**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #124 S3-253705-r1**

**Wuhan, China, 13 - 17 October 2025**

**Source: CATT**

**Title: New Key Issue on authentication and authorization of UE connection setup with data collection NF with communication security**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda item: 5.2.6**

**Work Item: Study on Security for Core Network Enhanced Support for Artificial Intelligence (AI) / Machine Learning (ML) Phase 2**

**Comments**

Regarding to the endorsed S3-252990, security threats do not state a clear requirement. In addition, the mixed use of "UE related information" and "UE related data" causes ambiguity. It is proposed to revise security threats as following.

\* \* \* First Change \* \* \* \*

## Y.X Key Issue#X: Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF

### Y.X.1 Key issue details

The architecture requirement in clause 4.2 of TS 23.700-04 [xx] is that MNO has full controllability and visibility for standardized data. That means the training data between UE and the 5G core will be standardized and it is visible to 5G core and MNO will be data controller.

The key issue aims to address the security issues, such as authentication and authorization for the UE during the connection setup with the data collection network function (Naming and role of data collection function is TBD and subject to progress of TR 23.700-04). This will ensure only legit and authorized UE are able to share its data towards the Data collection NF.

Another aspect is to address the security issues, ensuring integrity and confidentiality of the UE related data between UE towards the 5GC Data collection NF as studied in KI#1 of TR 23.700-04 to meet requirements for AI/ML for NR air interface operation with UE-side model training.

So, the focus is to identify the means to authenticate and authorize the connection setup between UE and NF before the data transmission take place and to study security of the communication between UE and data collection NF during data transmission.

Editor’s Note: UE to 5GC interaction is ffs depending on progress by SA2.

### Y.X.2 Security threats

Lack of authentication and authorization for data collection may lead to unauthorized access to network services.

Lack of confidentiality, integrity protection in collecting UE related data can lead to disclosure and tampering of UE related information.

Tampering of UE related data in transit can also impact the quality of training data towards 5GC data collection NF and subsequently to external OTT servers.

Lack of user consent may lead to inadvertent UE data disclosure.

### Y.X.3 Potential security requirements

The 5GS should support authentication and authorization between UE and data collection NF before data transmission takes place.

Editor’s Note: Authentication and authorization between UE and data collection NF is ffs depending on progress on the architecture aspects by SA2.

The 5GS should support confidentiality, integrity and replay protection for data in transit between UE and data collection NF.

The 5GS should support user consent mechanism for data collection by the network depending on the local regulations and operator policies.

Editor’s note: whether user consent is applicable or not will be decided by SA3 based on SA2 progress.

\* \* \* End of Change \* \* \* \*