**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #100Bis-e *S3-202528***

**e-meeting, 12-16 October 2020**

**Source: Intel**

**Title: New solution for key issue 1,2, 4,6**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda Item: 2.8**

# 1 Decision/action requested

***It is proposed to approve the New solution for key issues 1, 2, 4, 6 in TR 33.839.***

# 2 References

N/A

# 3 Rationale

# 4 Detailed proposal

**\*\*\*\*START OF CHANGES \*\*\***

2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.

- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".

[2] 3GPP TR 23.558: "Architecture for enabling Edge Applications."

[3] 3GPP TR 23.748: "Study on enhancement of support for Edge Computing in the 5G Core network (5GC)".

[4] 3GPP TR 23.758: "Study on application architecture for enabling Edge Applications".

[5] 3GPP TS 23.502: "Procedure for the 5G System; Stage 2".

[6] 3GPP TS 33.535: "Authentication and Key Management for Applications (AKMA) based on 3GPP credentials in the 5G System (5GS)".

[ZZ] 3GPP TS 33.501: "Security architecture and procedures for 5G System".

**\*\*\*\*NEXT CHANGES \*\*\***

## 6.X Solution #X: Authentication/Authorization framework for Edge Enabler Client and Servers

### 6.X.1 Introduction

This solution addresses the security requirement for the Authentication and Authorization of EEC in key issue #1 and key issue #2, Key issue 4, Key issue #6(for EDGE-1, EDGE-4 interfaces).

### 6.X.2 Solution details



Figure 6.X.2-1: Secondary Authentication Based Authentication/Authorization framework for Edge Enabler Client and Servers

The procedure includes the following steps:

Step 0: UE pre-configuration: If the ECS deployed by MNO is contracted with one or more ECSP(s), the ECS provides EES configuration information of MNO owned, and ECSP owned EESs via MNO ECS as described in clause 8.3.3.2 in 23.558 [2]. If a non-MNO ECSP deploys the ECS, the ECS endpoint address may be configured with the EEC. An EEC that is aware of multiple ECSP's ECS endpoint addresses may perform the service provisioning procedure per ECS ECSP multiple times.

Editor’s Note: Deployment scenarios related to ECS are FFS.

Editor’s Note: Interface security for Edge-1 and Edge-4 are FFS

Step 1: Primary Authentication: In this step, UE performs primary authentication with the network.

Step 2a, 2b: PDU session: As a result of UE initiating the service provisioning procedure with the ECS (as specified in clause 8.3 in TS 23.558 [2]), UE establishes a PDU session. This PDU Session may be established either to a well-known or pre-configured S-NSSAI or DNN, or the 5GC derives the S-NSSAI by using the registration for UE to network in step 1. Based on this information, the AMF selects an SMF, which in turn selects a PSA that provides a data connection to the Edge Cloud Service Provider's (Edge Data Network's) AAA Server. SMF continues secondary authentication as per clause 11.1.2 in 33.501[ZZ]. ECS may act as DN-AAA Server.

Step 3a, 3b: After successful UE-requested PDU Session Establishment authentication/authorization by an EDN-AAA server, the device discovers and connects, at the application level, to a ECS server address (that was preconfigured in the UE in step 0 or is derived from the application identifier and/or Service Provider Identifier provided by the user in step 1) for provisioning EEC with ECS. The UE performs EEC registration (as specified in clause 8.4.2 in TS 23.558 [2]) and Discovery (as specified in clause 8.5 in TS 23.558 [2]) with the EES.

After successfully establishing the secure session over EDGE-4 as in step 2, the Edge Enabling Client shall send an Initial Provisioning request with Access Token Request message to the Edge Configuration Server as per the OAuth 2.0 specification. The Edge Configuration Server shall verify the Access Token Request message per OAuth 2.0 specification. If the Edge Configuration Server successfully verifies the Access Token Request message, the Edge Configuration Server shall generate an access token specific to the Edge Enabling Client and return it in an Initial Provisioning Response (Access Token Response) message.

Step 4.a: On EDGE-1, the Edge Enabling Client authenticates to the Edge Enabling Server by establishing a TLS session with the Edge Enabling Server based on the Server (Edge Enabling Server) side certificate authentication or certificate-based mutual authentication) as indicated by Edge Configuration Server. Edge Configuration Server may provide Edge Enabling Client's root CA certificate during the registration response (as specified in clause 8.4 in TS 23.558[2]) to the Edge Enabling Server to validate the Edge Enabling Client's certificate. TLS provides integrity protection, replay protection, and confidentiality protection over the EDGE-1 interface. It is required to protect and to provide the access token to an authentic EES.

Step 4.b: The UE initiates the EEC registration procedure with the EES, including the access token obtained from the ECS in Step 3.b. The authorization check for the EEC registration request is performed by verifying the access token issued by the ECS to the UE. The EES obtains the access token validation service from the ECS.

Step 5: EEC requests a service (e.g., Discovery) with access token obtained in step 4. The Edge Enabling Server shall validate the access token. The Edge Enabling Server verifies the integrity of the access token by verifying the Edge Configuration Server signature. If validation of the access token is successful, the Edge Enabling Server shall verify the Edge Enabling Client's Service request against the authorization claims in the access token, ensuring that the Edge Enabling Client has access permission for the requested service.

e.g., When the UE initiates the EAS discovery procedure with the EES by including the same access token obtained from the ECS in Step 3.b if it is valid. Again, the EES obtains the access token validation service from the ECS. The EES also requests and obtains the access token(s) from the ECS for the UE to grant access to the EAS(s). In response to the request, the EES includes the EAS access grant token(s), with relevant information like validity time, to the UE.

If the obtained access token from the ECS (in Step 3.b) is not valid, then the EEC requests ECS for a new access token, as shown in figure 6.3.X-1. The access token request message includes the necessary parameters to identify the EEC security context and parameters for authenticity verification. After verifying the authenticity, the ECS provides a new access token to the EEC in response to the request.

Step 6: The UE obtains service from EAS by producing the access token obtained from the EES over the secure TLS connection. The UE also obtains security policy and the relevant access token from the EES in Step 5. Before sending the access token to the EAS, the UE and the EAS establish a secure channel using the EAS server certificate. It is required to protect and to provide the access token to an authentic EAS. The EAS obtains the access token validation service from the ECS via EES. After successful validation of the access token, the UE obtains the Edge Computing service from the EAS.

6.X.3 Solution evaluation

**\*\*\*END OF CHANGES\*\*\***