Technical Specification Group Services and System Aspects **TSGS#21(03)0483** Meeting #21, Frankfurt, Germany, 22-25 September 2003

Source:SA WG3Title:CR to 33.203: Introducing Cipher key Expansion for IMS (Rel-6)Document for:ApprovalAgenda Item:7.3.3

Meet	SA Doc	TS No.	CR No	Rev	Rel	Cat	Subject	Vers. Curre nt	Vers New	SAWG3 Doc
SP-21	SP-030483	33.203	042	-	Rel-6	В	Introducing Cipher key Expansion for IMS	5.6.0	6.0.0	S3-030375

CHANGE REQUEST									
ж	TS 33.20	<mark>3</mark> CR	042	жrev	Ж	Current versi	ion: 5.	6.0	ж
For HELP on using this form, see bottom of this page or look at the pop-up text over the # symbols.									
Proposed cl	hange affects:	UICC a	apps#	MEX	Radio	Access Networ	k Co	ore Ne	twork X
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Source:	ж	SA V	WG3									
Work item code:	ж	IMS	-ASEC					Ľ	Date: ೫	29/06/	2003	
Category:	ж	В						Rele	ase: ೫	Rel-6		
		Use	one of the	e following	categories:			Use	e <u>one</u> of	the follow	ving relea	ses:
			F (correc	ction)				2	2	(GSM Pł	nase 2)	
			A (corres	sponds to a	a correction	in an ea	rlier release	e)	R96	(Release	996) (
			B (additi	on of featu	ıre),				R97	(Release	997)	
			C (functi	onal modif	ication of fe	ature)			R98	(Release	1998)	
			D (editor	ial modific	ation)				R99	(Release	e 1999)	
		Deta	ailed expla	nations of	the above of	categorie	s can		Rel-4	(Release	e 4)	
		be fo	ound in 30	GPP <u>TR 21</u>	<u>.900</u> .				Rel-5	(Release	e 5)	
									Rel-6	(Release	e 6)	

Reason for change: अ	Currently there is no confidentiality protection for Release 5 IMS between the UE and the P-CSCF. The mechanism in place in Relase 5 is the use of protection as defined in TS33.102 between the UE and the RNC. The aim for the access security was to create a framework that is independent of underlying security. This CR introduces the key expansion function for the encryption key.								
Summary of change: भ	The change introduces a key expansion function for confidentiality protection								
Consequences if # not approved:	Consistent will be no key expansion function in the TS which is required for confidentiality protection								
Clauses affected: #	Annex I								
Other specs ₩ affected:	YNXOther core specifications#XTest specificationsXO&M Specifications								
Other comments: #	8								

Annex I (normative): Key expansion functions for IPsec ESP

Integrity Keys:

If the selected authentication algorithm is HMAC-MD5-96 then $IK_{ESP} = IK_{IM}$.

If the selected authentication algorithm is HMAC-SHA-1-96 then $\rm IK_{ESP}$ is obtained from $\rm IK_{IM}$ by appending 32 zero bits to the end of $\rm IK_{IM}$ to create a 160-bit string.

Encryption keys:

Divide CK_{IM} into two blocks of 64 bits each :

 $\underline{CK_{IM}} = \underline{CK_{IM1}} \parallel \underline{CK_{IM2}}$

Where CK IM1 are the 64 most significant bits and CK IM2 are the 64 least significant bits.

The key for DES-EDE3-CBC is then defined to be

 $\underline{CK}_{\underline{ESP}} = \underline{CK}_{\underline{IM1}} \parallel \underline{CK}_{\underline{IM2}} \parallel \underline{CK}_{\underline{IM1}},$

after adjusting parity bits to comply with [20].

[Editors Note: Should AES be implemented in Release 6 time frame the input key to AES shall be CK_{IM}]