3GPP TSG-RAN WG3 #116-e R3-223718

Online, 9th - 19th May 2022

Agenda Item: 9.3.7

Source: Ericsson (moderator)

Title: Summary of Offline Discussion on CB: #5\_Protocol\_Support

Document for: Approval

# Introduction

The chair summary is as follows

**CB: # 5\_ProtocolSupport**

**- For approach2, for NG and S1 interface, add a new RACS IE or other forms (e.g., a feature list) with criticality set to “reject” in the source-to-target Transparent container and the Criticality Diagnostics in the target to source node failure transparent container? Huawei, China Unicom, China Telecom**

**- Define a generic toolset for target functionality detection at source side including inclusion of the Criticality Diagnostics IE in the Target NG-RAN Node to Source NG-RAN Node Failure Transparent Container IE, and inclusion of a report on IE presence as received by the target NG-RAN node in the Target NG-RAN Node to Source NG-RAN Node Transparent Container IE? Qualcomm Incorporated, Vodafone**

**- The Source NG-RAN Node to Target NG-RAN Node Transparent Container IE contains a NGAP IE Support Information Request List IE which includes NGAP Protocol IE Ids for which the target NG-RAN node responses within a Response List in either the Target NG-RAN Node to Source NG-RAN Node Transparent Container IE or the Target NG-RAN Node to Source NG-RAN Node Transparent Failure Transparent Container IE its level of support? E///**

**- Down select the solutions, capture agreements**

**- Provide CRs if agreeable**

(E/// - moderator)

Summary of offline disc [R3-223718](file:///C:\Users\llopes\OneDrive%20-%20Qualcomm\Documents\3%20RAN3\RAN3%20116\Inbox\Drafts\CB%20%23%205_ProtocolSupport\Inbox\R3-223718.zip)

# For the Chairman’s Notes

to be added

# Discussion first round

## Introducing the *Criticality Diagnostics* IE in a CN transparent HO container

The moderator excuses for the blunt approach in the first topic on Criticality Diagnostics, but looking into the history of the discussion, we have decided very early that we abstain from including *Criticality Diagnostics* IE into any of the CN transparent HO containers. One of the consequences was to not include in any of the CN transparent HO containers (new) IEs with criticality set to "reject".

The moderator asks to confirm the agreement to not include *Criticality Diagnostics* IE in CN transparent HO containers and to not set the criticality of an IEs in those containers to "reject".

Please explain whether you confirm this approach and, in case, explain why you can't.

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| Company | Comment |
| Ericsson | Staying with the outlined agreements is preferred. |
| Qualcomm | We are not 100% sure what the exact agreement was! But what we are proposing (as part of a package) is to let the source have visibility of the criticality diagnostics sent to the AMF in the failure message. This is independent of whether there are any items with criticality “reject” in the transparent container (we are fine to assume none), and requires no real new functionality in the target. In some cases, this could allow faster detection of issues at the target side, for example realizing that the target gNB does not support some IE that comes from the AMF, but is not explicitly asked about. |
| Huawei | To be honest, we can not recall that we had such agreement before: not include the *Criticality Diagnostics* IE in CN transparent HO containers.  Note that as indicated in this R3-223334, the *criticality* *Diagnostics* in the transparent container is not a new concept, which is already included in terms of the NG-RAN/AMF/ SMF.  But we are fine with majority views to move forward. |
| CATT | Fine with Moderator’s proposal. |

## Introduce in NGAP an approach to query support of a certain IE from the target NG-RAN node based on the IE's IE-ID.

Two companies suggest to include the possibility to query support of protocol functions related to an IE based on the IE's IE ID on the interface instance via which the NGAP HANDOVER REQUEST message has been received, see R3-223374 and R3-223376.

NOTE: This implies that not only the target NG-RAN node's support is indicated, but also the functional support of the serving CN entities.

Please provided your view whether you can agree to such approach in general, and explain why in case you cannot.

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| Company | Comment |
| Ericsson | We are happy to see that another company had the same/a similar view on how to provide a general solution. |
| Qualcomm | We are also happy to explore this route, there are of course some differences of detail for further discussion. |
| Huawei | First good to see new “generic” approach(s).  We understand this approach can support RACS like feature, with defined NGAP IE ID.  But we may ask how this approach could support the RedCap like feature, i.e. without specific NGAP IE. In this case, the source node can not include the NGAP IE ID in the source-to-target container. But the approach#2 in R3-223334 can cover all cases. |
| CATT | Thanks QC for bringing the new solution.  Share the similar view with HW, even if with this approach, the source NG-RAN node may not be able to get the some capabilities of the target RAN node, as some functions may have no specific parameters over NGAP. |

## If the "IE ID support" approach is agreeable, is there a need to introduce an explicit support indication for RACS?

Please provide your answer to the question, if possible with some reasoning.

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| Company | Comment |
| Ericsson | we would assume that the general mechanism would serve the same purpose than an explicit indication. We would not understand why an explicit support indication would be necessary. |
| Qualcomm | As explained in our paper, we see this as a general approach for new use cases from now on. However for RACS we think that the S1AP approach can be simply copied as a one-off in order to have a unified RACS solution and not complicate the logic depending on source/target combinations. |
| Huawei | Agree with Ericsson, if the generic approach is finally selected, no need to introduce new things for RACS. |
| CATT | Agree with Ericsson and HW, if a generic mechanism is adopted, no need to introduce an explicit support indication for RACS. |

## Details on the "common approach" -

### Agree on R3-223376 as baseline

Would it be possible to take R3-223376 as baseline for the following details:

* The Source NG-RAN Node to Target NG-RAN Node Transparent Container IE contains the new *NGAP IE Support Information Request List* IE
* The Target NG-RAN Node to Source NG-RAN Node Transparent Container IE and the Target NG-RAN Node to Source NG-RAN Node Failure Transparent Container IE contains the new *NGAP IE Support Information Response List* IE.
* The *NGAP IE Support Information Response List* IE contains an *NGAP Protocol IE Support Information* IE.
* The maximum number of IE-IDs exchanged in the new IEs as low as 32.
* No need to include a "remote" criticality diagnostics in the "failure" transparent container as suggested in R3-223374.

Please provide your view.

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| Company | Comment |
| Ericsson | we would be happy to take the lead on the NGAP CR with the above assumptions. |
| Qualcomm | Ok to take 3376 as baseline subject to going over the detail  First four points above are ok but would like name of all IEs to be kept open, i.e. subject to content etc  Last point already discussed above: this could be part of a general solution without necessarily any impact on setting criticality to “reject” in TC. |
| Huawei | Agree to take it as baseline.  But a few questions.  For 2), why “the Target NG-RAN Node to Source NG-RAN Node **Failure** Transparent Container IE” includes the new *NGAP IE Support Information Response List* IE, reporting “supported” or “Not supported”?   * if reporting “supported”, why the failure happens? * If reporting “not supported”, how could the legacy node can report it?   For 5), agree. |
| CATT | Agree to take 3376 as baseline. |

### "IE Presence" IE (outside/inside transparent container)

R3-223374 suggests to introduce an *IE Presence* IE to indicated whether the IE-ID refers to an IE which is received outside or inside the transparent container, or both.

Please provide your view whether the suggestion is acceptable/necessary.

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| Company | Comment |
| Ericsson | So far, TS rapporteurs tried to distinguish re-used IE type definitions by allocating different IE-IDs. We believe that with such protocol design approach the suggested *IE Presence* IE is not necessary. |
| Qualcomm | Actually, there is a subtlety. The concept in 3374 was that an IE would only be reported if present somewhere in the received message (and then the rest is detail). So the source would know if e.g. the target AMF is sending a certain IE to the target gNB. Our understanding is that 3376 is more generic, i.e. support of an IE is reported regardless of presence in the message.  It would be good first to agree / confirm that this is acceptable, i.e. that support of an IE could be given in general, and not message-specific, and that it can be provided irrespective of whether the IE is present. Our view in 3374 was that support / understanding remained linked to the context of the HANDOVER REQUIRED message. It seems strange for example for the target to report on support of an IE that is not used in that message.  In any case, even if this is agreed, it seems useful to know of the presence of the IE in the received message at the target. In other words, if the source asks for the UE Radio Cap ID IE support, it wants to know both whether it is supported and whether it is present in the message from the AMF. So we think something like this is useful.  Regarding use of different IE IDs, we are not really sure this is always the case, or can be relied upon for the future, but can discuss this in a second step. |
| Huawei | So far we don’t see the need of this IE (not fully understand what “outside/inside container” means).  But we agree Qualcomm that some thinking should be considered. E.g., we should focus on the IEs may not be present in the handover Request message, thus handover is failed. Is this reason to include the IE code to the target to source **failure** transparent container? |
| CATT | Based on the above discussion, if we only focus on the NGAP IE Support*,* the *IE presence* proposed in 3374 is not needed. |

### Enumeration "no information available" in *NGAP Protocol IE Support Information*

R3-223376 suggests indicating the NGAP protocol IE support not only by means of 2 codepoints (supported/not supported) but also enable a kind of "don’t know (yet)" response.

NOTE: in R3-223376, the IE description text in §9.3.1.y needs to updated.

Please provide your view whether the suggestion is acceptable/necessary.

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| Company | Comment |
| Ericsson | We think that such additional codepoint could make the final solution future proof. We agree that for RACS (and similar features) such is definitely not needed. |
| Qualcomm | We are not sure of the use case, but ok to think about it. Actually it could apply to the case of an IE that is not used in HANDOVER REQUEST… |
| Huawei | Not sure this use case. E.g., how to understand the differences between the “not support” or “no information available”? does the “not support” mean the IE is received but not supported?  Also could the “not support” or “no information available” be included in the successful target to source container? |
| CATT | We can take the enumerated values in 3376 as the baseline.  The code-points and corresponding usage may need to be further elaborated, e.g., whether the code-points for success and failure procedures are same or not? Whether the code-point “not support” could be applied in failure container? |

### any other aspect to be discussed

Please provide below any other important aspect which was forgotten by the rapporteur. You can also chose to add a new sub-chapter below.

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| Company | Comment |
| Huawei | We acknowledge the benefits of the new “generic” approach (with details to be further discussed at next round).  But we need to consider solutions to detect node capability for new features without any new NGAP IEs, e.g., RedCap like features. Then it means approach#2 in R3-223334 can cover all cases. |
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# Conclusion, Recommendations [if needed]

If needed

# References

1. R3-223334 "On node capability detection for non-direct-connected nodes" (Huawei, China Unicom, China Telecom), discussion
2. R3-223335 "On node capability detection for non-direct-connected nodes [Node\_Cap\_Dect]" (Huawei, China Unicom, China Telecom), CR TS 38.413
3. R3-223373 "Further discussion on RACS Capability Detection for NG handover (and generalizing detection of target functionality by source NG-RAN node)" (Qualcomm Incorporated, Vodafone), discussion
4. R3-223374 "Detection of RACS support at target during N2/S1 handover" (Qualcomm Incorporated, Vodafone) CR TS 38.413
5. R3-223375 "Exchange of protocol support at target RAN node for NG handover" (Ericsson), discussion
6. R3-223376 "Exchange of protocol support at target RAN node for NG handover" (Ericsson), CR TS 38.413