Function in another PLMN, are protected on the N32-f interface between the two SEPPs in the two PLMNs.

**authentication data:** An authentication vectoror transformed authentication vector.

**authentication vector:** A vector consisting of CK, IK, RAND, AUTN, and XRES.

**backward security**: The property that for an entity with knowledge of Kn, it is computationally infeasible to compute any previous Kn-m (m>0) from which Kn is derived.

NOTE 5: In the context of KgNB key derivation, backward security refers to the property that, for a gNB with knowledge of a KgNB, shared with a UE, it is computationally infeasible to compute any previous KgNB that has been used between the same UE and a previous gNB.

**CM-CONNECTED state:** This is as defined in TS 23.501 [2].

NOTE5a: The term CM-CONNECTED state corresponds to the term 5GMM-CONNECTED mode used in TS 24.501 [35].

**CM-IDLE state:** As defined in TS 23.501 [2].

NOTE5b: The term CM-IDLE state corresponds to the term 5GMM-IDLE mode used in TS 24.501 [35].

**consumer's IPX (cIPX):** IPX provider entity with a business relationship with the cSEPP operator.

**consumer's NRF (cNRF):** The NRF that authenticates the service consumer NF and resides in the PLMN where the service consumer NF is located.

**consumer's PLMN (cPLMN):** The PLMN where the service consumer NF is located.

**consumer's SEPP (cSEPP):** The SEPP residing in the PLMN where the service consumer NF is located.

**current 5G security context:** The security context which has been activated most recently.

NOTE5c: A current 5G security context originating from either a mapped or native 5G security context can exist simultaneously with a native non-current 5G security context.

**forward security**: The fulfilment of the property that for an entity with knowledge of Km that is used between that entity and a second entity, it is computationally infeasible to predict any future Km+n (n>0) used between a third entity and the second entity.

NOTE 6: In the context of KgNB key derivation, forward security refers to the property that, for a gNB with knowledge of a KgNB, shared with a UE, it is computationally infeasible to predict any future KgNB that will be used between the same UE and another gNB. More specifically, n hop forward security refers to the property that a gNB is unable to compute keys that will be used between a UE and another gNB to which the UE is connected after n or more handovers (n=1 or more).

**full native 5G security context:** A native 5G security context for which the 5G NAS security context is full according to the above definition.

NOTE6a: A full native 5G security context is either in state "current" or state "non-current".

**Home Network Identifier:** An identifier identifying the home network of the subscriber.

NOTE6b: Described in detail in TS 23.003 [19].

**Home Network Public Key Identifier:** An identifier used to indicate which public/private key pair is used for SUPI protection and de-concealment of the SUCI.

NOTE6c: Described in this document and detailed in TS 23.003 [19].

**IAB-donor-CU**: As defined in TS 38.401 [78] .

**IAB-donor-DU**: As defined in TS 38.401 [78].

**IAB-node**: As defined in TS 38.300 [52].

**IAB-donor gNB**:As defined in TS 38.300 [52].

**IAB-UE**: The function within an IAB node, which behaves as a UE.

**mapped 5G security context**: An 5G security context, whose KAMF was derived from EPS keys during interworking and which is identified by mapped ngKSI.

**Master node**: As defined in TS 37.340 [51].

**N32-c connection:** A TLS based connection between a SEPP in one PLMN and a SEPP in another PLMN.

NOTE 6d: This is a short-lived connection that is used between the SEPPs for negotiation of the N32-f protection mechanism, cipher suite and protection policy exchange, and error notifications. Every N32-f connection requires an N32-c connection that was established before establishing N32-f.

**N32-f connection:** Logical connection that exists between a SEPP in one PLMN and a SEPP in another PLMN for exchange of protected HTTP messages.

NOTE 6e: When IPX providers are present in the path between the two SEPPs, an N32-f HTTP connection is setup on each hop towards the other SEPP.

**native 5G security context:** An 5G security context, whose KAMF was created by a run of primary authentication and which is identified by native ngKSI.

**ng-eNB**: As defined in TS 38.300 [52].

**NG-RAN node**: gNB or ng-eNB (as defined in TS 38.300 [52]).

**non-current 5G security context:** A native 5G security context that is not the current one.

NOTE 7: A non-current 5G security context may be stored along with a current 5G security context in the UE and the AMF. A non-current 5G security context does not contain 5G AS security context. A non-current 5G security context is either of type "full native" or of type "partial native".

**partial native 5G security context:** A partial native 5G security context consists of KAMF with the associated key set identifier, the UE security capabilities, and the uplink and downlink NAS COUNT values, which are initially set to zero before the first NAS SMC procedure for this security context.

NOTE 8: A partial native 5G security context is created by primary authentication, for which no corresponding successful NAS SMC has been run. A partial native context is always in state "non-current".

**producer's IPX (pIPX)**: IPX provider entity with a business relationship with the pSEPP operator.

**producer's NRF (pNRF):** The NRF where the service producer NF is registered in the PLMN where the service producer NF is located.

**producer's PLMN (pPLMN):** The PLMN where the service producer NF is located.

**producer's SEPP (pSEPP):** The SEPP residing in the PLMN where the service producer NF is located.

**Protection Scheme Identifier:** An identifier identifying a protection scheme that is used for concealing the SUPI.

**RM-DEREGISTERED state:** This is as defined in TS 23.501 [2].

NOTE8a: The term RM-DEREGISTERED state corresponds to the term 5GMM-DEREGISTERED mode used in TS 24.501 [35].

**RM-REGISTERED state:** As defined in TS 23.501 [2].

NOTE8b: The term RM-REGISTERED state corresponds to the term 5GMM-REGISTERED mode used in TS 24.501 [35].

**Routing Indicator:** An indicator defined in TS 23.003 [19] that can be used for AUSF or UDM selection.

**Scheme Output**: the output of a public key protection scheme used for SUPI protection.

**security anchor function:** The function SEAF that serves in the serving network as the anchor for security in 5G.

**Secondary node**: As defined in TS 37.340 [51].

**subscription credential(s):** The set of values in the USIM and in the home operator's network, consisting of at least the long-term key(s) and the subscription identifier SUPI, used to uniquely identify a subscription and to mutually authenticate the UE and 5G core network.

**subscription identifier:** The SUbscription Permanent Identifier (SUPI).

NOTE8c: As defined in TS 23.501 [2] and detailed in 23.003 [19].

**subscription concealed identifier:** A one-time use subscription identifier, called the SUbscription Concealed Identifier (SUCI), which contains the Scheme-Output, and additional non-concealed information needed for home network routing and protection scheme usage.

NOTE8d: Defined in the present document; detailed in TS 23.003 [19].

**subscription identifier de-concealing function:** The Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function (SIDF) service offered by the network function UDM in the home network of the subscriber responsible for de-concealing the SUPI from the SUCI.

**transformed authentication vector:** an authentication vector where CK and IK have been replaced with CK' and IK'.

**UE 5G security capability:** The UE security capabilities for 5G AS and 5G NAS.

**UE security capabilities:** The set of identifiers corresponding to the ciphering and integrity algorithms implemented in the UE.

NOTE 9: This includes capabilities for NG-RAN and 5G NAS, and includes capabilities for EPS, UTRAN and GERAN if these access types are supported by the UE.

### \*\*\* END CHANGES 1 \*\*\*

### \*\*\* BEGIN CHANGES 2 \*\*\*

## 3.2 Abbreviations

For the purposes of the present document, the abbreviations given in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1] and the following apply. An abbreviation defined in the present document takes precedence over the definition of the same abbreviation, if any, in 3GPP TR 21.905 [1].

5GC 5G Core Network

5G-AN 5G Access Network

5G-RG 5G Residential Gateway

NG-RAN 5G Radio Access Network

5G AV 5G Authentication Vector

5G HE AV 5G Home Environment Authentication Vector

5G SE AV 5G Serving Environment Authentication Vector

ABBAAnti-Bidding down Between Architectures

AEAD Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data

AES Advanced Encryption Standard

AKA Authentication and Key Agreement

AMF Access and Mobility Management Function

AMF Authentication Management Field

NOTE: If necessary, the full word is spelled out to disambiguate the abbreviation.

ARPF Authentication credential Repository and Processing Function

AUSF Authentication Server Function

AUTN AUthentication TokeN

AV Authentication Vector

AV' transformed Authentication Vector

BAP Backhaul Adaptation Protocol

BH Backhaul

CCA Client Credentials Assertion

Cell-ID Cell Identity as used in TS 38.331 [22]

CHO Conditional Handover

CIoT Cellular Internet of Things

cIPX consumer's IPX

CKSRVCC Cipher Key for Single Radio Voice Continuity

cNRF consumer's NRF

CP Control Plane

cPLMN consumer's PLMN

cSEPP consumer's SEPP

CTR Counter (mode)

CU Central Unit

DN Data Network

DNN Data Network Name

DU Distributed Unit

EAP Extensible Authentication Protocol

EDT Early Data Transmission

EMSK Extended Master Session Key

ENSI External Network Slice Information

EPS Evolved Packet System

FN-RG Fixed Network RG

gNB NR Node B

GUTI Globally Unique Temporary UE Identity

HRES Hash RESponse

HXRES Hash eXpected RESponse

IAB Integrated Access and Backhaul

IKE Internet Key Exchange

IKSRVCC Integrity Key for Single Radio Voice Continuity

IPUPS Inter-PLMN UP Security

IPX IP exchange service

KSI Key Set Identifier

KSISRVCC Key Set Identifier for Single Radio Voice Continuity

LI Lawful Intercept

MN Master Node

MO-EDT Mobile Originated Early Data Transmission

MT-EDT Mobile Terminated Early Data Transmission

MR-DC Multi-Radio Dual Connectivity

MSK Master Session Key

N3IWF Non-3GPP access InterWorking Function

NAI Network Access Identifier

NAS Non Access Stratum

NDS Network Domain Security

NEA Encryption Algorithm for 5G

NF Network Function

NG Next Generation

ng-eNB Next Generation Evolved Node-B

ngKSI Key Set Identifier in 5G

N5CW Non-5G-Capable over WLAN

N5GC Non-5G-Capable

NIA Integrity Algorithm for 5G

NR New Radio

NR-DC NR-NR Dual Connectivity

NSSAI Network Slice Selection Assistance Information

NSSAA Network Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization

PDN Packet Data Network

PEI Permanent Equipment Identifier

pIPX producer's IPX

pNRF producer's NRF

pPLMN producer's PLMN

PRINS PRotocol for N32 INterconnect Security

pSEPP producer's SEPP

PUR Preconfigured Uplink Resource

QoS Quality of Service

RES RESponse

SCG Secondary Cell Group

SEAF SEcurity Anchor Function

SCP Service Communication Proxy

NOTE: Void.

SEPP Security Edge Protection Proxy

SIDF Subscription Identifier De-concealing Function

SMC Security Mode Command

SMF Session Management Function

SN Secondary Node

SN Id Serving Network Identifier

SUCI Subscription Concealed Identifier

SUPI Subscription Permanent Identifier

TLS Transport Layer Security

TNAN Trusted Non-3GPP Access Network

TNAP Trusted Non-3GPP Access Point

TNGF Trusted Non-3GPP Gateway Function

TWAP Trusted WLAN Access Point

TWIF Trusted WLAN Interworking Function

TSC Time Sensitive Communication

UE User Equipment

UEA UMTS Encryption Algorithm

UDM Unified Data Management

UDR Unified Data Repository

UIA UMTS Integrity Algorithm

ULR Update Location Request

UP User Plane

UPF User Plane Function

URLLC Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communication

USIM Universal Subscriber Identity Module

XRES eXpected RESponse

### \*\*\* END CHANGES 2 \*\*\*

### \*\*\* BEGIN CHANGES 3 \*\*\*

### 13.4.1 OAuth 2.0 based authorization of Network Function service access

#### 13.4.1.0 General

The authorization framework described in clause 13.4.1 allows NF Service Producers to authorize the requests from NF Service requestors.

The authorization framework uses the OAuth 2.0 framework as specified in RFC 6749 [43]. Grants shall be of the type Client Credentials Grant, as described in clause 4.4 of RFC 6749 [43]. Access tokens shall be JSON Web Tokens as described in RFC 7519 [44] and are secured with digital signatures or Message Authentication Codes (MAC) based on JSON Web Signature (JWS) as described in RFC 7515 [45].

NOTE 1a: Securing the access token using Message Authentication Codes (MAC) based on JSON Web Signature (JWS) as described in RFC 7515 [45] requires a pairwise pre-shared symmetric key between the NRF and the NF Service Producer. The provisioning of such pre-shared symmetric key is outside the scope of this document.

The basic extent provided by the authorization token is at service level (i.e. the "scope" claim includes allowed services per NF type). Depending on the NF Service Producer configuration, higher level of granularity for the authorization token can be defined adding "additional scope" information within the token e.g. to authorize specific service operations and/or resources/data sets within service operations per NF Service Consumer type.

NOTE 1: The additional scope(s) included within the access token add additional security checks at the NF Service Producer that authorizes the services operations, resources and NF Service Consumer type related to the additional scope(s).

The authorization framework described in clause 13.4.1 is mandatory to support for NRF and NF.

#### 13.4.1.1 Service access authorization within the PLMN

##### 13.4.1.1.1 OAuth 2.0 roles

OAuth 2.0 roles, as defined in clause 1.1 of RFC 6749 [43], are as follows:

a. The Network Repository Function (NRF) shall be the OAuth 2.0 Authorization server.

b. The NF Service Consumer shall be the OAuth 2.0 client.

c. The NF Service Producer shall be the OAuth 2.0 resource server.

**OAuth 2.0 client (NF Service Consumer) registration with the OAuth 2.0 authorization server (NRF)**

The NF Service registration procedure, as defined in clause 4.17.1 of TS 23.502 [8], may be used to register the OAuth 2.0 client (NF Service Consumer) with the OAuth 2.0 Authorization server (NRF), as described in clause 2.0 of RFC 6749 [43]. The client id, used during OAuth 2.0 registration, shall be the NF Instance Id of the NF.

The OAuth 2.0 client can also be registered by other means.

Also NF Service Consumers which do not use the NF Service registration procedure for OAuth 2.0 client registration as specified above may get an access token from the NRF.

**OAuth 2.0 resource server (NF Service Producer) registration with the OAuth 2.0 authorization server (NRF)**

The NF Service registration procedure, as defined in clause 4.17.1 of TS 23.502 [8], shall be used to register the OAuth 2.0 resource server (NF Service Producer) with the OAuth 2.0 Authorization server (NRF). The NF Service Producer, as part of its NF profile, may include "additional scope" information related to the allowed service operations and resources per NF Service Consumer type.



Figure 13.4.1.1-1b NF Service Producer registers in NRF

1) The NF Service Producer registers as OAuth 2.0 resource server in the NRF. The NF profile configuration data of the NF Service Producer may include the "additional scope". The "additional scope" information indicates the resources and the actions (service operations) that are allowed on these resources for the NF Service Consumer. These resources may be per NF type of the NF Service Consumer or per NF instance ID of the NF Service Consumer.

2-3) After storing the NF Profile, NRF responds successfully.

##### 13.4.1.1.2 Service Request Process

The complete service request is a two-step process including requesting an access token by NF Service Consumer (Step 1, i.e. 1a or 1b), and then verification of the access token by NF Service Producer (Step 2).

**Step 1: Access token request**

Pre-requisite:

- The NF Service consumer (OAuth2.0 client) is registered with the NRF (Authorization Server).

- The NF Service Producer (OAuth2.0 resource server) is registered with the NRF (Authorization Server) with "additional scope" information per NF type.

- The NRF and NF Service Producer share the required credentials.

- The NRF and NF have mutually authenticated each other.

**1a. Access token request** **for accessing services of NF Service Producers of a specific NF type**

The following procedure describes how the NF Service Consumer obtains an access token before service access to NF Service Producers of a specific NF type.



Figure 13.4.1.1.2-1: NF Service Consumer obtaining access token before NF Service access

1. The NF Service Consumer shall request an access token from the NRF in the same PLMN using the Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get request operation. The message shall include the NF Instance Id(s) of the NF Service Consumer, the requested "scope" including the expected NF Service name(s) and optionally "additional scope" information (i.e. requested resources and requested actions (service operations) on the resources), NF type of the expected NF Service Producer instance and NF Service Consumer. The NF Service Consumer may also include a list of NSSAIs or list of NSI IDs for the expected NF Service Producer instances.

The message may include the NF Set ID of the expected NF Service Producer instances.

The message may include a list of S-NSSAIs of the NF Service Consumer.

2. The NRF may verify that the input parameters (e.g., NF type) in the access token request match with the corresponding ones in the public key certificate of the NF Service Consumer or those in the NF profile of the NF Service Consumer. The NRF checks whether the NF Service Consumer is authorized to access the requested service(s). If the NF Service Consumer is authorized, the NRF shall then generate an access token with appropriate claims included. The NRF shall digitally sign the generated access token based on a shared secret or private key as described in RFC 7515 [45]. If the NF Service Consumer is not authorized, the NRF shall not issue an access token to the NF Service Consumer.

The claims in the token shall include the NF Instance Id of NRF (issuer), NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer (subject), NF type of the NF Service Producer (audience), expected service name(s), (scope), expiration time (expiration) and optionally "additional scope" information (allowed resources and allowed actions (service operations) on the resources). The claims may include a list of NSSAIs or NSI IDs for the expected NF Service Producer instances. The claims may include the NF Set ID of the expected NF Service Producer instances.

3. If the authorization is successful, the NRF shall send access token to the NF Service Consumer in the Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get response operation, otherwise it shall reply based on Oauth 2.0 error response defined in RFC 6749 [43]. The other parameters (e.g., the expiration time, allowed scope) sent by NRF in addition to the access token are described in TS 29.510 [68]. The NF Service Consumer may store the received token(s). Stored tokens may be re-used for accessing service(s) from NF Service Producer NF type listed in claims (scope, audience) during their validity time.

**1b. Access token request for accessing services of a specific NF Service Producer instance / NF Service Producer service instance**

The following steps describe how the NF Service Consumer obtains an access token before service access to a specific NF Service Producer instance / NF Service Producer service instance.

1. The NF Service Consumer shall request an access token from the NRF for a specific NF Service Producer instance / NF Service Producer service instance. The request shall include the NF Instance Id(s) of the requested NF Service Producer, the expected NF Service name, optionally "additional scope" information (allowed resources and allowed actions (service operations) on the resources) and NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer.

2. The NRF checks whether the NF Service Consumer is authorized to use the requested NF Service Producer instance/NF Service Producer service instance, and then proceeds to generate an access token with the appropriate claims included. If the NF Service Consumer is not authorized, the NRF shall not issue an access token to the NF Service Consumer.

The claims in the token shall include the NF Instance Id of NRF (issuer), NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer (subject), NF Instance Id or several NF Instance Id(s) of the requested NF Service Producer (audience), expected service name(s) (scope), optionally "additional scope" information (allowed resources and allowed actions (service operations) on the resources), and expiration time (expiration).

3. The token shall be included in the Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get response sent to the NF Service Consumer. The NF Service Consumer may store the received token(s). Stored tokens may be re-used for accessing service(s) from NF Instance Id or several NF Instance Id(s) of the requested NF Service Producer listed in claims (scope, audience) during their validity time.

**Step 2: Service access request based on token verification**

The following figure and procedure describe how authorization is performed during Service request of the NF Service Consumer. Prior to the request, the NF Service Consumer may perform Nnrf\_NFDiscovery\_Request operation with the requested additional scopes to select a suitable NF Service Producer (resource server) which is able to authorize the Service Access request.



Figure 13.4.1.1.2-2: NF Service Consumer requesting service access with an access token

Pre-requisite: The NF Service Consumer is in possession of a valid access token before requesting service access from the NF Service Producer.

1. The NF Service Consumer requests service from the NF Service Producer. The NF Service Consumer shall include the access token.

The NF Service Consumer and NF Service Producer shall authenticate each other following clause 13.3.

2. The NF Service Producer shall verify the token as follows:

- The NF Service Producer ensures the integrity of the token by verifying the signature using NRF’s public key or checking the MAC value using the shared secret. If integrity check is successful, the NF Service Producer shall verify the claims in the token as follows:

NOTE: Void.

- It checks that the audience claim in the access token matches its own identity or the type of NF Service Producer. If a list of NSSAIs or list of NSI IDs is present, the NF Service Producer shall check that it serves the corresponding slice(s).

- If an NF Set ID present, the NF Service Producer shall check the NF Set ID in the claim matches its own NF Set ID.

- If scope is present, it checks that the scope matches the requested service operation.

- If the access token contains "additional scope" information (i.e. allowed resources and allowed actions (service operations) on the resources), it checks that the additional scope matches the requested service operation.

- It checks that the access token has not expired by verifying the expiration time in the access token against the current data/time.

- If the CCA is present in the service request, it may verify the CCA as specified in clause 13.3.8.3 and that the subject claim (i.e., the NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer) in the access token matches the subject claim in the CCA.

3. If the verification is successful, the NF Service Producer shall execute the requested service and responds back to the NF Service Consumer. Otherwise it shall reply based on Oauth 2.0 error response defined in RFC 6749 [43].

#### 13.4.1.1A Service access authorization in interconnect scenarios

In the inter-PLMN interconnect scenario, OAuth 2.0 roles are as follows:

a. The NF Service Consumer's Network Repository Function (cNRF) shall be the OAuth 2.0 Authorization server for the PLMN of the NF Service Consumer (cPLMN) and authenticates the NF Service Consumer.

b. The NF Service Producer's Network Repository Function (pNRF) shall be OAuth 2.0 Authorization server for the PLMN of the NF Service Producer (pPLMN) and generates the access token.

c. The NF Service Consumer in the cPLMN shall be the OAuth 2.0 client.

d. The NF Service Producer in the pPLMN shall be the OAuth 2.0 resource server.

As an example of the inter-PLMN interconnect use case, service access authorization in the roaming scenario where the service consumer NF is located in the visiting PLMN and the service producer NF is located in the home PLMN is specified in clause 13.4.1.2.

#### 13.4.1.2 Service access authorization in roaming scenarios

##### 13.4.1.2.1 OAuth 2.0 roles

In the roaming scenario, OAuth 2.0 roles are as follows:

a. The visiting Network Repository Function (vNRF) shall be the OAuth 2.0 Authorization server for vPLMN and authenticates the NF Service Consumer.

b. The home Network Repository Function (hNRF) shall be OAuth 2.0 Authorization server for hPLMN and generates the access token.

c. The NF Service Consumer in the visiting PLMN shall be the OAuth 2.0 client.

d. The NF Service Producer in the home PLMN shall be the OAuth 2.0 resource server.

**OAuth 2.0 client (NF Service Consumer) registration with the OAuth 2.0 authorization server (NRF) in the vPLMN**

Same as in the non-roaming scenario in 13.4.1.1.

**OAuth 2.0 resource server (NF Service Producer) registration with the OAuth 2.0 authorization server (NRF) in the hPLMN**

Same as in the non-roaming scenario in 13.4.1.1.

##### 13.4.1.2.2 Service Request Process

The complete service request is two-step process including requesting an access token by NF Service Consumer (Step 1, i.e. 1a or 1b), and then verification of the access token by NF Service Consumer (Step 2).

**Step 1 : Access token request**

Pre-requisite:

- The NF Service Consumer (OAuth2.0 client) is registered with the vNRF (Authorization Server in the vPLMN).

- The hNRF and NF Service Producer share the required credentials. Additionally, the NF Service Producer (OAuth2.0 resource server) is registered with the hNRF (Authorization Server in the hPLMN) with "additional scope" information per NF type.

- The two NRFs are implicitly authenticated via N32 mutual authentication of SEPPs.

NOTE: vSEPP to hSEPP communication is secured via N32. Only transitive trust between vNRF and hNRF can be achieved: The vNRF and vSEPP mutually authenticate, the vSEPP and hSEPP mutually authenticate, and the hSEPP and hNRF mutually authenticate. Hence, vNRF and hNRF can only implicitly authenticate each other.

- The NRF in the serving PLMN (vNRF) has authenticated the NF Service Consumer.

**1a. Access token request for accessing services of NF Service Producers of a specific NF type**

The following procedure describes how the NF Service Consumer obtains an access token for NF Service Producers of a specific NF type for use in the roaming scenario.



Figure 13.4.1.2.2-1: NF Service Consumer obtaining access token before NF Service access (roaming)

1. The NF Service Consumer shall invoke Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Request (NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer, the requested "scope" including the expected NF Service Name (s) and optionally "additional scope" information (i.e. requested resources and requested actions (service operations) on the resources), NF Type of the expected NF Service Producer instance, NF type of the NF Service Consumer, home and serving PLMN IDs, optionally list of NSSAIs or list of NSI IDs for the expected NF Service Producer instances, optionally NF Set ID of the expected NF Service Producer) from NRF in the same PLMN.

2. The NRF in serving PLMN shall identify the NRF in home PLMN (hNRF) based on the home PLMN ID, and request an access token from hNRF as described in clause 4.17.5 of TS 23.502 [8]. The vNRF shall forward the parameters it obtained from the NF Service Consumer, including NF Service Consumer type, to the hNRF.

3. The hNRF checks whether the NF Service Consumer is authorized to access the requested service(s). If the NF Service Consumer is authorized, the hNRF shall generate an access token with appropriate claims included as defined in clause 13.4.1.1. The hNRF shall digitally sign the generated access token based on a shared secret or private key as described in RFC 7515 [45]. If the NF service consumer is not authorized, the hNRF shall not issue an access token to the NF Service Consumer.

The claims in the token shall include the NF Instance Id of NRF (issuer), NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer appended with its PLMN ID (subject), NF type of the NF Service Producer appended with its PLMN ID (audience), expected services name(s), (scope) and expiration time (expiration), and optionally "additional scope" information (allowed resources and allowed actions (service operations) on the resources). The claims may include a list of NSSAIs or NSI IDs for the expected NF Service Producer instances. The claims may include the NF Set ID of the expected NF Service Producer instances.

4. If the authorization is successful, the access token shall be included in Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Response message to the vNRF. Otherwise it shall reply based on Oauth 2.0 error response defined in RFC 6749 [43].

5. The vNRF shall forward the Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Response or error message to the NF Service Consumer. The NF Service Consumer may store the received token(s). Stored tokens may be re-used for accessing service(s) from NF Service Producer NF type listed in claims (scope, audience) during their validity time. The other parameters (e.g., the expiration time, allowed scope) sent by NRF in addition to the access token are described in TS 29.510 [68].

**1b. Obtain access token for a accessing services of specific NF Service Producer instance / NF Service Producer service instance**

The following steps describe how the NF Service Consumer obtains an access token before service access to a specific NF Service Producer instance / NF Service Producer service instance.

1. The NF Service Consumer shall request an access token from the NRF for a specific NF Service Producer instance / NF Service Producer service instance. The request shall include the NF Instance Id of the requested NF Service Producer, appended with its PLMN ID, the expected NF service name and NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer, appended with its PLMN ID.

2. The NRF in the visiting PLMN shall forward the request to the NRF in the home PLMN.

3. The NRF in the home PLMN checks whether the NF Service Consumer is authorized to use the requested NF Service Producer instance/NF Service Producer service instance and shall then proceed to generate an access token with the appropriate claims included. If the NF Service Consumer is not authorized, the NRF in the home PLMN shall not issue an access token to the NF Service Consumer.

The claims in the token shall include the NF Instance Id of NRF (issuer), NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer appended with its PLMN ID (subject), NF Instance Id of the requested NF Service Producer appended with its PLMN ID (audience), expected service name(s) (scope) and expiration time (expiration).

4. The token shall be included in the Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get response sent to the NRF in the visiting PLMN.

5. The NRF in the visiting PLMN shall forward the Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get response message to the NF Service Consumer. The NF Service Consumer may store the received token(s). Stored tokens may be re-used for accessing service(s) from NF Instance Id or several NF Instance Id(s) of the requested NF Service Producer listed in claims (scope, audience) during their validity time.

**Step 2: Service access request based on token verification**

In addition to the steps described in the non-roaming scenario in 13.4.1.1, the NF Service Producer shall verify that the PLMN-ID contained in the API request is equal to the one inside the access token.



Figure 13.4.1.2.2-2: NF Service Consumer requesting service access with an access token in roaming case

The NF Service Producer shall check that the home PLMN ID of audience claim in the access token matches its own PLMN identity.

The pSEPP shall check that the serving PLMN ID of subject claim in the access token matches the remote PLMN ID corresponding to the N32-f context Id in the N32 message.

#### 13.4.1.3 Service access authorization in indirect communication scenarios

##### 13.4.1.3.1 Authorization for indirect communication without delegated discovery procedure

###### 13.4.1.3.1.1 With mutual authentication between NF Service Consumer and NRF at the transport layer

This clause covers the scenario where the NF Service Consumer and the NRF are connected over a mutually authenticated TLS connection.



Figure 13.4.1.3.1.1-1: Authorization and service invocation procedure, for indirect communication without delegated discovery, with mutual authentication between NF and NRF at the transport layer

**Discovery of the NF Service Producer:**

0. Optionally, the NF Service Consumer may discover the NF Service Producer before requesting authorization to invoke the services of the NF Service Producer. E.g. if the NF Service Consumer has not yet discovered the NF Service Producer, then it may run the discovery procedure.

**NF Service Consumer authorization:**

1-2.

After mutual authentication between NF Service Consumer and NRF at the transport layer, the NF Service Consumer and NRF perform the "Access token request before service access" procedure as described in clause 13.4.1.1. If the NF Service Consumer has already discovered the NF Service Producer, it can also perform the "Access token request for a specific NF Service Producer/NF Service Producer instance" procedure as described in clause 13.4.1.1.

**Service request:**

The NF Service Consumer, SCP, NRF and NF Service Producer perform the procedure "Indirect Communication without delegated discovery Procedure" described in clause 4.17.11 of TS 23.502 [8]. The following steps describe how the access token received from steps 1 and 2 is used in this procedure.

3. If no cached data is available, the NF Service Consumer discovers the NF Service Producer via the SCP.

4. The NF Service Consumer sends a service request for the specific service to the SCP. The service request includes the access token as received in step 2, and may include the NF Service Consumer CCA as defined in clause 13.3.8.

If the CCA is included, the NF type of the expected audience in the CCA shall contain "NF Service Producer". If the NF Service Consumer allows reselection of a target NF Service Producer by the SCP, the expected audience in the CCA shall also contain NF type "NRF".

NOTE: In the same deployment, the NF Service Consumer can delegate the reselection of the target NF Service Producer to the SCP for some requests, and not for other requests.

5. The SCP selects a NF Service Producer instance, performs the API root modifications and forwards the received request to the selected NF Service Producer instance. The request contains the access token and may contain the NF Service Consumer CCA if received in step 4.

6. To authorize the access, the NF Service Producer authenticates the service consumer NF using one of the methods described in clause 13.3.2.2 and if successful, it validates the access token as described in clause 13.4.1.1 by verifying the signature and checking if the requested service is part of the token's scope.

7. If the checks in step 6 are successful, the NF Service Producer processes the service request and provides a service response.

8. The SCP performs reverse API root modifications and forwards the service response.

###### 13.4.1.3.1.2 Without mutual authentication between NF and NRF at the transport layer

When there is no mutual authentication between NF Service Consumer and NRF at the transport layer, the NF Service Consumer performs the following procedure to obtain the access token from NRF and uses it for service access at the NF Service Producer. In this clause, the authentication of NF Service Consumer by the NRF and by the NF Service Producer is based on any of the methods described in clauses 13.3.1.2 and 13.3.2.2.



Figure 13.4.1.3.1.2-1: Authorization and service invocation procedure, for indirect communication without delegated discovery, without mutual authentication between NF and NRF at the transport layer

0. Optionally, the NF Service Consumer may discover the NF Service Producer before requesting authorization to invoke the services of the NF Service Producer.

1. The NF Service Consumer sends an access token request (Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Request) to the SCP with parameters as specified in 13.4.1.1. The access token request may additionally include the NF Service Consumer CCA as defined in clause 13.3.8.

If the CCA is included, the NF type of the expected audience in the CCA shall contain "NRF".

2. The SCP forwards the access token request (Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Request) to the NRF. The request may include the NF Service Consumer CCA if received in step 1.

3. The NRF authenticates the service consumer NF using one of the methods described in clause 13.3.1.2. If the NF Service Consumer authentication is successful and the NF Service Consumer is authorized based on the NRF policy, the NRF issues an access token as described in clause 13.4.1.1. The NRF uses the NF Service Consumer NF Instance ID as the subject of the access token.

4. The NRF sends the access token to the SCP in an access token response (Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Response).

5. The SCP forwards the access token response (Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Response) to the NF Service Consumer, including the access token.

6. The NF Service Consumer sends the service request to the SCP. The service request includes the access token received in Step 5 and may include the NF Service Consumer CCA.

If the CCA is included, the NF type of the expected audience in the CCA shall contain "NF Service Producer". If the NF Service Consumer allows reselection of a target NF Service Producer by the SCP, the expected audience in the CCA shall also contain NF type "NRF".

NOTE: In the same deployment, the NF Service Consumer can delegate the reselection of the target NF Service Producer to the SCP for some requests, and not for other requests.

7. The SCP forwards the service request to the NF Service Producer. The service request includes the access token received in step 6, and may include the NF Service Consumer CCA if received in step 6.

8. The NF Service Producer authenticates the NF Service Consumer by one of the methods described in clause 13.3.2.2 and if successful, it validates the access token as described in clause 13.4.1.1.

9. If the validation of the access token is successful, the NF Service Producer sends the service response to the SCP.

10. The SCP forwards the service response to the NF Service Consumer.

##### 13.4.1.3.2 Authorization for indirect communication with delegated discovery procedure

This clause covers the scenario where the NF Service Consumer use the SCP to discover and select the NF Service Producer instance that can process the service request.



Figure 13.4.1.3.2-1: Authorization and service invocation procedure, for indirect communication with delegated discovery

1. The NF Service Consumer sends a service request to the SCP. The service request may include the NF Service Consumer's CCA as defined in clause 13.3.8.The NF Service Consumer may include an access token in the service request if it has received an access token in a previous service response. If a previously received access token has expired, the NF Service Consumer may include discovery parameters as specified in TS 29.500 [74] clause 5.2.3.2.7 in the service request.

If the CCA is included, the NF type of the expected audience in the CCA shall contain both "NRF" and "NF Service Producer".

2. The SCP may perform a service discovery with the NRF. If NF Service Consumer has included an access token in step 1, or if the SCP has a cached granted access token, then SCP may reuse the access token and proceeds to step 6.

3. The SCP sends an access token request (Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Request) to the NRF. The access token request includes parameters as defined in clause 13.4.1.1. The access token request may include the NF Service Consumer's CCA if received in Step 1.

4. The NRF authenticates the NF Service Consumer using one of the methods described in clause 13.3.1.2. If NF Service Consumer authentication is successful and the NF Service Consumer is authorized based on the NRF policy, the NRF issues an access token as described in clause 13.4.1.1. The NRF uses the NF Service Consumer instance ID as the subject of the access token.

5. The NRF sends the access token to the SCP in an access token response (Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Response).

6. The SCP sends the service request to the NF Service Producer. The service request includes an access token (i.e., received in Step 1, received in Step 5, or previously cached), and may include the NF Service Consumer's CCA if received in Step 1.

7. The NF Service Producer authenticates the NF Service Consumer by one of the methods described in clause 13.3.2.2 and if successful, it validates the access token as described in clause 13.4.1.1.

8. If the validation of the access token is successful, the NF Service Producer sends the service response to the SCP.

9. The SCP forwards the service response to the NF Service Consumer. The SCP may include the access token in the service response to NF Service Consumer for possible re-use in subsequent service requests.

### \*\*\* END CHANGES 3 \*\*\*

### \*\*\* BEGIN CHANGES 4 \*\*\*

### 14.3.2 Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get Service Operation

**Service Operation name:** Nnrf\_AccessToken\_Get.

**Description:** NF Service Consumer requests NRF to provide an Access Token.

**Inputs, Required:** the NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer, the requested "scope" including the expected NF service name(s).

**Inputs, Optional:**PLMN ID of the requester NF Service Consumer, PLMN ID of the requested NF Service Producer, NF Instance Id(s) of the requested NF Service Producer, NF type of the expected NF Service Producer instance and NF Service Consumer, "additional scope" information (i.e. requested resources and requested actions (service operations) on the resources), list of NSSAIs or list of NSI IDs for the expected NF Service Producer instances, NF Set ID of the expected NF Service Producer instances, list of S-NSSAIs of the NF Service Consumer.

**Outputs, Required:** Access Token with appropriate claims, where the claims shall include NF Instance Id of NRF (issuer), NF Instance Id of the NF Service Consumer potentially appended with its PLMN ID (subject), NF type of the NF Service Producers or NF Instance Id or several NF Instance Id(s) of the requested NF Service Producer, potentially appended with PLMN ID (audience), expected service name (scope), optionally "additional scope" information (allowed resources and allowed actions (service operations) on the resources) and expiration time (expiration), may include list of NSSAIs or NSI IDs for the expected NF Service Producer instances, and may include the NF Set ID of the expected NF Service Producer instances.

**Outputs, Optional:** None.

### \*\*\* END CHANGES 4 \*\*\*