Source: SA WG3 (Security)

Title: CR to 33.234: Requirement on keeping WLAN access keys

independent from 2G/3G access keys stored in USIM (Rel-6)

Document for: Approval

Agenda Item: 7.3.3

SA Doc	Spec	CR	Rev	Phase	Subject	Cat	Version-Current	SA WG3 Doc	Workitem
number								number	
SP-040392	33.234	009	-		Requirement on keeping WLAN access keys independent from 2G/3G access keys stored in USIM	F	6.0.0	S3-040441	WLAN

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Clauses affected: # 6.1

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not correct.

connection establishment, because the key set reads out from the smart card is

Other specs affected:	#	X	Other core specifications Test specifications O&M Specifications	₩	
Other comments:	H				

*** START CHANGE***

6 Security mechanisms

6.1 Authentication and key agreement

The WLAN UE and AAA server shall support both EAP AKA and EAP SIM methods. The procedure to select the method is:

- 1) The WLAN UE shall send an identity (whatever it is: permanent, pseudonym, etc.) to the AAA server. If this identity is an IMSI, it shall contain an indication of the EAP method to be used.
- 2) If the AAA server recognizes the EAP method but not the user identity (for example an obsolete pseudonym), it shall request a new identity using the EAP method indicated by the WLAN UE.
- 3) If the AAA server recognizes the user identity (and hence the EAP method), it shall fetch AVs from HSS. If they don't match the EAP method received (e.g. the EAP method received is EAP AKA and triplets are received from HSS), the user's subscription shall prevail (in the previous example EAP SIM shall be used).
- 4) If the user identity is not recognized, the AAA server shall decide which method to use (there may exist a default method ONLY in this situation). If this default method does not match user's subscription (e.g. EAP AKA for a SIM user), the WLAN UE shall respond a NACK to the AAA server and then the AAA shall try with the other EAP method until a recognised identity is received.

The authentication and key agreement shall be dedicated for WLAN access only, thus the keys provided by the SIM (Kc) or USIM (CK, IK) during authentication and key agreement shall be stored in the ME's volatile memory.

*** END OF CHANGE***