**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #123 draft S3-252929-r1**

Goteborg, Sweden, 25 – 29 August 2025

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| *CR-Form-v12.1* | | | | | | | | |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** | | | | | | | | |
|  | | | | | | | | |
|  | **33.545** | **CR** | **0022** | **rev** | **1** | **Current version:** | **19.1.0** |  |
|  | | | | | | | | |
| *For* [***HE******LP***](http://www.3gpp.org/3G_Specs/CRs.htm#_blank)*on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at* [*http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests*](http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests)*.* | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME |  | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network | **X** |

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| ***Title:*** | Changes based on RAN3 input | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Source to WG:*** | Huawei, HiSilicon | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Work item code:*** | 5G\_Femto\_Sec | | | | |  | ***Date:*** | | | 2025-08-25 |
|  |  | | | |  | |  | | |  |
| ***Category:*** | **F** |  | | | | | ***Release:*** | | | Rel-19 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:* ***F*** *(correction)* ***A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)* ***B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)* ***D*** *(editorial modification)*  Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP [TR 21.900](http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Specs/html-info/21900.htm). | | | | | | | | *Use one of the following releases: Rel-8 (Release 8) Rel-9 (Release 9) Rel-10 (Release 10) Rel-11 (Release 11) … Rel-15 (Release 15) Rel-16 (Release 16) Rel-17 (Release 17) Rel-18 (Release 18)* | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Reason for change:*** | | RAN3 sent a LS to SA3 pointing out two issues: CAG ID verification and access mode.  This contribution provides the necessary modifications to align with RAN# updates. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | | Deletion of “operating in closed access mode”, and modification of the CAG ID verification requirements to make it mandatory for each CAG ID for each Femto cell. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | | Misaligned specifications. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | | 5.8 | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | | **Y** | **N** |  | | | |  | | |
| ***Other specs*** | |  | **x** | Other core specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***affected:*** | |  | **x** | Test specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***(show related CRs)*** | |  | **x** | O&M Specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***Other comments:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*Start of Change\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

## 5.8 CAG ID verification

The NR Femto GW shall verify that all UE associated messages from a Femto cell can be mapped to a specific CAG ID and that this CAG ID is allowed for the identity of the originating Femto. In the absence of a NR Femto GW, the AMF shall perform this CAG ID verification.

One NR Femto can host multiple Femto cells. Cells may belong to PNI-NPN. Hence, the CAGID verification shall be applied to all the CAG IDs mapping to individual Femto cells. The existing CAG concept defined for PNI-NPN in TS 23.501 [2] clause 5.30.3 shall be re-used for Femtocell access control.

NOTE 1: The CAG ID being verified may be explicitly present in the message as an information element or may be mapped by other means.

NOTE 2: The above requirement implies that the network has to ensure that all UE-associated messages from Femtocell are subject to the above verification, even if a (rogue) message from a compromised Femto would not indicate to originate from a NR Femto.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*End of Change\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*