Tdoc List

2026-02-13 14:55

Agenda Topic TDoc Title Source Type For Avail Treated Decision Wdrn Replaced-by Replaces
1 Agenda and Meeting Objectives S3‑260100 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260162  
    S3‑260103 Process for SA3#126 SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260104 Detailed agenda planning SA WG3 Chair other   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260162 Agenda SA WG3 Chair agenda   Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260100
2 Meeting Reports                      
2.1 Previous SA3 meeting report/s and SA report S3‑260101 Report from SA3#125 MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260102 Report from SA3#125-Adhoc-e MCC report   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260105 Report from last SA SA WG3 Chair report   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
2.2 SA3-LI Report                      
3 Reports and Liaisons from other Groups S3‑260716 Update to SA3 ToR SA3 Chair ToR   Yes
YesHuawei: shouldn’t we remove the "5G system" wording as well? The Chair replied that this was related to SCAS work, but it was pointed out that SCAS started in LTE. NTT-Docomo: remove the word "new".
 		revised No S3‑260754  
    S3‑260754 Update to SA3 ToR SA3 Chair ToR - No
YesORANGE asked the Chair to remind other WGs not to handle any security issues (as it has happened in 5G).
 		agreed No   S3‑260716
    S3‑260155 TCG progress - report from TCG rapporteur InterDigital, Inc. other Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260108 Out of sync t-ID handling for AIoT CT4 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑260199 Reply LS on Out of sync T-ID handling for AIoT vivo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260871  
    S3‑260236 Reply to LS on Out of sync T-ID handling for AIoT Lenovo LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260871  
    S3‑260871 Reply to LS on Out of sync T-ID handling for AIoT SA3 LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260236
    S3‑260222 Corrections to the Nadm_SecTID_Get service operation and out of sync detection Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260870  
    S3‑260870 Corrections to the Nadm_SecTID_Get service operation and out of sync detection Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260222
    S3‑260290 LS reply to Out of sync t-ID handling for AIoT Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260871  
    S3‑260293 Clarification of resynchronisation mechanism Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260870  
    S3‑260300 Reply LS on Out of sync T-ID handling for AIoT ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260871  
    S3‑260301 corrections for the re-synchronization of stored type T-ID ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260870  
    S3‑260372 Reply LS on Out of sync t-ID handling for AIoT Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesLenovo: updating the terminology is confusing. Old and new is not good, maybe current and future would be better. Nokia didn’t think that changing terminology wouldn’t fix the problem. Ericsson: we need a discussion paper to analyse this. Huawei proposed a baseline for the LS and CR and discuss during the week.
 		merged No S3‑260871  
    S3‑260373 Update to Out of sync t-ID handling for AIoT Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260870  
    S3‑260109 LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training RAN2 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260302 Reply LS on user consent for data collection at the UE for NW-side model training ZTE Corporation LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260516 DP on user consent for AI/ML network data collection Apple discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260515 Reply LS to RAN2 on user consent for AI/ML network data collection(R2-2506541) Apple LS out   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260729 [draft] Reply LS on User consent for Data collection at the UE for NW-side model training Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesThe Chair stated that there was no consensus among the companies.The original LS was noted. ORANGE didn’t agree with sending an LS stating the lack of consensus. Company positions are reflected in the meeting report from SA3_125.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260110 LS on Security parameter in A-IoT paging RAN2 LS in   Yes
YesDespite the actions for SA3 the Chair decided to note the LS.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260128 Reply LS on Security parameter in A-IoT paging TSG SA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260291 Reply LS on Security parameter in A-IoT paging Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260755  
    S3‑260630 Reply LS on Security parameter in A-IoT paging Ericsson, Orange LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260755  
    S3‑260755 Reply LS on Security parameter in A-IoT paging Ericsson, Orange LS out Approval No
YesChina Mobile objected to this contribution. They commented that there was no consensus in SA plenary. ORANGE commented that there was no consensus in the CR proposed by CMCC, and that the SA3 specification had been approved without changes. NTT-Docomo commented that the specification was clear enough and that there was no problem with including a statement coming from an existing specification. ORANGE clarified that the CR against TS 33.369 was not approved. The specification content could not be rejected on the basis that the CR was not approved.
 		noted No   S3‑260630
    S3‑260122 Reply LS on LI requirements on IMS Data Channel SA3-LI LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑260612 Way forward for the IMS Data Channel and LI cases Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260613 Corrections for IMS Data Channels and LI Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia: this is not needed. MCC: it should be cat-F or for Rel-20?? Refer to the 3GPP specifications in the NOTE.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260611 Reply LS on IMS Data Channel LI requirements Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
YesNokia: SA2 is still discussing this topic. No need to reply or create a CR. Huawei agreed that it was better to wait for SA2.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260121 LS on MANET multicast support for Layer-3 IP Type UE-to-UE multi-hop Relay SA2 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		replied to No    
    S3‑260409 Reply LS on MANET multicast support Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesNIST: refer to the security mechanism here.
 		revised No S3‑260772  
    S3‑260772 Reply LS on MANET multicast support SA3 LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260409
    S3‑260126 LS to SA3 on FS_APCOT study SA6 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		postponed No    
    S3‑260343 Reply LS on FS_APCOT study Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260692 Reply LS on FS_APCOT study Ericsson LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260730 LS on security of FS_APCOT study Nokia LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260106 Reply LS on Structure updates of AIoT Identifiers CT4 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260107 Reply LS on AIoT Device Permanent ID Length CT4 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260112 Reply LS on handling of service collision RAN2 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260127 Reply LS on AI/ML UE sided data collection TSG SA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260117 LS on AI/ML UE sided data collection SA2 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260113 Reply LS to S2-2510958 = RP-253004 on AI/ML UE sided data collection (to: SA, SA2; cc: RAN2, SA3, SA5; contact: Interdigital) RAN LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260114 Reply LS to SA3 on business model and architecture for SNPN cellular hotspots SA1 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260120 Reply LS on business model and architecture for SNPN cellular hotspots SA2 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260115 LS reply to SA2 (cc RAN2, SA4, CT1, SA3, RAN1) on IMS voice over NB-IoT NTN connected to EPC SA1 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260129 LS Response on external data channel content access requirements TSG SA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260116 Reply LS to SA (cc SA2, SA3, SA4, SA6, CT) on external data channel content access requirements SA1 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260125 Reply LS on external data channel content access SA6 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260118 Reply LS on Potential UDR in SNPN for AIoT SA2 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260119 LS Response on IETF Network Slice Application in 3GPP 5G End-to-End Network Slice SA2 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260124 Reply LS to IETF_TEAS_LS_250917 = S5-255022 on IETF Network Slice Application in 3GPP 5G End-to-End Network Slice (to: SA; cc: SA2, SA3, RAN3; contact: Ericsson) SA5 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260123 LS to SA2 on avatar Communications SA4 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260130 LS on Completion of AIML_CAL Study TSG SA LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260131 CVD-2025-0105 – GUTI Reuse in EPS Fallback vulnerability GSMA CVD PoE LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260132 Liaison_statement_to_3GPP_SA3_on_CRA_Open_consultation ETSI TC CYBER WG EUSR LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260133 Reply to LS on PQC transition for RFC 6509 IETF LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260134 LS on initiation of a new work item related to coordination of networking and computing ITU-T Study Group 17 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260135 LS/r on informing about the latest PQTN TF publications (reply to GSMAPQTN#93 Doc_003) ITU-T Study Group 17 LS in   Yes
YesEricsson pointed out that the LS was for action and a reply was needed. Huawei noted that no reply was needed, this was for information. ORANGE commented that this LS could not be ignored, especially on the statements about the 256 bit algorithms. This LS was postponed for the next meeting.
 		postponed No    
    S3‑260136 LS on DTLS for SCTP Progress Report IETF LS in   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260111 LS on Voice over NB-IoT NTN RAN2 LS in   Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260753 LS on LI requirements SA3-LI LS in discussion Yes
YesPostponed to the Malta meeting as requested by the SA3-LI Chair.
 		postponed No    
4 Maintenance (Rel-19 and pre-Rel-19)                      
4.1 Work Items                      
4.1.1 All Rel-19 and pre-Rel-19 WIs S3‑260142 Update on Snow5G Implementation Test Data Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260144 Update on Snow5G Design Conformance Test Data Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260145 Update on AES 256-bit Specification Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260804  
    S3‑260804 Update on AES 256-bit Specification Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260145
    S3‑260159 Corrections to "S3-260145: Update on AES 256-bit Specification" CHTTL draftCR Discussion Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260804  
    S3‑260146 Update on AES 256-bit Implementation Test Data Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260147 Update on AES 256-bit Design Conformance Test Data Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260148 Update on ZUC 256-bit Specification Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260805  
    S3‑260805 Update on ZUC 256-bit Specification Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260148
    S3‑260160 Corrections to "S3-260148: Update on ZUC 256-bit Specification" CHTTL draftCR Discussion Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260805  
    S3‑260149 Update on ZUC 256-bit Implementation Test Data Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260150 Update on ZUC 256-bit Design Conformance Test Data Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260806  
    S3‑260806 Update on ZUC 256-bit Design Conformance Test Data Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260150
    S3‑260156 Update on Snow5G 256-bit Specification Nokia CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson had a discussion paper in 694 proposing to change the structure.
 		revised No S3‑260803 S3‑260141
    S3‑260803 Update on Snow5G 256-bit Specification Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260156
    S3‑260161 Corrections to "S3-260156: Update on Snow5G 256-bit Specification" CHTTL draftCR Discussion Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260803  
    S3‑260694 Revisiting the structure of 256-bit algorithms specifications Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
YesNokia preferred not to change the structure now. They added that this was following the typical 3GPP SA3 structure for other algorithms.No value in spending time on changing the structure. GSMA: maybe it would be better to have cat-C for these CRs? Ericsson commented that the current strucutre was error prone and maintenance would be difficult. This was taken offline. It was commented that a restructuring and title change would imply withdrawing the current specifications and bring a new WID for new specifications. MCC added that bringing the SAGE content into 3GPP was not possible with just a copy/paste, because the content needed to follow 3GPP drafting rules. It was also mentioned that companies outside 3GPP were waiting to access the content that currently appears redacted in the 3GU Portal. The Chair decided to move forward with the CRs to make the content public as a stable specification. There would be time later to make further changes. NIST was not in favour of restructuring. Qualcomm added that there were references in other specs and they would be broken.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260189 Full Nonce Counter Lenovo discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260190 Full nonce counter Lenovo CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with removing that text. Nokia didn’t support it either.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260191 Full Nonce Counter Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260200 Correction on the use of Nadm_SecTID_Get vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260224 New T-ID Update Service Operation Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260201 Negotiation for privacy vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260226 Removal of sending Device Permanent Identity Lenovo CR Approval Yes
YesHuawei disagreed with this change.OPPO and KPN didn’t agree either.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260634 DP on Configuration of AIOT devices for privacy protection Ericsson discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260635 CR on Configuration of AIOT devices for privacy protection Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
YesLenovo objected to this contribution.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260225 Correction of the Nadm_SecAuthentication_Get service operation Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260976  
    S3‑260976 Correction of the Nadm_SecAuthentication_Get service operation Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260225
    S3‑260227 Corrections in clause 5.2.2 Authentication procedure Lenovo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260756  
    S3‑260292 Resolution of EN on randomness of RAND_AIOT_d Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260756  
    S3‑260756 Resolution of EN on randomness of RAND_AIOT_d Nokia CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260292
    S3‑260266 Add algorithm type distinguisher to key derivation OPPO CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260757  
    S3‑260303 Corrections in TS 33.369 regarding AIoT Identification Information and Inventory Report message ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
YesPhillips: this is not needed.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260304 Corrections of clause 5.3.4 in TS 33.369 regarding ciphered parameter ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260756  
    S3‑260305 Correction of clause Annex A.3 in TS 33.369 ZTE Corporation CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260374 Update to the length of security parameters Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260977  
    S3‑260977 Update to the length of security parameters Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260374
    S3‑260564 CR to TS33.369 define the length of (X)RES CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260977  
    S3‑260567 CR to TS33.369 define the length of T-ID CATT CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260977  
    S3‑260628 Length of RESAIOT in AIOT Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260977  
    S3‑260629 Length of T-ID in AIoT Ericsson CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260977  
    S3‑260382 Update the input parameter of enc and int keys Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260757  
    S3‑260757 Update the input parameter of enc and int keys Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260382
    S3‑260597 Updates on T-ID terminology of TS 33.369 Qualcomm Incorporated CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260870  
    S3‑260203 Correction on clause 6.4.6-R15 vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260204 Correction on clause 6.4.6-R16 vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260205 Correction on clause 6.4.6-R17 vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260206 Correction on clause 6.4.6-R18 vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260207 Correction on clause 6.4.6-R19 vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260758 Correction on clause 6.4.6-R19 vivo CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260208 Correction on X.12.2 vivo CR Approval Yes
YesEricsson had issues with step 6a and 6b.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260209 Alignment based on AIML consistency alignment vivo CR Approval Yes
YesNokia: SA2 needs to align everything before we do it. This was checked offline.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260234 MCX ETSI Plugtest Observations Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. discussion Discussion Yes
YesThe content was agreed. It was decided to send an endorsed document on behalf of SA3 for getting the feedback to the Plug test group.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260759 MCX ETSI Plugtest Observations SA3 other Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		endorsed No    
    S3‑260460 Clarification on key update of UE-Satellite-UE in IMS Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement Yes
YesNokia didn’t agree with this CR. The related key issue was not agreed in the related study. Qualcomm: how does the network about this? Huawei proposed to have a new study about it. There was no support for this in Rel-19.
 		not pursued No    
    S3‑260668 Correction of misalignment with TS 29.510: Replace appended PLMN ID access token claims with PLMN ID specific claims in roaming Ericsson, Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260760  
    S3‑260760 Correction of misalignment with TS 29.510: Replace appended PLMN ID access token claims with PLMN ID specific claims in roaming Ericsson, Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesNTT-Docomo: only relevant for Rel-20? BSI: this was introduced back in Rel-15. Ericsson: this has no impact on deployments (not FASMO). NTT-Docomo proposed to add something about this on the cover page for clarification.
 		agreed No   S3‑260668
    S3‑260679 Correction of reference numbering Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesThe Chair commented that although the error is fair, this may not be considered FASMO. MCC replied that this still needed to be corrected, a missing reference was still problematic because there is no proper reference.
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260681 Correction of reference numbering Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260682 Correction of reference numbering Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260684 Correction of reference numbering Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260695 Correction of reference numbering in TS 33.501 Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260697 Correction of reference numbering Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260141 Update on Snow5G 256-bit Specification Nokia Korea CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260156  
    S3‑260202 Add new terms and abbreviations vivo CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260978 Correction of misalignment with TS 29.510: Replace appended PLMN ID access token claims with PLMN ID specific claims in roaming Ericsson,Nokia CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
4.2 Study Items                      
4.2.1 All Rel-19 and pre-Rel-19 SIs                      
5 Rel-20 topics                      
5.1 5GA Work Items                      
5.1.1 Security related Events Handling S3‑260157 pCR to TS 33.502 – Detecting SBA layer parameters change Vodafone, Verizon, China Mobile, NTT DOCOMO, KDDI, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260778  
    S3‑260778 pCR to TS 33.502 – Detecting SBA layer parameters change Vodafone, Verizon, China Mobile, NTT DOCOMO, KDDI, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260157
    S3‑260289 pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for SBA parameters configuration IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260778  
    S3‑260620 Configuration related information Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260780  
    S3‑260228 pCR to TS 33.502 – Detecting events related to unexpected communication model flows Vodafone, Verizon, China Mobile, NTT DOCOMO, KDDI, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260779  
    S3‑260779 pCR to TS 33.502 – Detecting events related to unexpected communication model flows Vodafone, Verizon, China Mobile, NTT DOCOMO, KDDI, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260228
    S3‑260258 pCR to TS 33.502 - Security related Events for unexpected SBI call flows IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260779  
    S3‑260530 pCR to unexpected messages in SBA Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260779  
    S3‑260158 pCR to TS 33.502 – Removal of ENs Vodafone, Verizon, China Mobile, NTT DOCOMO, KDDI, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260780  
    S3‑260780 pCR to TS 33.502 – Removal of ENs Vodafone, Verizon, China Mobile, NTT DOCOMO, KDDI, AT&T, Deutsche Telekom, Telecom Italia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260158
    S3‑260614 Removing Editor's Note on determining NF Consumer for Authentication Failure Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260780  
    S3‑260615 Message type of malformed messages and massive number of messages Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260616 Alignment and clarification of the message IE Ericsson, Vodafone pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260617 Event instance identifier and clarification of event number/event code Ericsson, Vodafone pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260781  
    S3‑260781 Event instance identifier and clarification of event number/event code Ericsson, Vodafone pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260617
    S3‑260618 Clarification of the security event related to massive number of incoming messages Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260782  
    S3‑260782 Clarification of the security event related to massive number of incoming messages Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260618
    S3‑260619 Align terminology to "trust domain" Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260459 Update to Overview of Security related Events Handling Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260783  
    S3‑260783 Update to Overview of Security related Events Handling Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260459
    S3‑260229 Presentation for Approval to TSG SA - Security related Events Handling Vodafone TS or TR cover Approval Yes
YesVodafone commented that the TR reached 85% and more work with CRs was needed to address the remaining editor's notes
 		revised No S3‑261009  
    S3‑261009 Presentation for Approval to TSG SA - Security related Events Handling Vodafone TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260229
    S3‑260777 Draft TS 33.502 Vodafone draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.1.2 New WID on Mission Critical security                      
5.1.3 New WID on Security Assurance Specification for 5G-Advanced S3‑260223 Pseudo-CR on 33.511 gNB SCAS - Key Refresh NPL other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260930  
    S3‑260930 Pseudo-CR on 33.511 gNB SCAS - Key Refresh NPL other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260223
    S3‑260419 Living document to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260931  
    S3‑260931 Living document to TS 33.511 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑260419
    S3‑260137 Update to AMF SCAS according to NESASG feedback Nokia Korea draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260703 pCR for 33.512 Cleanup of TC NAS NULL integrity protection BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260704 pCR for 33.512 Specify NIA selection and use BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260420 Living document to TS 33.512 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260932  
    S3‑260932 Living document to TS 33.512 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑260420
    S3‑260933 Add reference terms update test cases and add new test case of NAS protection of Initial NAS message Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260140 Update to SEPP SCAS according to NESASG feedback Nokia Korea draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260423 Living document to TS 33.517 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260934 Living document to TS 33.517 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260138 Update to NRF SCAS according to NESASG feedback Nokia Korea draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260478 Correct NRF test case for access token request verification Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260935  
    S3‑260935 Correct NRF test case for access token request verification Ericsson other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260478
    S3‑260424 Living document to TS 33.518 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260937  
    S3‑260937 Living document to TS 33.518 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑260424
    S3‑260938 Add new test cases on Indirect Communication and token verification Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260139 Update to NWDAF SCAS according to NESASG feedback Nokia Korea draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260426 Living document to TS 33.521 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260939  
    S3‑260939 Living document to TS 33.521 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑260426
    S3‑260953 Update requirement and test case of clause 4.2.1.2.6 and add protocols to the robustness and fuzz testing Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260473 Clarification on the exact IE of producer PLMN ID verified by NF Producer Huawei, HiSilicon, BSI (DE) other Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260650 pCR on TS 33.117 protection against brute force and dict. attacks BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260954  
    S3‑260954 pCR on TS 33.117 protection against brute force and dict. attacks BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260650
    S3‑260651 pCR on TS 33.117 client credential assertion validation BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260652 pCR on TS 33.117 protection of transport layer BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260955  
    S3‑260955 pCR on TS 33.117 protection of transport layer BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260652
    S3‑260653 pCR on TS 33.117 security event logging BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260997  
    S3‑260997 pCR on TS 33.117 security event logging BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260653
    S3‑260654 pCR on TS 33.117 for TC_NO_UNUSED_HTTP_METHODS BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260998  
    S3‑260998 pCR on TS 33.117 for TC_NO_UNUSED_HTTP_METHODS BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260654
    S3‑260701 pCR for 33.117 Clean-up BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260702 pCR for 33.117 overload situations BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260429 Living document to TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260956  
    S3‑260956 Living document to TS 33.117 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑260429
    S3‑260957 Update terms requirement and test cases to several test cases. Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260655 Correction of 33.515 TC_CHARGING_ID_UNIQUENESS_SMF pre-conditions BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260958  
    S3‑260958 Correction of 33.515 TC_CHARGING_ID_UNIQUENESS_SMF pre-conditions BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260655
    S3‑260656 Correction of 33.515 TC_UP_SECURITY_POLICY_SMF expected results BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260421 Living document to TS 33.513 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260959 Update test cases and add abbreviations to TS 33.513 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260422 Living document to TS 33.514 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260960 Update references and execution steps to TS 33.514 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260425 Living document to TS 33.519 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260961 Add TLS to the robustness and fuzz testing to TS 33.519 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260427 Living document to TR 33.926 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260962  
    S3‑260962 Living document to TR 33.926 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No   S3‑260427
    S3‑260963 Update threat category impact interface and new threat to eNB, NRF and NSSAAF to TS 33.926 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260428 Living document to TS 33.116 Huawei, HiSilicon draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260964 Add abbreviations update execution steps to TS 33.116 Huawei, HiSilicon CR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260657 Living document for TS 33.523 BSI (DE) draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260965 Format and references corrections to TS 33.523 BSI (DE) CR Approval Yes
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260658 Living document for TS 33.226 BSI (DE), Montsecure, Deutsche Telekom draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260966 Update Test Names to TS 33.226 BSI (DE), Montsecure, Deutsche Telekom CR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260463 Clarification on the exact IE of producer PLMN ID verified by NF Producer Huawei, HiSilicon, BSI (DE) CR Agreement No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260833 Living doc to TS 33.216 Huawei, HiSilicon,BSI (DE),Ericsson draftCR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260967 Update Threat References: and test cases to TS 33.216 Huawei, HiSilicon,BSI (DE),Ericsson CR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260991 Corrections and updated test cases Huawei CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260992 Update references test names based on NESASG comments in TS 33.511 Huawei CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260993 Clarification on the exact IE of producer PLMN ID verified by NF Producer Huawei CR discussion Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260994 Update preconditions to clause 4.2.2.1.4 in TS 33.515 Huawei CR Agreement No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.1.4 New WID on PRINS Refinement                      
5.1.5 New WID on SCAS for NR Femto                      
5.1.6 New WID on SCAS for NR Femto SeGW S3‑260733 Draft TS 33.547 CATT pCR Approval Yes
YesNote from MCC: this version is the same one that was approved in the November meeting.
 		endorsed No    
    S3‑260734 Living document to TR 33.926 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260940 Cover sheet TS 33.547 for information CATT TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.1.7 New WID on SCAS for CAPIF Core Function S3‑260278 Skeleton for TS 33.531(SCAS for CAPIF CF) Rakuten Mobile, Inc, BSI (DE) draft TS Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260970 S3‑260184
    S3‑260970 Skeleton for TS 33.531(SCAS for CAPIF CF) Rakuten Mobile, Inc, BSI (DE) draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260278
    S3‑260643 pCR SCAS CAPIF Scope and Clause 4.1 Rakuten Mobile, Inc, BSI(DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260286 pCR CAPIF SCAS Section 4.2 Rakuten Mobile, Inc, BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260705 Pseudo-CR on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for CAPIF Core Function section 4.2 and 4.3 BSI (DE), Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260287 pCR CAPIF SCAS Section 4.3.1 Rakuten Mobile, Inc, BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260711 pCR for 33.926 Add threat framework for CCF BSI (DE), Montsecure other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260710 pCR on TS 33.926 adding threat for AEF_PSK TC for CCF BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260706 Add new CAPIF CF test case that verifies whether AEF_PSK is computed correctly by the CAPIF CF BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260972  
    S3‑260972 Add new CAPIF CF test case that verifies whether AEF_PSK is computed correctly by the CAPIF CF BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260706
    S3‑260712 pCR on TS 33.926 adding threat for OAuth TC for CCF BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260707 Add new CAPIF CF test case that verifies whether the onboard credential is correctly validated BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260941  
    S3‑260941 Add new CAPIF CF test case that verifies whether the onboard credential is correctly validated BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260707
    S3‑260713 pCR on TS 33.926 adding threat for validation resOwnerId TC for CCF BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260709 Add new API Exposing Function test case that verifies whether the API Exposing Function correctly validates the resOwnerId claim when Resource owner-aware Northbound API Access is used BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260973  
    S3‑260973 Add new API Exposing Function test case that verifies whether the API Exposing Function correctly validates the resOwnerId claim when Resource owner-aware Northbound API Access is used BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260709
    S3‑260714 pCR on TS 33.926 adding threat for rnaa revocation TC for CCF BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260708 Add new AEF test case that verifies whether revocation of an access token in an RNAA enabled CAPIF deployment is correctly implemented BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260936  
    S3‑260936 Add new AEF test case that verifies whether revocation of an access token in an RNAA enabled CAPIF deployment is correctly implemented BSI (DE), Montsecure, Rakuten Mobile Inc. other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260708
    S3‑260667 New threat for CAPIF nested API Rakuten Mobile, Inc, BSI(DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260288 pCR CAPIF SCAS nested API Rakuten Mobile, Inc, BSI (DE) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260184 Draft TS 33.531 Rakuten Mobile, Inc draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260278  
    S3‑260185 pCR on SCAS for CAPIF Core Function section 4.2 Rakuten Mobile, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260186 pCR on SCAS for CAPIF Core Function section 4.3.1 Rakuten Mobile, Inc pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260187 pCR on SCAS for CAPIF Core Function test case Rakuten Mobile, Inc pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260188 nested API invocation threat at CAPIF Core Function in TR 33.926 Rakuten Mobile, Inc CR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260971 Draft TS 33.531 Rakuten Mobile draft TS Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260995 Cover sheet TR 33.531 for information Rakuten Mobile TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2 5GA Study Items                      
5.2.1 Study on transitioning to Post Quantum Cryptography (PQC) in 3GPP S3‑260247 Replace Obsolete Version Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260811  
    S3‑260347 Corrections for TR 33.703 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260811  
    S3‑260811 Corrections for TR 33.703 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260347
    S3‑260346 Updating clause 6 based on IETF progress Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260392 Update to Current Work in IETF of IKEv2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260164 Considerations for TLS 1.3 AT&T Services, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260898  
    S3‑260898 Considerations for TLS 1.3 AT&T Services, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260164
    S3‑260171 PQC KEM solution for MIKEY-SAKKE Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260175 PQC DSA solution for MIKEY-SAKKE Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260249 Solution for Hybrid PQC based SUCI Computation Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260807 S3‑254729
    S3‑260807 Solution for Hybrid PQC based SUCI Computation Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260249
    S3‑260264 New solution for SUCI calculation with symmetric key InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260843  
    S3‑260843 New solution for SUCI calculation with symmetric key InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260264
    S3‑260306 hybrid KEM based SUCI calculation ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260899  
    S3‑260899 hybrid KEM based SUCI calculation ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260306
    S3‑260602 Pseudo-CR on ECIES-MLKEM Hybrid SUCI Calculation Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260900  
    S3‑260900 Pseudo-CR on ECIES-MLKEM Hybrid SUCI Calculation Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260602
    S3‑260603 Pseudo-CR on ECKEM-MLKEM Hybrid SUCI Calculation Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260901  
    S3‑260901 Pseudo-CR on ECKEM-MLKEM Hybrid SUCI Calculation Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260603
    S3‑260604 Pseudo-CR on Backward Compatible Hybrid SUCI Calculation Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260902  
    S3‑260902 Pseudo-CR on Backward Compatible Hybrid SUCI Calculation Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260604
    S3‑260696 A hybrid scheme for SUPI protection China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260859  
    S3‑260859 A hybrid scheme for SUPI protection China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260696
    S3‑260349 Updating Sol #1 for SUCI calculation Huawei, HiSilicon, Apple pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260508 TR33703 - PQC - revision of Solution#1 Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260559 Evaluation of solution #1 Thales, ORANGE, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260176 Solving the Editors Notes Solution 2 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260903  
    S3‑260903 Solving the Editors Notes Solution 2 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260176
    S3‑260350 Updating Sol #3 for SUCI calculation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260862  
    S3‑260862 Updating Sol #3 for SUCI calculation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260350
    S3‑260520 pCR to evaluation for solution #3 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260862  
    S3‑260390 EN addressing and evaluation for solution#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260844  
    S3‑260844 EN addressing and evaluation for solution#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260390
    S3‑260521 pCR to evaluation for solution #4 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260844  
    S3‑260476 EN Addition for solution #5 LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260560 Evaluation of solution #5 Thales, ORANGE, Samsung, NCSC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260904  
    S3‑260904 Evaluation of solution #5 Thales, ORANGE, Samsung, NCSC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260560
    S3‑260477 EN Addition for solution #6 LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260561 Evaluation of solution #6 Thales, ORANGE, Samsung, NCSC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260905  
    S3‑260905 Evaluation of solution #6 Thales, ORANGE, Samsung, NCSC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260561
    S3‑260550 Addressing Editor’s Notes and adding Evaluation to Solution #7 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260906  
    S3‑260906 Addressing Editor’s Notes and adding Evaluation to Solution #7 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260550
    S3‑260152 pCR on Terminology Update in Solution #8 Deutsche Telekom AG pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260522 pCR to evaluation for solution #8 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260907  
    S3‑260907 pCR to evaluation for solution #8 Samsung, Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260522
    S3‑260563 Evaluation of solution #8 Thales, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260523 pCR to evaluation for solution #9 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260908  
    S3‑260908 pCR to evaluation for solution #9 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260523
    S3‑260519 pCR to update solution #10 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260909  
    S3‑260909 pCR to update solution #10 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260519
    S3‑260527 pCR to evaluation for solution #11 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260910  
    S3‑260910 pCR to evaluation for solution #11 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260527
    S3‑260549 Evaluation to Solution #11 Ericsson, Thales, Orange pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260911  
    S3‑260911 Evaluation to Solution #11 Ericsson, Thales, Orange pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260549
    S3‑260169 Solving the Editors Notes in Solution 12 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260912  
    S3‑260912 Solving the Editors Notes in Solution 12 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260169
    S3‑260174 Evaluation on the hybrid SUCI Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260913  
    S3‑260913 Evaluation on the hybrid SUCI Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260174
    S3‑260524 pCR to evaluation for solution #12 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260913  
    S3‑260565 Evaluation of solution #12 Thales, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260170 Solving the Editors Notes on the symmetric SUCI Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260173 Evaluation on the symmetric SUCI Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260525 pCR to evaluation for solution #13 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260914  
    S3‑260914 pCR to evaluation for solution #13 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260525
    S3‑260210 Solution update on solution#14 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260915  
    S3‑260915 Solution update on solution#14 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260210
    S3‑260526 pCR to evaluation for solution #14 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260999  
    S3‑260999 pCR to evaluation for solution #14 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260526
    S3‑260231 Update of Solution#15 with key identification Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260232 Additional clarifications of Solution#15 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260566 Evaluation of solution #15 Thales, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260233 Evaluation of Solution#15 Lenovo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260528 pCR to evaluation for solution #15 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260248 Updates to Solution #16 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260731 Evaluation of solution #16 Thales, ORANGE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260683 Conclusions for IKEv2 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260917  
    S3‑260917 Conclusions for IKEv2 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260683
    S3‑260348 Overall evaluation for SUCI solutions Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260918  
    S3‑260918 Overall evaluation for SUCI solutions Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260348
    S3‑260551 Analyzing solutions for quantum resistant SUCIs Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260918  
    S3‑260153 Evaluation of SUCI Calculation Solutions and Recommendation for Solution #8 Deutsche Telekom AG discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260154 pCR on conclusions for solutions for SUCI calculation Deutsche Telekom AG pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260172 Proposed update for conclusion Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260518 pCR to merge all Hybrid solutions together Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260529 pCR for conclusion Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260918  
    S3‑260720 Pseudo-CR on MIKEY-SAKKE PQC evaluation Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260916 S3‑260235
    S3‑260916 Pseudo-CR on MIKEY-SAKKE PQC evaluation Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260720
    S3‑260391 Discussion about MIKEY SAKKE Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260396 Conclusion for MIKEY-SAKKE key exchange Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260916  
    S3‑260235 Pseudo-CR on MIKEY-SAKKE PQC evaluation Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. pCR Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260720  
    S3‑260436 withdrawn Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260437 withdrawn Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260897 Draft TR 33.703 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.2 New SID on Security Aspects for IMS resiliency                      
5.2.3 New Study on AIMLE Service Security S3‑260240 Updates to Solution#1 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260765  
    S3‑260765 Updates to Solution#1 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260240
    S3‑260241 Updates to Solution#4 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260766  
    S3‑260766 Updates to Solution#4 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260241
    S3‑260467 Resolving the ENs on Solution #2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260767  
    S3‑260767 Resolving the ENs on Solution #2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260467
    S3‑260534 Resolving ENs in solution#5 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260768  
    S3‑260768 Resolving ENs in solution#5 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260534
    S3‑260693 Resolving ENs and evaluation of solution#3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesSamsung: relation with CAPIF should be clarified.
 		revised No S3‑260769  
    S3‑260769 Resolving ENs and evaluation of solution#3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260693
    S3‑260242 Conclusions to Key Issues Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260770  
    S3‑260468 Conclusion for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260770  
    S3‑260469 Conclusion for KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260770  
    S3‑260535 Conclusion for KI#1 and KI#2 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260770  
    S3‑260770 Conclusion for KI#1 and KI#2 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260535
    S3‑260243 Editorial Clean-up for TR 33.786 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260764 Draft TR 33.786 Motorola Mobility draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260771 Cover sheet TR 33.786 for information Motorola Mobility TS or TR cover Approval No
Yes
 		approved No    
5.2.4 New Study on security for PLMN hosting a NPN phase 2 S3‑260319 Update the terms and abbreviations ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260165 Update the clause 4 Architecture Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260166 Update the clause 5 Security assumptions Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260947  
    S3‑260947 Update the clause 5 Security assumptions Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260166
    S3‑260167 Update the clause 6 evaluation for SBA interface protection Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260318 Remove the EN in clause 4 to 6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260948  
    S3‑260948 Remove the EN in clause 4 to 6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260318
    S3‑260168 Update the clause 7 Key issues Johns Hopkins University APL pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260335 Security requirements for KI#1 China Telecommunications Corp.,, ZTE, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260949  
    S3‑260949 Security requirements for KI#1 China Telecommunications Corp.,, ZTE, Nokia pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260335
    S3‑260336 Solution to TEID issue China Telecommunications Corp., ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260338 Conclusion to KI#1 China Telecommunications Corp., ZTE, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260337 Solution to inter domain security on N9 interface China Telecommunications Corp., ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260950  
    S3‑260950 Solution to inter domain security on N9 interface China Telecommunications Corp., ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260337
    S3‑260339 Conclusion to KI#2 China Telecommunications Corp., ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260946 Draft TR 33.758 China Telecom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.5 New SID on providing PSK for MPQUIC/TLS S3‑260395 Addressing key updating EN in sol#4 and updating evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260942  
    S3‑260942 Addressing key updating EN in sol#4 and updating evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260395
    S3‑260417 Addressing roaming EN in sol#5 and updating evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260944  
    S3‑260944 Addressing roaming EN in sol#5 and updating evaluation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260417
    S3‑260498 Evaluation for Solution #2 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260499 Resolution of Editor’s Note in Solution #3 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260945  
    S3‑260945 Resolution of Editor’s Note in Solution #3 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260499
    S3‑260255 Conclusion for Key Issue #1 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd., Nokia, Huawei, HiSilicon, Xiaomi, CableLabs, Charter Communications, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260531 Conclusion on Key Issue #1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260574 Conclusion for MPQUIC study Ericsson, Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260943 Draft TR 33.778 Huawei draft TR Approval Yes
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.6 New Study on Security for Core Network Enhanced Support for Artificial Intelligence (AI) / Machine Learning (ML) Phase 2 S3‑260256 Add conclusions for Key Issues #1 and #2 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260773  
    S3‑260773 Add conclusions for Key Issues #1 and #2 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260256
    S3‑260388 Conclusion on Key Issue#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260773  
    S3‑260389 Conclusion on Key Issue#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260773  
    S3‑260257 Closing ENs for Solution #2 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260774  
    S3‑260474 Update Sol#3 of AIML OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260774  
    S3‑260738 Update_soultion4 CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260774  
    S3‑260480 Cleanup for solutions #5 of TR 33.785 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260774  
    S3‑260259 Closing ENs for Solution #6 InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260774  
    S3‑260400 Resolution of EN for sol.8 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260774  
    S3‑260481 Cleanup for solutions #9 of TR 33.785 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260774  
    S3‑260573 Pseudo-CR on Resolving ENs in Solution #11 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260774  
    S3‑260211 Clean Up for TR 33.785 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260774  
    S3‑260774 Clean Up for TR 33.785 vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260211
    S3‑260775 Draft TR 33.785 Vivo draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260776 Cover sheet TR 33.785 for approval Interdigital TS or TR cover Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
5.2.7 New Study on Security and Privacy Aspects of Integrated Sensing and Communication S3‑260370 Sol7 update Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260951  
    S3‑260951 Sol7 update Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260370
    S3‑260457 pCR on EN resolution for Solution 1.5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑261007  
    S3‑261007 pCR on EN resolution for Solution 1.5 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260457
    S3‑260212 Update conclusion on KI#1 vivo pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson objected on the basis that this was not aligned with SA2. NTT-Docomo and Lenovo wanted to have some clarification as well. This was taken offline.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260311 Update conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260411 Update the conclusion of KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260853  
    S3‑260853 Update the conclusion of KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260411
    S3‑260438 Conclusion for KI#1 update Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260455 pCR on enhancing conclusions for KI#1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260485 Update KI#1 conclusion of TR 33.777 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260727 Update conclusion for KI#1 in TR 33.777 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260452 KI#2 update Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260410 Update Solution#2.2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260968  
    S3‑260968 Update Solution#2.2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260410
    S3‑260440 Solution for KI#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260969  
    S3‑260969 Solution for KI#2 Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260440
    S3‑260453 pCR on New solution for KI#2 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson didn’t agree with this document. This subject was being discussed in SA2 with no conclusion. Nokia commented whether this was being objected on Ericsson's assumption on the SA2 discussions.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260307 Conclusion for KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260412 Conclude the KI#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260447 Conclusion for KI#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260486 Intermediate conclusion for KI#2 of TR 33.777 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260728 Conclusion for KI #2 in TR 33.777 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260854  
    S3‑260854 Conclusion for KI #2 in TR 33.777 OPPO pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260728
    S3‑260407 Update to the Key Issue of sensing privacy Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260406 Solution to KI#3 of TR 33.777 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260487 New solution for TR 33.777 KI#3 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260974 New solution for TR 33.777 KI#3 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260308 Conclusion for KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260855  
    S3‑260855 Conclusion for KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260308
    S3‑260413 Conclude to the privacy of sensing Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260488 Intermediate conclusion for KI#3 of TR 33.777 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260312 Update to KI#4 on active attacks in sensing ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260856  
    S3‑260408 Update to the Key Issues of signal attacks Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260856  
    S3‑260500 Update to Key Issue #4 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260856  
    S3‑260856 Update to Key Issue #4 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260500
    S3‑260724 Discussion on active attacker on 5GA sensing signals OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260726 Remove ENs in KI #4 and KI #5 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260856  
    S3‑260309 Conclusion for KI#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260414 Conclude to the Key Issues of signal attacks Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260857  
    S3‑260857 Conclude to the Key Issues of signal attacks Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260414
    S3‑260313 Update to KI#5 on unauthorized passive sensing ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260858  
    S3‑260501 Update to Key Issue #5 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260858  
    S3‑260858 Update to Key Issue #5 Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260501
    S3‑260722 Discussion on passive attacker on 5GA sensing signals OPPO discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260310 Conclusion for KI#5 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260952 Draft TR 33.777 Xiaomi draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.8 New Study on Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for Container-based Product S3‑260666 pCR on TR 33.730 container SCAS conclusion BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑261000  
    S3‑260454 Conclusion for 33.730 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei didn’t agree with concluding until the test cases were done. They wanted to contribute more. Vodafone and BSI preferred to have this conclusion. It was agreed to add an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑261000  
    S3‑261000 Conclusion for 33.730 Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260454
    S3‑260465 pCR on adding different utilizations of containers for containerized network products Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260996  
    S3‑260996 pCR on adding different utilizations of containers for containerized network products Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260465
    S3‑260659 pCR on TR 33.730 completion of Security requirements related to logging BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260660 pCR on TR 33.730 completion of trusted image repo test case BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260987  
    S3‑260987 pCR on TR 33.730 completion of trusted image repo test case BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260660
    S3‑260661 pCR on TR 33.730 completion of vulnerability scanning or containerized NF BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260988  
    S3‑260988 pCR on TR 33.730 completion of vulnerability scanning or containerized NF BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260661
    S3‑260662 pCR on TR 33.730 completion of Containerized NF run-time security BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260989  
    S3‑260989 pCR on TR 33.730 completion of Containerized NF run-time security BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260662
    S3‑260663 pCR on TR 33.730 completion of Data protection in containerized NF BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260664 pCR on TR 33.730 new test on Resource quotas and limits enforcement BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260990  
    S3‑260990 pCR on TR 33.730 new test on Resource quotas and limits enforcement BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260664
    S3‑260665 pCR on TR 33.730 new test on Pod security policy enforcement BSI (DE) other Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑261003 Draft TR 33.730 Ericsson draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.9 New Study on Security Aspects of Satellite Access in 5G Phase 4 S3‑260600 Adding scope Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260981  
    S3‑260981 Adding scope Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260600
    S3‑260399 Discussion Paper on security work for NAS message exchange with multiple satellites Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
YesNokia: communication between MME onboard to MME on ground is not in scope. Novamint: this is not needed.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260398 New Solution for KI#1 Secure NAS messages via one pair of COUNTs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260832  
    S3‑260832 New Solution for KI#1 Secure NAS messages via one pair of COUNTs Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260398
    S3‑260580 New solution on download task management for S&F operations CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260581 New solution on NAS keys isolation in S&F operations CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260928  
    S3‑260928 New solution on NAS keys isolation in S&F operations CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260581
    S3‑260601 New solution to the NAS key stream re-use issue during S&F operations Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: backward compatibility issues.
 		revised No S3‑260834  
    S3‑260834 New solution to the NAS key stream re-use issue during S&F operations Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260601
    S3‑260315 Resolve EN in solution #1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260982  
    S3‑260982 Resolve EN in solution #1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260315
    S3‑260316 Resolve EN in solution #2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260983  
    S3‑260983 Resolve EN in solution #2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260316
    S3‑260470 Address ENs in Sol#6 of TR 33.700-30 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260835  
    S3‑260835 Address ENs in Sol#6 of TR 33.700-30 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260470
    S3‑260489 Address the EN in solution #5 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260984  
    S3‑260984 Address the EN in solution #5 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260489
    S3‑260490 Add the evaluation of solution #5 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260985  
    S3‑260985 Add the evaluation of solution #5 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260490
    S3‑260586 Update Solution#3 for removing ENs and adding evaluation CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260700 EN removal and evaluation for solution #7 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260986  
    S3‑260986 EN removal and evaluation for solution #7 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260700
    S3‑260717 Further details and EN removal for Solution #4 Sateliot, Novamint pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260718 Further details and EN removal for Solution #8 Sateliot, Novamint pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260314 Conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260471 Conclusion for KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260491 Add the conclusion of KI#1 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260740 Conclusion for KI #1 in TR 33.700-30 OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260831 Draft TR33.700-30 Qualcomm draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.10 New Study on Security aspects of CAPIF Phase 4 S3‑260317 Resolve EN and add evaluation to solution #2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260785  
    S3‑260785 Resolve EN and add evaluation to solution #2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260317
    S3‑260364 Updating solution#4 and add evaluation China Telecommunications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260786  
    S3‑260786 Updating solution#4 and add evaluation China Telecommunications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260364
    S3‑260482 Update solution #3 of TR 33.700-23 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260787  
    S3‑260787 Update solution #3 of TR 33.700-23 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260482
    S3‑260532 [TR 33.700-23] Resolving ENs in solution#5 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260788  
    S3‑260788 [TR 33.700-23] Resolving ENs in solution#5 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260532
    S3‑260636 Resolving Editor’s Note in Solution-1 Accessing Group Resources Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260439 pCR on evaluation of Sol#6 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260789  
    S3‑260789 pCR on evaluation of Sol#6 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260439
    S3‑260483 Update solution #8 of TR 33.700-23 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260790  
    S3‑260790 Update solution #8 of TR 33.700-23 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260483
    S3‑260637 Resolving Editors’ Note in Solution-7 Open Discover Service APIs Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260791  
    S3‑260791 Resolving Editors’ Note in Solution-7 Open Discover Service APIs Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260637
    S3‑260442 pCR on resolution of ENs and conclusion for Sol#11 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑261001  
    S3‑261001 pCR on resolution of ENs and conclusion for Sol#11 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260442
    S3‑260484 Update solution #10 of TR 33.700-23 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260792  
    S3‑260792 Update solution #10 of TR 33.700-23 Xiaomi Communications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260484
    S3‑260638 Resolving Editors’ Note in Solution-9 Scope Parameter with Purpose Information Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260793  
    S3‑260793 Resolving Editors’ Note in Solution-9 Scope Parameter with Purpose Information Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260638
    S3‑260344 LS on KI for certificate unavailability Huawei, HiSilicon LS out Approval Yes
YesSamsung, Nokia and Ericsson didn’t agree with sending this out without agreeing on the key issue first.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260345 Updating KI #4 of TR 33.700-23 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260794  
    S3‑260446 pCR on KI#4 for CAPIF phase 4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260794  
    S3‑260639 Update to KI#4 Credentials Unavailability Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260794  
    S3‑260794 Update to KI#4 Credentials Unavailability Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260639
    S3‑260533 [TR 33.700-23] Conclusion for key issue#1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260979  
    S3‑260979 [TR 33.700-23] Conclusion for key issue#1 Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260533
    S3‑260443 pCR on conclusion for KI#2 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260445 pCR on conclusion for KI#3 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260640 New Solution for KI#4 “Fixing Certificate Related Problems” Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260450 pCR on New KI on Location Security for CAPIF Ph4_SEC Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260784 Draft TR 33.700-23 China Telecom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.11 New Study on security aspect of support of Ambient power-enabled Internet of Things-Phase 2 S3‑260456 Update R20 AIOT security scope OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei, TMO:no requirements in the NOTE 2. Nokia: change the scope according to the SID updates. It was agreed to remove the NOTE and add reference to the SA document in the rationale of the pCR.
 		revised No S3‑260814  
    S3‑260814 Update R20 AIOT security scope OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260456
    S3‑260568 KI#2: solution for DO-A capable AIoT devices Thales, ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260815  
    S3‑260815 KI#2: solution for DO-A capable AIoT devices Thales, ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260568
    S3‑260321 Solution on Authentication for AIoT devices ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: hard to evaluate without details.ORANGE supported this, evaluation was not needed.
 		merged No S3‑260815  
    S3‑260273 New solution on authentication OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260816  
    S3‑260816 New solution on authentication OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260273
    S3‑260493 New solution on authentication of DO-A capable device Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260817  
    S3‑260817 New solution on authentication of DO-A capable device Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260493
    S3‑260631 New solution to KI#2: AKA-based authentication for inventory, command and registration Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260818  
    S3‑260818 New solution to KI#2: AKA-based authentication for inventory, command and registration Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260631
    S3‑260547 New sol on AIoT authentication Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260819  
    S3‑260819 New sol on AIoT authentication Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260547
    S3‑260570 New solution on DO-A capable AIoT Device registration procedure CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260820  
    S3‑260820 New solution on DO-A capable AIoT Device registration procedure CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260570
    S3‑260579 New solution on DO-A capable AIoT Device security handling in mobility CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260598 Authentication procedure for DO-A capable AIoT devices Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: private or public networks? The use of UICC in this solution is not described at all if this is used in public networks. Introducing the use of UICC here would be quite heavy and would need more than an editor's note.
 		revised No S3‑260821  
    S3‑260821 Authentication procedure for DO-A capable AIoT devices Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260598
    S3‑260274 Solution Update OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260822  
    S3‑260822 Solution Update OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260274
    S3‑260375 update to solution#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260823  
    S3‑260823 update to solution#2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260375
    S3‑260569 New solution on DO-A capable AIoT Device communication protection CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260824  
    S3‑260824 New solution on DO-A capable AIoT Device communication protection CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260569
    S3‑260599 Protection of information for DO-A capable AIoT devices Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260980  
    S3‑260980 Protection of information for DO-A capable AIoT devices Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260599
    S3‑260377 conclusion on key issue #3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesThree companies stated that it was too early.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260294 Solution to KI#3 concerning privacy protection of DOA message Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260825  
    S3‑260825 Solution to KI#4 concerning privacy protection of DOA message Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260294
    S3‑260376 new solution on ID privacy protection Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: remove the evaluation.
 		revised No S3‑260826  
    S3‑260826 new solution on ID privacy protection Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260376
    S3‑260369 New solution on T-ID based AIOT device privacy protection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260827  
    S3‑260827 New solution on T-ID based AIOT device privacy protection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260369
    S3‑260592 Update Sol#7 DO-A Capable AIoT Device Identifier Protection with Bloom Filter Xidian, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260642 Addressing EN in Solution #6 for group paging using Bloom filter Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260828  
    S3‑260828 Addressing EN in Solution #6 for group paging using Bloom filter Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260642
    S3‑260441 Conclusion on KI#4 AIOT ID protection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260378 conclusion on key issue #4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: too premature since we are still receiving solutions. Nokia and Qualcomm shared the same view.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260492 New solution for UE Authorization during Intermediate UE selection Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260829  
    S3‑260829 New solution for UE Authorization during Intermediate UE selection Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260492
    S3‑260721 New solution on authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: it needs to align with SA2.
 		revised No S3‑260830  
    S3‑260830 New solution on authorization of intermediate UE for 5G Ambient IoT OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260721
    S3‑260320 Conclusion for key issue 1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: there is no conclusion on their spec. OPPO, Nokia, ORANGE supported this.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260632 Updating potential security requirements in key issue on resource exhaustion Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260593 Update KI#5 of AIOT OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260633 Solution to Amplification of resource exhaustion Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260585 Protection of information transferring between private and public network to support type 1 AIoT Devices in topology 2 China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260641 New Key Issue on secure AIoT device context expiry Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260813 Draft TR 33.714 OPPO draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.12 New Study on best security practices for SBA S3‑260401 Resolution for EN for RFC 9700 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260839  
    S3‑260739 Replay prevention Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260841  
    S3‑260841 Replay prevention Nokia pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260739
    S3‑260670 Pseudo-CR on Resolving editor's notes for RFC 9700 best practices Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260839  
    S3‑260839 Pseudo-CR on Resolving editor's notes for RFC 9700 best practices Ericsson,Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260670
    S3‑260402 Resolution for EN for RFC 8725 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260842  
    S3‑260842 Resolution for EN for RFC 8725 Huawei, HiSilicon,Ericsson,Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260402
    S3‑260669 Pseudo-CR on Resolving editor's notes for RFC 8725 best practices Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260842  
    S3‑260741 Additional suggestion to the resolution for EN for RFC 8725 Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260842  
    S3‑260671 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on using UTF-8 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260676 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on performing algorithm verification Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260677 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on validating all cryptographic operations Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑261002  
    S3‑261002 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on validating all cryptographic operations Ericsson,Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260677
    S3‑260672 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on using end-to-end TLS between the client and the resource server Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260845  
    S3‑260845 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on using end-to-end TLS between the client and the resource server Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260672
    S3‑260673 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on transmission of authorization responses Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260846 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on transmission of authorization responses Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260674 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on configuration of client_id Ericsson,Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260675 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on sender-constrained access tokens Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260847  
    S3‑260847 Pseudo-CR on Best security practice on sender-constrained access tokens Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260675
    S3‑260742 Editorial updates Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260744 Scope Nokia pCR   Yes
YesEricsson: use the SID for the scope.
 		revised No S3‑260848  
    S3‑260848 Scope Nokia pCR - No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260744
    S3‑260746 Overview Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260849  
    S3‑260849 Overview Nokia pCR - No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260746
    S3‑260743 References Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260403 Conclusion for BSP4SBA Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260404 Offline CC Minutes of Meeting Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260840 Draft TR 33.755 Huawei draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.13 New SID on Security Aspect for NR Femto Phase 2 S3‑260360 Updates to Key Issue#1 Nokia, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260920  
    S3‑260920 Updates to Key Issue#1 Nokia, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260360
    S3‑260351 Evaluation to solution #1 in TR 33.746 China Telecommunications Corp. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260596 Adding a note to solution #3 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260725 EN removal for solution #4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260322 Evaluation for sol#6 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260356 New sol on security protection for N2 interface for NR Femto China Telecommunications Corp. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260921  
    S3‑260921 New sol on security protection for N2 interface for NR Femto China Telecommunications Corp. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260356
    S3‑260357 New sol on security protection for N3 and N9 interface for NR Femto system China Telecommunications Corp. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260922  
    S3‑260922 New sol on security protection for N3 and N9 interface for NR Femto system China Telecommunications Corp. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260357
    S3‑260449 New Solution for Key Issue #1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260562 New Solution for Key Issue #4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260923  
    S3‑260923 New Solution for Key Issue #4 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260562
    S3‑260323 Conclusions for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260924  
    S3‑260924 Conclusions for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260323
    S3‑260353 Conclusion to KI#1 in TR 33.746 China Telecommunications Corp. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260924  
    S3‑260324 Conclusions for KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260925  
    S3‑260925 Conclusions for KI#2 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260324
    S3‑260354 Conclusion to KI#2 in TR 33.746 China Telecommunications Corp. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260925  
    S3‑260325 Conclusions for KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260926  
    S3‑260926 Conclusions for KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260325
    S3‑260355 Conclusion to KI#3 in TR 33.746 China Telecommunications Corp. draftCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260926  
    S3‑260326 Conclusions for KI#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260927  
    S3‑260927 Conclusions for KI#4 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260326
    S3‑260919 Draft TR 33.746 ZTE draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.14 New SID on Security aspects of WAB nodes for NR S3‑260362 Updates for Key Issue #2 Nokia, Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawe and Ericssoni didn’t agree with this contribution. Nokia and Samsung asked to be minuted the following: Despite the fact that detection of compromised WAB nodes was agreed in the SID under WT#2, companies have objected to key issue updates, and related solutions, with proposals aligned with WT#2 from the SID.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260575 Pseudo-CR on Key Issue 4 Update Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260577 Pesudo-CR on New Solution for KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260837  
    S3‑260837 Pesudo-CR on New Solution for KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260577
    S3‑260451 New solution to detect compromised MWAB nodes using location tracking Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260472 Solution for KI #2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260838  
    S3‑260838 Solution for KI #2 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260472
    S3‑260554 new solution on Security protection for MWAB nodes China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260557 new solution on Detection of compromised WAB node China Telecom Corporation Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: it looks like an implementation guideline. This is implementation-based.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260749 Solution to KI#2 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260578 Pseudo-CR on New Solution for Key Issue #3 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260576 Psuedo-CR on New Solution for KI#4 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260418 Add conclusion to KI#1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia didn’t support this. Ericsson either.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260836 Draft TR 33.724 China Telecom draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.2.15 New Study on enhanced security management service for security configuration provisioning S3‑260327 Security threats analysis and security requirements for TR 33.704 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
YesHuawei, Ericsson: use cases not in scope.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260582 skeleton of security configuration provisioning China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260851  
    S3‑260851 skeleton of security configuration provisioning China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260582
    S3‑260583 pcr on scope for security configuration provisioning China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260852  
    S3‑260852 pcr on scope for security configuration provisioning China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260583
    S3‑260850 Draft TR 33.704 China Mobile draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
5.3 6G Study Items                      
5.3.1 6G Security SID S3‑260448 LS on Security Requirements for 6G Roaming Orange (Rapporteur) LS out Approval Yes
YesQualcomm: As a reminder, avoid requirements coming from LS.We got a mandate from the Plenary on this. Huawei: put SA in copy? ORANGE didn’t mind putting SA in copy. Nokia: involving SA would delay progress.
 		revised No S3‑260795  
    S3‑260795 LS on Security Requirements for 6G Roaming SA3 LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260448
    S3‑260513 DP on MAC layer security methodology Apple discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260609 SA#2 – Discussion - Way forward for MAC CE security Qualcomm Incorporated discussion Discussion Yes
YesNokia: discussion with RAN2 is needed to evaluate the overhead.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260276 MAC CEs Risk Analysis - a proposal for methodology and requirements InterDigital, Inc. other Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260282 Pseudo-CR on MAC-CE risk analysis skeleton Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260796  
    S3‑260796 Pseudo-CR on MAC-CE risk analysis skeleton Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260282
    S3‑260431 AnnexB - proposal for a new annex skeleton for Annex B on MAC CE Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260796  
    S3‑260715 Way forward for MAC CE security including pCR NTT DOCOMO INC.. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260797  
    S3‑260797 Way forward for MAC CE security including pCR NTT DOCOMO INC.. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260715
    S3‑260512 TR33801-01 - draft_revised_annex B Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260796  
    S3‑260283 Pseudo-CR on MAC-CE risk analysis skeleton description Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260798  
    S3‑260432 AnnexB - proposal for content update for B.1 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260386 AnnexB - Discussion paper on risk severity criteria of MAC CE Huawei, HiSilicon discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260430 AnnexB - proposal for a new annex content for B.2 on MAC CE methodology and risk analysis Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260799  
    S3‑260798 AnnexB - proposal for a new annex content for B.2 on MAC CE methodology and risk analysis Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260280 Proportionality consideration for time and overhead critical MAC-CEs Ericsson discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260723 Considerations on MAC CEs in 6G VODAFONE discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260587 Discussion Paper on MAC CE Privacy Leakage Combined with C-RNTI Xidian University, OPPO discussion Decision Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260284 Pseudo-CR on Selective MAC-CE risk analysis in a table Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260799  
    S3‑260385 AnnexB - Risk analysis for Activation/Deactivation of SCells Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260799  
    S3‑260299 Annex B MAC-CE risk analysis Nokia, Samsung, ZTE, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260799  
    S3‑260799 Annex B MAC-CE risk analysis Nokia, Samsung, ZTE, OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260299
    S3‑260503 Methodology to MAC CE Risk Analysis Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260799  
    S3‑260275 Annex B – Adding MAC CEs Risk Analysis InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260799  
    S3‑260281 MAC-CE questionnaire from SA3 to RAN2 Ericsson discussion Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260358 MAC CE questionare to R2 Nokia discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260588 Draft reply LS- Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects OPPO, Samsung LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260801  
    S3‑260279 [draft] Reply LS on Early Alignment on Access Stratum security aspects Ericsson LS out   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260801  
    S3‑260610 SA#2 – KI#NEW - MAC CE security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260802  
    S3‑260802 SA#2 – KI#NEW - MAC CE security Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260610
    S3‑260328 New key issue on MAC CE security ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260802  
    S3‑260511 TR33801-01- New KI on MAC layer security in RAN security Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260802  
    S3‑260538 SA#2 – KI#NEW – MAC CE protection Samsung, SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260802  
    S3‑260555 Update SA#2 Add new security aspects CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260589 DP on PHY Layer Sensing Signals in 6G OPPO, BUPT, ST Engineering iDirect discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260329 Updating introduction of security area#2 to include lower layer secuirty ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260504 New Key Issue for SA#2 on Protection for Messages before AS Security Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260809  
    S3‑260536 SA#2 - Discussion paper on system information protection Samsung discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260537 SA#2 - KI#NEW - System Information protection/paging protection Samsung, SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260808  
    S3‑260808 SA#2 - KI#NEW - System Information protection/paging protection Samsung, SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
YesDiscussions whether false base stations should be included. There had been a three-year study in the past and there were doubts whether this would bring a different outcome from that study. Qualcomm, Deutsche Telekom, Interdigital agreed to have the key issue. However, there were differences in the definition of the key issue details. Huawei and Qualcomm objected to the contribution.
 		noted No   S3‑260537
    S3‑260539 SA#2 - KI#NEW - Initial RACH protection Samsung, SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260809  
    S3‑260245 SA#2 – KI#NEW - Security of initial RAN messages prior to AS security activation InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260809  
    S3‑260809 SA#2 – KI#NEW - Security of initial RAN messages prior to AS security activation InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260245
    S3‑260239 SA#2 – KI#NEW - System Information Security and Base Station Authenticity InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260808  
    S3‑260607 SA#2 – KI#NEW - Robust AS security setup Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260809  
    S3‑260163 Discussion for SPARROW KeyIssue Keysight Technologies UK Ltd discussion Information Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260143 New KeyIssue in RAN security - SPARROW Keysight Technologies UK Ltd pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia and Huawei didn’t agree with the key issue. Deutsche Telekom: it's a protocol issue. Interdigital: this is a vaid attack.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260540 SA#2 - KI#NEW - Enhanced user plane security policy Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: premature. We don’t even have an architecture.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260541 SA#2 - KI#NEW - Decoupled user plane security in 6G RAN Samsung pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia, Huawei, ORANGE: too early to start the key issue.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260506 New Key Issue for SA#2 on Security Enhancement for RAN User Plane Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260238 SA#2 – KI#NEW - Security of RAN User Plane Procedures InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260606 SA#2 – KI#NEW - User-plane security in 6G RAN Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260230 New Key Issue on User Plane protocol security for RAN area MITRE-FFRDC pCR Approval Yes
YesEricsson: requirements need some work.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260542 SA#2 - KI#NEW - Key separation for RAN mobility Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260810  
    S3‑260505 New Key Issue for SA#2 on Security Enhancement for RAN Mobility Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260810  
    S3‑260810 New Key Issue for SA#2 on Security Enhancement for RAN Mobility Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260505
    S3‑260605 SA#2 – KI#NEW - Security for RAN mobility Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260810  
    S3‑260250 SA#2 – KI#NEW - Security of Mobility and State Transitions in 6G InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260237 SA#2 – KI#NEW - Security of RAN Control Plane Procedures InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
YesNokia: it depends on RAN3 decisions.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260621 Annex#A - Proposal for an Attacker model methodology for the 6G study Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260365 Annex-A Discussion Paper on attacker model handling Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
YesThe Chair asked for support of option 2 (removal of annex A). Keysight, Nokia, Lenovo,Vivo,Xiaomi, Samsung, CMCC, Huawei, BT, OPPO Support for retaining Annex A Ericsson, John Hopkins,Interdigital, NTT-Docomo, Vodafone, NPN, NCSC, Phillips, T-Mobile. It was agreed that Ericsson will provide an example of the attacker model for the next meeting, in order to make a decision about Annex A.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260622 Annex#A - Pseudo-CR providing an Attacker model definition Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑261005  
    S3‑261005 Annex#A - Pseudo-CR providing an Attacker model definition Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260622
    S3‑260366 Attacker Model update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑261004  
    S3‑261004 Attacker Model update Nokia pCR Approval Yes
YesLenovo asked to be minuted: One example of how the attacker model would be linked to the Key Issues towards a potential progress can help the SA3 group to have a common understanding.
 		approved No   S3‑260366
    S3‑260623 Annex#A - Pseudo-CR providing an example of an Attacker model Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260444 Clause 4.1 - Add missing description of SA#4 Orange (Rapporteur) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260812  
    S3‑260812 Clause 4.1 - Add missing description of SA#4 Orange (Rapporteur) pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260444
    S3‑260645 Add the missing Core Network security area description China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR   Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260812  
    S3‑260359 Description for core network security in clause 4.1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260812  
    S3‑260553 Update SA#1 Add new security aspects CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260479 Update Security area #3: UE to Core Network Security OPPO pCR Approval Yes
YesORANGE: let's wait for SA2 progress.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260383 SA#3-update-update SA#3 description -update to the security area on UE to Core Network Security Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260861  
    S3‑260861 SA#3-update-update SA#3 description -update to the security area on UE to Core Network Security Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260383
    S3‑260558 Update SA#5 Add new security aspects CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260929  
    S3‑260929 Update SA#5 Add new security aspects CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260558
    S3‑260464 SA#5 - update - update SA#5 description on authentication and key agreement for applications Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, China Telecom, China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260462 SA#5 - update - authorization and authentication of UE for localized service Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260340 SA#5 - update - update SA#5 introduction China Telecommunications Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260295 Security aspects of localized service access Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260556 SA#6 - Update - addition of SA6 reference Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260863  
    S3‑260863 SA#6 - Update - addition of SA6 reference Nokia pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260556
    S3‑260719 Update to 6G exposure security area Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260863  
    S3‑260624 New Security Area on Data collection for security monitoring Ericsson, AT&T, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, NSA, T-Mobile US, Nokia, SK Telecom, Deutsche Telekom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260864  
    S3‑260864 New Security Area on Data collection for security monitoring Ericsson, AT&T, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, NSA, T-Mobile US, Nokia, SK Telecom, Deutsche Telekom pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260624
    S3‑260361 SA#NEW Discussion paper on AI in 6G security and privacy Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260745 SA#NEW- AI Security Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260865  
    S3‑260865 SA#NEW- AI Security Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260745
    S3‑260571 SA#NEW - New Security Area on AI Security Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260865  
    S3‑260363 SA#NEW Security area on AI-enabled 6G systems IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260865  
    S3‑260371 SA#NEW-New Security area on AI security for 6G China Telecommunications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260865  
    S3‑260433 SA#NEW - new security area proposal on AI Huawei, HiSilicon, Lenovo, CATT, China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260865  
    S3‑260330 New Security area for AI ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260865  
    S3‑260572 SA#NEW - New Security Area on Data Framework Security Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260866  
    S3‑260213 SA#NEW Security and Privacy of Data Framework vivo, InterDigital, OPPO, China Mobile, Apple, CATT, Samsung, SKT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260866  
    S3‑260866 SA#NEW Security and Privacy of Data Framework vivo, InterDigital, OPPO, China Mobile, Apple, CATT, Samsung, SKT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260213
    S3‑260502 New Security Area on Sensing Security and Privacy Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260591 6G Sensing Security Area Update OPPO, CMCC pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260552 SA#NEW - New Security Area on Security and privacy of cellular IoT enablers in 6G Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260415 SA#NEW - New security area on the security visibility Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, ZTE pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260735 SA#NEW- Security Area on Subscriber Permission CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260644 SA#NEW - DP on Subscriber Permission study requirements Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260647 SA#NEW - security area on Subscriber Permission and Application User Consent Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260750 pCR to TS 33.801 - Security of Computing Support IIT Bombay pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260625 SA#1 - Security Assumptions - Add security assumptions for a serving network security anchor Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260867  
    S3‑260867 SA#1 - Security Assumptions - Add security assumptions for a serving network security anchor Ericsson pCR Approval No
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260625
    S3‑260253 SA#1 – KI#NEW - Security Domains and Trust Anchors InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260868  
    S3‑260868 SA#1 – KI#NEW - Security Domains and Trust Anchors InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260253
    S3‑260254 SA#1 – KI#NEW - 6G Key Hierarchy and Key Lifecycle Management InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260869  
    S3‑260869 SA#1 – KI#NEW - 6G Key Hierarchy and Key Lifecycle Management InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260254
    S3‑260475 SA#3 - KI#NEW - Security handling for new NAS protocol LG Electronics pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260737 SA#3-KI#NEW- New KI on 6G New NAS security CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260434 SA#3 - KI#NEW- New key issue on security aspects for new NAS security under SA#3 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260507 New Key Issue for SA#3 on Security for 6G NAS Xiaomi EV Technology pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260466 New key issue on NAS algorithm negotiation for 6G Network Huawei, HiSilicon, China Telecom, China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260352 SA#3-KI#NEW-New KI on Security for 6G new NAS between UE and Core Network China Telecommunications pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260543 SA#3 - KI#NEW - Security for 6G control signalling Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260260 SA#3 - KI#NEW - UE to CN Control Plane Security InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260405 SA#4 - Security Assumptions - add security assumption under SA#4 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260747 DP on SBA core network, interconnect and roaming Nokia discussion   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260748 KI for SBA, Interconnect and Roaming Nokia pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260435 SA#5 - Security Assumption - add security assumption under SA#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260649 SA#5 - KI#NEW - New KI under SA#5 China Mobile, vivo pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260251 SA#5 - KI#NEW - Authentication between UE and Network in 6GS Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260265 SA#5 - KI#NEW - Authentication and Authorization for 6G Access InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260608 SA#1 – KI#NEW - KDF agility Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260416 SA#1 - KI#NEW - New key issue on the security visibility Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260544 SA#3 - KI#NEW - Security for Interworking Samsung pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260752 SA#3 – KI#NEW - Security of Interworking Between 5GS and 6GS InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260262 SA#3 - KI#NEW - UE to HPLMN Security InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260261 SA#3 - KI#NEW - UE to CN User Plane Security InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260397 SA#3-KI#NEW-New key issue about concealing permanent or long-term subscription identifier Huawei, HiSilicon, China Unicom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260384 SA#3-KI#new_new key issue on refreshing of temporary identifier Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260151 New KI on NF Authentication on Application Layer in 6G Deutsche Telekom AG pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260648 SA#4 - KI#NEW - New KI under SA#4 China Mobile, Deutsche Telekom pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260342 SA#4 - KI#NEW - New Key Issue on security between PLMN and localized network provided via PLMN China Telecommunications Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260298 New key issue on 6G re-authentication optimization Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260584 SA5-KI new-legacy USIM authentication China Mobile pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260214 SA#5 - KI#NEW - Vulnerability Resolution vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260387 SA#5-KI#new_new key issue on primary authentication optimization Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260509 TR33801-01- New KI on authentication request replay protection in Authentication Security areas Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260496 SA#5 - KI#NEW - Re-authentication in roaming scenarios Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260267 SA#5 - KI#NEW - Access-Agnostic Authentication for 6G InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260751 SA#5-KI#NEW-NSWO authentication in 6G CableLabs, Charter Communications, China Telecom, ZTE, Rogers, Comcast, Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No   S3‑260285
    S3‑260678 SA#5-KI#NEW-New KI under SA#5-Key issue on subscriber identity privacy China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260497 SA#5 - KI#NEW - Subscriber identifier privacy Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260271 SA#5 – KI#NEW - Subscriber Identifier Privacy in 6G InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260215 SA#5 - KI#NEW - Subscriber ID Protection vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260268 SA#5 - KI#NEW - Unified Framework for 6G Service-Level Authentication and Authorization InterDigital, Europe, Ltd. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260252 SA#5 - KI#NEW - Authentication for 3rd party service Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260296 Discussion Paper on 6G Authentication Enhancements Nokia discussion Endorsement Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260546 SA#5 - KI#NEW - Reducing dependency on long-term credential Samsung, SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260510 TR33801-01- New KI on long term key leakage in Authentication Security areas Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260297 New key issue on 6G authentication enhancements Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260545 SA#5 - KI#NEW - long-term credential update Samsung, SK Telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260341 SA#5 - KI#NEW - New Key Issue on authentication of UE for localized service access provided via PLMN China Telecommunications Corp. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260736 SA#5 - KI# NEW - New KI on security and privacy of identification for entities beyond subscription CATT pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260517 SA#6 DP on security and privacy aspects of Network Exposure security Area Nokia discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260216 Annex#NEW - Risk analysis of System Information and paging messages vivo, SK telecom pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		not treated No    
    S3‑260277 SA#4 – KI#NEW - Security of Interworking Between 5GS and 6GS InterDigital, Inc. pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260285 SA#5-KI#NEW-NSWO authentication in 6G CableLabs, Charter Communications, China Telecom, ZTE, Rogers, Comcast pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260751  
    S3‑260646 SA#4 - KI#NEW - New KI under SA#4 China Mobile Com. Corporation pCR Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
    S3‑260800 Draft TR 33.801-01 ORANGE draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
    S3‑260801 LS on questions on MAC-CE security ORANGE LS out Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260975 6G SID-working procedures and priorities for the next meeting ORANGE (Rapporteur) other - Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
5.3.2 New Study on supporting AEAD algorithms S3‑260182 Explanations of the Term AEAD Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260183 Updates on the terms related to AEAD Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260872  
    S3‑260194 Pseudo-CR on Definitions and abbreviations KDDI pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260872  
    S3‑260217 Align terms for AEAD vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260872  
    S3‑260594 Pseudo-CR on defining terms for TR 33.771 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260872  
    S3‑260872 Pseudo-CR on defining terms for TR 33.771 Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260594
    S3‑260685 Adding definitions Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260872  
    S3‑260181 Introduction of user scenarios for 256-bit support Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260874  
    S3‑260874 Introduction of user scenarios for 256-bit support Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No   S3‑260181
    S3‑260220 Update on A.3 Order of Operations vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260875  
    S3‑260875 Update on A.3 Order of Operations vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260220
    S3‑260688 Update of Annex A Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260193 Pseudo-CR on assumption update KDDI pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260876  
    S3‑260876 Pseudo-CR on assumption update KDDI pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260193
    S3‑260195 Pseudo-CR on new Key Issue Interworking and co-existence KDDI pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260686 New KI on authenticated encryption Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260877  
    S3‑260877 New KI on authenticated encryption Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260686
    S3‑260514 AEAD - KI#1 revision Apple pCR   Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260878  
    S3‑260878 AEAD - KI#1 revision Apple pCR - Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260514
    S3‑260221 New Solution on Interoperability Analysis between AEAD-only and non-AEAD systems vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260595 Pseudo-CR on solution for supporting AEAD mode Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260879  
    S3‑260879 Pseudo-CR on solution for supporting AEAD mode Qualcomm Incorporated pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260595
    S3‑260687 New Solution for KI#1 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260269 New solution on algorithm selection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260880  
    S3‑260880 New solution on algorithm selection OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260269
    S3‑260219 New solutiion on AEAD Algorithm Interface vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260881  
    S3‑260881 New solutiion on AEAD Algorithm Interface vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260219
    S3‑260270 New solution on using NCAx as pure cipher algorithm OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260882  
    S3‑260882 New solution on using NCAx as pure cipher algorithm OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260270
    S3‑260272 New solution on using NCAx as pure integrity algorithm OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260883  
    S3‑260883 New solution on using NCAx as pure integrity algorithm OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260272
    S3‑260394 New solution about on-demand Extra-IV value derivation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260884  
    S3‑260884 New solution about on-demand Extra-IV value derivation Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260394
    S3‑260590 New sol on using NCAx as cipher and integrity algorithm OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260885  
    S3‑260885 New sol on using NCAx as cipher and integrity algorithm OPPO pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260590
    S3‑260690 New Solution for KI#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260886  
    S3‑260886 New Solution for KI#2 Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260690
    S3‑260699 Solution to KI#3 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260887  
    S3‑260887 Solution to KI#3 Lenovo, Motorola Mobility pCR Approval No
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260699
    S3‑260180 Solution enhancements for solution 1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260888  
    S3‑260888 Solution enhancements for solution 1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260180
    S3‑260177 Solution evaluation for solution 1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260889  
    S3‑260889 Solution evaluation for solution 1 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260177
    S3‑260197 Pseudo-CR on Solution #2 update KDDI pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260218 Solution#4 Update on AEAD Algorithm Negotiation vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260890  
    S3‑260890 Solution#4 Update on AEAD Algorithm Negotiation vivo pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260218
    S3‑260333 resolve EN and add evaluation for solution #3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260891  
    S3‑260891 resolve EN and add evaluation for solution #3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260333
    S3‑260379 update to solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260892  
    S3‑260892 update to solution#5 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260379
    S3‑260494 Address the ENs in solution #6 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260893  
    S3‑260893 Address the ENs in solution #6 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260494
    S3‑260495 Add the evaluation of solution #6 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260894  
    S3‑260894 Add the evaluation of solution #6 Beijing Xiaomi Mobile Software pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260495
    S3‑260179 Solution evaluation for solution 7 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260895  
    S3‑260895 Solution evaluation for solution 7 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260179
    S3‑260198 Pseudo-CR on Solution #8 update KDDI pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260380 update to solution#9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑260896  
    S3‑260896 update to solution#9 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260380
    S3‑260393 EN addressing for solution #10 Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No    
    S3‑260178 Solution evaluation for solution 11 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑261006  
    S3‑261006 Solution evaluation for solution 11 Nokia pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		approved No   S3‑260178
    S3‑260196 Pseudo-CR on new solution for handling of input parameters for interworking KDDI pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260689 New Solution for KI on authenticated encryption Ericsson pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260680 Way forward for the application of AEAD China Mobile Com. Corporation discussion   Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260331 Conclusion for KI#1 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260332 Conclusion for KI#3 ZTE Corporation pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260381 general conclusion on the candidate 256bit algorithms Huawei, HiSilicon pCR Approval Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260873 Draft TR 33.771 Vivo draft TR Approval No
Yes
 		email approval No    
6 New Study/Work items                      
6.1 New 5G-Advance SIDs/WIDs S3‑260192 Support of AES-256 bit cryptography and other security enhancements in 5G-NTN THALES, ESA, European Commission, Eutelsat, Hispasat, SES discussion Discussion Yes
YesNokia: some of this falls into AEAD scope. ORANGE: support of these organizations is not too relevant. Danger of fragmentation here. NCSC: sceptical about the impact of quantum. In ETSI QSC we found that the impact is not so critical. AT&T: this should be in scope of 5G (to be solved in the next few years). Vodafone: there is an impact on operator's networks. Interdigital: not clear who the attacker is here. We have to be clear who we are protecting against. Qualcomm: avoid fragmentation between 5G and 6G.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260334 WID on Security Aspect for NR Femto Phase 2 ZTE Corporation WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		revised No S3‑261008  
    S3‑261008 WID on Security Aspect for NR Femto Phase 2 ZTE Corporation WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260334
    S3‑260548 New WID on Post-quantum Cryptography Migration Ericsson WID new Agreement Yes
YesORANGE: the scope is bigger than needed.Certification part is not stable at all in IETF.The SUCI part can be workd over after we finish the study on PQC. Qualcomm: wait for the conclusion of the PQC study for WT3. ORANGE: WT1 would be OK if we leave only the key exchange. Thales supported the WID only if WT3 was included.
 		revised No S3‑260761  
    S3‑260761 New WID on Post-quantum Cryptography Migration Ericsson WID new Agreement No
YesNTT-Docomo: this WID will not be done in Rel-20. Work will continue in future releases. Huawei queried when the work for this WID could start, given that the study was being done in parallel. Ericsson replied that contributions were welcome in April. The overlapping part in the study was already stable. Nokia: no conclusions in the study yet. NTT-Docomo commented that there was no rush and that this could be brought next meeting.
 		noted No   S3‑260548
    S3‑260698 New WID on 5G Security Assurance Specification (SCAS) for the Container-based Products Ericsson, BSI (DE) WID new Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: too early for this. Vodafone queried about the technical reason. Huawei commented that there were new test cases submitted in the current meeting that needed to be considered first. Once the SID was finished the work on the WID could be considered.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260626 New SID on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 3 Ericsson SID new Discussion Yes
YesHuawei: the WID is enough. Nokia: SA2 should do more pgrogress.
 		noted No    
    S3‑260627 New WID on the security support for the Next Generation Real Time Communication services Phase 3 Ericsson WID new Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260691 New SID on Security of application user consent architecture Ericsson, Interdigital SID new Agreement Yes
YesSimilar study item in tdoc S3-260732.
 		revised No S3‑260762  
    S3‑260762 New SID on Security of application user consent architecture Ericsson, Interdigital SID new Agreement Yes
YesApple queried why agreeing on a study when it is not clear what the study will verse on. The Chair commented that it was normal procedure to create security studies based on the security requirements coming out of the work from other WG studies. Apple objected on the basis that there was no output or security work described here. Ericsson asked what the technical concern was. Apple asked for a discussion paper with a security analyssis of SA6's work acompanying the study. The Chair commented that Ericsson could bring the study directly to Plenary if there was no consensus in SA3. Apple sustained their obejction.
 		noted No   S3‑260691
    S3‑260732 New SID on security aspects of APCOT Nokia SID new Approval Yes
Yes
 		merged No S3‑260762  
    S3‑260367 New WID on Security aspect of NSSAA in EPS Nokia WID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260368 Introducing security of NSSAA over EPC Nokia CR Agreement Yes
YesHuawei: don’t copy text from specifications from other groups. Better refer to the spec. Qualcomm: Annex Y refers to their CR, this should be clarified. (Note from MCC: use the related CRs and specs affected field on the cover page). ORANGE: network slicing security is optional. Motivation for defining authentication for that? Ericsson wanted to postpone for the next meeting.
 		not pursued No    
6.2 New 6G SIDs/WIDs S3‑260263 New SID on Mission Critical Next Generation Security Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. SID new Agreement Yes
YesNokia: PQC study includes TS 33.180; this study could compete agains that study. Huawei: is this for 5GA or 6G? Task 2 and 3 could be merged. NIST: we support this SID; there will be lack of time in PQC study, so let's do it here. Airbus supported this SID and was concerned about including Mission Critical aspects in tthe general PQC study. Ericsson supported the SID. AT&T supported this SID as well. NTT-Docomo: maybe add a WT in the PQC study? Or wait until the study concludes.
 		revised No S3‑260860  
    S3‑260860 New SID on Mission Critical Next Generation Security Motorola Solutions UK Ltd. SID new Agreement Yes
Yes
 		agreed No   S3‑260263
    S3‑260461 new SID on the security of IMS Architecture Enhancement Huawei, HiSilicon, China Mobile, China Unicom SID new Agreement Yes
YesORANGE: key issues to be addressed? Huawei commented that SA2 had just approved their SID. RANGE replied that it was bettter to wait for SA2's progress. Samsung supported this. Ericsson added that some tasks in SA2 would not be complete until September 2026.
 		noted No    
6.3 SIDs/WIDs revision S3‑260244 Discussion Paper to update the TR 33.786 Approval Timeline Lenovo, Motorola Mobility discussion Discussion Yes
Yes
 		noted No    
    S3‑260246 Revised SID on AIMLE Service Security Lenovo, Motorola Mobility SID revised Approval Yes
YesThe dates will be corrected in the SA3 Chair report to SA.
 		endorsed No    
    S3‑260458 Revised SID for AIoT security ph2 OPPO SID revised Approval Yes
Yes
 		agreed No    
    S3‑260763 Revised SID for AIoT security ph2 OPPO SID revised Approval No
Yes
 		withdrawn Yes    
6.4 SIDs/WIDs Prioritization                      
7 CVD and research                      
8 Any Other Business