Tdoc List
2025-10-17 12:38
Agenda | Topic | TDoc | Title | Source | Type | For | Avail | Treated | Decision | Wdrn | Replaced-by | Replaces |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
1 | Agenda and Meeting Objectives | S3‑253100 | Agenda | SA WG3 Chair | agenda | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑253102 | Process for SA3#124 | SA WG3 Chair | other | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253103 | Detailed agenda planning | SA WG3 Chair | other | No |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
2 | Meeting Reports |   | ||||||||||
2.1 | Previous SA3 meeting report/s and SA report | S3‑253101 | Report from SA3#123 | MCC | report | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑253660 | Report from last SA plenary | WG Vice Chair | report | Information | Yes |
YesNokia queried about adding the checkpoint. NTT-Docomo answered that it wasn't clear for him what checkpoint really meant.
Huawei: RAN is concerned that if SA3 makes a decision that impacts them they would like to know in time, so that's the reason for the checkpoint.
| noted | No | ||||
2.2 | SA3-LI Report |   | ||||||||||
3 | Reports and Liaisons from other Groups | S3‑253106 | LS on control plane CIoT with overhead reduction | C1-255649 | LS in | Yes |
YesThree CRs related to this topic:
3245
3465
3524 (Qualcomm) accompanied with the WID in S3-253525.
Vivo reply LS in 244.
It was discussed whether a WID was needed. MCC added that Rel-19 was frozen and no new WIDs would be allowed. Qualcomm answered that this was for alignment, so MCC commented that cat-F and no WID would be the way to go. NTT-Docomo commented that TEI19 in this case would lose traceability of the work and whether the CT1 WID could be added here. MCC replied that only SA3 WID codes could be used. This was taken offline.
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑253245 | CR on alignment with CT1 on control plane CIoT with overhead reduction | vivo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253465 | Adding security requirements for the new EMM TRANSPORT message | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253524 | Adding NORDAT procedures to TS 33.401 | Qualcomm Incorporated, Eutelsat Group, Iridium, Viasat, Sateliot, Novamint, Skylo, Thales | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253525 | New WID on NORDAT security | Qualcomm Incorporated, Eutelsat Group, Iridium, Viasat, Sateliot, Novamint, Skylo, Thales | WID new | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253244 | Reply LS on control plane CIoT with overhead reduction | vivo | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253112 | LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training | R2-2506541 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑253278 | Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253346 | Reply LS on user consent for data collection at the UE for NW-side model training | Xiaomi EV Technology | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253553 | [draft] Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training | DOCOMO Communications Lab. | LS out | Approval | Yes |
YesVerizon, Ericsson, Vodafone: postpone the response to the next meeting.
NTT_Docomo: postponing would mean moving rel-19 things to next year, it's not good. If we decide to do it in Rel-20 postponing is better.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253805 | Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training | DOCOMO Communications Lab. | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253222 | Reply LS to RAN2 on user consent for AI/ML network data collection(R2-2506541) | Apple | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253223 | DP on user consent for AI/ML network data collection | Apple | discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253233 | Discussion on user consent for Network based data collection | OPPO | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253232 | Discussion on user consent for Network based data collection | OPPO | discussion | Discussion | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253234 | Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training | OPPO | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253248 | Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training | vivo | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253438 | Reply LS on user consent for data collection at the UE for NW-side model training | ZTE | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253635 | Reply LS on user consent for NW-side data collection | CATT | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253275 | KI on gNB based data collection | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253119 | Reply LS on LI requirements on IMS Data Channel | S2-2507657 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑253449 | Reply LS on decrypting the Data Channel context | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253806 | |||
S3‑253516 | LS reply on LI requirements on IMS Data Channel | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253806 | |||
S3‑253806 | LS reply on LI requirements on IMS Data Channel | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253516 | |||
S3‑253574 | Discussion on IMS Data Channel security and LI | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253654 | Corrections for IMS Data Channels and LI | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑253652 | |||
S3‑253575 | Reply LS on LI requirements on IMS Data Channel | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253806 | |||
S3‑253128 | LS on UE parameters update header security | C1-253719 | LS in | Yes |
YesRelated CRs in 3277, 3144,3577.
| postponed | No | |||||
S3‑253277 | Alignment CR for UPU Header | Nokia | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253662 | |||
S3‑253144 | Alignment CR for UPU Header Security | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesWrong version on the cover page.
| revised | No | S3‑253662 | |||
S3‑253662 | Alignment CR for UPU Header Security | Lenovo | CR | Approval | No |
YesIt was commented that this CR would be revised in the next meeting.
| agreed | No | S3‑253144 | |||
S3‑253577 | UPU security alignment | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253662 | |||
S3‑253276 | Reply LS on UE parameters update header security | Nokia | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253129 | Reply LS on Security related protocol-specific parameters for N6 delay | C3-252543 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑253116 | Reply LS on Security related protocol-specific parameters for N6 delay measurement | S2-2507601 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253479 | Reply LS on Security related protocol-specific parameters for N6 delay measurement | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253807 | ||||
S3‑253807 | Reply LS on Security related protocol-specific parameters for N6 delay measurement | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253479 | |||
S3‑253593 | Reply LS on Security related protocol-specific parameters for N6 delay measurement | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253807 | |||
S3‑253113 | LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects | RP-252891 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253127 | Reply to LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects | SP-251268 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253249 | Reply LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects | vivo | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253250 | Revised SID on supporting AEAD algorithms | vivo | SID revised | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: part of 6G work, this is not needed. ORANGE thought the same: it's business as usual. OPPO supported the same view.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253118 | LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | S2-2507636 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑253246 | Discussion Paper on security issue related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | vivo | discussion | Decision | Yes |
YesEricsson: We don’t support transport of real time voice packets data over NAS. This is not made for the user plane.
Qualcomm: we should check the security only. Why do we suddenly need a MAC for user plane data? We shouldn’t answer topics under SA2 scope.
Apple: we don’t agree with removing a control plane solution.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253526 | Discussion on a response to S2-2507636 on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253176 | Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | ZTE Corporation | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253797 | ||||
S3‑253224 | Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC(S2-2507636) | Apple | LS out | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253797 | ||||
S3‑253243 | Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253797 | |||
S3‑253247 | Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | vivo | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253797 | |||
S3‑253797 | Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | vivo | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253247 | |||
S3‑253332 | [draft]reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253797 | |||
S3‑253339 | Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253797 | |||
S3‑253390 | Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253797 | |||
S3‑253527 | Response LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | Qualcomm Incorporated | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253650 | Reply LS on issues related to support of IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC | Philips International B.V. | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253797 | |||
S3‑253123 | LS on digital assets authentication | S6-253788 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑253348 | Reply LS on digital assets authentication | Xiaomi EV Technology | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253665 | |||
S3‑253398 | Reply LS on digital assets authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253665 | |||
S3‑253665 | Reply LS on digital assets authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253398 | |||
S3‑253517 | LS reply on digital assets authentication | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253665 | |||
S3‑253124 | LS on Security risk of usage permission management of Digital Asset | S6-253789 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑253312 | Reply LS on Security risk of usage permission management of Digital Asset | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253666 | |||
S3‑253333 | reply LS on Security risk of usage permission management of Digital Asset | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253666 | |||
S3‑253666 | reply LS on Security risk of usage permission management of Digital Asset | China Mobile | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253333 | |||
S3‑253349 | Reply LS on security risk of usage permission management of Digital Asset | Xiaomi EV Technology | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253666 | |||
S3‑253518 | LS reply on Security risk of usage permission management of Digital Asset | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253333 | |||
S3‑253125 | LS on Study on Modernization of Specification Format and Procedures for 6G | SP-251228 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253110 | LS on ""IETF Network Slice Application in 3GPP 5G End-to-End Network Slice"" | IETF | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253108 | Reply LS on PLMN ID checks in interconnect scenarios when NFc supports multiple PLMN IDs | C4-253357 | LS in | Yes |
YesRelated CRs in 446 (Huawei) and 644 (Nokia).
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253446 | Deprecation of the use of the requesterPlmnList in the Access Token Request | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesSupported by Ericsson.
| revised | No | S3‑253667 | |||
S3‑253667 | Deprecation of the use of the requesterPlmnList in the Access Token Request | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253446 | |||
S3‑253644 | Update on requesterPlmnList | Nokia | draftCR | Yes |
YesEricsson: not needed.
| merged | No | S3‑253667 | ||||
S3‑253109 | LS on Structure updates of AIoT Identifiers | C4-253575 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253120 | LS on AIoT Device Permanent ID Length | S2-2507793 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253111 | LS to 3GPP SA3 re Adoption of TS 33.529 as a NESAS SCAS | GSMA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253114 | Reply LS on Discreet listening | S1-253557 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253115 | Reply LS on accessing external data channel content | S2-2507541 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253117 | Reply LS on procedures in Avatar communication | S2-2507605 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253121 | Reply LS on signalling feasibility of dataset and parameter sharing | S2-2508104 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253122 | Reply LS on signalling feasibility of dataset and parameter sharing | S5-254083 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253126 | LS on Guidance on 6G data related work tasks | SP-251261 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253145 | Reply LS on security parameter in paging request message | R2-2506465 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253215 | TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur | InterDigital France R&D, SAS | other | Information | Yes |
YesNokia: any discussions on PQC?
Interdigital answered that they would share more details about this with SA3 later by email or next meeting.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253146 | Request Guidance on “Reply Liaison Statement on harmonised standard of relevant components of ECC Decision (22)07 on “Harmonised framework on aerial UE usage in MFCN” harmonised bands” | S2-2508014 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | |||||
S3‑253576 | Corrections for IMS Data Channels and LI | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253652 | |||
S3‑253652 | Corrections for IMS Data Channels and LI | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253654 | S3‑253576 | ||
S3‑253659 | LS to inform about the publication of ETSI TR 104 005 - Technical Report on impacts of the post-quantum cryptography on ETSI TC SET specifications | ETSI TC SET | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
4 | Maintenance (Rel-19 and pre-Rel-19) |   | ||||||||||
4.1 | Work Items |   | ||||||||||
4.1.1 | All Rel-19 and pre-Rel-19 WIs | S3‑253347 | Update to security handling when CU is acting as MN and SN is unchanged | Xiaomi | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: not fine with removing the whole thing but we can reword it.
| revised | No | S3‑253668 | |
S3‑253668 | Update to security handling when CU is acting as MN and SN is unchanged | Xiaomi | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253347 | |||
S3‑253379 | editorial change and alignment to LTM procedure | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253668 | |||
S3‑253408 | Clarification on AMF knows the message from a NR Femto | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesLenovo and Nokia proposed some small improvements.
| revised | No | S3‑253669 | |||
S3‑253669 | Clarification on AMF knows the message from a NR Femto | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253408 | |||
S3‑253409 | Clarification on CAG ID is option to use in NR Femto | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253670 | |||
S3‑253670 | Clarification on CAG ID is option to use in NR Femto | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253409 | |||
S3‑253443 | Modification on the description of Nnrf_AccessToken_RetrieveKey Service Operation | Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253671 | |||
S3‑253671 | Modification on the description of Nnrf_AccessToken_RetrieveKey Service Operation | Huawei, HiSilicon, Ericsson,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253443 | |||
S3‑253495 | Removal of optional input from NRF key retrieval operation | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253671 | |||
S3‑253590 | Update to description of Nnrf_AccessToken_RetrieveKey Service Operation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draftCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253671 | ||||
S3‑253655 | Correcting key options | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253673 | ||||
S3‑253673 | Correcting key options | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | - | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253655 | |||
S3‑253444 | Alignment of SA2 progress for Avatar communication | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253672 | |||
S3‑253672 | Alignment of SA2 progress for Avatar communication | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253444 | |||
S3‑253645 | Security for IMS avatar communication – Receiving UE ID and URL association verification. | Philips International B.V. | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253672 | |||
S3‑253242 | 5GC Signaling Traffic Monitoring Security Requirements | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253679 | 5GC Signaling Traffic Monitoring Security Requirements | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253313 | addressing EN on proessing purpose in TS 33.122 | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesIt was commented that this editor's note could be removed and taken care of in Rel-20.
Nokia preferred to convert it into a note (purpose of data processing not addressed).
This was kept open.
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253646 | Removal of Editor’s Note regarding the support for UAV triggered UUAA from UAS3 TS 33.256 | Ericsson, Interdigital | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: we expect a LS from SA2 this week about this, let's keep it open.
Huawei reviewed the LS and this was agreed.
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253539 | Mandating AEAD ciphersuites for TLS 1.2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253540 | Mandating AEAD ciphersuites for TLS 1.2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253541 | Mandating AEAD ciphersuites for TLS 1.2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253542 | Mandating AEAD ciphersuites for TLS 1.2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253452 | Discussion on the update of master keys of UE-Satellite-UE in IMS | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253528 | Clarifying the handling of the selected EPS NAS algorithms | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑252802 | |||
S3‑253529 | Discussion on the handling of Path-Switch acknowledge message that include UE security capabilities | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253534 | Correction of clause 6.10.5 in TS 33.501 regarding inter-MN handover | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: reformulate instead of remove.
It was kept open.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253535 | Correction of Annex E in TS 33.401 regarding inter-MN handover in dual connectivity | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253550 | Corrections in clause 6.10.2 of TS 33.501 regarding dual connectivity | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253681 | |||
S3‑253681 | Corrections in clause 6.10.2 of TS 33.501 regarding dual connectivity | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesEditorial correction.
| agreed | No | S3‑253550 | |||
S3‑253578 | Alignment of AKMA UE ID exposure via NEF with TS 23.502 | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesPostponed to the next meeting.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253639 | Discussion on UUAA trigger during the USS changeover | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253165 | Remove the EN in the scope | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesORANGE commented that the SNPN topic was treated in the last SA plenary and some corrections may be needed in the scope, but this didn’t mean a change for the scope of the whole document.
| revised | No | S3‑253809 | |||
S3‑253809 | Remove the EN in the scope | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253165 | |||
S3‑253164 | Clean up for TS 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253367 | editorial changes and addressing the editorial ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253808 | |||
S3‑253808 | editorial changes and addressing the editorial ENs | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253367 | |||
S3‑253368 | Update to the ID privacy requirement | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesORANGE rejected this contribution. The network cannot pre-know the capabilities.This was from the last meeting's discussion.
T-Mobile: in reasons for change we cannot mention costs, but complexity.
MCC: no clauses affected on the cover page.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253675 | Update to the ID privacy requirement | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253436 | Update clause 4.2.1.2 device requirements for TS 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesHuawei, Nokia: this is not needed.
Thales: no reason to have this computation written in particular.
NTT_Docomo supported Thales.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253167 | Update the clause 5.2.2 for TS 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesLenovo: we don’t need the first change. Let's not change the names of our parameters and be consistent.
| merged | No | S3‑253677 | |||
S3‑253206 | Addressing ENs in AIoT Authentication Procedure in TS 33.369 | KPN N.V. | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesMCC: no clauses affected on the cover. The category would not be allowed for Rel-19.
OPPO: new solution, we cannot agree with that.
ORANGE: don’t add new editor's notes in Rel-19.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253218 | AIoT Randomness Clarification | OPPO | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253677 | |||
S3‑253677 | AioT correction to the authentication procedures | OPPO | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253218 | |||
S3‑253281 | CR to TS33.369 Update authentication procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253677 | |||
S3‑253678 | CR to TS33.369 Update authentication procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253251 | Correction on Authentication | vivo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253677 | |||
S3‑253270 | Fix missing content for MAC description. | OPPO, InterDigital | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253684 | |||
S3‑253271 | Fix missing context: Key generation description of AIoT device | OPPO, InterDigital | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesQualcomm, Huawei, Nokia didn’t agree with the first change.
Authentication procedure will merge into 667.
| merged | No | S3‑253684 | |||
S3‑253370 | Addressing the editor’s note on randomness | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253677 | |||
S3‑253471 | Authentication procedure optimization | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: this is implementation specific. Qualcomm and Ericsson agreed.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253472 | Authentication procedure clarification | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253677 | |||
S3‑253682 | Authentication procedure clarification | Lenovo | CR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253503 | Authentication of AIOT device by ADM | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253505 | Clarification of frequency of AIoT device authentication. | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253677 | |||
S3‑253504 | Clarification on randomness for the RAND generated by the device | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253677 | |||
S3‑253506 | Issues with RES verification at AIOTF | Ericsson | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
YesNokia: we prefer to solve this in Rel-20. NTT_Docomo supported this.
CMCC didn’t agree with this proposal. Stick to the decision that we made already.
Thales had another solution that wasn’t discussed and didn’t agree with agreeing this technically.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253509 | Credentials storage at UDR | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesORANGE: not sure if there is any UDR in this case.
CMCC: ask SA2 if the UDR is in scope.
It was agreed to send an LS in tdoc 683.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253531 | Corrections in authentication procedure in TS 33.369 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253667 | |||
S3‑253629 | Enhancements for AIoT authentication procedure | Thales | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: good and it addresses the complexity, but it is too late. Maybe a good start for Rel-20.
Huawei had comments and wanted to address it offline.
Qualcomm: this is a new solution, not a cat-F. Ericsson agreed.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253166 | Resolve the key derivation issue in AIoT device for command procedure | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesQualcomm: not needed.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253252 | Correction on command protection | vivo | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesPhillips didn’t see the need to add all these text. Huawei agreed with Philips.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253282 | CR to TS33.369 Update communication procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253369 | Updates to the security aspects on command protection | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesEricsson: not future proof. Nokia supported this.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253643 | Information protection during command procedure - corrections | Philips International B.V. | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesNokia: implementation specific.Sony supported this.
This was taken offline.
| revised | No | S3‑253684 | |||
S3‑253684 | Information protection during command procedure - corrections | Philips International B.V. | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253643 | |||
S3‑253253 | Correction on Privacy | vivo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253685 | |||
S3‑253685 | Correction on Privacy | vivo | CR | Approval | No |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253253 | |||
S3‑253272 | Discussion Paper on AIoT Device identifier Protection for Multiple Inventory | Xidian University, OPPO | discussion | Decision | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253273 | Procedure for AIoT device identifier protection with Bloom filter during Multiple inventory | Xidian University, OPPO | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesNTT_Docomo: new procedure, this is not cat-F. This is cat-B and it should go for Rel-20. Lenovo agreed with this, it was too late to have an alternate solution.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253279 | CR to TS33.369 Update identifier privacy requirements | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia didn’t agree with this. Huawei supported Nokia.
Merging only the deletion of the editor's note.
| merged | No | S3‑253675 | |||
S3‑253280 | CR to TS33.369 Update privacy general clause for privacy policy pre-configuration | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesORANGE didn’t see the need for this.Lenovo didn’t agree with it either. It was taken offline.
| revised | No | S3‑253676 | |||
S3‑253676 | CR to TS33.369 Update privacy general clause for privacy policy pre-configuration | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253280 | |||
S3‑253283 | CR to TS33.369 Update filtering inventory privacy procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253685 | |||
S3‑253284 | CR to TS33.369 Update individual inventory privacy procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253685 | |||
S3‑253306 | T-ID Terminology and handling clarification, and Additional NOTEX in clause 5.4.3 | Interdigital, OPPO | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesSony: this is changing items that were agreed in previous meetings.
| merged | No | S3‑253685 | S3‑253152 | ||
S3‑253371 | Update to the ID privacy aspects | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253685 | |||
S3‑253433 | Correction of typo in clause 5.4.3 for TS 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253685 | |||
S3‑253434 | Introduce ID Type in the protection of AIoT device identifier privacy for TS 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesQualcomm: extending the definiton of ID type, but this is SA2's job.
Huawei: note it and wait for progress from SA2 and CT groups.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253435 | Resolve exhaustively derive XRESAIoTs issue during inventory with filtering information | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253470 | Recovery procedure clarification | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253685 | |||
S3‑253802 | Recovery procedure clarification | Lenovo | CR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253532 | Adding a NOTE in ID privacy of individual inventory in TS 33.369 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253533 | Updates on device identification information in ID privacy of TS 33.369 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253630 | Enhancement for protection of AIoT device identifier privacy | Thales | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesSony: new, late to Rel-19, never discussed before. ORANGE supported this.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253631 | Addressing the missing information on the initial value of temporary identifier in Clause 5.4.3 and Annex B. | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253854 | |||
S3‑253854 | Addressing the missing information on the initial value of temporary identifier in Clause 5.4.3 and Annex B. | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253631 | |||
S3‑253168 | Add the key hierarchy to TS 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesNTT_Docomo: is this really cat-F? Is it necessary? Not really justified. Add it in Rel-20 as TEI.
OPPO: we missed this description, and there is no stage 3 impact.
Qualcomm: we will not have an incomplete specification if we don’t add this.
Nokia: not a correction, it doesn’t provide anything. They were not against the contribution in any case.
It was agreed to modify the cover page to have a better justification for the change.
MCC warned that after a release is frozen only corrections are allowed, so bringing contributions adding more information should be avoided, even if they didn’t bring any stage 3 impact.
| revised | No | S3‑253800 | |||
S3‑253800 | Add the key hierarchy to TS 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesNTT_Docomo was concerned about allowing these kind of contributions, submitted only for information. ORANGE agreed and objected to the contribution.
| not pursued | No | S3‑253168 | |||
S3‑253372 | new clause for security related services | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253801 | |||
S3‑253801 | new clause for security related services | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | No |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253372 | |||
S3‑253437 | Add a new clause as the protection of the disabling messages | OPPO | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253469 | New clause for security related services | Lenovo | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253801 | |||
S3‑253174 | Allocate FC Value for 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253175 | Update the FC Value in 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
S3‑253152 | T-ID Terminology and handling clarification, and Additional NOTEX in clause 5.4.3 | InterDigital France R&D, OPPO | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253306 | |||
S3‑253162 | Update the FC Value in 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253163 | Allocate FC Value for 33.369 | ZTE Corporation | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253202 | CR to TS33.369 Update identifier privacy requirements | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253203 | CR to TS33.369 Update filtering inventory privacy procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253204 | CR to TS33.369 Update individual inventory privacy procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253205 | CR to TS33.369 Update authentication procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253207 | CR to TS33.369 Update communication procedure | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253208 | CR to TS33.369 Update privacy general clause for privacy policy pre-configuration | CATT | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253214 | Add a new clause as the protection of the disabling messages | OPPO | CR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253502 | Addressing the missing information on the initial value of temporary identifier in Clause 5.4.3 and Annex B. | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253607 | |||
S3‑253536 | Corrections in clause 6.10.2 of TS 33.501 regarding dual connectivity | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253607 | Addressing the missing information on the initial value of temporary identifier in Clause 5.4.3 and Annex B. | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | S3‑253502 | |||
S3‑253683 | LS on potential UDR in SNPN for AIoT | Ericsson | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
4.2 | Study Items |   | ||||||||||
4.2.1 | All Rel-19 and pre-Rel-19 SIs | S3‑253314 | Adding MOBILE protocol to inventory list | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||
S3‑253543 | Remove duplicate references from 33.938 | Qualcomm Incorporated | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | ||||
5 | Rel-20 topics |   | ||||||||||
5.1 | 5GA Work Items |   | ||||||||||
5.1.1 | Security related Events Handling | S3‑253519 | Update to Overview of Security related Events Handling | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253789 | |
S3‑253564 | Revision of example of trust domain | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Teliacom Italia, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253789 | |||
S3‑253789 | Revision of example of trust domain | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Teliacom Italia, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253564 | |||
S3‑253579 | Pseudo-CR on SECHAND architecture | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253789 | |||
S3‑253520 | Update to requirements on configuration for events detection and delivery | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253790 | |||
S3‑253790 | Update to requirements on configuration for events detection and delivery | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253520 | |||
S3‑253521 | Update to requirements on delivery of detected events | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253791 | |||
S3‑253791 | Update to requirements on delivery of detected events | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253521 | |||
S3‑253622 | pCR to resolving EN in configuration of security related events | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253565 | Template proposal for Security related events | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia, IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253793 | |||
S3‑253793 | Template proposal for Security related events | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia, IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253565 | |||
S3‑253623 | pCR to define security related events | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253580 | Pseudo-CR on Security related events for malformed message and authorization failure | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253793 | |||
S3‑253566 | Proposal to introduce security related events - Malformed message | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253794 | |||
S3‑253794 | Proposal to introduce security related events - Malformed message | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesContent on malformed messages only.
| approved | No | S3‑253566 | |||
S3‑253594 | pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for Malformed Messages | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253794 | |||
S3‑253567 | Proposal to introduce security related events - flooding message | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253598 | pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for Massive Number of Incoming | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253568 | Proposal to introduce security related events - failed authentication | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253573 | pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for Authentication Failure | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253569 | Proposal to introduce security related events - failed authorization | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253795 | |||
S3‑253795 | Proposal to introduce security related events - failed authorization | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253569 | |||
S3‑253589 | pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for Authorization Failure | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253795 | |||
S3‑253587 | pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for Authorization Failure at NRF | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253796 | pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for Authorization Failure at NRF | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253570 | Proposal to introduce security related events - replay attack | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253601 | pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for replay attacks on the SBA layer | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253571 | Proposal to introduce security related events - failed connection | China Mobile, Vodafone, AT&T, T-Mobile US, Verizon, Charter Communication, KDDI, Telecom Italia, China Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253602 | pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for unexpected SBI call flows | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253647 | pCR TS33.502 proposal to introduce security related events - OAM | DOCOMO Communications Lab. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253296 | |||
S3‑253604 | pCR to TS 33.502 - Tabular Summary of Security related Events | IIT Bombay | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253296 | pCR TS33.502 proposal to introduce security related events - OAM | DOCOMO Communications Lab. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253647 | |||
S3‑253447 | Update to Overview of Security related Events Handling | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253448 | Update to requirements on configuration for events detection and delivery | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253451 | Update to requirements on delivery of detected events | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253792 | Draft TS 33.502 | CMCC | draft TS | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.1.2 | New WID on Mission Critical security | S3‑253235 | [33.180] Alignment of recording replay user service authorization | Airbus | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253828 | |
S3‑253828 | [33.180] Alignment of recording replay user service authorization | Airbus | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesThis was decided not to be pursued, due to the Time Units issue.Airbus will bring it back in the next meeting.
| not pursued | No | S3‑253235 | |||
S3‑253236 | [33.180] Alignment on Logging, Recording, Audit and Discreet Monitoring | Airbus, Motorola | CR | Agreement | Yes |
YesMCC queried whether the alignment needed to be done in Rel-19 or Rel-20, since this was cat-F.
NTT_Docomo commented that there were no TUs for this work; in fact this was excluded from the agenda. Maybe bring back the CR to the next meeting to clarify the time spent on this work. A revised WID could be brought in order to fix the TUs allocation.
This was decided not to be pursued, due to the Time Units issue.
| revised | No | S3‑253829 | |||
S3‑253829 | [33.180] Alignment on Logging, Recording, Audit and Discreet Monitoring | Airbus, Motorola | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | S3‑253236 | |||
S3‑253397 | Clarification about security for MC over IOPS | Huawei, HiSilicon, Motorola Solutions, Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
5.1.3 | New WID on Security Assurance Specification for 5G-Advanced | S3‑253401 | living document to TS 33.117 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253762 | |
S3‑253762 | living document to TS 33.117 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | S3‑253401 | |||
S3‑253131 | Correction in requirement description for HTTP input validation | Nokia, BSI | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesContent is approved and it will go to S3-253762.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253132 | Correction of test case content for web server Logging | Nokia, BSI | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesContent is approved and it will go to S3-253762.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253133 | Correction no automatic launch from removable media | Nokia, BSI | CR | Approval | Yes |
YesAgreed content will go to 762.
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253406 | living document to TS 33.514 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253763 | |||
S3‑253763 | living document to TS 33.514 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | S3‑253406 | |||
S3‑253322 | Revise the interfaces to be captured in TS 33.514 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253405 | living document to TS 33.513 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253764 | |||
S3‑253764 | living document to TS 33.513 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | S3‑253405 | |||
S3‑253325 | Adding N19 to the scope of robustness and fuzz testing in TS 33.513 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253326 | Corrections to the references in TS 33.515 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253453 | Correction for SEPP SCAS based on NESASG feedbacks | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253454 | Correction for NEF SCAS based on NESASG feedbacks | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253455 | Correction for NWDAF SCAS based on NESASG feedbacks | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253456 | Correction for VNP SCAS based on NESASG feedbacks | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253400 | living document to TR 33.926 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253402 | living document to TS 33.216 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253403 | living document to TS 33.511 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253404 | living document to TS 33.512 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253407 | living document to TS 33.518 | Huawei, HiSilicon | draftCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.1.4 | New WID on PRINS Refinement | S3‑253221 | PRINS Refinement | CableLabs, Nokia, Charter Communications, China Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Comcast Communications, Verizon, CMCC, BSI, NTT Docomo, Vodafone, Telecom Italia | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253803 | |
S3‑253803 | PRINS Refinement | CableLabs, Nokia, Charter Communications, China Telecom, Deutsche Telekom, Comcast Communications, Verizon, CMCC, BSI, NTT Docomo, Vodafone, Telecom Italia | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253221 | |||
S3‑253445 | Procedure to making some security parameters visible to RIs | Huawei, HiSilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253804 | |||
S3‑253804 | Procedure to making some security parameters visible to RIs | Huawei, HiSilicon,China Mobile, CableLabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253445 | |||
5.1.5 | New WID on SCAS for NR Femto | S3‑253657 | Skeleton for TS 33.546(SCAS for NR Femto) | China Unicom | draft TS | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | |||
S3‑253439 | Update the scope of TS 33.546 | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253765 | |||
S3‑253765 | Update the scope of TS 33.546 | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253439 | |||
S3‑253658 | Scope of TS 33.546 | China Unicom | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253765 | ||||
S3‑253440 | Update the introduction of TS 33.546 | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253766 | Draft TS 33.546 | China Unicom | draft TS | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.1.6 | New WID on SCAS for NR Femto SeGW | S3‑253632 | Skeleton for TS 33.547(SCAS for NR Femto for SeGW) | CATT | draft TS | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑253633 | Scope of TS 33.547 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253767 | |||
S3‑253767 | Scope of TS 33.547 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253633 | |||
S3‑253441 | Update the scope of TS 33.547 | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253767 | |||
S3‑253442 | Update the introduction of TS 33.547 | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253424 | Critical assets of NR Femto SeGW | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253425 | Location verification | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253426 | Threat related to failed location verification | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253770 | |||
S3‑253770 | Threat related to failed location verification | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253426 | |||
S3‑253427 | Unauthenticated traffic filtering | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253771 | |||
S3‑253771 | Unauthenticated traffic filtering | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253427 | |||
S3‑253428 | Threat related to unauthenticated traffic | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253846 | |||
S3‑253846 | Threat related to unauthenticated traffic | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253428 | |||
S3‑253768 | Draft TS 33.547 | CATT | draft TS | discussion | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
S3‑253769 | Living document TR 33.926 | CATT | draftCR | discussion | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2 | 5GA Study Items |   | ||||||||||
5.2.1 | Study on transitioning to Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in 3GPP | S3‑253481 | Pseudo-CR on Overview Background Information of the PQC study | Ericsson, Qualcomm, NCSC, NPL, NTAC, BSI, NIST, US NSA, BT, Vodafone, KDDI, Verizon, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253687 | |
S3‑253687 | Pseudo-CR on Overview Background Information of the PQC study | Ericsson, Qualcomm, NCSC, NPL, NTAC, BSI, NIST, US NSA, BT, Vodafone, KDDI, Verizon, Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253481 | |||
S3‑253482 | Pseudo-CR on Transition timeline of the PQC study | Ericsson, Qualcomm, NCSC, NPL, NTAC, BSI, NIST, US NSA, BT, Vodafone, KDDI, Verizon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei and Samsung: remove the last paragraph. Huawei saw it as a recommendation that should go as a conclusion at the end of the study.
| revised | No | S3‑253688 | |||
S3‑253688 | Pseudo-CR on Transition timeline of the PQC study | Ericsson, Qualcomm, NCSC, NPL, NTAC, BSI, NIST, US NSA, BT, Vodafone, KDDI, Verizon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253482 | |||
S3‑253483 | Pseudo-CR on PQ and PQT Algorithms of the PQC study | Ericsson, Qualcomm, NCSC, NPL, NTAC, BSI, NIST, BT, Vodafone, KDDI, Verizon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253689 | |||
S3‑253689 | Pseudo-CR on PQ and PQT Algorithms of the PQC study | Ericsson, Qualcomm, NCSC, NPL, NTAC, BSI, NIST, BT, Vodafone, KDDI, Verizon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253483 | |||
S3‑253287 | proposed new text for general assumptions | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson, Qualcomm, Huawei: this content fits better somewhere else, not here in the assumptions.
| revised | No | S3‑253690 | |||
S3‑253690 | proposed new text for general assumptions | Nokia | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253287 | |||
S3‑253315 | Assumption on symmetric and asymmetric crypto | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253691 | |||
S3‑253318 | pCR on description for coexistence of PQC and non-PQC algorithms in clause 4.2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253691 | |||
S3‑253484 | Pseudo-CR on General Assumptions of the PQC study | Ericsson, Qualcomm, NCSC, NPL, NTAC, BSI, NIST, US NSA, BT, Vodafone, KDDI, Verizon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesORANGE: remove "free available" and "well tested". You also say that hybrid are both in and out of scope.
MCC: references to tdocs are not valid. In the same NOTE refer to the 256-bit studies isntead of just saying "3GPP is working on…".
| revised | No | S3‑253691 | |||
S3‑253691 | Pseudo-CR on General Assumptions of the PQC study | Ericsson, Qualcomm, NCSC, NPL, NTAC, BSI, NIST, US NSA, BT, Vodafone, KDDI, Verizon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253484 | |||
S3‑253288 | proposed new text for PQC level description | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei, Qualcomm: add references to the algorithms.
| revised | No | S3‑253692 | |||
S3‑253692 | proposed new text for PQC level description | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253288 | |||
S3‑253316 | Description on PQC algorithm types and diversity | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: old names of algorithms. This is more related to crypto-agility. This was taken offline.
Qualcomm: you need to differ from signatures and cryptographic algorithms.
| revised | No | S3‑253847 | |||
S3‑253847 | Description on PQC algorithm types and diversity | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253316 | |||
S3‑253319 | pCR on Crypto agility assumption for TR 33.703 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253693 | |||
S3‑253334 | Pseudo-CR on Crypto Agility | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: crypto agility is not part of the transition, remove that part.Ericsson supported this.
| revised | No | S3‑253693 | |||
S3‑253693 | Pseudo-CR on Crypto Agility | China Mobile | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253334 | |||
S3‑253173 | updating skeleton of clause 6 | Ericsson, Qualcomm, Huawei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: why are we introducing several "general" clauses?
| revised | No | S3‑253694 | |||
S3‑253694 | updating skeleton of clause 6 | Ericsson, Qualcomm, Huawei | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253173 | |||
S3‑253548 | Pseudo-CR on different types of IETF drafts | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253694 | |||
S3‑253380 | Generel clause for 6.1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253695 | |||
S3‑253695 | Generel clause for 6.1 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253380 | |||
S3‑253335 | Pseudo-CR on PQC migration of IKEv2 protocol | China Mobile | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253696 | ||||
S3‑253382 | PQC migration for IKEv2 protocols | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253696 | |||
S3‑253488 | Pseudo-CR on updating the IKEv2 clause of the PQC Study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253696 | |||
S3‑253546 | Pseudo-CR on updating clause 6 for IKEv2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253696 | |||
S3‑253696 | Pseudo-CR on updating clause 6 for IKEv2 | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253546 | |||
S3‑253381 | PQC migration for PKI certificates | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253830 | |||
S3‑253830 | PQC migration for PKI certificates | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253381 | |||
S3‑253489 | Pseudo-CR on updating the PKI clause of the PQC Study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253830 | |||
S3‑253485 | Pseudo-CR on updating the TLS 1.2 clause of the PQC Study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes6.X.3 to be removed in the revision.
| revised | No | S3‑253831 | |||
S3‑253831 | Pseudo-CR on updating the TLS 1.2 clause of the PQC Study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253485 | |||
S3‑253486 | Pseudo-CR on updating the TLS 1.3 clause of the PQC study | Ericsson, Qualcomm, KDDI | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253487 | Pseudo-CR on updating the TLS 1.3 clause of the PQC Study | Ericsson, KDDI | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253490 | Pseudo-CR on updating the JOSE and COSE clauses of the PQC Study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253832 | |||
S3‑253832 | Pseudo-CR on updating the JOSE and COSE clauses of the PQC Study | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253490 | |||
S3‑253544 | Pseudo-CR on updating clause 6 for JWE and JWS | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253832 | |||
S3‑253545 | Pseudo-CR on updating clause 6 for COSE | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesIt was commented whether references to IETF drafts needed to be maintained, but it was clarified that this shoud be done only during the lifetime of the internal TR.
Cisco commented that anyone from 3GPP could ask the status of the drafts in their email lists.
It was proposed to remove individual IETF draft references in the PQC TR. This was taken to the next meeting.
| merged | No | S3‑253832 | |||
S3‑253547 | Pseudo-CR on updating clause 6 for IPsec ESP | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: this is not needed. Just add a NOTE for all protocols that use a symmetric crypto.
Qualcomm commented that they would bring a contribution for the next meeting.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253231 | TR33703 - PQC - editorial change on Clause 7.1 | Apple | pCR | Yes |
YesHuawei wondered whether this was needed.
NTT_Docomo: use the protocol names, don’t number them.
| revised | No | S3‑253833 | ||||
S3‑253833 | TR33703 - PQC - editorial change on Clause 7.1 | Apple | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253231 | |||
S3‑253285 | Discussion on KI for MIKEY-SAKKE | Nokia | discussion | Information | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253286 | Change to MIKEY-SAKKE | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253855 | |||
S3‑253855 | Change to MIKEY-SAKKE | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253286 | |||
S3‑253317 | LS to IETF on PQC transition for MIKEY-SAKKE | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253834 | |||
S3‑253834 | LS to IETF on PQC transition for MIKEY-SAKKE | Huawei, HiSilicon | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253317 | |||
S3‑253230 | TR33703 - PQC - SUCI enhancement | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253835 | ||||
S3‑253835 | TR33703 - PQC - SUCI enhancement | Apple | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253230 | |||
S3‑253289 | Solution proposal PQC for SUCI protection | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesThales: remove the evaluation. ORANGE clarified that it is good practice to review solutions before going for the evaluations. At least a meeting cycle is left.
| revised | No | S3‑253836 | |||
S3‑253836 | Solution proposal PQC for SUCI protection | Nokia | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253289 | |||
S3‑253320 | New solution on SUCI calculation with hybrid KEMs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253837 | |||
S3‑253837 | New solution on SUCI calculation with hybrid KEMs | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253320 | |||
S3‑253383 | New solution for SUCI Calculation - SUPI pseudonym | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253838 | |||
S3‑253838 | New solution for SUCI Calculation - SUPI pseudonym | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253383 | |||
S3‑253475 | Solution for SUCI calculation using quantum key | LG Electronics | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253839 | |||
S3‑253839 | Solution for SUCI calculation using quantum key | LG Electronics | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253475 | |||
S3‑253476 | Solution for SUCI calculation using quantum encapsulated key | LG Electronics | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253841 | |||
S3‑253841 | Solution for SUCI calculation using quantum encapsulated key | LG Electronics | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253476 | |||
S3‑253492 | Pseudo-CR on New Solution to Quantum Resistant SUCI Calculation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253840 | |||
S3‑253840 | Pseudo-CR on New Solution to Quantum Resistant SUCI Calculation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253492 | |||
S3‑253523 | Hybrid PQC for SUCI calculation | THALES, ORANGE, LG U+, SK Telecom | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253842 | |||
S3‑253842 | Hybrid PQC for SUCI calculation | THALES, ORANGE, LG U+, SK Telecom | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253523 | |||
S3‑253610 | pCR on PQC shared key solution for SUPI Concealment | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253843 | |||
S3‑253843 | pCR on PQC shared key solution for SUPI Concealment | Samsung | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253610 | |||
S3‑253611 | pCR on SUPI Concealment using Hybrid shared Key | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253844 | |||
S3‑253844 | pCR on SUPI Concealment using Hybrid shared Key | Samsung | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253611 | |||
S3‑253612 | pCR on SUPI Concealment using hybrid method | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253845 | |||
S3‑253845 | pCR on SUPI Concealment using hybrid method | Samsung | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253612 | |||
S3‑253491 | Discussion paper on sending an LS to IETF to expedite their work on using PQ and PQT algorithms in IETF Protocols used by 3GPP | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
YesHuawei, Cisco didn’t find convenient to ask IETF to speed up. Ericsson agreed that they didn’t mean to use that language when exchanging with IETF.
Cisco, Huawei: no need to endorse this, better to discuss the LS when submitted.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253686 | Draft TR 33.703 | Huawei | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.2 | New SID on Security Aspects for IMS resiliency | S3‑253608 | Scope for FS_IMSRE_SEC | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253754 | |
S3‑253754 | Scope for FS_IMSRE_SEC | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253608 | |||
S3‑253254 | Scope of IMS Resiliency | vivo, KDDI | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253754 | |||
S3‑253609 | Skeleton for TR 33.768 | Samsung | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253255 | Overview of IMS Resiliency | vivo, KDDI | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253755 | |||
S3‑253755 | Overview of IMS Resiliency | vivo, KDDI | other | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253255 | |||
S3‑253256 | Key issue on SIP Registration Enhancement for IMS Resilience | vivo, KDDI | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253724 | Draft TR 33.768 | Samsung | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.3 | New Study on AIMLE Service Security | S3‑253134 | Endorsed Draft TR from SA3#123 | Lenovo | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253004 | |
S3‑253135 | Key Issue on Secure AIMLE Client related handling | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253697 | |||
S3‑253697 | Key Issue on Secure AIMLE Client related handling | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253135 | |||
S3‑253136 | Key Issue on Secure AIML related Transfer | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253697 | |||
S3‑253137 | Key Issue on Secure AIML capability evaluation, monitoring and control | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253697 | |||
S3‑253138 | Key Issue on Secure AIMLE assistance and Split Operations | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253697 | |||
S3‑253140 | Security Assumptions | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253698 | |||
S3‑253698 | Security Assumptions | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253140 | |||
S3‑253139 | Solution to KI#1 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253699 | |||
S3‑253699 | Solution to KI#1 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253139 | |||
S3‑253459 | Authorization of AIMLE clients acting as FL members for access to AIMLE Service Security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253700 | |||
S3‑253700 | Authorization of AIMLE clients acting as FL members for access to AIMLE Service Security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253459 | |||
S3‑253701 | Draft TR 33.786 | Motorola Mobility | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.4 | New Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN phase 2 | S3‑253336 | Skeleton of TR 33.758 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,ZTE | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑253365 | Incorporating content in the endorsed TR | China Telecom Corporation Ltd., ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253366 | Overview | China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253737 | |||
S3‑253737 | Architecture | China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253366 | |||
S3‑253169 | Update the clause 6 evaluation for SBA interface protection | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253848 | |||
S3‑253848 | Update the clause 6 evaluation for SBA interface protection | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253169 | |||
S3‑253422 | TEID issue in N9 interface | China Telecom Corporation Ltd., CableLabs, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253739 | |||
S3‑253739 | TEID issue in N9 interface | China Telecom Corporation Ltd., CableLabs, ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253422 | |||
S3‑253423 | Topology hiding in N9 interface | China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253740 | |||
S3‑253740 | Topology hiding in N9 interface | China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253423 | |||
S3‑253726 | Draft TR 33.758 | China Telecom | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.5 | New SID on providing PSK for MPQUIC/TLS | S3‑253414 | Skeleton on PSK MPQUIC TLS | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253753 | |
S3‑253753 | Skeleton on PSK MPQUIC TLS | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253414 | |||
S3‑253384 | New key issue of PSK support for MPQUIC TLS | Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, Nokia, CableLabs, Xiaomi | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253711 | |||
S3‑253711 | New key issue of PSK support for MPQUIC TLS | Huawei, HiSilicon, Interdigital, Nokia, CableLabs, Xiaomi | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253384 | |||
S3‑253292 | New Solution for MPQUIC_TLS using PSK derived from KgNB | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253712 | |||
S3‑253712 | New Solution for MPQUIC_TLS using PSK derived from KgNB | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253292 | |||
S3‑253350 | Solution for PSK Derivation | Xiaomi EV Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253713 | |||
S3‑253713 | Solution for PSK Derivation | Xiaomi EV Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253350 | |||
S3‑253351 | Solution for PSK Delivery | Xiaomi EV Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253714 | |||
S3‑253714 | Solution for PSK Delivery | Xiaomi EV Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253351 | |||
S3‑253385 | New solution of using 5G security context to derive authentication pre-shared key for MPQUIC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253715 | |||
S3‑253715 | New solution of using 5G security context to derive authentication pre-shared key for MPQUIC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253385 | |||
S3‑253387 | New solution of using pre-configured PSK to establish the security of MPQUIC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253716 | |||
S3‑253716 | New solution of using pre-configured PSK to establish the security of MPQUIC | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia didn’t agree with the document.
| noted | No | S3‑253387 | |||
S3‑253410 | New solution on two layer key generation method | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253717 | |||
S3‑253717 | New solution on two layer key generation method | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253410 | |||
S3‑253563 | Solution on leveraging PSK for MPQUIC TLS | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253718 | |||
S3‑253718 | Solution on leveraging PSK for MPQUIC TLS | Nokia | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253563 | |||
S3‑253415 | architecture assumption | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253745 | Draft TR 33.778 | Huawei | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.6 | New Study on Security for Core Network Enhanced Support for Artificial Intelligence (AI) / Machine Learning (ML) Phase 2 | S3‑253259 | Draft TR for AIML_Ph2_SEC | vivo, InterDigital | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑253257 | Scope for AIML_Ph2_SEC | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253702 | |||
S3‑253702 | Scope for AIML_Ph2_SEC | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253257 | |||
S3‑253290 | New KI for UE Data Collection Exposure | InterDigital Belgium. LLC, CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253704 | |||
S3‑253704 | New KI for UE Data Collection Exposure | InterDigital Belgium. LLC, CATT | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253290 | |||
S3‑253392 | New Key issue Authorization for UE data towards OTT server | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253704 | |||
S3‑253299 | New KI on privacy protection for UE training data collection | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253704 | |||
S3‑253413 | Reconstruct KI#1 on AI/ML ph4 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253457 | Key issue on user consent for AIML_Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253458 | Key issue on authentication and authorization for AIML_Ph2 | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253636 | Revision of S3-252990 Key issue on | CATT | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253705 | |||
S3‑253705 | Revision of S3-252990 Key issue on | CATT | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253636 | |||
S3‑253258 | New Solution for Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253706 | |||
S3‑253706 | New Solution for Security of UE connection setup with Data Collection NF | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253258 | |||
S3‑253291 | New Solution for Security for UE-side data collection over UP | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253707 | |||
S3‑253707 | New Solution for Security for UE-side data collection over UP | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253291 | |||
S3‑253364 | New sol on secure communication between UE and the data collection function | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253708 | |||
S3‑253708 | New sol on secure communication between UE and the data collection function | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253364 | |||
S3‑253298 | New solution on security of connection between UE and Data Collection NF | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253709 | |||
S3‑253709 | New solution on security of connection between UE and Data Collection NF | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253298 | |||
S3‑253634 | New solution for security of connection between UE and Data Collection NF | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253710 | |||
S3‑253710 | New solution for security of connection between UE and Data Collection NF | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253634 | |||
S3‑253703 | Draft TR 33.785 | Vivo | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.7 | New Study on Security and Privacy Aspects of Integrated Sensing and Communication | S3‑253352 | Endorsed Draft TR for ISAC Security | Xiaomi EV Technology | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑253179 | New solution on authorization for sensing service request from AF | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253744 | ||||
S3‑253744 | New solution on authorization for sensing service request from AF | ZTE Corporation | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253179 | |||
S3‑253180 | New solution on authorization for sensing service request from UE | ZTE | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253260 | New Solution for Authorization for Sensing Service | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson: not in line with SA2.
| revised | No | S3‑253856 | |||
S3‑253856 | New Solution for Authorization for Sensing Service | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253260 | |||
S3‑253211 | New solution on authorization for sensing service request | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson: misalignemnt with SA2. This also looks "too much SA2"-like contribution, it should be adapted to SA3 procedures.
| revised | No | S3‑253849 | |||
S3‑253849 | New solution on authorization for sensing service request | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253211 | |||
S3‑253395 | New Solution to secure the connection to Sensing service consumer | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson: misalignment with SA2.
| revised | No | S3‑253850 | |||
S3‑253850 | New Solution to secure the connection to Sensing service consumer | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253395 | |||
S3‑253514 | new solution on authorization of sensing service request | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesZTE: avoid using terms like "shall" or "should", this is a TR.
Ericsson: this needs updating to aling with SA2.
Lenovo suggested adding an editor's note.
| revised | No | S3‑253746 | |||
S3‑253746 | new solution on authorization of sensing service request | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253514 | |||
S3‑253556 | New authorization solution for KI#2 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253747 | |||
S3‑253747 | New authorization solution for KI#2 | Lenovo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253556 | |||
S3‑253572 | Reusing existing mechanism for security of authorization of sensing service operation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesVivo: remove the evaluation, this doesn’t capture totally the requirement for key issue 1.
| revised | No | S3‑253748 | |||
S3‑253748 | Reusing existing mechanism for security of authorization of sensing service operation | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253572 | |||
S3‑253359 | Update KI#2 on secure sensing data and associated information collection and transport | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253749 | |||
S3‑253749 | Update KI#2 on secure sensing data and associated information collection and transport | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253359 | |||
S3‑253360 | Update KI#2 on secure sensing entity and sensing function discovery and (re-)selection | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253749 | |||
S3‑253361 | Update KI#2 on secure parameter configuration | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253749 | |||
S3‑253393 | Update to KI#2 to add security requirement for communication between Sensing Entitiy and SF | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253749 | |||
S3‑253181 | New solution on security protection for sensing service operations | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Yes |
YesEricsson: not aligned with sA2 procedures.
| revised | No | S3‑253851 | ||||
S3‑253851 | New solution on security protection for sensing service operations | ZTE Corporation | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253181 | |||
S3‑253394 | New Solution to secure the connection between Sensing Entity and SF | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this and proposed to note it. Huawei proposed to delete the Split SF architecture and add an editor's note saying that this would be for FFS. This was agreed.
| revised | No | S3‑253751 | |||
S3‑253751 | New Solution to secure the connection between Sensing Entity and SF | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253394 | |||
S3‑253396 | New Solution to secure the connection between SF components | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson didn’t agree and proposed to note it.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253515 | new solution on security of sensing operation | Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253624 | Security protection for sensing service operations between 5G-AN and SF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253750 | |||
S3‑253750 | Security protection for sensing service operations between 5G-AN and SF | Samsung | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253624 | |||
S3‑253178 | New key issue on Security protection for sensing result exposure | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Yes |
YesXiaomi: remove the privacy related stuff.
Huawei: difference with key issue one is not clear.
| revised | No | S3‑253852 | ||||
S3‑253852 | New key issue on Security protection for sensing result exposure | ZTE Corporation | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253178 | |||
S3‑253362 | New KI on secure sensing result exposure | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253852 | |||
S3‑253356 | Discussion on 5G-A ISAC privacy handling | Xiaomi Technology | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253357 | Scope update | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson: privacy aspects are not clear because the scope in SA2 is Aerial Objects.RAN1/RAN3 should clarifiy how to distinguish the object.
It was clarified and asked to be minuted that if SA2 is changing their scope SA3 will align with them.
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253752 | Scope update | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253358 | Security assumption update | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNTT_Docomo: note it and come back to it when we have more information from RAN about how to distinguish the object.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253177 | New key issue on privacy protection for sensing service | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253853 | New key issue on privacy protection for sensing service | ZTE Corporation | pCR | - | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253592 | pCR Privacy requirements for sensing | DOCOMO Communications Lab. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253728 | Draft TR 33.777 | Xiaomi | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.8 | New Study on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for Container-based Product | S3‑253147 | References for SCAS for Container-based Products | BSI (DE) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑253148 | Defintions for SCAS for Container-based Products | BSI (DE) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253149 | Assumptions for SCAS for Container-based Products | BSI (DE) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253150 | Assets and Threats for SCAS for Container-based Products | BSI (DE) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253719 | |||
S3‑253719 | Assets and Threats for SCAS for Container-based Products | BSI (DE) | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253150 | |||
S3‑253151 | Test Cases for SCAS for Container-based Products | BSI (DE) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253720 | |||
S3‑253720 | Test Cases for SCAS for Container-based Products | BSI (DE) | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253151 | |||
S3‑253141 | new test cases on SCAS for CNP | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253721 | |||
S3‑253721 | new test cases on SCAS for CNP | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253141 | |||
S3‑253722 | Draft TR 33.730 | Ericsson | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.9 | New Study on Security Aspects of Satellite Access in 5G Phase 4 | S3‑253537 | Skeleton for TR 33.700-30 | Qualcomm Incorporated | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑253538 | Incorporating content from the endorsed TR | Qualcomm Incorporated | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253199 | Update key issue1 | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253157 | New Key Issue Z | InterDigital France R&D, SAS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253158 | New Key Issue Y | InterDigital France R&D, SAS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253159 | New Key Issue X | InterDigital France R&D, SAS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253160 | New Key Issue B | InterDigital France R&D, SAS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253161 | New Key Issue A | InterDigital France R&D, SAS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253182 | New solution on derivation of Satellite-Specific NAS keys for S&F operation | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253725 | ||||
S3‑253725 | New solution on derivation of Satellite-Specific NAS keys for S&F operation | ZTE Corporation | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253182 | |||
S3‑253183 | New solution on NAS Security Context Isolation via Satellite-Specific NAS COUNT | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253727 | ||||
S3‑253727 | New solution on NAS Security Context Isolation via Satellite-Specific NAS COUNT | ZTE Corporation | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253183 | |||
S3‑253200 | New solution on UE context management for S&F operations | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253729 | |||
S3‑253729 | New solution on UE context management for S&F operations | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253200 | |||
S3‑253210 | New solution on security protection in split MME architecture | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253727 | |||
S3‑253237 | Solution to KI#1: Specific rules to handle NAS counter overflow in S&F mode | Sateliot, Novamint | pCR | Decision | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253810 | |||
S3‑253810 | Solution to KI#1: Specific rules to handle NAS counter overflow in S&F mode | Sateliot, Novamint | pCR | Decision | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253237 | |||
S3‑253238 | Solution to KI#1: Separate NAS COUNT pairs per satelliteID | Sateliot, Novamint | pCR | Decision | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253730 | |||
S3‑253730 | Solution to KI#1: Separate NAS COUNT pairs per satelliteID | Sateliot, Novamint | pCR | Decision | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253238 | |||
S3‑253338 | New solution on protection for DL NAS message of authenticated UE in split-MME architecture | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253733 | |||
S3‑253733 | New solution on protection for DL NAS message of authenticated UE in split-MME architecture | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253338 | |||
S3‑253389 | Solution for KI#1: Secure NAS messages via distributing different NAS keys in multiple satellites | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253734 | |||
S3‑253734 | Solution for KI#1: Secure NAS messages via distributing different NAS keys in multiple satellites | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253389 | |||
S3‑253510 | Solution for NAS COUNT synchronization in store-and-forward operations | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253735 | |||
S3‑253735 | Solution for NAS COUNT synchronization in store-and-forward operations | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253510 | |||
S3‑253723 | Draft TR 33.700-30 | Qualcomm | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.10 | New Study on Security aspects of CAPIF Phase 4 | S3‑253327 | TR 33.700-23 skeleton | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑253324 | scope of TR 33.700-23 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253756 | |||
S3‑253756 | scope of TR 33.700-23 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253324 | |||
S3‑253554 | Pseudo-CR on Scope of CAPIF Ph4 study | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253756 | |||
S3‑253323 | pCR for high-level architecture of TR 33.700-23 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253757 | |||
S3‑253757 | pCR for high-level architecture of TR 33.700-23 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253323 | |||
S3‑253551 | Architecture assumption of CAPIF Ph4 study | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253757 | |||
S3‑253184 | New key issue on authorization of UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253758 | ||||
S3‑253758 | New key issue on authorization of UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group | ZTE Corporation | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253184 | |||
S3‑253321 | New KI on Security for UE-deployed API invoker accessing other UEs’ resources of a group | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253758 | |||
S3‑253562 | KI on security aspects of GroupID Authorization | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253758 | |||
S3‑253309 | New KI on security for open discover service API | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253759 | |||
S3‑253759 | New KI on security for open discover service API | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253309 | |||
S3‑253555 | KI on security aspects of Open Discover Service APIs | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253759 | |||
S3‑253597 | Key Issue on security aspects of open discover service APIs | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253759 | |||
S3‑253557 | KI on security aspects of CAPIF SA6 KI#3 on certificate unavailability | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253760 | |||
S3‑253760 | KI on security aspects of CAPIF SA6 KI#3 on certificate unavailability | Nokia | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253557 | |||
S3‑253595 | Key issue on more granular authorization based on purpose information | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253761 | |||
S3‑253761 | Key issue on more granular authorization based on purpose information | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253595 | |||
S3‑253731 | Draft TR 33.700-23 | China Telecom | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.11 | New Study on security aspect of support of Ambient power-enabled Internet of Things-Phase 2 | S3‑253300 | Draft skeleton for TR 33.714 AIOT | OPPO | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
YesORANGE: remove overview.
There were contributions about the overview, so they had to be open first to make a decision.
| revised | No | S3‑253822 | |
S3‑253822 | Draft skeleton for TR 33.714 AIOT | OPPO | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
YesRemoving the overview.
| approved | No | S3‑253300 | |||
S3‑253170 | Update the Overview | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesORANGE: this is not an overview. There is something like the scope and the second paragraph looks like a requirement.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253213 | Add content to Overview in TR 33.714 | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesORANGE: this is not an overview. I don’t agree with the second paragraph on the Rel-19.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253171 | Authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT services | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253823 | |||
S3‑253212 | New key issue on authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253823 | |||
S3‑253340 | Key issue for authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT services | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253823 | |||
S3‑253373 | Authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT services | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253823 | |||
S3‑253559 | KI on authorization of intermediate UE | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesCMCC: not clear what we are trying to solve. I don’t see any threat to address.
| revised | No | S3‑253823 | |||
S3‑253823 | KI on authorization of intermediate UE | Nokia | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253559 | |||
S3‑253172 | Authentication in Ambient IoT service | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253824 | |||
S3‑253302 | New Key issue on authentication for DO-A Capable AIOT Devices | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253824 | |||
S3‑253341 | Key issue for authentication for DO-A capable AIoT devices | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253824 | |||
S3‑253824 | Key issue for authentication for DO-A capable AIoT devices | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253341 | |||
S3‑253374 | Authentication in Ambient IoT service to support DO-A Capable AIoT Devices | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253824 | |||
S3‑253558 | KI on UICC hosted authentication | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253824 | |||
S3‑253303 | New Key Issue on information protection of DO-A procedure | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253825 | |||
S3‑253376 | Protection of information during AIoT service communication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253825 | |||
S3‑253825 | Protection of information during AIoT service communication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253376 | |||
S3‑253301 | New Key Issue on AIOT device ID protection in DO-A procedure | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253826 | |||
S3‑253826 | New Key Issue on AIOT device ID protection in DO-A procedure | OPPO | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253301 | |||
S3‑253377 | Privacy by protecting AIoT device identifiers | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253826 | |||
S3‑253507 | Key issue proposal on privacy for DO-A capable device | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253826 | |||
S3‑253560 | KI on identifier privacy | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253826 | |||
S3‑253508 | New Key Issue on Amplification of resource exhaustion by exploiting AIoT paging messages | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei preferred to have more time for discussion and continue with this issue in the next meeting.
OPPO supported studying this key issue in Rel-20.
| revised | No | S3‑253827 | |||
S3‑253827 | New Key Issue on Amplification of resource exhaustion by exploiting AIoT paging messages | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253508 | |||
S3‑253732 | Draft TR 33.714 | OPPO | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.12 | New Study on best security practices for SBA | S3‑253391 | Skeleton for Security Best Practice for SBA | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson wanted to add an overview clause. Nokia commented that there was no need for sake of simplification.
| revised | No | S3‑253778 | |
S3‑253778 | Skeleton for Security Best Practice for SBA | Huawei, HiSilicon | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253391 | |||
S3‑253417 | On the skeleton of the SBA best practices TR | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253497 | Pseudo-CR on BCP for token replay prevention | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: there are parts here that should be in an evaluation, this is a description clause.
| revised | No | S3‑253779 | |||
S3‑253779 | Pseudo-CR on BCP for token replay prevention | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253497 | |||
S3‑253498 | Pseudo-CR on BCP for protecting redirect-based flows | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253499 | Pseudo-CR on BCP for resource owner password credentials grant | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253500 | Pseudo-CR on BCP for access token privilege restriction | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253780 | |||
S3‑253780 | Pseudo-CR on BCP for access token privilege restriction | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253500 | |||
S3‑253501 | Pseudo-CR on BCP for other recommendations | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253781 | |||
S3‑253781 | Pseudo-CR on BCP for other recommendations | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253501 | |||
S3‑253736 | Draft TR 33.755 | Huawei | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.13 | New SID on Security Aspect for NR Femto Phase 2 | S3‑253466 | Draft TR for FS_NR_Femto_Sec_Ph2 | ZTE | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑253467 | Update the scope of TR 33.746 | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253813 | |||
S3‑253813 | Update the scope of TR 33.746 | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253467 | |||
S3‑253432 | New sol on security detection of misconfiguration femto device | China Telecommunications Corp. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253814 | ||||
S3‑253814 | New sol on security detection of misconfiguration femto device | China Telecommunications Corp. | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253432 | |||
S3‑253512 | Solution for detection of compromised Femto | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253815 | |||
S3‑253815 | Solution for detection of compromised Femto | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253512 | |||
S3‑253431 | New sol on security protection for N4 interface for local access services | China Telecommunications Corp. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253816 | ||||
S3‑253816 | New sol on security protection for N4 interface for local access services | China Telecommunications Corp. | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253431 | |||
S3‑253522 | Solution for security of Local UPF for key issue 2 | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253429 | New KI on security protection for the NR Femto MS | China Telecommunications Corp. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253817 | ||||
S3‑253817 | New KI on security protection for the NR Femto MS | China Telecommunications Corp. | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253429 | |||
S3‑253430 | New sol on security protection for NR Femto MS | China Telecommunications Corp. | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253818 | ||||
S3‑253818 | New sol on security protection for NR Femto MS | China Telecommunications Corp. | pCR | - | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253430 | |||
S3‑253468 | New KI on Mitigation of QoSA in edge computing | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253603 | New key issue on hardware hardening for the NR Femto | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesMCC: the first sentence should have a reference.
CableLabs: it's a paper that hasn’t been published yet.
It was agreed to remove the sentence.
| revised | No | S3‑253819 | |||
S3‑253819 | New key issue on hardware hardening for the NR Femto | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253603 | |||
S3‑253738 | Draft TR 33.746 | ZTE | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.2.14 | New SID on Security aspects of WAB nodes for NR | S3‑253328 | Draft skeleton for TR 33.724 WAB Sec | China Telecom Corporation Ltd.,Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑253329 | Scope of TR 33.724 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: not the same as the SID.
| revised | No | S3‑253820 | |||
S3‑253820 | Scope of TR 33.724 | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253329 | |||
S3‑253625 | Scope for FS_5G_WAB_SEC | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253820 | |||
S3‑253464 | Update on Security Architecture and Assumptions | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253330 | New KI on Security of WAB-Node | China Telecom Corporation Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253821 | |||
S3‑253411 | New Key issue on reusing NDS/IP to N2 and Xn interfaces in WAB | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253463 | New KI on Security Protection of Compromised WAB Nodes and Core Network Measures | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253821 | |||
S3‑253821 | New KI on Security Protection of Compromised WAB Nodes and Core Network Measures | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253463 | |||
S3‑253626 | New KI for Protection and binding of MWAB-gNB control plane over BH-PDU sessions | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253627 | New KI for Detection and mitigation of compromised WAB nodes | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253821 | |||
S3‑253412 | Solution on reusing NDS/IP to N2 and Xn interfaces in WAB | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253741 | Draft TR 33.724 | China Telecom | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
5.3 | 6G Study Items |   | ||||||||||
5.3.1 | 6G Security SID | S3‑253239 | 6G Security Study Planning | Orange (Rapporteur) | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253663 | |
S3‑253663 | 6G Security Study Planning | Orange (Rapporteur) | discussion | Information | Yes |
YesThe prioiryt for the 6G SID to estabilise the security areas.
| noted | No | S3‑253239 | |||
S3‑253297 | 6G Security Study working procedures | Nokia, ORANGE | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253240 | TR Skeleton draft TR 33.801-01 | Rapporteurs (Orange, Nokia) | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
YesVivo: a solution addressing several key issues?
ORANGE: a mapping table could be used. Interdigital supported doing this.
Nokia clarified that several 3GPP WGs used this interim agreements clause.
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253156 | A proposal for a table to Map Solutions to Key Issues | InterDigital France R&D, SAS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253640 | Add KI and Solution Mapping Table to 6G Skeleton | vivo | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253473 | TR Template update for the conclusion section | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: business as usual.It doesn’t fit in the conclusions either.
ORANGE: this is not an editor's note.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253585 | Proposal for an Annex in TR 33.801-01 on ways of working about key issues, solutions and conclusions | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesORANGE: better to have this as editor's notes. It is also too early for the conclusions.
ORANGE asked Ericsson to modify the current editor's notes in the skeleton to address these.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253583 | Threat and Risk Analysis process for 6G | Ericsson | discussion | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253584 | Proposal for Threat and Risk Analysis Annex in the 6G TR 33.801-01 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253772 | |||
S3‑253772 | Proposal for an attacker model annex in the 6G TR 33.801-01 | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253584 | |||
S3‑253552 | Attacker model for 6G - pCR to 33.801-01 | DOCOMO Communications Lab. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253772 | |||
S3‑253241 | Scope to draft TR 33.801-01 | Orange, Nokia (Rapporteurs) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesEricsson: remove the future tense.
| revised | No | S3‑253773 | |||
S3‑253773 | Scope to draft TR 33.801-01 | Orange, Nokia (Rapporteurs) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253241 | |||
S3‑253656 | Discussion Paper on Security Areas Analysis | vivo | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253648 | Discussion on the 6G security areas | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253201 | 6G security areas proposal | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253613 | New Security Area on Security Architecture | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253661 | |||
S3‑253418 | New security area on Security architecture | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253661 | |||
S3‑253661 | New security area on Security architecture | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253418 | |||
S3‑253561 | New Security Area on localized vertical networks | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253294 | New Security Area on Security Context and Key Management | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253664 | |||
S3‑253664 | New Security Area on Security Context and Key Management | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253294 | |||
S3‑253615 | New Security Area on security context and key management | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253664 | |||
S3‑253638 | New Security Area on New Non-Access Stratum | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253664 | |||
S3‑253474 | New Security Area on multiple NAS | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253664 | |||
S3‑253353 | New Security Area on Security Establishment between UE and 6GC | Xiaomi EV Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253664 | |||
S3‑253399 | Proposal of adding 6G security area on the security visibility and configurability | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
S3‑253305 | New Security Area on UE Trustworthiness | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253674 | |||
S3‑253142 | Discussion on UE abnormal behaviour detection to improve security | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253143 | New Security Area on Security Evaluation and Control for UE | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, T-Mobile US, Deutsche Telekom | other | Endorsement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253674 | |||
S3‑253674 | New Security Area on Security Evaluation and Control for UE | Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, T-Mobile US, Deutsche Telekom | other | Endorsement | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253143 | |||
S3‑253293 | New Security Area on Data Framework | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253775 | |||
S3‑253274 | New Security Area on 6G Data Framework Security | Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecom. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253775 | |||
S3‑253621 | New Security Area on Data Privacy | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253642 | New Security Area on Security and Privacy of Data Framework | vivo | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253775 | |||
S3‑253775 | New Security Area on Security and Privacy of Data Framework | vivo | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253642 | |||
S3‑253227 | TR33801-01- Security areas - Privacy | Apple | pCR | Yes |
YesORANGE preferred not to have privacy as a separate security area. Nokia supported this.
Huawei: if going through it should be drastically simplified.
Vivo: merging with user consent aspect? ORANGE answered that there was no decision about this.
Ericsson: we can have a privacy clause later in the TS.
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253354 | New Security Area on Enhanced Privacy Control | Xiaomi EV Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253154 | New Security Area on Privacy | InterDigital France R&D, SAS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253606 | New Security Area on User Consent | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesVodafone: user consent comes into the regulation.Let's wait for other groups' opinion.
Huawei: we have a study on User Consent in Rel-20. It's hard to differentiate the scope between that one and this one in 6G.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253582 | New Security Area on Security monitoring of RAN and CN | Ericsson, AT&T, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, TMO US | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
S3‑253308 | Security areas Cryptographic algorithms | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253229 | TR33801-01- Security areas - Cryptographic algorithms | Apple | pCR | Yes |
YesEricsson: no need for this security area. Nokia,Vivo and Huawei supported this.
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253153 | New Security Area on Post-Quantum Readiness | InterDigital France R&D, SAS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253619 | New Security Area on Cryptographic algorithm | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253416 | New security area on AI topic | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253680 | |||
S3‑253680 | New security area on AI topic | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253416 | |||
S3‑253653 | New Security Area on Native AI | Lenovo | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253680 | ||||
S3‑253331 | New Security Area on 6G RAN Security | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: lower layer security should not be studied in 6G.
| revised | No | S3‑253774 | |||
S3‑253774 | New Security Area on 6G RAN Security | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253331 | |||
S3‑253378 | New security area on RAN security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253774 | |||
S3‑253344 | New security area on RAN architecture security | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253774 | |||
S3‑253226 | TR33801-01- Security areas - RAN security | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253774 | ||||
S3‑253185 | New security area on RAN security | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253774 | |||
S3‑253155 | New Security Area on RAN Security | InterDigital France R&D, SAS | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253774 | |||
S3‑253616 | New Security Area on RAN Security | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253774 | |||
S3‑253599 | New Security Area on Secure RRC connection setup procedure | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253774 | |||
S3‑253268 | DP on Lower Layer Security Threats in 6G | Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecom. | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253269 | New 6G Security Area on Lower Layer Security | Guangdong OPPO Mobile Telecom. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253774 | |||
S3‑253228 | TR33801-01- Security areas - MAC layer security | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253774 | ||||
S3‑253596 | New Security Area on MAC layer | Nokia | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253774 | |||
S3‑253209 | DP on Security Area for PHY Layer Sensing Signals in 6G | OPPO | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253355 | New Security Area on Sensing Security and Privacy | Xiaomi EV Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
S3‑253220 | New Security Area on ISAC Privacy and Confidentiality in 6G (ISAC-PRIV) | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
S3‑253581 | New Security Area on UE to core network security | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253664 | |||
S3‑253614 | New Security Area on Authentication, Key Agreement and Authorization | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253345 | New security area on authentication and key agreement | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253225 | TR33801-01- Security areas - Authentication enhancement | Apple | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | ||||
S3‑253419 | New security area on Authentication | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253641 | New Security Area on Authentication | vivo | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253304 | Proposal on Security area AKA | Nokia Corporation | other | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253776 | Proposal on Security area AKA | Nokia Corporation | other | Approval | No |
YesIt was asked to be minuted: this security area does not preclude NSWO.
| approved | No | S3‑253304 | |||
S3‑253493 | New Security Area on Enhancing AKA-based Primary Authentication | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253549 | New Security Area on primary authentication enhancement | ZTE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253295 | New Security Area on Secondary Authentication | InterDigital Belgium. LLC | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253637 | New Security Area on Subscriber Privacy | CATT | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253617 | New Security Area on Subscription Privacy | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253649 | New Security Area on Non-3GPP access | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253776 | |||
S3‑253628 | New Security Area on Core network security and interconnect and roaming | Nokia | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253777 | ||||
S3‑253618 | New Security Area on Core Network Security and Roaming Security | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253777 | |||
S3‑253420 | New security area on Network security | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253777 | |||
S3‑253494 | New Security Area on Security for Core Network, Interconnect and Roaming | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253777 | |||
S3‑253777 | New Security Area on Security for Core Network, Interconnect and Roaming | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253494 | |||
S3‑253421 | New security area on multi-party trust (MPT) framework | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253777 | |||
S3‑253620 | New Security Area on Interworking and Migration | Samsung | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
S3‑253307 | General security requirements for 6G – the CAPTAIN framework | CableLabs | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
S3‑253363 | New Security Area on security and privacy aspects of network exposure | Xiaomi Technology | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
S3‑253480 | New Security Area on Exposure security | Nokia | pCR | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | |||||
S3‑253600 | New Security Area on External Exposure | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| not treated | No | ||||
S3‑253219 | New Security Area on UE Trustworthiness for Delegated/Network Functions (UT-DF) | InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes | ||||
S3‑253742 | Draft TR 33.801-01 | ORANGE | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
S3‑253811 | Annex mapping solutions to key issues | ORANGE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
S3‑253812 | Editor's note to interim agreements | ORANGE | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||||
5.3.2 | New Study on supporting AEAD algorithms | S3‑253189 | TR 33.771 skeleton | KDDI Corporation (TTC) | draft TR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | ||
S3‑253190 | Scope of TR 33.771 | KDDI Corporation (TTC) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesAddressing comments from MCC and Qualcomm.
| revised | No | S3‑253782 | |||
S3‑253782 | Scope of TR 33.771 | KDDI Corporation (TTC) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253190 | |||
S3‑253191 | pCR overview | KDDI Corporation (TTC) | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia: no need to duplicate this information.Just refer to the specification.
Qualcomm: it is useful to have this in the TR.
Nokia: what if we changed anything in the reference? How do we maintain this?
Huawei: add it to an annex.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253192 | pCR introduction to AEAD | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesHuawei: overlap with existing information, or information still under discussion.
Vivo: good for the reader. Move to an annex.
MCC: remove references to ETSI SAGE, these are 3GPP documents.
| revised | No | S3‑253783 | |||
S3‑253783 | pCR introduction to AEAD | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253192 | |||
S3‑253375 | assumption for supporting AEAD algorithms | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
YesNokia didn’t agree. Where are these benefts on?
Qualcomm: this is actually what we will conclude with.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253588 | New key issue on default integrity protection | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253784 | |||
S3‑253784 | New key issue on default integrity protection | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253588 | |||
S3‑253193 | pCR new KI algorithm selection | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253785 | |||
S3‑253785 | pCR new KI algorithm selection | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253193 | |||
S3‑253188 | New key issue on security algorithm negotiation supporting AEAD algorithms | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253785 | |||
S3‑253217 | New key issue algorithm selection | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253784 | |||
S3‑253265 | New Key Issue on Supporting Standalone or Hybird AEAD | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253785 | |||
S3‑253342 | Key issue for negotiation for using AEAD algorithms | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253785 | |||
S3‑253477 | New key issue on security algorithm negotiation for AS SMC | LG Electronics | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253785 | |||
S3‑253478 | New key issue on security algorithm negotiation for NAS SMC | LG Electronics | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253785 | |||
S3‑253266 | New Key Issue on Operational Sequence of AEAD | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253786 | |||
S3‑253786 | New Key Issue on Operational Sequence of AEAD | vivo | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253266 | |||
S3‑253186 | New key issue on AEAD algorithm integration on NAS/AS security | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253786 | |||
S3‑253198 | pCR new KI adoption of AEAD for AS | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253786 | |||
S3‑253216 | New key issue adopting AEAM algorithm for AS layer protection | OPPO | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253786 | |||
S3‑253343 | Key issue for user data and signalling protection when using AEAD algorithms | Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253786 | |||
S3‑253388 | New key issue about the AEAD algorithm interface | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253787 | |||
S3‑253787 | New key issue about the AEAD algorithm interface | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253388 | |||
S3‑253591 | New key issue on generic interface towards AEAD | Ericsson | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253787 | |||
S3‑253264 | New Key Issue on Key Hierarchy | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253788 | |||
S3‑253788 | New Key Issue on Key Hierarchy | vivo | pCR | Approval | No |
Yes
| noted | No | S3‑253264 | |||
S3‑253187 | New key issue on key hierarchy and management to support AEAD algorithms | ZTE Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253788 | |||
S3‑253195 | pCR new KI encryption key | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253788 | |||
S3‑253513 | KI on Key hierarchy | THALES | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253788 | |||
S3‑253262 | New Key Issue on Handling of AAD | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253787 | |||
S3‑253197 | pCR new KI use of AD | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253787 | |||
S3‑253386 | New key issue about the creation and handling of AEAD algorithm initialization vector | Huawei, HiSilicon | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253787 | |||
S3‑253196 | pCR new KI unique nonce | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253787 | |||
S3‑253263 | New Key Issue on Handling of IV | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253787 | |||
S3‑253261 | New Key Issue on Expected MAC Length | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253267 | New Key Issue on Co-existence of AEAD-compatible systems and legacy systems | vivo | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253194 | pCR new KI negotiation of protection provided by AEAD | KDDI Corporation | pCR | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253785 | |||
S3‑253743 | Draft TR 33.771 | Vivo | draft TR | Approval | No |
Yes
| email approval | No | ||||
6 | New Study/Work items |   | ||||||||||
6.1 | New 5G-Advance SIDs/WIDs | S3‑253450 | New SID on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | SID new | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||
S3‑253460 | New WID on Security Enhancements in SEAL Data Delivery-phase | Huawei, HiSilicon | WID new | Approval | Yes |
YesSamsung: too early. TR ongoing and one solution decided.Bring it back when SA6 concludes.
Nokia thought that this was too solution specific and preferred a more generic approach.
Huawei preferred to have this as one shot WID, having it approved with the CR together.
Ericsson preferred to postpone the WID and CR until the work in SA6 was more mature. There was no urgency.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253461 | Discussion paper on Security Enhancements in SEAL Data Delivery Phase 3 | Huawei, HiSilicon | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253462 | Add optional Flow ID Parameter for Security of SEALDD Services | Huawei, Hisilicon | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| not pursued | No | ||||
S3‑253511 | Minor updates to SID on Security Aspect for NR Femto Phase 2 | Nokia | SID revised | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253857 | |||
S3‑253857 | Minor updates to SID on Security Aspect for NR Femto Phase 2 | Nokia | SID revised | Agreement | No |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253511 | |||
S3‑253586 | New SID on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 3 | Ericsson | SID new | Discussion | Yes |
YesBrought for discussion.Ericsson will bring it back to the November meeting.
| noted | No | ||||
S3‑253605 | New SID on enhanced security management service about security policy provisioning | China Mobile, ZTE, CATT, Johns Hopkins University APL, CAICT, CableLabs, Nokia, China Unicom, China Telecom | SID new | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
6.2 | New 6G SIDs/WIDs | S3‑253337 | New Study on feasibility of decentralized trust enablement for 6G | China Mobile, Johns Hopkins University, Deutsche Telekom | SID new | Approval | Yes |
YesCMCC wanted to see this topic discussed in the 6G study item.
ORANGE wasn’t clear of what problem needed to be solved here.
| noted | No | ||
6.3 | SIDs/WIDs Prioritization | S3‑253530 | Possible additional work task(s) for Rel-20 Satellite SID | Qualcomm Incorporated | discussion | Discussion | Yes |
YesNTT_Docomo commented that there may be no time to do security work if SA3 got the request to dedicate more TUS to satellite.
| noted | No | ||
7 | CVD and research | S3‑253105 | CVD-2024-0096 – SNI5GECT: A Practical Approach to Inject aNRchy into 5G NR | GSMA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| postponed | No | |||
S3‑253651 | LS reply on CVD-2024-0096 – SNI5GECT: A Practical Approach to Inject aNRchy into 5G NR | Nokia | LS out | Yes |
YesThe Chair commented that this LS would be postponed for only one more meeting.
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253130 | CVD-2025-0101 - Four critical vulnerabilities in the access control mechanism of the 5G core Network | GSMA | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| replied to | No | |||||
S3‑253107 | Reply LS on Four critical vulnerabilities in the access control mechanism of the 5G core Network | C4-253086 | LS in | Yes |
Yes
| noted | No | |||||
S3‑253311 | Clarification on access token with respect to a list of S-NSSAIs | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Deutsche Telekom | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253798 | |||
S3‑253798 | Clarification on access token with respect to a list of S-NSSAIs | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Deutsche Telekom | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| agreed | No | S3‑253311 | |||
S3‑253496 | Clarification of producerSnssaiList usage in Access Token claims | Ericsson | CR | Agreement | Yes |
Yes
| merged | No | S3‑253798 | |||
S3‑253310 | Reply LS to GSMA on CVD-2025-0101 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Deutsche Telekom | LS out | Approval | Yes |
Yes
| revised | No | S3‑253799 | |||
S3‑253799 | Reply LS to GSMA on CVD-2025-0101 | Huawei, HiSilicon, Nokia, Deutsche Telekom | LS out | Approval | No |
Yes
| approved | No | S3‑253310 | |||
8 | Any Other Business | S3‑253104 | SA3 meeting calendar | SA WG3 Chair | other | No |
Yes
| withdrawn | Yes |