3GPP TSG SA WG3	draft S3-99397
Meeting #7, Den Haag, 26-27 October, 1999

Source:	Secretary TSG SA WG3 (Ansgar Bergmann)
Title:		Report of TSG SA WG3 Meeting #7 - (approved)

Table of contents

1	Opening of the meeting; general	3
2	Approval of the Agenda	3
3	Registration and assignment of input documents	3
4	Approval of the meeting report of TSG-SA3 Meeting no. 6	3
5	Reports / Liaisons from other groups	4
5.1	TSG-SA (plenary and WGs)	4
5.1.1 TSG SA plenary	5
5.1.2	TSG SA working groups	5
5.2`TSG-CN, TSG-RAN, TSG-T	5
5.2.1	CN	5
5.2.2	RAN	5
5.3	Partners and their bodies	6
5.4	Others (SAGE, TIA TR45 / AHAG, etc.)	6
5.4.1	AHAG	6
6	Selection of external evaluators for 3G cipher	6
7	MExE security review:	6
8	Terminal security: 296, 303, 386	6
9	SMG10 ad hoc session	7
10	Review of specifications (open issues, identification of CRs)	7
10.1	TS 21.133, Security threats and requirements	7
10.2	TS 33.102, Security architecture	8
10.3	TS 33.103, Integration guidelines	9
10..4	TS 33.105, Cryptographic algorithm requirements	9
10.5	TS 33.106, Lawful interception requirements	9
10..6	TS 33.107, Lawful interception architecture	9
10.7	TS 33.120, Security principles and objectives	9
10.8	TR 33.900, Guide to 3G security	9
10.9	TR 33.901, Criteria for cryptographic algorithm design process	9
10.10	TR 33.902, Formal analysis of security mechanisms	10
11	Review list of CRs required for S3#8 / allocation of responsibilities	10
12	Review project plan	10
13	Future meetings	10
14	Any other business	10
15	Close of meeting	10
Annex A: List of documents	11
Annex B: Participants	14
Annex C: Decision of S3#7	15
Annex D: Action points from S3#7	16
Annex E: Status of CRs	17
Annex F: Liaison Statements from S3#7	18
Annex G: Specifications for approval / information at SA#6	18

1	Opening of the meeting; general
The 3GPP TSG SA WG3 Vice Chairman, Stefan Pütz, welcomed the delegates and thanked KPN for hosting the meeting. He set the main objective of the meeting:
-	to prepare the work so that all necessary contributions will be ready for SA#6.

2	Approval of the Agenda
•	S3#6 approved the following agenda (based on S3-99355):

1	Opening of the meeting
2	Approval of the agenda
3	Registration and assignment of input documents
4	Approval of the meeting report of TSG-SA3 Meeting no. 6
5	Reports / Liaisons from other groups
5.1	TSG-SA (plenary and WGs)
5.2	TSG-CN, TSG-RAN, TSG-T
5.3	Partners and their bodies
5.4	Others (SAGE, TIA TR45 / AHAG, etc.)
6	Selection of external evaluators for 3G ciphering
7	MExE security review
8	Terminal security
9	SMG10 ad hoc session
9.1	GEA2
9.2	CTS
9.3	LI
9.4	LCS 
9.5	Triplet re-use
10	Review specifications (open issues, identify CRs)
10.1	TS 21.133, Security threats and requirements
10.2	TS 33.102, Security architecture
10.3	TS 33.103, Integration guidelines
10.4	TS 33.105, Cryptographic algorithm requirements
10.5	TS 33.106, Lawful interception requirements
10.6	TS 33.107, Lawful interception architecture
10.7	TS 33.120, Security principles and objectives
10.8	TR 33.900, Guide to 3G security
10.9	TR 33.901, Criteria for cryptographic algorithm design process
10.10	TR 33.902, Formal analysis of security mechanisms
11	Review list of CRs required for S3#8 / allocation of responsibilities
12	Review project plan
13	Future meetings
14	Any other business
14.1	3GPP and 3GPP2 authentication procedures
15	Close of meeting

3	Registration and assignment of input documents
See Annex A.
4	Approval of the meeting report of TSG-SA3 Meeting no. 6
The meeting report in S3-99355 was approved.
Action points from S3#6:
•	Ansgar Bergmann to create S3-99343, LS to RAN3, cc to RAN2, RAN and T2, to be sent as response to the draft LS in S3-99307, with CR 33.102-013 (S3-99233) attached. Superseded.
•	Is LS in S3-99323 sufficiently answered? No need for further action identified during S3#7.
•	Action point Tim Wright, Bart Vinck: To send the presentations for TR-45 AHAG, TR-45.2 (CN) and TR-45.3 to the S3 mailing list: Done
•	MExE security to be dealt with further at S3#7. Done.
•	Integrity protection for SMS should be included (e.g., as a protected mode which can or can't be applied). CR required for S3#8.
•	Integrity protection for general user data: This should be removed or completed. At S3#7, a principle agreement was reached. Possibly CRs required for S3#8.
•	Roland Schmitz to prepare a CR to 33.102 to at least mention INAP security. Done at S3#6.
•	Peter Howard to distribute an updated version of CR 33.102-017 until Monday, 4 October 1999 evening (Greenwich Time): Done: The updated CR is S3-99348.
•	A revision to be presented by Peter Howard adding a note that, e.g. due to implementation aspects, further changes may be necessary. Done: S3-99344.
•	Attention: One figure is out of range!
•	GH to send out a revision of draft CR 33.102-018 until Monday, 4 October 1999, evening (Greenwich time) for agreement by correspondence in S3 until Friday, 8 October 1999. Done: CR 33.102-018 in S3-99349 and CR 33.102-019 in S3-99350.
•	It was agreed at S3#6 that an updated version of 33.103 incorporating all relevant updates relevant to the USIM would be sent by the rapporteur, Colin Blanchard, to T3 on Sunday, 3 October 1999; that Colin Blanchard would distribute a draft version incorporating all necessary changes, intended for approval at SA#5, on Wednesday, 6 October 1999 to the S3 mailing list for comments until Thursday, 7 October 1999; that Colin Blanchard would distribute the resulting version to the S3 mailing list on Friday, 8 October; that Ansgar Bergmann would do the necessary editorial changes for presentation as V2.0.0 to SA#5 for approval on the week-end 9-10 October 1999.
•	Action point for S3#7: The parameter COUNT for ciphering shall be re-named to COUNTC   : Done.
•	TS 33.107 to be prepared for SA approval at SA#8.
•	GH, AB to prepare 33.902 during next week for Korea. Done.
•	The interested parties to provide the complete description of a robust mechanism and all necessary associated CRs for introduction of enhanced user identity confidentiality to S3#7. Action point closed, action going on.
•	To look at the updated version of p-c-sec. Action point closed, action goring on.
•	Peter Howard to distribute an updated version of the work plan.
•	Charles Brookson to draft some text for a press release, making a wider public aware of the 3GPP security specifications: This should be done after SA#6.
5	Reports / Liaisons from other groups
5.1	TSG-SA (plenary and WGs)
5.1.1 TSG SA plenary
S3-99358, containing the slides of the S3 Chairman presented to SA#5, was noted. 
S3-99359, notes on SA#5 by the S3 Chairman, was noted.
S3-99373 highlights some common decisions of SA, T, CN and RAN made at their Korea meetings in October 1999. It was noted.
S3-99380, draft report from SA#5 was noted.
Discussion at S3#7 of these documents: 
-	TR-45 AHAG (Ad Hoc Authentication Group) is a group specifying security aspects among others for 3GPP2 and TIA. Participation at the meetings of AHAG may be restricted (e.g., when algorithms subject to export control are discussed), that is why it can not be a TIA subgroup, which requires open participation. 
-	Sebastien Nguyen Ngoc stated that the list of R99 security features in S3-99358 should not be regarded as the list of R99 security features agreed by S3; in particular, France Telecom would not agree to see MAP security as a R99 feature. It was clarified by Peter Howard, that the list only describes what can be finalised by S3 in time for R99; that still, due to time restrictions in other groups, SA could decide that the one or the other feature would be deferred to later releases.
-	Concerning the IPR situation for the 3G cipher algorithm, S3-99359 characterises the IPR declaration of Mitsubishi. It was clarified that it is not a matter for S3 to check whether IPR declarations satisfy the requirements of an SDO or 3GPP policy.
-	It was clarified that SA had decided to ask SAGE to develop the 3G cipher algorithm in order to meet the time requirements; also that new cipher algorithms are not currently sought, because there is currently no requirement for a second algorithm, and because any additional algorithm would also add to the complexity of the system as it would be relevant for an open interface.
5.1.2	TSG SA working groups
S3-99372, e-mail exchange on S2 presentation to S3 on mobile IP: 
•	Geir Køien to contact S2 and to agree a short paper sketching what the contents of the S2 presentation on mobile IP to S3 should be. Interested S3 delegates should join the activity. (S3 delegate Stephen Beer indicated his participation.)
5.2`TSG-CN, TSG-RAN, TSG-T
5.2.1	CN
S3-99364, Report from N2B in Eton on MAP security and EUIC progress, Source: T-Mobil, Deutsche Telekom T-Nova: This document reports on the progress of work in N2 on MAP security and EUIC. Valtteri N reported that there was a draft N2 LS to S3 indicating that MAP security core network aspects cannot be finalised by N2 in time for R99.
S3#7 discussed that it would be helpful to have an expert from S3 to participate at N2 as an S3 representative; unfortunately, nobody volunteered.
5.2.2	RAN
•	S3-99377: RB to draft an answer as S3-99393 after S3#7. 
•	S3-99378, liaison from R3 on Common Identification for Relocation Co-ordination: As an answer, the LS in S3-302 was approved.
S3-99379, liaison from T2 on MExE: See section 7.
5.3	Partners and their bodies
No input received.
5.4	Others (SAGE, TIA TR45 / AHAG, etc.)
5.4.1	AHAG
S3-99376 was presented by Bart Vinck.
S3-99366 was presented by Peter Howard.
Clarifications at S3#7: 
-	AHAG has 3 proposals on the table. It did not make a selection but sent the proposals to TR-45.2, TR-45.3 and TR-45.5. TR-45.2 had deselected the proposal from CipherIt.
-	There will a joint TR-45.2 / TR-45.3 meeting on 9 November 1999 where the proposals will be presented.
•	S3#7 endorsed the proposal of a joint AHAG / S3 meeting in the week 10-14 April. It was agreed to extend the date from Tuesday to Friday (11-14) and to propose the joint meeting for Tuesday and Wednesday morning.
6	Selection of external evaluators for 3G cipher
Gert Roelofsen presented S3-99382, Report of TSG SA WG3 Ad Hoc Meeting To Review Submissions For Algorithm Evaluation, 25 October 1999, which had been prepared by Peter Howard.
Clarifications at S3#: The closing date for submissions as indicated in the letter was Friday 22 October, not November, 1999. 
The proposal in S3-9982 was approved, with the modification to replace "prior to 1 November" by "up to 1 November 2:00 post meridiem central European time".
Mike Walker will send appropriate letters. 
7	MExE security review: 
S3-99297: This LS had been postponed at S3#6. 
S3-99379 is a liaison from T2 on MExE.
•	Colin Blanchard to co-ordinate an e-mail group to further study MExE security aspects and to respond to the LS in S3-99297 and S3-99379; to prepare proposals for MExE security at S3#8.
8	Terminal security: 296, 303, 386
S3-99296, Security mechanisms for the IMEI, source Ericsson, and S3-99303, The use of Zero-Knowledge Identification mechanisms for 3G Terminal Identification, Source: Vodafone, had already been tabled at S3#6. The latter document proposes a mechanism for secure ME identification. S3-99296 concludes that secure storage based on the change requests to the GSM core specifications and secure signalling based on existing integrity protection mechanisms should be adequate for the original usage of the IMEI, blacklisting of stolen equipment; furthermore, that security mechanisms guaranteeing the integrity of the TE software should be assumed; finally, that new usage and new requirements should be defined first.
Discussion at S3#7:
-	The view was expressed to start with a requirement specification for IMEI security before fixing technical solutions.
-	On the other hand, the view was expressed that there may be a lot of future applications for a secure IMEI, and that both a "top-down" and "bottom-up" approach should apply.
-	The view was expressed that a new mechanism for IMEI security would not be feasible in R99. On the other hand, the work item was endorsed by SA; not to introduce such a feature from the beginning might repeat problems experienced in GSM.
-	The view was expressed that the way decided for GSM at last SMG10 meeting (to require in the specifications that the ME resists against attempts to change the IMEI) should also be the solution for 3GPP R99.
Conclusions:
•	The way decided for GSM at last SMG10 meeting (to require in the specifications that the ME resists against attempts to change the IMEI, see CRs in AP99-101) should also be a minimum requirement for the solution for 3GPP R99.
•	Wael Adi to co-ordinate an e-mail group to elaborate proposals how to proceed on IMEI security. E-mails should be sent to the S3 e-mail exploder and should contain the string "IMEI security" as sub-string of the subject field. 
The role of the co-ordinator of an e-mail group was clarified (to set up a document list, to summarise from time to time the discussion, to report to next S2).
A draft document giving some of the reasons for:
- a terminal identity
- a method for proving the terminal to various people or organisations.
was distributed by Charles Brookson (S3-99394).
9	SMG10 ad hoc session
See the report of that meeting.
10	Review of specifications (open issues, identification of CRs)
10.1	TS 21.133, Security threats and requirements
Requirements to be elaborated concern SMS integrity protection and user data protection. 
Discussion in S3#7:
-	The view was expressed that integrity protection might not be required for user originated messages but rather only for SMS used applications like in SIM Application Toolkit.
-	For some applications (e.g., SAT) end-to-end security protection might be required.
•	Conclusion of S3#7:
•	(1)	Integrity protection for user data in general: The working assumption is that for some applications, ciphering is sufficient, for other applications, integrity protection would be a matter for the application.
•	(2)	When SMS is sent in a sublayer of CM (as it is currently the case), that is in the signalling plane, integrity protection (between MS and RAN) is provided anyhow. If SMS is sent in the user plane (currently not foreseen), (1) applies.
•	Bart Vinck will draft a CR to 21.133 to reflect the working assumption on SMS and user data integrity protection.
10.2	TS 33.102, Security architecture
S3-99356, Keystream repeat attacks, source: Vodafone was presented. An updated version, (editorial corrections) is S3-99391.
•	The LS in S3-99388 with attached S3-99391 was approved.
Semyon Mizikovsky explained that there is a minor error in S3-99356 and S3-99366: Within TR-45.5 it is proposed that for connection establishment without authentication and following mid-connection loss of keystream synchronisation, the mobile station would send the 24 most significant bits of the 32 bit cipher counter. Louis Finkelstein commented that what should be communicated to the AHAG is that in order to stop a replay attack, the 24 bits should be incremented by one. This would avoid the scenario where the old base site had a higher least significant bits than the new base site. 
S3-99360, Enhanced User Identity Confidentiality, corresponding CRs in S3-99361, S3-99362: Conclusion of S3#7: The CRs should be separated into 
-	a part covering the routing aspects of the identity provided by the mobile station and annex B. This part is agreed in principle; a new version will be sent by e-mail (with some minor corrections, e.g. in the first paragraph if the new correcting 
-	a part proposing a scheme for paging.
Comments: 
-	The gain of the added functionality was questioned. It was explained that if the scheme is mandatory, mobile stations would not answer to paging with their IMSI; this would reduce the possibility to trace and localise the user.
-	The proposal adds around 30 octets to paging messages when the TMSI cannot be used, and the paging channels may be a critical resource. S3-99360 indicates that around 2% of paging messages might be affected; however this depends of the network configuration; it was also doubted whether it is the right strategy to page with IMSI or similar when there was no response to paging with TMSI.
-	The time to answer to paging may be critical.
-	Should the same parameters be re-used at the following authentication? Yes
-	In annex B, SQN was seen an easy implementation of a general TVP. 
S3-99363, Issues for refinement of 33.102, source: T-Mobil:
-	It was agreed that KSI has the same length and corresponds to CKSN (the name could be changed to CKSN, but this would have to be done in all 3GPP specs)
•	PH to draft a CR 33.102-025 to shorten KSI to 3bits (to become S3-99389).
-	It has to be specified how the MS reacts when the maximum value for COUNT is reached.
-	General comment on security procedures: There are general benefits to reduce options in standards because equipment product costs become lower. In the particular case of SQN management, however, option pruning is not envisaged at the moment, as operators are not sure whether they want to introduce the scheme.
-	AMF should be of fixed length. 3G 33.103 defines 2 bytes, so if somebody would like to change it he should prepare a contribution. Also, there might be the possibility to agree on fixed length but still to ask the interface specifications to foresee variable length for future extensions.
S3-99368, Distribution of authentication vectors between VLRs/SGSNs, and S3-99369, corresponding CR 33.102-023 on Distribution of Authentication vectors between VLRs/SGSNs, both source: Ericsson: Agreed in principle; CR should be based on version 3.2.0 (to be available at the end of the week). It should be mentioned in other comments that SN/VLR should be replaced throughout the spec by SGSN/VLR.
•	RB to create S3-99395, CR 33.102-023r1 on Distribution of Authentication vectors between VLRs/SGSNs (rev. of S3-99369).
S3-99370, CR 33.102-024 on Secure UMTS-GSM Interoperation, source: Ericsson: It was commented that the CR should be revised to refer to AV instead of quintets; it should be based on version 3.2.0.
•	RB to create S3-99396, CR 33.102-024r1 on Secure UMTS-GSM Interoperation (rev. of S3-99370) for S3#8.
S3-99381: This document contains the draft new versions of 33.102, 33.103 and 33.105. For 33.102, there was a CR on editorial re-organisation (012) interacting with other CRs. The rapporteurs should check these specifications, in particular 33.102, and if necessary, propose improvements, until Thursday, 28 October 1999. Then AB would send out the final versions out on Monday.
S3-99387, 3GPP AKA as an ESA candidate, source: Siemens: Comments:
-	Possible impact on 3GPP specifications are to be evaluated, but they will be minor (possibly a one-bit indication in AMF).
-	Values for Broadcast (global) challenges will be changed typically every 1.25 seconds.
•	S3-99387 was agreed. S3 will develop the necessary consequences to the 3GPP specifications, and endorse the liaison function taken by Bart Vinck between 3GPP2 and 3GPP.
BV will do a presentation at the joint TR-45.2/TR-45.3 meeting on 9 November 1999.
10.3	TS 33.103, Integration guidelines
•	CR 33.103-002r1 on Corrections to Figure 1 (UMTS functional security architecture) in S3-99390 (rev. of S3-99383) was agreed.
•	Some further minor changes to 33.103 will be necessary: KSI (3 bits), AUTN (112-144 bits), GI instead of GMSI.
10..4	TS 33.105, Cryptographic algorithm requirements
•	CR 33.105-004 on Time variant parameter for synchronisation of ciphering in S3-99384 was agreed.
10.5	TS 33.106, Lawful interception requirements
No input. 
10..6	TS 33.107, Lawful interception architecture
No input.
10.7	TS 33.120, Security principles and objectives 
No input.
10.8	TR 33.900, Guide to 3G security
A new draft will soon become available.
10.9	TR 33.901, Criteria for cryptographic algorithm design process
No input.
10.10	TR 33.902, Formal analysis of security mechanisms
•	GH to provide an updated main part, some sentences for the scope and a CR for addition of the second paper.
11	Review list of CRs required for S3#8 / allocation of responsibilities
The list of outstanding issues for R99 in the S3#5 meeting report was studied. Still outstanding issues are related to
•	Terminal security (IMEI)
•	IMUI paging
•	Mobile IP
•	VHE security

12	Review project plan
S3-99367. Comments should be sent to PH until end of next week.
13	Future meetings
Meeting	Date	Location	Host	
S3#7	26-27 October 1999	Den Haag, Netherlands	KPN	
S3#8 (partly joint with SMG10-99#3)	16-19 November 1999 (MExE session on Wednesday afternoon)	Sophia Antipolis, France (Hotel Mediathel)	ETSI	
S3#9	7-9 December 1999	Helsinki	Nokia	
S3#10	19-21 January 2000	Brussels	Siemens	
S3#11	22-24 February 2000			
S3#12	11-14 April 2000 (including joint meeting with AHAG)			

14	Any other business
None.
15	Close of meeting
The meeting was closed.

Annex A: List of documents
Tdoc 3GPP S3-99	Title	Type/CR	Rev	Rel.	Effected spec	WI / Topic	Source	AI	Status	
296	Security mechanisms for the IMEI						Ericsson		working assumption as in AP99-101 agreed
2 action points agreed	
297	Update on MExE security	R					Vodafone		CB to co-ordinate an e-mail group on Mexe and to report back at S3#8	
303	The use of Zero-Knowledge Identification mechanisms for 3G Terminal Identification						Vodafone		See 296	
353	Report of S3#6	R							Approved	
355	Draft Agenda	A					Chairman	2	Agreed with modifications	
356	Attacks on re-start of ciphering without authentication
	R					Vodafone	10.2	LS to RAN in S3-388	
357	Final version of letter to potential external evaluators of 3G cipher	Info					Chairman	6	Noted	
358	S3 chairman’s status report to SA#5	Report					Chairman	5.1	Noted	
359	S3 chairman’s notes on SA#5	Report					Chairman	5.1	Noted	
360	Enhanced User Identity Confidentiality	info		R99	33.102
33.103	Security Architecture EUIC	MMO, T-Mobil, T-Nova	10.2	See 361	
361	Refinement of Enhanced User Identity Confidentiality	CR33.102-022		R99	33.102	Security Architecture EUIC	MMO, T-Mobil, T-Nova	10.2	New CRs expected (for e-mail discussion): One for routing, one for paging. CR for routing agreed in principle.	
362	Refinement of Enhanced User Identity Confidentiality	CR33.103-001		R99	33.103	Security Architecture EUIC	MMO, T-Mobil, T-Nova	10.2	as for 361	
363	Issues for refinement of 33.102	info		R99	33.102	Security Architecture	T-Mobil	10.2	discussed, actions agreed	
364	Report from N2B in Eaton on MAP security and EUIC progress 	R		R99		Security Architecture	T-Mobil, T-Nova	5.2	Noted	
365	<not assigned>									
366	Report of TR45 AHAG meeting, 12-13 October, 1999	R					Vodafone	5.4	Further discussion in S3#7	
367	3G PD 30.810 v1.0.0 Project plan for security (SP99395)	Review					ICG Security group	12	To be updated after the meeting	
368	Distribution of authentication vectors between VLRs/SGSNs				33.102		Ericsson	10.2	Agreed 	
369	Distribution of Authentication vectors between VLRs/SGSNs	CR 33.102-023		99			Ericsson	10.2	agreed with minor modifs	
370	Secure UMTS-GSM Interoperation	CR 33.102-024		99			Ericsson	10.2	to be agreed until next S3	
371	Support of third algorithm evaluation team	Info					Ericsson	6	Noted	
372	E-mail exchange to Presentation on Mobile IP operations in UMTS	Info		2000			3GPP support	5.1	Geir Køien to draft a paper between S3#7 and S3#8	
373	Highlights from SA#5	Info					3GPP support	5.1	Noted	
374	Template for 3G specifications	Info					3GPP support	Info	noted	
375	Security requirements for the introduction of mobility to IP						Eurescom	14.2	postponed to S3#8	
376	Presentation to TR 45.2	Info					Bart Vinck	5.4	Further discussion in S3#7	
377	LS from R3 on security mode control	LS					R3	5.2	Postponed to 10.2. RB to draft a response	
378	liaison from R3 on Common Identification for Relocation Co-ordination	LS					R3	5.2	Postponed to 10.2. PH to draft a response	
379	liaison from T2 on MExE 	LS		99			T2	5.2	CB to co-ordinate an e-mail group on Mexe and to report back at S3#8	
380	SA#5 report V0.0.2	R					3GP support	5.1	Noted	
381	Report on implementing SA#5 decisions	R			33.102, 33.103, 33.105, 33.902		AB	10.2	discussed	
382	Report from pre-filtering meeting	R					Peter Howard	6	Recommended proposal agreed	
383	Corrections to figure 1	CR 33.103-002						10.3	rev. in 390 approved	
384	CR 33.105-004 on Time variant parameter for synchronisation of ciphering	CR 33.105-004			33.105		Mitsubishi		Agreed	
385	Draft response to 378	LS					Vodafone		rev. in 392	
386	LS from S2 on Enhanced User identity Confidentiality	LS					S2		Noted	
387	3GPP AKA as an ESA candidate			R99			Siemens		agreed	
388	LS to RAN with S3-99356 attached						VN		agreed	
389	CR for 3 bit KSI						PH		not yet availalbe	
390	CR 33.103-002r1 on Corrections to Figure 1 (UMTS functional security architecture)	CR 33.103-002r1	S3-99383					10.3	agreed	
391	rev. of S3-99356								noted	
392	rev. of S3-99385	LS							agreed	
393	response to S3-99377								outstanding (tbd by RB)	
394	Terminal Security: Requirements for a Secure Identity						DTI (Charles Brookson)		available	
395	[reserved for CR 33.102-023r1 on Distribution of Authentication vectors between VLRs/SGSNs (rev. of S3-99369)]
	CR 33.102-023r1	S3-99369	R99	33.102		RB		outstanding (tbd by Rolf Blom)	
396	[reserved for CR 33.102-024r1 on Secure UMTS-GSM Interoperation (rev. of S3-99370) for S3#8]
	CR 33.102-024r1 	S3-99370	R99	33.102		RB		outstanding (tbd by Rolf Blom)	
397	[reserved for S3#7 report]	R								

Annex B: Participants

Name	Company	SDO	S3	SMG10	
Stefan Pütz, S3 Vice Chair	T-Mobil	ETSI	x	x	
Wael Adi	BOSCH TELECOM DANMARK A/S	ETSI	x	x	
Adnan Al-adnani	PANASONIC MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS	ETSI	-	-	
Stefan Andersson	ERICSSON L.M.	ETSI	-	-	
Hiroshi Aono	NTT DoCoMo	TTC	x	x	
Nigel Barnes	MOTOROLA Ltd	ETSI	-	-	
Stephen Beer	Dera	ETSI	x	x	
Colin Blanchard	BT	ETSI	x	x	
Rolf Blom	ERICSSON L.M.	ETSI	x	x	
Charles Brookson	DTI	ETSI	x	x	
Takeshi Chikazawa	Mitsubishi Electric Co.	ARIB	x	x	
Per Christoffersson	TELIA AB	ETSI	x	x	
Simon Corfield	Dera	ETSI	x	x	
Luc de Bie	Siemens Atea	ETSI	x	x	
Louis Finkelstein	Motorola	T1	x	-	
Masahiro Furuse	NTT DoCoMo	ARIB	-	-	
Günther Horn	SIEMENS AG	ETSI	x	-	
Peter Howard	VODAFONE Group Plc	ETSI	x	x	
Brian King	Motorola Inc.	T1	-	-	
Mariko Kishi	Mitsubishi Electric Co.	ARIB	-	-	
Geir Køien 	TELENOR AS	ETSI	x	x	
Michael Marcovici	Lucent Technologies	T1	x	-	
Semyon Mizikovsky	Lucent Technologies	T1		-	
Sebastien Nguyen Ngoc	France Telecom	ETSI	x	-	
Valtteri Niemi	NOKIA Corporation	ETSI	x	x	
Petri Nyberg	Sonera Corp.	ETSI	x	-	
Ludovic Rousseau	GEMPLUS Card International	ETSI	x	x	
Roland Schmitz	Deutsche Telekom AG	ETSI	-	-	
Benno Tietz	Mannesmann Mobilfunk	ETSI	x	x	
Marco Tosalli	TELECOM ITALIA S.p.A.	ETSI	-	-	
Peter Trautmann	BMWi	ETSI	x	-	
Bart Vinck	Siemens Atea NV	ETSI	x	-	
Berthold Wilhelm	BMWi	ETSI	-	-	
Ansgar Bergmann (Secretary)	ETSI	ETSI	x	x	
x = participated
Annex C: Decision of S3#7 
For decisions on CRs, Liaison Statements and Specifications, see Annex E, F and G. 
•	S3#7 endorsed the proposal of a joint AHAG / S3 meeting in the week 10-14 April. It was agreed to extend the date from Tuesday to Friday (11-14) and to propose the joint meeting for Tuesday and Wednesday morning.
•	The way decided for GSM at last SMG10 meeting (to require in the specifications that the ME resists against attempts to change the IMEI, see CRs in AP99-101) should also be a minimum requirement for the solution for 3GPP R99.
•	Conclusion of S3#7:
(1)	Integrity protection for user data in general: The working assumption is that for some applications, ciphering is sufficient, for other applications, integrity protection would be a matter for the application.
(2)	When SMS is sent in a sublayer of CM (as it is currently the case), that is in the signalling plane, integrity protection (between MS and RAN) is provided anyhow. If SMS is sent in the user plane (currently not foreseen), (1) applies.
•	S3-99387 was agreed. S3 will develop the necessary consequences to the 3GPP specifications, and endorse the liaison function taken by Bart Vinck between 3GPP2 and 3GPP.

Annex D: Action points from S3#7
•	Ansgar Bergmann to create S3-99343, LS to RAN3, cc to RAN2, RAN and T2, to be sent as response to the draft LS in S3-99307, with CR 33.102-013 (S3-99233) attached. 
•	Integrity protection for SMS should be included (e.g., as a protected mode which can or can't be applied). CR required for S3#8.
•	Integrity protection for general user data: This should be removed or completed. At S3#7, a principle agreement was reached. Possibly CRs required for S3#8.
•	TS 33.107 to be prepared for SA approval at SA#8.
•	Charles Brookson to draft some text for a press release, making a wider public aware of the 3GPP security specifications: This should be done after SA#6.
•	Geir Køien to contact S2 and to agree a short paper sketching what the contents of the S2 presentation on mobile IP to S3 should be. Interested S3 delegates should join the activity. (S3 delegate Stephen Beer indicated his participation.)
•	S3-99377: RB to draft an answer as S3-99393 after S3#7. 
•	Colin Blanchard to co-ordinate an e-mail group to further study MExE security aspects and to respond to the LS in S3-99297 and S3-99379; to prepare proposals for MExE security at S3#8.
•	Wael Adi to co-ordinate an e-mail group to elaborate proposals how to proceed on IMEI security. E-mails should be sent to the S3 e-mail exploder and should contain the string "IMEI security" as sub-string of the subject field. 
•	Bart Vinck will draft a CR to 21.133 to reflect the working assumption on SMS and user data integrity protection.
•	PH to draft a CR 33.102-025 to shorten KSI to 3bits (to become S3-99389).
•	RB to create S3-99395, CR 33.102-023r1 on Distribution of Authentication vectors between VLRs/SGSNs (rev. of S3-99369).
•	RB to create S3-99396, CR 33.102-024r1 on Secure UMTS-GSM Interoperation (rev. of S3-99370) for S3#8.
•	Some further minor changes to 33.103 will be necessary: KSI (3 bits), AUTN (112-144 bits), GI instead of GMSI.
•	GH to provide an updated main part of 33.902, some sentences for the scope and a CR for addition of the second paper.

Annex E: Status of CRs
WG_STATUS	SPEC	CR	REV	SUBJECT	CAT	WG_DOC	VERS_CURRENT	DATE	SOURCE	WG_RESPON	WG_MEETING	3G_WORKITEM	LINKED_CRS	REMARKS	
revision requested	33.102	022		Refinement of Enhanced User Identity Confidentiality	C	S3-99361	3.2.0		MMO	S3	S3#7	Security Architecture EUIC			
revision requested	33.102	023		Distribution of Authentication vectors between VLRs/SGSNs	C	S3-99369	3.2.0		Ericsson	S3	S3#7				
revision requested	33.102	024		Secure UMTS-GSM Interoperation	C	S3-99370	3.2.0		Ericsson	S3	S3#7				
not yet available	33.102	025		Length of KSI	C	S3-99389	3.2.0		Vodafone	S3	after S3#7			document not yet available	
revision requested	33.103	001		Refinement of Enhanced User Identity Confidentiality	C	S3-99362	3.0.0		MMO	S3	S3#7				
revised	33.103	002		Corrections to figure 1	D	S3-99383	3.0.0	25/10/99	DERA	S3	S3#7				
agreed	33.103	002	1	Corrections to figure 1	D	S3-99390	3.0.0	27/10/99	S3	S3	S3#7				
agreed	33.105	004		Time variant parameter for synchronisation of ciphering	D	S3-99384	3.1.0	26/10/99	S3	S3	S3#7				

Annex F: Liaison Statements from S3#7
•	S3-99378, liaison from R3 on Common Identification for Relocation Co-ordination: As an answer, the LS in S3-99302 was approved.
•	The LS in S3-99388 with attached S3-99391 was approved.
Annex G: Specifications for approval / information at SA#6
None so far.