**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #123 S3-252706-r3**

Goteborg, Sweden, 25 – 29 August 2025

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| *CR-Form-v12.1* | | | | | | | | |
| **CHANGE REQUEST** | | | | | | | | |
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|  | **33.516** | **CR** | **0008** | **rev** | **-** | **Current version:** | **18.0.0** |  |
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| *For* ***HE******LP*** *on using this form: comprehensive instructions can be found at  http://www.3gpp.org/Change-Requests.* | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Proposed change affects:*** | UICC apps |  | ME |  | Radio Access Network |  | Core Network |  |

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| ***Title:*** | Add test case that verifies if the AUSF processes RES\* failures correctly | | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Source to WG:*** | BSI (DE), Montsecure | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Source to TSG:*** | S3 | | | | | | | | | |
|  |  | | | | | | | | | |
| ***Work item code:*** | SCAS\_5GA | | | | |  | ***Date:*** | | | 2025-08-15 |
|  |  | | | |  | |  | | |  |
| ***Category:*** | **F** |  | | | | | ***Release:*** | | | Rel-20 |
|  | *Use one of the following categories:* ***F*** *(correction)* ***A*** *(mirror corresponding to a change in an earlier release)* ***B*** *(addition of feature),* ***C*** *(functional modification of feature)* ***D*** *(editorial modification)*  Detailed explanations of the above categories can be found in 3GPP TR 21.900. | | | | | | | | *Use one of the following releases: Rel-8 (Release 8) Rel-9 (Release 9) Rel-10 (Release 10) Rel-11 (Release 11) … Rel-15 (Release 15) Rel-16 (Release 16) Rel-17 (Release 17) Rel-18 (Release 18)* | |
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| ***Reason for change:*** | | The AMF has a test case named TC\_RES\_STAR\_VERIFICATION\_FAILURE that verifies whether RES\* verification failure is handled correctly.  TS 33.501, clause 6.1.3.2.2 also requires the AUSF to perform the RES\* verification.  Especially in a roaming scenario, this verification is done in the AUSF network function for the home network, since the AMF/SEAF is part of the visiting network in such case.  If verification in the AUSF is not correctly implemented, this might have security implications, as seen in some open source implementations. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Summary of change:*** | | Added a test case TC\_RES\_STAR\_VERIFICATION\_FAILURE\_AUSF that tests whether RES\* verification is correctly implemented in the AUSF. | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Consequences if not approved:*** | | Security key K\_SEAF might be leaked if the AUSF network function does not implement RES\* verification correctly (more information in TR 33.926). | | | | | | | | |
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| ***Clauses affected:*** | | 4.2.2.X | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | | **Y** | **N** |  | | | |  | | |
| ***Other specs*** | | **X** |  | Other core specifications | | | | TR 33.926 CR 0108 | | |
| ***affected:*** | |  | **x** | Test specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
| ***(show related CRs)*** | |  | **x** | O&M Specifications | | | | TS/TR ... CR ... | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***Other comments:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |
|  | |  | | | | | | | | |
| ***This CR's revision history:*** | |  | | | | | | | | |

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* START OF 1st CHANGE \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*

#### 4.2.2.X RES\* verification failure handling

*Requirement Name:* RES\* verification failure handling of AUSF

*Requirement Reference:* TS 33.501, clause 6.1.3.2.0 and TS 29.509, clause 5.2.2.2.2.

*Requirement Description*:

As specified in TS 33.501, clause 6.1.3.2.0, step 11, AUSF compares the received RES\* with the stored XRES\*. If the RES\* and XRES\* are equal, the AUSF considers the authentication as successful from the home network point of view. AUSF informs UDM about the authentication result.

*Threat Reference*: TR 33.926, clause F.2.2.X, RES\* verification failure

*Test case*:

**Test Name:** TC\_RES\_STAR\_VERIFICATION\_FAILURE\_AUSF

**Purpose:**

Test case 1: Verify that the AUSF correctly handles RES\* verification when the RES\* value is the same as the XRES\* value.

Test case 2: Verify that the AUSF correctly handles RES\* verification when the RES\* value is set an incorrect value (value not equal to XRES\*).

Test case 3: Verify that the AUSF correctly handles RES\* verification when the RES\* value is set to null.

**Pre-Conditions:**

- AUSF network product is connected in simulated/real network environment including a UDM and AMF. The UDM and AMF may be simulated.

- The tester has access to the user credentials.

- The SUPI is provisioned in the UDR.

- Tester can derive expected RES\* from RAND, AUTN, and subscriber credentials.

- Serving Network Name is consistently configured.

**Execution Steps:**

1. The tester triggers an Nausf\_UEAuthentication request message (POST /ue-authentications) sent from AMF to AUSF containing the SUCI derived from the SUPI and Serving Network Name.

2. The tester captures the Nausf\_UEAuthentication response message (HTTP 201 Created) sent from AUSF to AMF containing HXRES\*, AUTN and RAND values.

NOTE: Execution Steps 1 and 2 are to be executed for Test case 1, 2 and 3.

Test case 1 (RES\* equals XRES\*):

3. The tester computes a valid RES\* value based on the observed RAND.

4. The tester triggers an Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate request message (UT /ue-authentications/{authCtxId}/5g-aka-confirmation) sent from AMF to AUSF containing the computed RES\* value.

5. The tester captures the Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate response message (HTTP 200 OK) sent from AUSF to AMF containing AUTHENTICATION\_SUCCESS, SUPI and Kseaf.

Test case 2 (RES\* incorrect and not null):

3. The tester computes an incorrect RES\* value (not the expected value and not all zeroes).

4. The tester triggers an Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate request message sent from AMF/SEAF to AUSF containing the incorrect RES\* value.

5. The tester captures the Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate response message sent from AUSF to AMF/SEAF.

Test case 3 (RES\* set to null):

3. The tester triggers an Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate request message sent from AMF/SEAF to AUSF containing only zeroes as the RES\* value.

4. The tester captures the Nausf\_UEAuthentication\_Authenticate response message sent from AUSF to AMF/SEAF.

**Expected Results:**

For test case 1, the AUSF responds with a successful authentication response. Additionally, the AUSF notifies the UDM of the successful authentication over the N13 interface.

For test cases 2 and 3, the AUSF responds with an unsuccessful authentication response. Additionally, the AUSF notifies the UDM of the unsuccessful authentication over the N13 interface.

**Expected format of evidence:**

Evidence suitable for the interface, e.g., evidence can be presented in the form of log messages or a packet trace. A packet trace contains at least the messages sent between the AMF/SEAF and AUSF and the messages sent between the AUSF and UDM on the N13 interface.

\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\* END OF CHANGE \*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*\*