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**Source:** SA WG3  
**Title:** CR to 33.203: Modification of the security association lifetime management (Rel-5)  
**Document for:** Approval  
**Agenda Item:** 7.3.3

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Meet	SA Doc	TS No.	CR No	Rev	Rel	Cat	Subject	Vers. Current	Vers New	SAWG3 Doc
SP-21	SP-030484	33.203	043	-	Rel-5	F	Modification of the security association lifetime management	5.6.0	5.7.0	S3-030442

## CHANGE REQUEST

⌘ **TS 33.203 CR 043** ⌘ rev      ⌘ Current version: **5.6.0** ⌘

For **HELP** on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the ⌘ symbols.

**Proposed change affects:** UICC apps  ME  Radio Access Network  Core Network


<b>Title:</b>	⌘	Modification of the security association lifetime management	
<b>Source:</b>	⌘	SA WG3	
<b>Work item code:</b>	⌘	IMS-ASEC	<b>Date:</b> ⌘ 18/07/2003
<b>Category:</b>	⌘	<b>F</b>	<b>Release:</b> ⌘ Rel-5
		<i>Use one of the following categories:</i> <b>F</b> (correction) <b>A</b> (corresponds to a correction in an earlier release) <b>B</b> (addition of feature), <b>C</b> (functional modification of feature) <b>D</b> (editorial modification) Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP <a href="#">TR 21.900</a> .	<i>Use one of the following releases:</i> <b>2</b> (GSM Phase 2) <b>R96</b> (Release 1996) <b>R97</b> (Release 1997) <b>R98</b> (Release 1998) <b>R99</b> (Release 1999) <b>Rel-4</b> (Release 4) <b>Rel-5</b> (Release 5) <b>Rel-6</b> (Release 6)

<b>Reason for change:</b>	⌘	Some of the current security association lifetime management is unclear, inconsistent and incomplete.
<b>Summary of change:</b>	⌘	The setting of the a lifetime in section 7.1 is removed, as it is covered in section 7.4.1a. The method of setting of the security associations lifetime is made more explicit. It is also stated that all SAs should be deleted once all IMPUs are de-registered.
<b>Consequences if not approved:</b>	⌘	Inconsistence and unclear statements would be left in the specification, which could possibly cause incompatible implementations.

<b>Clauses affected:</b>	⌘	6.1.4, 7.1, 7.4.1a, 7.4.2a										
<b>Other specs affected:</b>	⌘	<table border="1" style="display: inline-table; border-collapse: collapse;"> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">Y</td> <td style="padding: 2px;">N</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;">X</td> <td style="padding: 2px;"></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;"></td> <td style="padding: 2px;">X</td> </tr> <tr> <td style="padding: 2px;"></td> <td style="padding: 2px;">X</td> </tr> </table>	Y	N	X			X		X	Other core specifications	⌘ TS 24.229, TS 24.228
		Y	N									
		X										
	X											
	X											
	X	Test specifications										
	X	O&M Specifications										
<b>Other comments:</b>	⌘											

## 6.1.4 Network Initiated authentications

In order to authenticate an already registered user, the S-CSCF shall send a request to the UE to initiate a re-registration procedure. When received at the S-CSCF, the re-registration shall trigger a new IMS AKA procedure that will allow the S-CSCF to re-authenticate the user.



~~Both the UE and the P-CSCF shall shorten the lifetime of the old SA pair generated from the last successful authentication, so as to guarantee that the new SA pair shall be used.~~

The UE shall initiate the re-registration on the reception of the Authentication Required indication. In the event that the UE does not initiate the re-registration procedure after the request from the S-CSCF, the S-CSCF may decide to de-register the subscriber or re-issue an Authentication-Required.

## 7.1 Security association parameters

For protecting IMS signaling between the UE and the P-CSCF it is necessary to agree on shared keys that are provided by IMS AKA, and a set of parameters specific to a protection method. The security mode setup (cf. clause 7.2) is used to negotiate the SA parameters required for IPsec ESP with authentication, but without confidentiality.

The SA parameters that shall be negotiated between UE and P-CSCF in the security mode set-up procedure, are:

### - Integrity algorithm

NOTE: What is called "authentication algorithm" in [13] is called "integrity algorithm" in this specification in order to be in line with the terminology used in other 3GPP specifications and, in particular, to avoid confusion with the authentication algorithms used in the AKA protocol.

The integrity algorithm is either HMAC-MD5-96 [15] or HMAC-SHA-1-96 [16].

Both integrity algorithms shall be supported by both, the UE and the P-CSCF as mandated by [13]. In the unlikely event that one of the integrity algorithms is compromised during the lifetime of this specification, this algorithm shall no longer be supported.

NOTE: If only one of the two integrity algorithms is compromised then it suffices for the IMS to remain secure that the algorithm is no longer supported by any P-CSCF. The security mode set-up procedure (cf. clause 7.2) will then ensure that the other integrity algorithm is selected.

### - SPI (Security Parameter Index)

The SPI is allocated locally for inbound SAs. The triple (SPI, destination IP address, security protocol) uniquely identifies an SA at the IP layer. The UE shall select the SPIs uniquely, and different from any SPIs that might be used in any existing SAs (i.e. inbound and outbound SAs). The SPIs selected by the P-CSCF shall be different than the SPIs sent by the UE, cf. section 7.2.

NOTE: This allocation of SPIs ensures that protected messages in the uplink always differ from protected messages in the downlink in, at least, the SPI field. This thwarts reflection attacks. When several applications use IPsec on the same physical interface the SIP application should be allocated a separate range of SPIs.

### The following SA parameters are not negotiated:

- Life type: the life type is always seconds;
- SA duration: the SA duration has a fixed length of  $2^{32}-1$ ;

NOTE: The SA duration is a network layer concept. From a practical point of view, the value chosen for "SA duration" does not impose any limit on the lifetime of an SA at the network layer. The SA lifetime is controlled by the SIP application as specified in clause 7.4.

- Mode: transport mode;
- Key length: the length of the integrity key  $IK_{ESP}$  depends on the integrity algorithm. It is 128 bits for HMAC-MD5-96 and 160 bits for HMAC-SHA-1-96.

### Selectors:

The security associations (SA) have to be bound to specific parameters (selectors) of the SIP flows between UE and P-CSCF, i.e. source and destination IP addresses, transport protocols that share the SA, and source and destination ports.

- IP addresses are bound to a pair of SAs, as in clause 6.3, as follows:
  - inbound SA at the P-CSCF:  
The source and destination IP addresses associated with the SA are identical to those in the header of the IP packet in which the initial SIP REGISTER message was received by the P-CSCF.

- outbound SA at the P-CSCF:  
the source IP address bound to the outbound SA equals the destination IP address bound to the inbound SA;  
the destination IP address bound to the outbound SA equals the source IP address bound to the inbound SA.

NOTE: This implies that the source and destination IP addresses in the header of the IP packet in which the protected SIP REGISTER message was received by the P-CSCF need to be the same as those in the header of the IP packet in which the initial SIP REGISTER message was received by the P-CSCF.

- The transport protocol selector shall allow UDP and TCP.
- Ports:
  1. The P-CSCF receives messages protected with ESP from any UE on one fixed port (the "protected port") different from the standard SIP port 5060. The number of the protected port is communicated to the UE during the security mode set-up procedure, cf. clause 7.2. For every protected request towards UE, the P-CSCF shall insert the protected port into Via header. No unprotected messages shall be sent from or received on this port. From a security point of view, the P-CSCF may receive unprotected messages from any UE on any port which is different from the protected port.

NOTE: The protected port is fixed for a particular P-CSCF, but may be different for different P-CSCFs.

2. For protected or unprotected outbound messages from the P-CSCF (inbound for the UE) any source port number may be used at the P-CSCF from a security point of view.
3. For each security association, the UE assigns a local port to send or receive protected messages to and from the P-CSCF ("protected port"). No unprotected messages shall be sent to or received on this port. The UE shall use a single protected port number for both TCP and UDP connections. The port number is communicated to the P-CSCF during the security mode set-up procedure, cf. clause 7.2. When the UE sends a re-REGISTER request, it shall always pick up a new port number and send it to the network. If the UE is not challenged by the network, the port number shall be obsolete. Annex H of this specification gives detail how the port number is populated in SIP message. From a security point of view, the UE may send or receive unprotected messages to or from the P-CSCF on any ports which are not the protected ports.
4. The P-CSCF is allowed to receive only REGISTER messages on unprotected ports. All other messages not arriving on the protected port shall be discarded by the P-CSCF.
5. For every protected request, the UE shall insert the protected port of the corresponding SA into Via header. The UE is allowed to receive only the following messages on an unprotected port:
  - responses to unprotected REGISTER messages;
  - error messages.

All other messages not arriving on a protected port shall be discarded by the UE.

The following rules apply:

1. For each SA which has been established and has not expired, the SIP application at the P-CSCF stores at least the following data: (UE\_IP\_address, UE\_protected\_port, SPI, IMPI, IMPU1, ... , IMPUn, lifetime) in an "SA\_table".

NOTE: The SPI is only required when initiating and deleting SAs in the P-CSCF. The SPI is not exchanged between IPsec and the SIP layer for incoming or outgoing SIP messages.

2. The SIP application at the P-CSCF shall check upon receipt of a protected REGISTER message that the pair (source IP address, source port) in the packet headers coincide with the UE's address pair (IP address, source port) inserted in the Via header of the protected REGISTER message. If the Via header does not explicitly contain the UE's address pair, but rather a symbolic name then the P-CSCF shall first resolve the symbolic name by suitable means to obtain an address pair.
3. The SIP application at the P-CSCF shall check upon receipt of an initial REGISTER message that the pair (UE\_IP\_address, UE\_protected\_port), where the UE\_IP\_address is the source IP address in the packet header and the protected port is sent as part of the security mode set-up procedure (cf. clause 7.2), has not yet been associated with entries in the "SA\_table". Furthermore, the P-CSCF shall check that, for any one IMPI, no more

than three SAs per direction are stored at any one time. If these checks are unsuccessful the registration is aborted and a suitable error message is sent to the UE.

NOTE: According to clause 7.4 on SA handling, at most three SAs per direction may exist at a P-CSCF for one user at any one time.

4. For each incoming protected message the SIP application at the P-CSCF shall verify that the correct inbound SA according to clause 7.4 on SA handling has been used. The SA is identified by the pair (UE\_IP\_address, UE\_protected\_port) in the "SA\_table". The SIP application at the P-CSCF shall further check that the IMPU associated with the SA in the "SA\_table" and the IMPU in the received SIP message coincide. If this is not the case the message shall be discarded.
5. For each SA which has been established and has not expired, the SIP application at the UE stores at least the following data: (UE\_protected\_port, SPI, lifetime) in an "SA\_table".

NOTE: The SPI is only required to initiate and delete SAs in the UE. The SPI is not exchanged between IPsec and the SIP layer for incoming or outgoing SIP messages.

6. When establishing a new pair of SAs (cf. clause 6.3) the SIP application at the UE shall ensure that the selected number for the protected port, as well as SPI number, do not correspond to an entry in the "SA\_table".

NOTE: Regarding the selection of the number of the protected port at the UE it is generally recommended that the UE randomly selects the number of the protected port from a sufficiently large set of numbers not yet allocated at the UE. This is to thwart a limited form of a Denial of Service attack. UMTS PS access link security also helps to thwart this attack.

7. For each incoming protected message the SIP application at the UE shall verify that the correct inbound SA according to clause 7.4 on SA handling has been used. The SA is identified by UE\_protected\_port in the "SA\_table". The source port selector is set to be a wildcard in the UE's IPsec database.

NOTE: If the integrity check of a received packet fails then IPsec will automatically discard the packet.

~~8. The lifetime of an SA at the application layer between the UE and the P-CSCF shall equal the registration period.~~

### 7.4.1a Management of security associations in the UE

The UE shall be involved in only one registration procedure at a time, i.e. the UE shall remove any data relating to any previous incomplete registrations or authentications, including any SAs created by an incomplete authentication.

The UE may start a registration procedure with an existing pair of SAs. This will be referred to as the old SAs. The authentication produces a pair of new SAs. These new SAs shall not be used to protect non-authentication traffic until noted during the authentication flow. In the same way, certain messages in the authentication shall be protected with a particular SA. If the UE receives a message protected with the incorrect SA, it shall discard the message.

A successful authentication proceeds in the following steps:

- The UE sends the SM1 message to register with the IMS. If SM1 was protected, it shall be protected with the old outbound SA.
- The UE receives an authentication challenge in a message (SM6) from the P-CSCF. This message shall be protected with the old inbound SA if SM1 was protected and unprotected otherwise.
- If this message SM6 can be successfully processed by the UE, the UE creates the new SAs, which are derived according to section 7.1. The lifetime of the new SAs shall be set to allow enough time to complete the registration procedure. The UE then sends its response (SM7) to the P-CSCF, which shall be protected with the new outbound SA. Meanwhile, if SM1 was protected, the UE shall use the old SAs for messages other than those in the authentication, until a successful message of new authentication is received (SM12); if SM1 was unprotected, the UE is not allowed to use IMS service until it receives an authentication successful message (SM12).
- The UE receives an authentication successful message (SM12) from the P-CSCF. It shall be protected with the new inbound SA.

—After the successful processing of this message by the UE, the registration is complete. The UE sets the lifetime of the new SAs ~~using the maximum of registration timer in the message and the lifetime of the old SAs~~ such that it either equals the latest lifetime of the old SAs or it will expire shortly after the registration timer in the message, depending which gives the SAs the longer life. For further traffic sent from UE, the new outbound SA is used. The old outbound SA is ~~are~~ now deleted. The old inbound SA is kept for receiving messages from P-CSCF. It shall be deleted when either lifetime is expired, or a further SIP message protected with the new inbound SA is successfully received from the P-CSCF. The new SAs are used to protect all traffic.

A failure in the authentication can occur for several reasons. If the SM1 was not protected, then no protection shall be applied to the failure messages, except the user authentication failure message which shall be protected with the new SA. If SM1 was protected, the old SAs shall be used to protect the failure messages. In both cases, after processing the failure message, the UE shall delete the new SAs.

The UE shall monitor the expiry time of registrations without an authentication and if necessary increase ~~adjust~~ the lifetime of the SAs ~~created by the last successful authentication such that it will expire shortly after the registration timer in the message~~ it holds to ensure that they live longer than the expiry time given in the registration.

Note: In particular this means that the lifetime of a SA is never decreased.

The UE shall delete any SA whose lifetime is exceeded. The UE shall delete all SAs it holds once all the IMPUs are de-registered.

### 7.4.2 Void

#### 7.4.2a Management of security associations in the P-CSCF

When the S-CSCF initiates an authentication by sending a challenge to the UE, the P-CSCF may already contain existing SAs from previously completed authentications. It may also contain an existing pair of SAs from an incomplete authentication. These will be referred to as the old and registration SAs respectively. The authentication produces a pair of new SAs. These new SAs shall not be used to protect non-authentication traffic until noted during the authentication

flow. Similarly certain messages in the authentication shall be protected with a particular SA. If the P-CSCF receives a message protected with the incorrect SA, it shall discard the message.

The P-CSCF associates the IMPI given in the registration procedure and all the successfully registered IMPUs related to that IMPI to an SA.

A successful authentication proceeds in the following steps:

- The P-CSCF receives the SM1 message. If SM1 is protected, it shall be protected with the old inbound SA.
- The P-CSCF forwards the message containing the challenge (SM6) to the UE. This shall be protected with the old outbound SA, if SM1 was protected and unprotected otherwise.
- The P-CSCF then creates the new SAs, which are derived according to section 7.1. The expiry time of the new SAs shall be set to allow enough time to complete the registration procedure. The registration SAs shall be deleted if they exist.
- The P-CSCF receives the message carrying the response (SM7) from the UE. It shall be protected using the new inbound SA. If SM1 was protected, the old SAs are used to protect messages other than those in the authentication.
- The P-CSCF forwards the successful registration message (SM12) to the UE. It shall be protected using the new outbound SA. This completes the registration procedure for the P-CSCF. The P-CSCF sets the expiry time of the new SAs such that they either equals the latest lifetime of the old SAs or it will expire shortly after the registration timer in the message, depending which gives the SAs the longer life~~equal to the maximum of registration timer in the message and the lifetime of the old SAs.~~
- After SM12 is sent, the P-CSCF handles the UE related SAs according to following rules:
  - If there are old SAs, but SM1 is received unprotected, the P-CSCF considers error cases happened, and assumes UE does not have those old SAs for use. In this case the P-CSCF shall remove the old SAs.
  - If SM1 is protected with an old valid SA, the P-CSCF keeps this inbound SA and the corresponding outbound SA with the UE active, and continues to use them. Any other old SAs are deleted. The kept old SAs are deleted when either the old SAs lifetime are expired, or a further SIP message protected with the new inbound SA is successfully received from the UE. Then further messages are protected with new SAs. This completes the SA handling procedure for the P-CSCF.

A failure in the authentication can occur for several reasons. If the SM1 was not protected, then no protection shall be applied to the failure messages, except the user authentication failure message which shall be protected with the new SA. If SM1 was protected, the old SAs shall be used to protect the failure messages. In both cases, after processing the failure message, the P-CSCF shall delete the new SAs.

The P-CSCF shall monitor the expiry time of registrations without an authentication and if necessary increase ~~adjust~~ the lifetime of SAs created by the last successful authentication such that it will expire shortly after the registration timer in the message~~it holds to ensure that they live longer than the expiry time given in the registration.~~

Note: In particular this means that the lifetime of a SA is never decreased.

The P-CSCF shall delete any SA whose lifetime is exceeded. The P-CSCF shall delete all SAs it holds that are associated with a particular IMPI once all the associated IMPUs are de-registered.