**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #123 draft\_S3-253010-r2**

**Goteborg, Sweden, 25 – 29 August 2025**

**Source: ZTE, Huawei, Nokia**

**Title: Pseudo-CR on KI on security and privacy aspects for local access**

**Document for: Approval**

**Agenda item: 6.1.3**

**Spec: TBD**

**Version: v0.0.0**

**Work Item: FS\_NR\_Femto\_Sec\_Ph2**

**Comments**

Add a new key issue on security and privacy aspects for local access

\* \* \* First Change \* \* \* \*

# 2 References

The following documents contain provisions which, through reference in this text, constitute provisions of the present document.

- References are either specific (identified by date of publication, edition number, version number, etc.) or non‑specific.

- For a specific reference, subsequent revisions do not apply.

- For a non-specific reference, the latest version applies. In the case of a reference to a 3GPP document (including a GSM document), a non-specific reference implicitly refers to the latest version of that document *in the same Release as the present document*.

[1] 3GPP TR 21.905: "Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications".

[X] 3GPP TS 23.501: "System architecture for the 5G System (5GS)".

\* \* \* Next Change \* \* \* \*

## 5.X Key Issue #X: Security and privacy aspect for local access

### 5.X.1 Key issue details

As defined in TS 23.501 [X] for NR Femto, if a local UPF is deployed close to the location of NR Femto node, the edge computing functionality shall be applied and the deployment options of NR Femto with a locally deployed UPF is also given the annex V. The security and privacy aspect for NR Femto and locally deployed UPF supporting edge computing was not discussed R19.

### 5.X.2 Security threats

The locally deployed UPF is located outside the operator’s security domain, if the 5GS core network topology is not hided towards locally deployed UPF, the core network topology and address information may be exposed outside the operator’s security domain.

### 5.X.3 Potential security requirements

The 5GS should support a mechanism to provide secure local access services for NR Femto.

The 5GS should support a mechanism to hide the 5GS core network topology from the locally deployed UPF.

\* \* \* End of Changes \* \* \* \*