help.doc

Document S3-000043

e.g. for 3GPP use the format TP-99xxx or for SMG, use the format P-99-xxx

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		33.102	CR	XX	C	Current Versio	on: <mark>3.3.1</mark>	
GSM (AA.BB) or 3G (AA.BBB) specification number ↑								
For submission t	CO: SA#7 Deting # here ↑	for ap for infor	oproval mation	X		strateg non-strateg	gic (for S gic use c	SMG only)
Proposed change affects: (U)SIM ME X UTRAN / Radio X Core Network X (at least one should be marked with an X) (U)SIM ME X UTRAN / Radio X Core Network X								
<u>Source:</u>	Ericsson					Date:	2000-01-17	
Subject:	Clarification	<mark>on cipher key and</mark>	d integrit	<mark>ty key lif</mark> e	etime			
Work item:	Release 99							
Category:FA(only one categoryshall be markedCwith an X)D	Correction Correspond Addition of f Functional r Editorial mo	s to a correction i eature nodification of fea dification	in an eai ature	rlier relea	ase X	Release:	Phase 2 Release 96 Release 97 Release 98 Release 99 Release 00	X
<u>Reason for</u> change:	Clarification	needed on how tl	he USIN	1 shall trig	gger the ge	eneration of r	new security k	eys.
Clauses affected	<u>6.4.3, 6</u>	.4.4						
Other specs	Other 3G core Other GSM co MS test speci BSS test spec O&M specifica	e specifications ore specifications fications ifications ations		$\begin{array}{l} \rightarrow \ \text{List of} \\ \rightarrow \ \text{List of} \end{array}$	CRs: CRs: CRs: CRs: CRs: CRs:			
Other comments:								
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<----- double-click here for help and instructions on how to create a CR.

6.4.3 Cipher key and integrity key lifetime

Authentication and key agreement which generates cipher/integrity keys is not mandatory at call set-up, and there is therefore the possibility of unlimited and malicious re-use of compromised keys. A mechanism is needed to ensure that a particular cipher/integrity key set is not used for an unlimited period of time, to avoid attacks using compromised keys. The USIM shall therefore contain a mechanism to limit the amount of data that is protected by an access link key set.

Each time an RRC connection is released the highest value of the hyperframe number (the current value of COUNT) of the bearers that were protected in that RRC connection is stored in the USIM. When the next RRC connection is established that value is read from the USIM and incremented by one.

The USIM shall trigger the generation of a new access link key set (a cipher key and an integrity key) if the counter reaches a maximum value set by the operator and stored in the USIM at the next RRC connection request message sent out. When this maximum value is reached the cipher key and integrity key stored on USIM shall be deleted.

This mechanism will ensure that a cipher/integrity key set cannot be reused more times than the limit set by the operator.

6.4.4 Cipher key and integrity key identification

The key set identifier (KSI) is a number which is associated with the cipher and integrity keys derived during authentication. The key set identifier is allocated by the network and sent with the authentication request message to the mobile station where it is stored together with the calculated cipher key CK and integrity key IK.

The purpose of the key set identifier is to make it possible for the network to identify the cipher key CK and integrity key IK which is stored in the mobile station without invoking the authentication procedure. This is used to allow re-use of the cipher key CK and integrity key IK during subsequent connection set-ups.

The key set identifier is three bits. Seven values are used to identify the key set. A value of "111" is used by the mobile station to indicate that a valid key is not available for use. At deletion of the cipher key and integrity key, the KSI is set to "111". The value '111' in the other direction from network to mobile station is reserved.