**3GPP TSG-SA3 Meeting #115 *S3-240886***

Athens, Greece, 26th February - 1st March 2024

**Title: LS on the introduction of the domain "ipxnetwork.org"**

**Response to: LS S3-240256 on the introduction of the domain "ipxnetwork.org" and clarifications of the outsourced SEPP and Hosted SEPP deployment scenarios from GSMA 5GMRR**

**Release: n/a**

**Work Item: n/a**

**Source: 3GPP SA3 #115**

**To: GSMA 5GMRR**

**Cc:**

**Contact person: Andreas Pashalidis**

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**Send any reply LS to: 3GPP Liaisons Coordinator,** **mailto:3GPPLiaison@etsi.org**

**Attachments:** -

# 1 Overall description

3GPP SA3 thanks GSMA 5GMRR for its LS on the introduction of the domain "ipxnetwork.org" and clarifications of the outsourced SEPP and Hosted SEPP deployment scenarios (S3-240256). SA3 would like to draw attention to

* clause 6.1.3c.5.3.1 of TS 33.310, which does not prohibit the usage of the domain suffix "ipxnetwork.org" in the certificate(s) used by the SEPP on its inter-domain interface, and
* the test case on trust anchoring in clause 4.2.5 of TS 33.517 where the "ipxnetwork.org" domain suffix is explicitly mentioned as an example.

Therefore, SA3 believes that there is no need to include further references to the above domain suffix in its specifications. Moreover, in reference to the models 3 and 4 as per S3-240256, SA3 would like to highlight that it considers the inclusion of PLMN IDs in the Subject Alternative Name field of certificates, irrespective of their domain suffix, crucial for trust anchoring with a per-operator granularity. The absence of such PLMN IDs would cause the above test case to fail. SA3 considers maintaining this level of granularity necessary in order to

* reflect the fact that no commonly accepted root CA appears to exist within the global roaming ecosystem as described in GSMA FS.34,
* limit the attack surface represented by any single compromised root CA,
* enable trust anchoring using a consistent granularity both for direct and non-direct roaming relations, and
* support a segregation-friendly design of roaming-related services.

In reference to model 5 (SMS delivery from A2P providers): SA3 considers this use case to be separate from roaming, and it remains unclear whether this is an operator requirement. Entities such as SMS aggregators are currently outside 3GPP scope.

# 2 Actions

**To GSMA 5GMRR**

**ACTION:** SA3 asks GSMA 5GMRR to take into account the information above and to adopt their mechanisms for models 3 and 4 such that PLMN IDs are included in leaf certificates. If this is not possible, GSMA 5GMRR is asked to explain why this is the case and provide some alternative means for trust anchoring with the granularity of individual PLMNs in the context of these, and similar, models.

# 3 Dates of next TSG SA WG 3 meetings

SA3#116 20 - 24 May 2024 Jeju (South Korea)

SA3#117 19 - 23 August 2024 Maastricht (Netherlands)