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["TDoc","Title","Source","Contact","Contact ID","Type","For","Abstract","Secretary Remarks","Agenda item sort order","Agenda item","Agenda item description","TDoc sort order within agenda item","TDoc Status","Reservation date","Uploaded","Is revision of","Revised to","Release","Spec","Version","Related WIs","CR","CR revision","CR category","TSG CR Pack","Reply to","To","Cc","Original LS","Reply in"]
["S3-190600","Agenda","WG Vice Chair","Mirko Cano Soveri",41957,"agenda",null,null,"No comment on agenda. Ericsson provided a welcome presentation. Chair reminded everyone of IT being a shared facility. Chaired provided IPR policy and a reminder of the anti-trust issues.",null,"2","Approval of Agenda and Meeting Objectives",6000,"approved","2019-02-19T11:02:14.143","2019-02-19T11:04:23.473"]
["S3-190638","New Test Case: Error handling of malformed JSON object between two network products","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution proposes to add a generalized security requirement and test case related for discarding the malformed JSON object sent between two network products.","What is meant be malformed as if it general, then there could be a test for malformed JSON objects. ",null,"4.1.10","Other issues",6380,"noted","2019-03-03T08:35:39.037","2019-03-04T13:35:51.937",null,null,"Rel-16","33.517","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190672","Living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Wei Lu",79335,"draftCR","Approval","This is a living document for capturing general SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 for NF-specific SCAS documents to reference.",null,null,"4.1.10","Other issues",6720,"Revised","2019-03-04T03:09:14.803","2019-03-04T03:16:51.350",null,"S3-190897","Rel-16","33.117","16.0.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190897","Living Document: General SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Wei Lu",79335,"draftCR","Approval","This is a living document for capturing general SBA/SBI aspects in TS 33.117 for NF-specific SCAS documents to reference.",null,null,"4.1.10","Other issues",6720,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190672",null,"Rel-16","33.117","16.0.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190749","The purpose and scope of SCAS","Ericsson","Christine Jost",49662,"discussion","Endorsement",null,"It was commment that test cases should not define new requirements - modify proposal 2 by adding \"and where the requirement is documented in a 3GPP TS or TR\" This was agreeable. Proposal 1 require the rapporteur to bring in the relevent text for their TS",null,"4.1.10","Other issues",7490,"Revised","2019-03-04T09:48:40.557","2019-03-04T14:10:37.457",null,"S3-190883","Rel-16",null,null,"SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190883","The purpose and scope of SCAS","Ericsson","Christine Jost",49662,"discussion","Endorsement",null,"Endorsed without being seen ",null,"4.1.10","Other issues",7490,"endorsed",null,null,"S3-190749",null,"Rel-16",null,null,"SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190775","SCAS 5G: mutual authentication between NFs","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Wei Lu",79335,"draftCR","Approval","This paper proposes a new sub-clause under 4.2.2.1 for one general baseline requirement and its corresponding test case applicable to all NFs utilizing SBI, which is mutual authentication between NFs.","The proposed test case adds more requirement to an existing test case, so rather than add a new test case it was agreed to work offline to update an exisiting test cases. The EN \"Security objectives and threat need to be added with reference to TS 33.926\" was alos needed. ",null,"4.1.10","Other issues",7750,"Revised","2019-03-04T11:14:23.227","2019-03-04T12:09:38.610",null,"S3-190896","Rel-16","33.117","16.0.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190896","SCAS 5G: mutual authentication between NFs","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Wei Lu",79335,"draftCR","Approval","This paper proposes a new sub-clause under 4.2.2.1 for one general baseline requirement and its corresponding test case applicable to all NFs utilizing SBI, which is mutual authentication between NFs.",null,null,"4.1.10","Other issues",7750,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190775",null,"Rel-16","33.117","16.0.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190777","SCAS 5G: update to Access Token Verification Failure in non-roaming case","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Wei Lu",79335,"draftCR","Approval","This paper proposes some updates to one of the test cases, which is authorization failure handling of NF service access within the same PLMN.",null,null,"4.1.10","Other issues",7770,"approved","2019-03-04T11:16:41.650","2019-03-04T12:09:38.623",null,null,"Rel-16","33.117","16.0.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190778","SCAS 5G: update to Access Token Verification Failure in roaming case","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Wei Lu",79335,"draftCR","Approval","This paper proposes some updates to one of the test cases, which is authorization failure handling of NF service access in roaming scenario.","No comments",null,"4.1.10","Other issues",7780,"approved","2019-03-04T11:19:57.933","2019-03-04T12:09:38.640",null,null,"Rel-16","33.117","16.0.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190779","SCAS 5G: Search Result Handling for NF Discovery","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Wei Lu",79335,"draftCR","Approval","This paper proposes a new sub-clause under 4.2.2.1 for search result handling applicable to all NFs for NF discovery. The sub-clause contains two test case: \n-\tone is the correct handling by a NF service consumer when receiving search result validity peri","No support for this contribution",null,"4.1.10","Other issues",7790,"noted","2019-03-04T11:24:36.977","2019-03-04T12:09:38.640",null,null,"Rel-16","33.117","16.0.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190740","SCAS: AMF-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,"It was questioned whether the test case in 4.2.2.1.X.1 was needed - it was agreed that this was not needed. For 4.2.2.Y.1 test case,  an EN \"Security objectives and threat need to be added with reference to TS 33.926\" was agreed to be added. The expected result of 4.2.2.Y.1 was taken offline. Same EN for 4.2.2.Y.2, 4.2.2.Z.1 and 4.2.2.Z.2 was agreed. Taken offline whether 4.2.2.Y.2 needs to consider handovers. No other changes for 4.2.2.Z.1.  4.2.2.Z.2 taken offline to see if it can be merged with 4.2.2.Z.1.",null,"4.1.2","Access and Mobility Management Function (TS 33.512)",7400,"Revised","2019-03-04T09:32:21.537","2019-03-04T10:21:44.847",null,"S3-190884","Rel-16","33.512","0.5.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190884","SCAS: AMF-specific adaptations of security functional requirements and related test cases","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"4.1.2","Access and Mobility Management Function (TS 33.512)",7400,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190740",null,"Rel-16","33.512","0.5.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190887","New draft TS 33.512","Deutsche Telekom AG",null,null,"draft TS","Approval",null,null,null,"4.1.2","Access and Mobility Management Function (TS 33.512)",7400,"Reserved"]
["S3-190741","Security Assurance Requirements and Test Case for UPF","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,"It was questioned with confidentilaity and integrity need to be separate test cases - it was agreed to merge them. It was questioned whether the test cases are needed at all as the general test case already exists in TS 33.117. The Pre-Comdition should not refer to a PLMN as it is always in a test lab - proposal to remove \"if ..\" and make the test manadatory was agreed. EN \"Security objectives and threat need to be added with reference to TS 33.926\" was agreed to be added. It was proposed to remove Y2 to Y5 test cases as it was not clear that this directly apply. Discussion taken offline on this. The revision of this document (S3-190885) will only consider X1 and Y1. Revision of Y2 to Y5 will be in S3-190886. ",null,"4.1.3","User Plane Function (UPF) (TS 33.513)",7410,"Revised","2019-03-04T09:32:21.537","2019-03-04T10:21:44.863",null,"S3-190885","Rel-16","33.513","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190885","Security Assurance Requirements and Test Case for UPF","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"4.1.3","User Plane Function (UPF) (TS 33.513)",7410,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190741",null,"Rel-16","33.513","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190886","Security Assurance Requirements and Test Case for UPF - references to TS 33.250","Huawei, Hisilicon",null,null,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"4.1.3","User Plane Function (UPF) (TS 33.513)",7410,"Reserved",null,null,null,null,"Rel-16","33.513","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190888","New draft TS 33.513","Samsung",null,null,"draft TS","Approval",null,null,null,"4.1.3","User Plane Function (UPF) (TS 33.513)",7410,"Reserved"]
["S3-190743","Security Assurance Requirement and test cases for SMF","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,"There was no support and several people against including the first test case - this will not be included. Test 2 will be included with \"The tester captures the N1 initial context setup message.\" clarified that this on N2 interface and EN \"Security objectives and threat need to be added with reference to TS 33.926\". There was no support and several people against including the third and fourth test cases - these will not be included. Change 5 needs to be aligned with the remaing test case.",null,"4.1.5","Session Management Function (SMF) (TS 33.515)",7430,"Revised","2019-03-04T09:32:21.567","2019-03-04T10:21:44.863",null,"S3-190889","Rel-16","33.515","0.1.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190889","Security Assurance Requirement and test cases for SMF","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"4.1.5","Session Management Function (SMF) (TS 33.515)",7430,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190743",null,"Rel-16","33.515","0.1.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190890","New draft TS 33.515","Huawei",null,null,"draft TS","Approval",null,null,null,"4.1.5","Session Management Function (SMF) (TS 33.515)",7430,"Reserved"]
["S3-190637","New Test Case: Error handling of malformed N32 signalling message sent between peer SEPPs","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution proposes to add SEPP security requirement and test case related for discarding the malformed N32 signalling message sent between two peer SEPPs.","Not security related but generic - some suggestion. that this should go into TS 33.117. This was taken offline to work on what parts need to go into TS 33.117",null,"4.1.7","Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) (TS 33.517)",6370,"noted","2019-03-03T08:32:49.757","2019-03-04T13:35:51.937",null,null,"Rel-16","33.517","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190728","Test Case: Connection-specific scope of IPX-provider cryptographic material","Deutsche Telekom AG","Hans Christian Rudolph",72672,"pCR","Approval",null,"It was agreed that  EN \"Security objectives and threat need to be added with reference to TS 33.926\" and another EN that the requirements need to be TS 33.501.",null,"4.1.7","Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) (TS 33.517)",7280,"Revised","2019-03-04T08:44:37.710","2019-03-04T09:29:06.250",null,"S3-190891","Rel-16","33.517","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190891","Test Case: Connection-specific scope of IPX-provider cryptographic material","Deutsche Telekom AG","Hans Christian Rudolph",72672,"pCR","Approval",null,"Approved without  being seen. ",null,"4.1.7","Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) (TS 33.517)",7280,"approved",null,null,"S3-190728",null,"Rel-16","33.517","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190780","SCAS SEPP: Serving PLMN ID Mismatch","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Wei Lu",79335,"pCR","Approval","Based on the current version of TS 33.517, this paper proposes the test case for correct handling by SEPP when identifying the mismatch between the PLMN-ID contained in the incoming N32-f message and the PLMN-ID in the related N32-f context.","It was felt that the threats were not clearly defined. The discussion of the threat description was taken oflline. The needs for 'consumer' and 'producer' in the test was questioned - this will be taken offline. The private key should be the test private key. The second expected result is not in TS 33.501 so can not be added currently. ",null,"4.1.7","Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) (TS 33.517)",7800,"Revised","2019-03-04T11:30:13.417","2019-03-04T12:09:38.657",null,"S3-190892","Rel-16","33.517","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190892","SCAS SEPP: Serving PLMN ID Mismatch","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Wei Lu",79335,"pCR","Approval","Based on the current version of TS 33.517, this paper proposes the test case for correct handling by SEPP when identifying the mismatch between the PLMN-ID contained in the incoming N32-f message and the PLMN-ID in the related N32-f context.",null,null,"4.1.7","Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) (TS 33.517)",7800,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190780",null,"Rel-16","33.517","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190893","New draft TS 33.517","Nokia",null,null,"draft TS","Approval",null,null,null,"4.1.7","Security Edge Protection Proxy (SEPP) (TS 33.517)",7800,"Reserved"]
["S3-190742","Security Assurance Requirement and Test for NRF","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,"It was questioned whether the first test is needed as it is not a security test. This discussion will be taken offline. The second tests seem to check whether the authroisation feature is implemented (i.e. checking functionality - does this need to be covered. Something needs to be clarified - this will be taken offline. Similar concerns were raised for test case 3. ",null,"4.1.8","Network Resource Function (NRF) (TS 33.518)",7420,"not concluded","2019-03-04T09:32:21.553","2019-03-04T10:21:44.863",null,null,"Rel-16","33.518","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190805","SCAS NRF: Scope Representation for Nnrf_AccessToken Service","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Wei Lu",79335,"pCR","Approval","Based on the current version of TS 33.518, this paper proposes two new test cases for scope representation for Nnrf_AccessToken Service, which are NRF-specific security requirements derived from 29.510.","It was also questioned whether this is really just testing functionality and what is the secrity rationale for the test case. There was no support for inclusion of these cases.",null,"4.1.8","Network Resource Function (NRF) (TS 33.518)",8050,"noted","2019-03-04T11:39:40.710","2019-03-04T12:09:38.640",null,null,"Rel-16","33.518","0.2.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190618","SCAS NEF Add test steps for authorization on northbound APIs","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,"The security rationale of the proposed test case was questioned. If with a faked token, the AMF responds then there is a security problem was the response. This was taken offline to fix the execution steps. ",null,"4.1.9","Network Exposure Function (NEF) (TS 33.519)",6180,"Revised","2019-03-02T01:27:58.937","2019-03-04T10:10:54.343",null,"S3-190894","Rel-16","33.519","0.3.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190894","SCAS NEF Add test steps for authorization on northbound APIs","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"4.1.9","Network Exposure Function (NEF) (TS 33.519)",6180,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190618",null,"Rel-16","33.519","0.3.0","SCAS_5G"]
["S3-190895","New draft TS 33.519","ZTE",null,null,"draft TS","Approval",null,null,null,"4.1.9","Network Exposure Function (NEF) (TS 33.519)",6180,"Reserved"]
["S3-190744","New Key Issue: Support of a UP gateway function on the N9 interface","Ericsson","Christine Jost",49662,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",7240,"available","2019-03-04T09:48:40.447","2019-03-04T14:10:37.457",null,null,"Rel-16","33.855","1.3.0","FS_SBA_Sec"]
["S3-190737","New KI: flexible protection of data exchange on N9","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",7250,"available","2019-03-04T09:32:21.520","2019-03-04T10:21:44.833",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190876","Protection of N9 interface in Inter-PLMN scenario","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Nagendra Bykampadi",69265,"pCR","Approval","Protection of N9 interface in Inter-PLMN scenario",null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",7260,"available","2019-03-04T14:09:24.510","2019-03-04T14:19:16.483",null,null,"Rel-16","33.855","1.3.0","FS_SBA_Sec"]
["S3-190869","Security aspects of Service Communication Proxy (SCP)","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Nagendra Bykampadi",69265,"pCR","Approval","SRel-16 5GC supports indirect communication via an SCP. Security aspects of SCP must be studied in detail to ensure that there is no loss in security with the introduction of SCP between two NFs",null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",7270,"available","2019-03-04T13:51:36.007","2019-03-04T14:19:16.500",null,null,"Rel-16","33.855","1.3.0","FS_SBA_Sec"]
["S3-190726","Key Issue: Protection of SCP interfaces","Deutsche Telekom AG","Hans Christian Rudolph",72672,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",7370,"available","2019-03-04T08:41:13.920","2019-03-04T09:29:06.237",null,null,"Rel-16","33.855","1.3.0","FS_SBA_Sec"]
["S3-190727","Key Issue: Secure message transport via the SCP","Deutsche Telekom AG","Hans Christian Rudolph",72672,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",7440,"available","2019-03-04T08:42:08.757","2019-03-04T09:29:06.250",null,null,"Rel-16","33.855","1.3.0","FS_SBA_Sec"]
["S3-190871","NF to NF authenticaton and authorization in Indirect communication mode","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Nagendra Bykampadi",69265,"pCR","Approval","This key issue addresses how NF to NF authentication and authorization works in Indirect communication mode.",null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",8690,"available","2019-03-04T13:56:16.987","2019-03-04T14:19:16.517",null,null,"Rel-16","33.855","1.3.0","FS_SBA_Sec"]
["S3-190872","Authorization of NF service access in SCP","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Nagendra Bykampadi",69265,"pCR","Approval","In Rel-16, the SCP is expected to support the functionality of OAuth 2.0 based service access authorization of NF service consumer.",null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",8710,"available","2019-03-04T13:59:15.860","2019-03-04T14:19:16.517",null,null,"Rel-16","33.855","1.3.0","FS_SBA_Sec"]
["S3-190874","Service access authorization within a NF Set or NF Service Set","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Nagendra Bykampadi",69265,"pCR","Approval","Study the impact of instance Set introduced by SA2, on OAuth 2.0 based Service access authorization.",null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",8720,"available","2019-03-04T14:06:42.487","2019-03-04T14:19:16.483",null,null,"Rel-16","33.855","1.3.0","FS_SBA_Sec"]
["S3-190873","Indirect communication between NFs in roaming scenarios","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Nagendra Bykampadi",69265,"pCR","Approval","This key issue studies the use of SCP on the consumer and/or producer side in roaming scenarios and security aspects when indirect communication is used between two NFs in such scenarios",null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",8730,"available","2019-03-04T14:03:30.243","2019-03-04T14:19:16.467",null,null,"Rel-16","33.855","1.3.0","FS_SBA_Sec"]
["S3-190724","Draft LS on SCP security requirements","Deutsche Telekom AG","Hans Christian Rudolph",72672,"LS out","Approval",null,null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",8740,"available","2019-03-04T08:38:12.737","2019-03-04T09:29:06.250",null,null,"Rel-16",null,null,"FS_SBA_Sec",null,null,null,null,null,"SA2"]
["S3-190725","Key Issue: Handling of invalid IPX patches","Deutsche Telekom AG","Hans Christian Rudolph",72672,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",8760,"available","2019-03-04T08:40:06.013","2019-03-04T09:29:06.237",null,null,"Rel-16","33.855","1.3.0","FS_SBA_Sec"]
["S3-190879","TLMSP, A Proxy Transport Layer Secure Protocol","NCSC","Colin Whorlow",70257,"other","Discussion","This document is submitted on behalf of ETSI TC Cyber.  It provides information on TLMSP, a proxy transport layer secure protocol.  TLMSP has similarities to application layer security for N32 and fulfils similar requirements.",null,null,"5.1","Study on Security Aspects of the 5G Service Based Architecture (FS_SBA-Sec) (Rel-16)",8790,"available","2019-03-04T14:49:02.340","2019-03-04T14:57:25.657",null,null,"Rel-16"]
["S3-190723","Conclusion for KDF negotiation for 5G System Security","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.10","Study of KDF negotiation for 5G System Security (FS_5GS_KDF) (Rel-16)",7230,"available","2019-03-04T08:22:46.323","2019-03-04T12:30:02.507","S3-190706",null,"Rel-16","33.808","0.2.0","FS_5GS_KDF"]
["S3-190609","Solution for Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization with multiple registrations in the same PLMN","InterDigital, Inc.","Samir Ferdi",72165,"pCR","Approval","A new solution for Slice Specific Authentication and Authorization when UE is registering in the same AMF in the same serving PLMN over both 3GPP and non-3GPP accesses",null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6090,"available","2019-02-21T15:08:55.930","2019-03-02T15:42:02.570",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190697","Amendment to solution #2","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6560,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.277","2019-03-04T11:21:26.450",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190692","Discussions on solutions to AMF key separation","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"discussion","Discussion",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6570,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.120","2019-03-04T11:21:26.437",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813"]
["S3-190693","AMF key separation solution 1","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6920,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.153","2019-03-04T11:21:26.437",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190694","AMF key separation solution 2","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6930,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.200","2019-03-04T11:21:26.437",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190695","AMF key separation solution 3","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6940,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.230","2019-03-04T11:21:26.450",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190799","KAMF separation using a standalone SEAF","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6950,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.553","2019-03-04T14:20:18.480",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190814","Solution for key separation based on slice authentication keys","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6960,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.083","2019-03-04T14:01:11.460",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.3.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190696","Discussion on provisioning security features for a network slice","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"discussion","Discussion",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6970,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.260","2019-03-04T11:21:26.450",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813"]
["S3-190698","Amendment to solution #3","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6980,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.293","2019-03-04T11:21:26.467",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190867","Privacy for Slice Authentication","Lenovo, Motorola Mobility","Andreas Kunz",72589,"pCR","Approval","This paper introduces a solution on Key Issue #4: Security and privacy aspects related to the solution for Network Slice specific access authentication and authorization.",null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",6990,"available","2019-03-04T13:48:25.153","2019-03-04T14:29:22.950",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190738","Remove EN in 6.6.3","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",7380,"available","2019-03-04T09:32:21.520","2019-03-04T10:21:44.847",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190739","Solution for slice specific authorization","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",7390,"available","2019-03-04T09:32:21.537","2019-03-04T10:21:44.847",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190656","NSSAI protection during the RRC connection establishment procedure","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution proposes a new solution.",null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",7710,"available","2019-03-03T09:19:33.103","2019-03-04T13:35:51.903",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190657","NSSAI protection during the RRC connection establishment procedure","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution proposes a new solution.",null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",7910,"available","2019-03-03T09:21:15.737","2019-03-04T13:35:51.903",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190791","Proposed solution for protecting the S-NSSAI for transmission at the AS layer","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",7990,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.303","2019-03-04T14:20:18.497",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190699","Amendment to KI#6","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",8140,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.307","2019-03-04T11:21:26.467",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190771","Key issue on Granularity of isolation for slice specific security","LG Electronics","Joonwoong Kim",66512,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.11","Study on Security aspects of Enhancement of Network Slicing (FS_eNS_SEC) (Rel-16)",8670,"available","2019-03-04T11:08:33.387","2019-03-04T11:18:06.330",null,null,"Rel-16","33.813","0.2.0","FS_eNS_SEC"]
["S3-190731","pCR to TR33.814 – Text for Clause Introduction","CATT","Wei Zhou",61782,"pCR","Approval",null,"The difference between regulatory and commercial location services was not clear and not needed in the introducation - the document will be revised to remove these terms",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7180,"Revised","2019-03-04T08:58:30.910","2019-03-04T09:10:18.530",null,"S3-190898","Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190898","pCR to TR33.814 – Text for Clause Introduction","CATT","Wei Zhou",61782,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7180,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190731",null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190732","Text for Clause 4 Security aspects of eLCS","CATT","Wei Zhou",61782,"pCR","Approval",null,"There was discussion on commercial location not being fully specified in Rel-15 and needs to be enhanced in Rel-16. This leads to a need to re-word 4.1 to account for this. It was agreed to remove 4.2.",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7190,"Revised","2019-03-04T09:04:45.257","2019-03-04T09:10:18.530",null,"S3-190899","Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190899","Text for Clause 4 Security aspects of eLCS","CATT","Wei Zhou",61782,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7190,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190732",null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190729","pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for positioning data confidentiality protection","CATT","Wei Zhou",61782,"pCR","Approval",null,"There was general agreementon this but will be will taken offline for re-wording - the revision of this will contain an EN to agree that there will be no mechanism to protect individual NAS IEs.",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7200,"Revised","2019-03-04T08:49:41.480","2019-03-04T09:10:18.513",null,"S3-190900","Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190900","pCR to TR33.814 - Key issue for positioning data confidentiality protection","CATT","Wei Zhou",61782,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7200,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190729",null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190719","Key Issue for encryption and integrity protection of assistance data","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,"It was not clear what was missing from the Rel-15 security - this analysis would help the understanding of this key issue",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7210,"noted","2019-03-04T08:08:52.140","2019-03-04T12:30:02.477",null,null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190720","Key Issue for encryption and integrity protection of location data","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,"This contribution overlaps with S3-190729 and will be merged into the revision of that document. ",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7220,"merged","2019-03-04T08:08:52.203","2019-03-04T12:30:02.490",null,null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190730","pCR to TR33.814 - Solution for positioning data confidentiality protection","CATT","Wei Zhou",61782,"pCR","Approval",null,"It was felt too early to conclude on this solution as there is no key issue for this yet, i.e. need to resolve whether there needs to be protection of NAS IEs when NAS security is not activated. The meeting agreed that there should not be a mechanism to protect individual NAS IEs- this will be captured by an EN in S3-190900.",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7290,"noted","2019-03-04T08:53:24.753","2019-03-04T09:10:18.530",null,null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190721","Key Issue for privacy setting integrity between UE and homenetwork","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,"There was much discussion on whether this is a legitimate key issue. It was felt that the serving network can already determine the UE's location and hence it is not possible to prevent a serving network fro using the UE's locations. Mechanisms outside the scope of standards could be useful here. A NOTE will be added to S3-190900 to try to capture this discussion - otherwise an EN wil be added . ",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7300,"noted","2019-03-04T08:08:52.263","2019-03-04T12:30:02.490",null,null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190772","Key issue on UE location privacy setting","LG Electronics","Joonwoong Kim",66512,"pCR","Approval",null,"The same disscusion as above document.",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7310,"noted","2019-03-04T11:08:33.403","2019-03-04T11:18:06.330",null,null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190755","New KI: Privacy control in LCS","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,"The word ' effective' was removed from the requirement as it is not easy to assess what is effective. 'System' was changed to '5G system' in the requirement. An EN is added to capture the open issue of who enforces the privacy.",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7320,"Revised","2019-03-04T10:03:56.237","2019-03-04T13:08:56.320",null,"S3-190902","Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190902","New KI: Privacy control in LCS","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,"Approved without being seen",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7320,"approved",null,null,"S3-190755",null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190881","Key Issue proposal on location measurement tampering for FS_eLCS_Sec","Philips International B.V.","John Bernsen",35096,"pCR","Approval","In several 3GPP location services, the UE of which the location is to be determined performs measurements itself and sends these measurements to the network so the network can determine its location. Examples are\n•\tOTDOA (Observed Time Difference Of Arriv","Corrections were needed to the fomatting. 5.X.2 needs to be removed as that Is not used for key issues in this topic. The 'etc.' is removed from security threats. It was felt that the threats could be re-wriiten to make it clear that the ME is lying about location related data and also to include threats when location can be monitized in some way, e.g. cheaper call from home. It was agreed to remove the requirements. ",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7510,"Revised","2019-03-06T09:22:02.077","2019-03-06T09:31:26.730",null,"S3-190903","Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190903","Key Issue proposal on location measurement tampering for FS_eLCS_Sec","Philips International B.V.","John Bernsen",35096,"pCR","Approval","In several 3GPP location services, the UE of which the location is to be determined performs measurements itself and sends these measurements to the network so the network can determine its location. Examples are\n•\tOTDOA (Observed Time Difference Of Arriv",null,null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7510,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190881",null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190722","Solution on integrity protection of privacy setting between UE and UDM","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7520,"noted","2019-03-04T08:08:52.343","2019-03-04T12:30:02.507",null,null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190756","New solution: Effective privacy control in LCS","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,"There were several changes agreed for this contribution, namely remove effective and replace with enhanced, add sentence on steps and clarify the measurements are related to location measurements ",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7530,"Revised","2019-03-04T10:03:56.253","2019-03-04T13:08:56.320",null,"S3-190904","Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190904","New solution: Effective privacy control in LCS","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,"Approved with being seen",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7530,"approved",null,null,"S3-190756",null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190751","New solution: WLAN measurements from UEs","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,"It was commented that the WLAN identities can be spoofed, then there would be a lack of confidence in the data. It was agreed to add a sentence of the contribution. Editorially it is needed to decide UE or UEs in many places. Clarification on the serving network and the fact that it is for managed WLAN documents. Some of the wording will be checked offline. ",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7540,"Revised","2019-03-04T10:03:55.987","2019-03-04T13:08:56.273",null,"S3-190905","Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190905","New solution: WLAN measurements from UEs","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7540,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190751",null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190752","New solution: Bluetooth measurements from UEs","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,"same comments as to 751, so same updates",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7550,"Revised","2019-03-04T10:03:56.003","2019-03-04T13:08:56.287",null,"S3-190906","Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190906","New solution: Bluetooth measurements from UEs","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7550,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190752",null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190753","Update KI: TBS positioning","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,"no comments",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7560,"approved","2019-03-04T10:03:56.017","2019-03-04T13:08:56.287",null,null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190754","New solution: TBS measurements from UEs","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,"VF: how to reconciliate the non-commercial nature of R15 with the statement that R15 solution is sufficient. E//: Add sentence that R15 is sufficient also for commercial LCS BT: spoofing of SSIDs is easy, similar sentence to 751 ",null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7720,"Revised","2019-03-04T10:03:56.017","2019-03-04T13:08:56.303",null,"S3-190907","Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190907","New solution: TBS measurements from UEs","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7720,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190754",null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190718","Solution for updating key to broadcast assitance data","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",8810,"noted","2019-03-04T08:08:52.077","2019-03-04T12:30:02.477",null,null,"Rel-16","33.814","0.2.0","FS_eLCS_Sec"]
["S3-190901","New draft TR 33.814","CATT",null,null,"draft TR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.12","Study on Security of the enhancement to the 5GC location services (FS_eLCS_Sec) (Rel-16)",8810,"Reserved"]
["S3-190681","overall introduction","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6190,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:14.917","2019-03-04T11:21:26.497",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190619","URLLC-KI UP security performance for low latency","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6200,"available","2019-03-02T01:47:49.027","2019-03-04T10:10:54.343",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190620","URLLC-solution Enhancement of handover with Xn forwarding tunnel","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6310,"available","2019-03-02T01:47:49.293","2019-03-04T10:10:54.343",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190819","New solution for security for redundant data transmission using Dual Connectivity procedures","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6770,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.193","2019-03-04T14:01:11.477",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.2.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190631","Evaluation and text for resolving editor’s note for solution #5 in TR 33.825","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution proposes solution evaluation and text for resolving editor’s note for solution #5 in TR 33.825.",null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6780,"available","2019-03-03T08:12:25.783","2019-03-04T13:35:51.920",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190682","URLLC solution5 update","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6790,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:14.933","2019-03-04T11:21:26.513",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190689","Dynamic UP security policy control solution for URLLC","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6800,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.073","2019-03-04T13:56:15.740",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec, FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190818","Solution #Y: Security for redundant data transmission using Dual Connectivity","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6810,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.163","2019-03-04T14:01:11.477",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.2.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190685","solution1 and evaluation update","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6820,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:14.997","2019-03-04T11:21:26.530",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190680","deleting the EN of solution3","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6830,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:14.903","2019-03-04T11:21:26.497",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190820","Correction to solution #3 ‘Security policy handling for redundant data transmission’","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6840,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.210","2019-03-04T14:01:11.477",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.2.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190683","evaluation of solution 3","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6850,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:14.950","2019-03-04T11:21:26.513",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190679","solution 2 clarification","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6860,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:14.870","2019-03-04T11:21:26.483",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190678","conclusion for key issue 6","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6870,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:14.857","2019-03-04T11:21:26.483",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190796","Conclusion on KI #6 for Study on the security for URLLC","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",6890,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.490","2019-03-04T14:20:18.463",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190686","conclusion for key issue 1","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",7940,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.010","2019-03-04T11:21:26.530",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190687","conclusion for key issue 2","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",7950,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.027","2019-03-04T11:21:26.403",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190677","conclusion for key issue 3","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",7960,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:14.810","2019-03-04T11:21:26.483",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190794","Conclusion on KI #3 for Study on the security for URLLC","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",7970,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.443","2019-03-04T14:20:18.450",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190684","conclusion for key issue 4","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",8180,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:14.967","2019-03-04T11:21:26.513",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190795","Conclusion on KI #4 for Study on the security for URLLC","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",8190,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.460","2019-03-04T14:20:18.450",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190797","Conclusion on KI #8 for Study on the security for URLLC","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.13","Study on security for 5G URLLC (FS_5G URLLC_SEC) (Rel-16)",8200,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.507","2019-03-04T14:20:18.463",null,null,"Rel-16","33.825","0.3.0","FS_5G_URLLC_SEC"]
["S3-190757","Considerations on network product class when using NFV technology","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.14","Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products (FS_VNP_SECAM_SCAS) (Rel-16)",7570,"available","2019-03-04T10:33:40.283","2019-03-04T12:14:03.817",null,null,"Rel-16","33.818","0.1.0","FS_VNP_SECAM_SCAS"]
["S3-190758","Considerations on SECAM of the virtualized network products","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.14","Study on SECAM and SCAS for 3GPP virtualized network products (FS_VNP_SECAM_SCAS) (Rel-16)",7580,"available","2019-03-04T10:36:40.217","2019-03-04T12:14:03.783",null,null,"Rel-16","33.818","0.1.0","FS_VNP_SECAM_SCAS"]
["S3-190862","Key issue on Alignment of the terms Private network and NPN","Samsung","Rajavelsamy Rajadurai",33521,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",7000,"available","2019-03-04T13:31:07.337","2019-03-04T14:03:46.420",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190700","Discussion on NPN authentication","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"discussion","Endorsement",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",7870,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.323","2019-03-04T11:21:26.467",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819"]
["S3-190787","Proposed solution to the key hierarchy for non-public networks","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",7880,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.193","2019-03-04T14:19:41.960",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190788","Proposed addition to key issue#1.1 for standalone non-public networks","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",7890,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.227","2019-03-04T14:19:41.960",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190789","Adding network binding requirement to the keys issue #1.1 on standalone public networks","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",7900,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.257","2019-03-04T14:21:29.073",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190790","Proposed solution to key issue #1.1 in TR 33.819","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8450,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.270","2019-03-04T14:20:18.497",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190855","KI on credential storage for NPN-Ues","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8460,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.693","2019-03-04T14:50:44.117",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","16.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190858","Key issue on secure storage of SNPN access credentials","Samsung, Intel","Rajavelsamy Rajadurai",33521,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8470,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:46.373","2019-03-04T14:03:46.403",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190859","Solution for secure storage of SNPN access credentials","Samsung, Intel","Rajavelsamy Rajadurai",33521,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8480,"available","2019-03-04T13:27:33.720","2019-03-04T14:03:46.403",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190860","Key issue on CAG access control in Non-standalone NPNs","Samsung","Rajavelsamy Rajadurai",33521,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8490,"available","2019-03-04T13:28:50.677","2019-03-04T14:03:46.403",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190861","New solution for CAG access control in Non-standalone NPNs","Samsung","Rajavelsamy Rajadurai",33521,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8500,"available","2019-03-04T13:29:52.890","2019-03-04T14:03:46.420",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190845","Discussion on NPN Authentication","Cablelabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"discussion","Endorsement",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8510,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.600","2019-03-04T14:50:44.133",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819",null,"FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190856","KI on authentication and authorization of NPN subscribers by a 5G external entity","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8520,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.693","2019-03-04T14:50:44.133",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","16.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190846","Deployment options for authentication in NPNs","Cablelabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8530,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.633","2019-03-04T14:50:44.133",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","16.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190847","Evaluation of EAP-TTLS for non-certificate based UE authentication in SNPNs","Cablelabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8540,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.633","2019-03-04T15:11:51.527",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","16.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190848","Solution on non-certificate based UE authentication in 5G NPN with AAA","Cablelabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8550,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.633","2019-03-04T14:50:44.147",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","16.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190849","Solution on non-certificate based UE authentication in 5G NPN without AAA","Cablelabs, Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8560,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.647","2019-03-04T14:50:44.147",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","16.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190850","Discussion of security solutions for SNPN service access via PLMN and vice versa","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"discussion","Endorsement",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8570,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.647","2019-03-04T14:50:44.147",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819",null,"FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190851","Solution on SNPN service access via PLMN","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8580,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.663","2019-03-04T14:50:44.163",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","16.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190852","Solution on PLMN service access via NPN","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8590,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.663","2019-03-04T14:50:44.163",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","16.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190853","Discussion on Authentication of UE to PLMN integrated NPN","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"discussion","Endorsement",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8600,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.677","2019-03-04T14:50:44.163",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819",null,"FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190854","Solution for UE authentication to PLMN integrated NPN","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8610,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.677","2019-03-04T14:50:44.117",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","16.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190857","Rapporteur correction to TR 33819","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Anja Jerichow",68341,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8620,"available","2019-03-04T13:25:21.710","2019-03-04T14:50:44.133",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","16.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190882","Issue of Alignment of the terms Private network and NPN","SAMSUNG","Narendranath Durga Tangudu",73161,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.15","Study on Security for 5GS Enhanced support of Vertical and LAN Services (FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC) (Rel-16)",8820,"available","2019-03-07T09:34:16.710","2019-03-07T09:39:16.690",null,null,"Rel-16","33.819","0.2.0","FS_Vertical_LAN_SEC"]
["S3-190768","pCR to 33935 - addition section 4.1 Overview","VODAFONE Group Plc","Tim P. Evans",24416,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.16","Study on LTKUP Detailed solutions (FS_LTKUP_Detail) (Rel-16)",7680,"available","2019-03-04T11:07:21.173","2019-03-04T14:34:46.750",null,null,"Rel-16","33.935","0.1.0","FS_LTKUP_Detail"]
["S3-190773","pCR to 33935 - addition of detailed solution 4b","VODAFONE Group Plc","Tim P. Evans",24416,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.16","Study on LTKUP Detailed solutions (FS_LTKUP_Detail) (Rel-16)",7730,"available","2019-03-04T11:09:37.523","2019-03-04T15:01:31.737",null,null,"Rel-16","33.935","0.1.0","FS_LTKUP_Detail"]
["S3-190840","Detailed solution 5 in TR 33.935","Gemalto N.V.","Mireille Pauliac",23516,"pCR","Approval","Addition of detailed solution 5 in 3GPP TR 33.935",null,null,"5.16","Study on LTKUP Detailed solutions (FS_LTKUP_Detail) (Rel-16)",8400,"available","2019-03-04T12:23:53.027","2019-03-04T14:48:14.727",null,null,"Rel-16","33.935","0.0.1","FS_LTKUP_Detail"]
["S3-190605","Proposal for FS_UP_IP_Sec Key Issue #1.3: User plane integrity between UE and network","Philips International B.V.","John Bernsen",35096,"pCR","Approval","Proposal for zero overhead user plane integrity protection by using cryptographic CRCs in Transport Blocks and Code Blocks. The error behavior of the UE-eNodeB link due to noise is unaffected by this integrity protection.","Nokia: impact is at phy layer. Not reliable ZTE: PDCP is multiplexed into transport block, how is policy in case of multiplexed being taken care of. Huawei: solution is not within the scope of this TR. Should adopt PDCP from 5G. BT: CRC should be for natural errors, can't distinguish between security and transmission errors. VF: add this solution and then point out all of the problems in evaluation. DT: creative solution, should go in. E//: why is integrity not provided at PDCP layer. Philips: this is zero overhead solution. VF: prefer as two tdocs, with key issue. E//: description of key issue is too global. DCM: not put in key issue. put in solution and then put in evalution. VF: put in solution and give evaluation. Huawei: this study was understood that it is only about user plane integrity protection at PDCP layer. IDCC: add key issue of overhead QC: support IDCC and Huawei proposal. QC: need agreement that solution should not have impact on physical layer. NEC: note for now. Lot of support for noting it.",null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",6050,"noted","2019-02-20T12:37:46.080","2019-02-20T13:35:45.647",null,null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190647","Editorial corrections in TR 33.853 v0.1.0","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","Editorial changes to TR 33.853.","VF: ok as rapporteur.",null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",6470,"approved","2019-03-03T09:00:36.753","2019-03-04T13:35:51.997",null,null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190648","Discussion on the need of UP IP solution for Rel.15 UEs","NEC Europe Ltd, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Samsung","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"discussion","Discussion","This contribution discusses the motivation of a new key issue.",null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",6480,"noted","2019-03-03T09:02:46.113","2019-03-04T13:35:51.857",null,null,"Rel-16","33.853"]
["S3-190649","New key issue on data rate limitation of integrity protection in UP DRB","NEC Europe Ltd, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Samsung","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution introduces a new key issue.","Huawei: only support one solution. If operator decides to turn off, then what can one do. VF: not clear that this is serving network decision, so need to be more clear about operators. NEC: if only 64kbit/sec is possible then how can IP be used. Nokia: if IP is turned off, then what can be done? policy needs to be removed. NEC: remove first requirement. how does the user know that there is IP? VF: service level agreement. NEC: support for second part is there. Huawei: when UE doesn't support full data rate, then do something else. E//: what is the key issue we are trying to solve. QC: if no IP protection is enabled, how can the user be protected. VF: if the home operator promises IP, but the serving network doesn't support it, then how could IP be provided. BT: mismatch between the users preference and policy of network. Samsung: differentiate user and protocol perspective VF: whether worth it depends on user expectation. E//: solution targeting R15 UEs, but target solutions that defend if IP is not supported. need to be clarified.  ",null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",6490,"Revised","2019-03-03T09:04:50.933","2019-03-04T13:35:51.873",null,"S3-190911","Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190911","New key issue on data rate limitation of integrity protection in UP DRB","NEC Europe Ltd, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility, Samsung","Rajvel ",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution introduces a new key issue.",null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",6490,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190649",null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190650","New solution for data rate limitation of integrity protection in UP DRB","NEC Europe Ltd, Lenovo, Motorola Mobility","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution introduces a new solution.",null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",6500,"available","2019-03-03T09:06:53.847","2019-03-04T13:35:51.873",null,null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190651","New solution for data rate limitation of integrity protection in UP DRB","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution introduces a new solution.",null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",6510,"available","2019-03-03T09:09:40.617","2019-03-04T13:35:51.873",null,null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190652","New key issue on integrity protection capability imbalance in MR-DC scenarios","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution introduces a new key issue.",null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",6520,"available","2019-03-03T09:12:13.767","2019-03-04T13:35:51.887",null,null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190653","New solution for integrity protection capability imbalance in MR-DC scenarios","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution introduces a new solution.",null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",6530,"available","2019-03-03T09:13:51.970","2019-03-04T13:35:51.887",null,null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190707","Support UP_IP in option 7","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",7070,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.453","2019-03-04T12:30:02.537",null,null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190708","UP IP for Option 4","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",7080,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.530","2019-03-04T12:30:02.553",null,null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190802","pCR: New KI: Integrity Algorithm independence","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",8020,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.757","2019-03-04T14:20:18.480","S3-190388",null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190803","pCR: New KI: Ability to prioritize certain PDCP packets on the UE uplink","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",8030,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.817","2019-03-04T14:20:18.497","S3-190387",null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190804","pCR: New KI: Efficient handling of PDCP discardTimer expiry on the UE Uplink","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",8040,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.880","2019-03-04T14:20:18.497","S3-190386",null,"Rel-16","33.853","0.1.0","FS_UP_IP_Sec"]
["S3-190880","(FS_UP_IP_Sec) Integrity protection of the User Plane -New key Issue - Reporting Integrity check failures to the network","BT plc","Colin Blanchard",71421,"discussion","Decision","It is proposed to add a key issue to TR33.853 [3] concerning operation  1) during normal handover between eNB’s and 2) when redundant transmission in the user plane is used to support Ultra Reliable Low Latency Communication   URLLC\nAnd add the following",null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",8800,"available","2019-03-04T14:51:25.927","2019-03-04T15:24:20.717",null,null,null,"33.853"]
["S3-190910","draft TR33.853","VODAFONE Group Plc","Tim P. Evans",null,"draft TR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.17","Study on User Plane Integrity Protection (FS_UP_IP_Sec) (Rel-16)",8800,"Reserved"]
["S3-190610","Initialisation of Sensitive Functions in a Virtualised Environment","ETSI TC CYBER","Mirko Cano Soveri",41957,"LS in",null,null,null,null,"5.18","Study on Security Impacts of Virtualisation (FS_SIV) (Rel-16)",6100,"available","2019-02-25T01:57:45.473","2019-02-25T02:09:04.790"]
["S3-190809","Skeleton for TR 33.846","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,"no comments",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6210,"approved","2019-03-04T11:52:13.977","2019-03-04T14:01:11.430",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190810","Scope for TR 33.846","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6220,"approved","2019-03-04T11:52:14.007","2019-03-04T14:01:11.430",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190760","Key issue to ensure the security of session anchor keys","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,"together with 690",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6230,"noted","2019-03-04T10:42:03.303","2019-03-04T12:14:03.817",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190690","A key issue on the long-term key and its related anchor key leakage","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,"together with 811",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6240,"noted","2019-03-04T06:36:15.090","2019-03-04T11:21:26.420",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.1.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190811","New KI: Leakage of long-term key","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,"VF: what is the relation to LTKUP, BT: this is about mitigation, the other is about prevention, seems to be duplicating the response mechanism. E//: unrelated to LTKUP, this is about perfect forward secrecy. E//: solutions also include active attacks, E// only wants to address passive attacks. VF: this was already discussed in several studies. Orange: agree with VF. BT: solution out of this would be to stop a man in the middle. VF: already in solution 4b and 6 out of LTKUP. E//: we had the discussion before. Todor: between agreeing the study item and now, the 9 series TR was discussed. Telenor: assumption of key comrpomise during production should be out of scope. Orange: this should eventually become a focussed study to update 9 series TR from LTKUP. NEC: agree that assumption of root key compromise is tenacious, but this is about PFS. ",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6250,"noted","2019-03-04T11:52:14.023","2019-03-04T14:01:11.447",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190759","Key issue regarding the minimal computational cost when generating session anchor keys","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,"Orange: how was the evaluation done that the current state is not optimal. IDCC: it is not implied that current auth schemes are not effective or efficient. Orange: why is the current authentication from computational perspective not optimal? VF: similar to 256 discussion, difficult to quantify performance, agree with spirit of contribution, but not possible to evaluate against. BT: in IoT space, many and competing performance requirements. Lowest common denominatoris only password? NEC: similar to discussion on KDF. Huawei: different, this is on efficiency. IDCC: \"may\" not fulfil?",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6260,"noted","2019-03-04T10:39:40.760","2019-03-04T12:14:03.800",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190626","eAUTH-Linkability KI exposure of cause value","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,"together with 735",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6270,"merged","2019-03-02T01:47:49.340","2019-03-04T10:10:54.390",null,"S3-190909","Rel-16","33.846","0.3.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190735","Key issue on linkability attack","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,"together with 762",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6280,"merged","2019-03-04T09:32:21.507","2019-03-04T10:21:44.833",null,"S3-190909","Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190762","Key issue to resist the linkability attacks","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,"VF: this is only in case of rare auth failures. DCM: fake base station replaying a auth vector. NEC: UE will not camp on cell after two auth failures. Huawei: this allows a DoS. E//: only barred for 5min. ZTE: attacker can change cell ID. VF: should be in FBS study. Huawei: this attack needs to be studied because it is a published attack. VF: support this in this study, but close FBS? E//: referencing the wrong paper. Adrian: needs to be documented here or in FBS. Proposal to merge and then decide to put into FBS or eAUTH TR. NCSC: avoid saying \"the linkability attack\".  E//: leave requirements blank for now.",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6290,"Revised","2019-03-04T10:45:45.780","2019-03-04T12:14:03.817",null,"S3-190909","Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190909","Key issue to resist the linkability attacks","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6290,"Reserved",null,null,"S3-190762",null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190628","eAUTH-Linkability KI SQN exposure","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,"QC: keep it open for now, until CR by QC has been decided, then add if not agreed in May meeting. ZTE: this is different key issue. Gemalto: support QC proposal. NEC: also. BT: support, need a list of known attacks. VF: Normal network operator procedures of SQN buckets could be used to prevent this attack. Merge first requirement into 909, second requirement will be reconsidered after the May meeting discussions.  ",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6330,"merged","2019-03-02T01:47:49.357","2019-03-04T10:10:54.390",null,"S3-190909","Rel-16","33.846","0.3.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190627","eAUTH-Linkability KI different length of response","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,"QC: the message needs to be protected, not the length. ZTE: even if encrapted, teh length will leak which type it is. QC: key issue is assuming that there is a specific solution. IDCC: replace length of response by indistinguishable responses. Orange, VF: support IDCC phrasing NCSC: if this is not about length, then it fits in with 909. Merge to 909",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6340,"merged","2019-03-02T01:47:49.357","2019-03-04T10:10:54.390",null,"S3-190909","Rel-16","33.846","0.3.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190621","eAUTH-SUCI KI Computing resource consuming","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,"VF: should be \"a\" privacy mechanism, not \"the\", can already be done, nothing new required. IDCC: key is not to asymmetric algorithm. VF: are we really worried about DoS attack on computation resource because we have virtual scalable servers. BT: ECC was chosen to avoid performance issues IDCC: right choice, but in case of DDoS attack, there is a problem. support the issue, but not the focus on asymmetric. E//: because UE is limited, and needs to do more work than UDM. TIM: new issue jsut came up after 6 month - is this to legitimate a new option? NEC: not do this. QC also. DT: also. ",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6580,"noted","2019-03-02T01:47:49.310","2019-03-04T10:10:54.357",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.3.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190761","Key issue to mitigate the DDoS attacks on the UDM","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,"NCSC: same as previous contribution, same applies? VF: same, or worse, this doesnt even say where the DDoS is coming from.",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6590,"noted","2019-03-04T10:43:53.783","2019-03-04T12:14:03.800",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190622","eAUTH-SUCI KI congestion","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,"VF: in case of proprietary mechanism, UDM is scoped accordingly. BT: this was already agreed with CT, so not an issue. NEC: how can a UE produce false output? E//: already dealt with in 33.501 by rejection of long SUCIs. ",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6900,"noted","2019-03-02T01:47:49.310","2019-03-04T10:10:54.357",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.3.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190623","eAUTH-SUCI KI quantum computing","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,"VF: there is indication which mechanism is being used. NCSC: only relevant in 20years time. IDCC: extend to whole scope of authentication, not only SUCI concealment. Orange: quantum study already gave timeline.  Juniper: agree. QC: agree. Noted",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",6910,"noted","2019-03-02T01:47:49.323","2019-03-04T10:10:54.357",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.3.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190633","New KI on Fast re-authentication procedure for 5GS","NEC Europe Ltd, Intel","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This pCR proposes a key issue for study item on security for authentication enhancements in 5GS (TR 33.846).","ZTE: not covered by scope of SID. NEC: because DoS is in scope, so it should be in scope: QC: not in scope, E//: not in scope, BT: support this contribution. QC: because of horizontal and vertical key handover, auth is rare, currently not a problem. NEC: for as long as staying in the same access, then few authentications, not when changing access. Huawei: with virtualization, you can throw more resources at it. NEC: this is AuC. BT: should be in URLLC work item. ZTE: note it. Normal authentication can be used.",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",7350,"noted","2019-03-03T08:18:00.007","2019-03-04T13:35:51.920",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190813","Update on EAP-AKA´ PFS","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,"Nokia: what is status of IETF discussion? E//: ongoing email discussion.",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",7360,"noted","2019-03-04T11:52:14.067","2019-03-04T14:01:11.447",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190812","New solution: EAP-AKA´ PFS","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",7590,"noted","2019-03-04T11:52:14.037","2019-03-04T14:01:11.447",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190841","33.846: solution for anchor keys security","Gemalto N.V.","Mireille Pauliac",23516,"pCR","Approval","Solution for anchor keys security in 3GPP TR 33.846","no key issue for this",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",7600,"noted","2019-03-04T12:33:10.710","2019-03-04T14:57:33.220",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.1","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190658","Discussion paper on UE initiated EAP AKA' with PFS","Nokia","Suresh Nair",70166,"discussion","Endorsement",null,"no key issue for this",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",7610,"noted","2019-03-03T21:24:51.357","2019-03-04T14:15:53.430"]
["S3-190659","UE Initiated EAP AKA' PFS solution","Nokia","Suresh Nair",70166,"other","Approval","This contribution proposes a UE initiated option for EAP AKA with PFS","no key issue for this",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",7620,"noted","2019-03-03T21:37:05.683","2019-03-04T14:15:53.430",null,null,null,"33.846",null,"FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190691","Solution Proposal based on DH between UE and AUSF","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,"NCSC: no DH for SUPI protection, but ECDH. No key issue, noted",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",7630,"noted","2019-03-04T06:36:15.120","2019-03-04T11:21:26.420",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.1.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190763","Security enhancement for the key KSEAF based on the symmetric algorithm","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,"VF: long term key can be updated anyways in IoT. No key issue",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",7640,"noted","2019-03-04T10:47:33.237","2019-03-04T12:14:03.817",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190764","KSEAF enhancement for the EAP-AKA’ protocol","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,"VF: same as before",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",7650,"noted","2019-03-04T10:52:24.900","2019-03-04T12:14:03.830",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190839","New solution: Deriving session anchor keys with random number","ZTE Corporation, Nubia","Jin PENG",49548,"pCR","Approval",null,"no key issue for this",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",7660,"noted","2019-03-04T12:18:46.293","2019-03-04T12:28:24.053",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190765","ECIES based security enhancement for the key KSEAF","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,"no key issue for this",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",8090,"noted","2019-03-04T10:55:57.113","2019-03-04T12:14:03.830",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190766","KSEAF enhancement for 5G AKA protocol","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,"no key issue for this",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",8100,"noted","2019-03-04T11:01:40.570","2019-03-04T12:14:03.830",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190629","eAUTH-Linkability solution encrypted session anchor key based solution","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,"related to 909 discussion E//: related to linkability, VF: is this backwards compatible ZTE: yes",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",8110,"not concluded","2019-03-02T01:47:49.370","2019-03-04T10:10:54.407",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.3.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190736","New solution for linkability attack","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,"related to 909 discussion  ",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",8120,"not concluded","2019-03-04T09:32:21.507","2019-03-04T10:21:44.833",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190625","eAUTH-SUCI solution mitigation of large SUCI attack","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,"no key issue for this",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",8130,"noted","2019-03-02T01:47:49.340","2019-03-04T10:10:54.373",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.3.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190624","eAUTH-SUCI solution adding symmetric algorithm for SUPI protection scheme","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,"no key issue for this VF: secret key shall not leave the USIM, otherwise makes no sense. Exactly as specified in 33.501. secret key shared across a batch of USIMs.",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",8390,"noted","2019-03-02T01:47:49.323","2019-03-04T10:10:54.373",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.3.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190634","Solution to support Fast Re-authentication in 5GS","NEC Europe Ltd, Intel","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This pCR proposes a solution to support fast re-authentication to study item on authentication enhancements in 5GS (TR 33.846).","no key issue for this",null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",8410,"noted","2019-03-03T08:21:56.757","2019-03-04T13:35:51.920",null,null,"Rel-16","33.846","0.0.0","FS_AUTH_ENH"]
["S3-190908","Draft TR 33.846 enhanced authentication","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",null,"draft TR","approval",null,null,null,"5.19","Study on authentication enhancements in 5GS (FS_AUTH_ENH) (Rel-16)",8410,"Reserved"]
["S3-190863","Draft TR 33.xxx - Skeleton TR on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul","Samsung","Rajavelsamy Rajadurai",33521,"other",null,null,null,null,"5.20","Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (FS_NR_IAB_Sec)",8630,"available","2019-03-04T13:34:38.333","2019-03-04T14:03:46.437"]
["S3-190864","Scope for the study on security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul","Samsung","Rajavelsamy Rajadurai",33521,"other",null,null,null,null,"5.20","Study on Security for NR Integrated Access and Backhaul (FS_NR_IAB_Sec)",8640,"available","2019-03-04T13:35:43.213","2019-03-04T14:03:46.437"]
["S3-190601","New Key Issue for eV2X TR - privacy protection for unicast messages","InterDigital, Inc.","Alec Brusilovsky",72017,"other","Approval","This contribution proposes a new KI for eV2X TR.",null,null,"5.21","Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (FS_eV2X_Sec)",6010,"available","2019-02-19T13:51:16.347","2019-03-02T16:05:32.877"]
["S3-190602","New Key Issue for eV2X TR - privacy protection for multicast messages","InterDigital, Inc.","Alec Brusilovsky",72017,"other","Approval","This contribution proposes a new KI for eV2X TR.",null,null,"5.21","Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (FS_eV2X_Sec)",6020,"available","2019-02-19T13:57:11.440","2019-03-02T16:05:32.907"]
["S3-190604","New Key Issue for eV2X TR - security for unicast/multicast messages","InterDigital, Inc.","Alec Brusilovsky",72017,"other","Approval","This contribution proposes a new KI for eV2X TR.",null,null,"5.21","Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (FS_eV2X_Sec)",6040,"available","2019-02-19T18:09:37.960","2019-03-02T16:05:32.907"]
["S3-190606","New Key Issue for eV2X TR - Security of the UE service authorization and revocation","InterDigital, Inc.","Alec Brusilovsky",72017,"other","Approval","This contribution proposes a new KI for eV2X TR.",null,null,"5.21","Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (FS_eV2X_Sec)",6060,"available","2019-02-20T15:43:12.563","2019-03-02T16:05:32.890"]
["S3-190607","New Key Issue for eV2X TR - Security of the UE service provisioning","InterDigital, Inc.","Alec Brusilovsky",72017,"other","Approval","This contribution proposes a new KI for eV2X TR.",null,null,"5.21","Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (FS_eV2X_Sec)",6070,"available","2019-02-20T15:47:39.690","2019-03-02T16:05:32.890"]
["S3-190608","References","InterDigital, Inc.","Alec Brusilovsky",72017,"other","Approval","This contribution proposes References Section for eV2X TR.",null,null,"5.21","Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (FS_eV2X_Sec)",6080,"available","2019-02-20T16:13:18.313","2019-03-02T16:05:32.890"]
["S3-190769","Skeleton of eV2X security study","LG Electronics","Joonwoong Kim",66512,"other","Approval",null,null,null,"5.21","Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (FS_eV2X_Sec)",7690,"available","2019-03-04T11:08:33.373","2019-03-04T11:18:06.313",null,null,"Rel-16"]
["S3-190770","Scope proposal for eV2X security study","LG Electronics","Joonwoong Kim",66512,"other","Approval",null,null,null,"5.21","Study on Security Aspects of 3GPP support for Advanced V2X Services (FS_eV2X_Sec)",7700,"available","2019-03-04T11:08:33.387","2019-03-04T11:18:06.330",null,null,"Rel-16"]
["S3-190750","New KI: Interworking between AKMA and GBA","Ericsson","Henrik Andreas Normann",77974,"pCR","Approval","Re-submission of S3-190326 which was not treated in Kochi.\nInvestigate if interworking between AKMA and GBA introduces any new security concerns.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6130,"available","2019-03-04T09:58:12.263","2019-03-04T13:06:59.087",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190640","Discussion on use of established keys for AKMA root key","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"discussion","Discussion","This contribution discusses the issue of out-of-sync keys and propose the solution approach.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6320,"available","2019-03-03T08:42:30.280","2019-03-04T13:35:51.950",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835",null,"FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190646","New KI on Synchronization of Keys when using established keys","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution introduces a new KI.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6390,"available","2019-03-03T08:55:10.347","2019-03-04T13:35:51.980",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190702","Key issue on Key freshness in AKMA","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6400,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.093","2019-03-04T12:30:02.523",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190824","Updates to KI #14","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6410,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.287","2019-03-04T14:01:11.507",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190613","New Solution: Battery efficient AKMA","KPN N.V.","Iko Keesmaat",33148,"pCR","Approval","This solution proposes procedures, signalling, and a key hierarchy to obtain AKMA functionality for battery contrained UEs.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6420,"available","2019-02-28T13:35:49.663","2019-03-04T13:12:20.537",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190632","Solution to KI#9 Key separation for AKMA AFs","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This pCR proposes a solution for Key issue #9 specified in study item on AKMA.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6430,"available","2019-03-03T08:15:02.987","2019-03-04T13:35:51.920",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190801","pCR: Reusing KAUSF for AKMA","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6440,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.630","2019-03-04T14:20:18.480","S3-190385",null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190639","Solution for Established Key Synchronization","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution introduces a new solution for implicit boostrapping key sychronization.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6450,"available","2019-03-03T08:37:57.290","2019-03-04T13:35:51.950",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190642","Resolving Editor’s Notes in Solution #16","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution resolves an existing EN.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6460,"available","2019-03-03T08:47:04.927","2019-03-04T13:35:51.967",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190641","Discussion on using KSEAF and/or KAUSF for AKMA in view of regulatory compliance","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"discussion","Discussion","This contribution discusses how and why to use KAUSF and/or KSEAF.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",6880,"available","2019-03-03T08:45:19.933","2019-03-04T13:35:51.967",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835",null,"FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190644","Updating solution #16 to include home network option","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution updates existing solution #16.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",7010,"available","2019-03-03T08:51:08.183","2019-03-04T13:35:51.967",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190645","Creating a combined solution for usage of KSEAF and KAUSF","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution introduces a new solution.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",7020,"available","2019-03-03T08:52:48.853","2019-03-04T13:35:51.980",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190643","Solution for Roaming Architecture","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution introduces a new solution.",null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",7030,"available","2019-03-03T08:49:04.143","2019-03-04T13:35:51.967",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190688","improvement for AKMA architecture","Huawei, HiSilicon","Zander (Zhongding) Lei",66556,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",7500,"available","2019-03-04T06:36:15.057","2019-03-04T11:21:26.420",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190703","Solution for Key freshness in AKMA","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",7670,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.173","2019-03-04T12:30:02.523",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190767","AKMA Architecture and procedures with the anchor function as NEF","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",7740,"available","2019-03-04T11:05:04.203","2019-03-04T13:51:16.867",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190774","Resolving Editor's notes in solution 6","China Mobile Com. Corporation","Xiaoting Huang",78337,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8010,"available","2019-03-04T11:09:52.247","2019-03-04T13:51:16.850",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190807","Protocol details for solution 3","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8060,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:13.927","2019-03-04T14:01:11.413",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190821","Updates to Solution #14","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8070,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.223","2019-03-04T14:01:11.493",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190823","New Solution Key Lifetime","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8080,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.270","2019-03-04T14:01:11.493",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190836","Modification of user identity in solution 2 and solution 3","ZTE Corporation, Nubia","Jin PENG",49548,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8210,"available","2019-03-04T12:18:46.247","2019-03-04T12:28:24.053",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190842","Solution 15 editorials","Ericsson","Vlasios Tsiatsis",76181,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8220,"available","2019-03-04T13:09:21.437","2019-03-04T13:51:26.913",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190843","Solution 15 comment on the application keys","Ericsson","Vlasios Tsiatsis",76181,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8230,"available","2019-03-04T13:09:21.543","2019-03-04T13:51:26.913",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190701","Evaluation of solution 4","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8240,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:50.767","2019-03-04T12:30:02.507",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190806","Evaluation of solution 2","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8360,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:13.897","2019-03-04T14:01:11.413",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190808","Evaluation of solution 3","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8420,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:13.960","2019-03-04T14:01:11.430",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190822","Conclusion to Solution #14","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8430,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.240","2019-03-04T14:01:11.493",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190844","Solution 15 evaluation","Ericsson","Vlasios Tsiatsis",76181,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.5","Study on authentication and key management for applications based on 3GPP credential in 5G IoT (FS_AKMA) \n(Rel-16)",8440,"available","2019-03-04T13:09:21.607","2019-03-04T13:51:26.930",null,null,"Rel-16","33.835","0.3.0","FS_AKMA"]
["S3-190611","Reply LS on authentication of group of IoT devices","S1-190501","Mirko Cano Soveri",41957,"LS in",null,null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",6030,"available","2019-02-25T02:02:33.200","2019-02-25T02:09:04.800"]
["S3-190784","Acknowledging the multiple possible mobility solutions for CP small data","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",6110,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.083","2019-03-04T14:19:41.977",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.3.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190815","Evaluation to Solution #3 ‘Security solution for MO SMS at AMF re-allocation’","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",6140,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.100","2019-03-04T14:01:11.460",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.4.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190816","Evaluation to Solution #4 ‘Security solution for UL small data transfer in RRC Suspend and Resume with early data transmission (EDT)’","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",6610,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.130","2019-03-04T14:01:11.460",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.4.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190817","Evaluation to Solution #5 ‘Security solution for small data included in initial NAS signalling at mobility’","Ericsson","Noamen Ben Henda",63310,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",6620,"available","2019-03-04T11:52:14.147","2019-03-04T14:01:11.477",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.4.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190614","Update of Solution #6 – Use of UE Configuration Update","KPN N.V.","Iko Keesmaat",33148,"pCR","Approval","This contribution provides an update of Solution #6 Detecting and handling signalling overload due to Malicious Applications on the UE.",null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",7040,"available","2019-02-28T13:38:08.460","2019-03-04T13:11:03.367",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.4.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190661","Deleting EN on the usage of per-gNB and per-UE counters for solution #7 “protecting gNB from RRC DoS attack”","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",7050,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.513","2019-03-04T12:33:33.753",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.4.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190662","Delete the EN related to the “AttackInformationNotification” message","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",7060,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.797","2019-03-04T12:33:33.753",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.4.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190792","Security protection of small data at idle mode mobility","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",7170,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.350","2019-03-04T14:20:18.433",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.3.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190800","Adding an evaluation to solution #9 in TR 33.861","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",7840,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.583","2019-03-04T14:20:18.480",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.3.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190785","Resolving the editor’s note in solution #10 in TR 33.861","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",7850,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.117","2019-03-04T14:19:41.977",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.3.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190786","Adding an evaluation to solution #10 in TR 33.861","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",7860,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.147","2019-03-04T14:19:41.943",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.3.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190717","Update to solution#12\"DDoS attack mitigation in CIoT\"","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",7920,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:52","2019-03-04T12:30:02.477",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.4.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190603","Solution proposal for FS_CIoT_sec_5G key issue #1 and #2","Philips International B.V.","John Bernsen",35096,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",8000,"available","2019-02-19T15:18:01.397","2019-02-20T12:27:33.387",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.4.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190704","Solution to identify misbehaving UEs","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",8150,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.233","2019-03-04T12:30:02.523",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.4.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190705","Solution to Migitate DDoS Attack based on RAN","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",8160,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.313","2019-03-04T12:30:02.537",null,null,"Rel-16","33.861","0.4.0","FS_CIoT_sec_5G"]
["S3-190706","Conclusion for KDF negotiation for 5G System Security","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.6","Study on evolution of Cellular IoT security for the 5G System (FS_CIoT_sec_5G) (Rel-16)",8170,"revised","2019-03-04T08:08:51.377",null,null,"S3-190723","Rel-16","33.808","0.2.0","FS_5GS_KDF"]
["S3-190745","New KI: N3GPP Key Hierarchy","Ericsson","Christine Jost",49662,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7090,"available","2019-03-04T09:48:40.510","2019-03-04T14:10:37.473",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190746","New Solution: New access type distinguisher for N3GPP","Ericsson","Christine Jost",49662,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7100,"available","2019-03-04T09:48:40.523","2019-03-04T14:10:37.473",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190747","New Solution: Key separation for untrusted and trusted access","Ericsson","Christine Jost",49662,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7110,"available","2019-03-04T09:48:40.540","2019-03-04T14:10:37.443",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190748","New Solution: SUCI deconcealment for the FN-RG","Ericsson","Christine Jost",49662,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7120,"available","2019-03-04T09:48:40.540","2019-03-04T14:10:37.457",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190877","Mobility between TNAPs within the Trusted Non-3GPP Access Network (TNAN)","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Nagendra Bykampadi",69265,"pCR","Approval","Mobility between TNAPs within the Trusted Non-3GPP Access Network (TNAN)",null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7130,"available","2019-03-04T14:11:34.260","2019-03-04T14:19:16.500",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190878","Mobility between TNGFs within the Trusted Non-3GPP Access Network (TNAN)","Nokia, Nokia Shanghai Bell","Nagendra Bykampadi",69265,"pCR","Approval","Mobility between TNGFs within the Trusted Non-3GPP Access Network (TNAN)",null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7140,"available","2019-03-04T14:13:24.180","2019-03-04T14:19:16.500",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190710","Add content to Introduction clause","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7150,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.610","2019-03-04T12:30:02.553",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190709","Add content to section 4","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7160,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.577","2019-03-04T12:30:02.553",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190713","Delete EN for solution #3","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7450,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.733","2019-03-04T12:30:02.443",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190714","Add evaluation to solution #3","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7460,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.797","2019-03-04T12:30:02.443",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190715","Delete EN for solution 5","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7470,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.857","2019-03-04T12:30:02.443",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190716","Add evaluation to soluiton 5","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",7480,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.920","2019-03-04T12:30:02.460",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190712","Conclusion on KI#1","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",8750,"available","2019-03-04T08:08:51.703","2019-03-04T12:30:02.430",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190875","Removal of Editor’s Note in Solution#6","Lenovo, Motorola Mobility","Andreas Kunz",72589,"pCR","Approval","This document proposes to resolve the Editor’s Note in Solution#6",null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",8770,"available","2019-03-04T14:08:44.417","2019-03-04T14:29:22.980",null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190711","Add content to section 4","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.7","Study on the security of the Wireless and Wireline Convergence for the 5G system architecture (FS_5WWC_SEC) \n(Rel-16)",8780,"reserved","2019-03-04T08:08:51.657",null,null,null,"Rel-16","33.807","0.3.0","FS_5WWC_SEC"]
["S3-190615","False base station key issue for RLOS P-CR","SPRINT Corporation","Greg Schumacher",35113,"pCR","Agreement",null,null,null,"5.8","Study on Security Aspects of PARLOS (FS_PARLOS_Sec) (Rel-16)",6150,"available","2019-03-01T04:55:25.380","2019-03-01T05:05:33.827",null,null,"Rel-16","33.815","0.3.0","FS_PARLOS_Sec"]
["S3-190616","Reduced confidentiality protection key issue for RLOS P-CR","SPRINT Corporation","Greg Schumacher",35113,"pCR","Agreement",null,null,null,"5.8","Study on Security Aspects of PARLOS (FS_PARLOS_Sec) (Rel-16)",6160,"available","2019-03-01T04:59:10.247","2019-03-01T05:05:33.827",null,null,"Rel-16","33.815","0.3.0","FS_PARLOS_Sec"]
["S3-190617","Fraud controls bypassed key issue for RLOS P-CR","SPRINT Corporation","Greg Schumacher",35113,"pCR","Agreement",null,null,null,"5.8","Study on Security Aspects of PARLOS (FS_PARLOS_Sec) (Rel-16)",6170,"available","2019-03-01T05:03:40.147","2019-03-01T05:05:33.813",null,null,"Rel-16","33.815","0.3.0","FS_PARLOS_Sec"]
["S3-190781","Proposed evaluation for Solution #1 AS and NAS security for RLOS services","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.8","Study on Security Aspects of PARLOS (FS_PARLOS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7810,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:15.977","2019-03-04T14:19:41.960",null,null,"Rel-16","33.815","0.3.0","FS_PARLOS_Sec"]
["S3-190782","Proposed evaluation for Solution #2 AS and NAS security based on the emergency call procedures","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.8","Study on Security Aspects of PARLOS (FS_PARLOS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7820,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.023","2019-03-04T14:19:41.977",null,null,"Rel-16","33.815","0.3.0","FS_PARLOS_Sec"]
["S3-190783","Proposed update for Solution #2 AS and NAS security based on the emergency call procedures","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.8","Study on Security Aspects of PARLOS (FS_PARLOS_Sec) (Rel-16)",7830,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.053","2019-03-04T14:19:41.977",null,null,"Rel-16","33.815","0.3.0","FS_PARLOS_Sec"]
["S3-190868","Solution Evaluations and Conclusion on KI#1","Lenovo, Motorola Mobility","Andreas Kunz",72589,"pCR","Approval","This document provides the evaluations to the solutions and a conclusion for KI#1.",null,null,"5.8","Study on Security Aspects of PARLOS (FS_PARLOS_Sec) (Rel-16)",8680,"available","2019-03-04T13:50:16.540","2019-03-04T14:29:22.967",null,null,"Rel-16","33.815","0.3.0","FS_PARLOS_Sec"]
["S3-190669","New security requirement against tampering of RRCResumeRequest message","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6300,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.873","2019-03-04T12:33:33.737",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190667","Protection of RRSResumeCause","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6350,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.857","2019-03-04T12:33:33.720",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190670","New security requirement against replay of RRCResumeRequest message","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6360,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.890","2019-03-04T12:33:33.737",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190668","RRCResume replay protection","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6540,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.873","2019-03-04T12:33:33.720",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190829","KI#1 in TR 33.809 - new solution with netwrok controlled RRC Reject message","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6550,"available","2019-03-04T11:59:10.130","2019-03-04T13:10:00.730",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190834","Adding evaluation for Solution #1","Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd","Shu Guo",76339,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6600,"available","2019-03-04T12:04:33.357","2019-03-04T12:23:41.390",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190831","KI#2 in TR 33.809 – updated details (cleanup)","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6630,"available","2019-03-04T11:59:10.147","2019-03-04T13:10:00.747",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190798","Changing the security requirement for KI #2","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6640,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.520","2019-03-04T14:20:18.463",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190676","Cell Authenticated Access for fake base station detection","Intel Mobile Communications","Abhijeet Kolekar",66157,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6650,"available","2019-03-04T06:31:15.640","2019-03-04T11:31:18.923",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190832","KI#2 in TR 33.809 – new solution for tamper resistant SI messages","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6660,"available","2019-03-04T11:59:10.177","2019-03-04T13:10:00.747",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190835","Adding evaluation for Solution #2","Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd","Shu Guo",76339,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6670,"available","2019-03-04T12:06:48.517","2019-03-04T12:23:41.373",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190865","Evaluation of Solution #2","Samsung","Rajavelsamy Rajadurai",33521,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6680,"available","2019-03-04T13:38:08.407","2019-03-04T14:03:46.437",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190630","5GFBS-solution Using symmetric algorithm with assistance of USIM and home network","ZTE Corporation","Zhenhua Xie",38520,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6690,"available","2019-03-02T01:47:49.370","2019-03-04T11:52:42.023","S3-190155",null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190776","Certificate based solution against false base station","Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd","Shu Guo",76339,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6700,"available","2019-03-04T11:16:37.237","2019-03-04T12:23:41.407",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190833","ID based solution against false base station","Apple Computer Trading Co. Ltd","Shu Guo",76339,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6710,"available","2019-03-04T12:01:54.810","2019-03-04T12:23:41.373",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190866","Solution for AS security during RRC Idle mode","Samsung","Rajavelsamy Rajadurai",33521,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6730,"available","2019-03-04T13:39:13.507","2019-03-04T14:03:46.450",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190635","Updating Key issue #3 for Network detection of nearby false base station","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution proposes an update to key issue #3 in TR 33.809.",null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6740,"available","2019-03-03T08:26:35.380","2019-03-04T13:35:51.937",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190825","KI#3 in TR 33.809 - updates to updates to details and threats","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6750,"available","2019-03-04T11:59:10.100","2019-03-04T13:10:00.717",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190826","KI#3 in TR 33.809 - updates to requirements","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",6760,"available","2019-03-04T11:59:10.117","2019-03-04T13:10:00.717",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190828","KI#3 in TR 33.809 - conclusion on second requirement (reactive action)","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",7330,"available","2019-03-04T11:59:10.130","2019-03-04T13:10:00.730",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190654","Notifying cell information to the network after authentication procedure failure","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution proposes a new solution.",null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",7340,"available","2019-03-03T09:16:12.387","2019-03-04T13:35:51.887",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190674","Notifying cell information to the network when the UE determines that the network fails the authentication procedure","NEC Europe Ltd","Kundan Tiwari",75778,"pCR","Approval","Reporting false base station to the network.",null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",7760,"available","2019-03-04T05:18:57.620","2019-03-04T05:28:59.657",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190660","Network detection of false base station from UE measurement reports","Nokia","Suresh Nair",70166,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",7930,"available","2019-03-03T21:40:13.713","2019-03-04T14:15:53.413",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190665","Avoiding UE connecting to fake base station during HO","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",7980,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.843","2019-03-04T12:33:33.767",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190666","Measurement report requirement for the case when the UE in RRC-IDLE & RRC-INACTIVE","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8250,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.843","2019-03-04T12:33:33.783",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190671","Measurement Report Requirement When UE in RRC-CONNECTED","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8260,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.890","2019-03-04T12:33:33.737",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190827","KI#3 in TR 33.809 - new solution for enriched measurement reports","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8270,"available","2019-03-04T11:59:10.117","2019-03-04T13:10:00.730",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190733","New requirment for Authentication relay attack","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8280,"available","2019-03-04T09:32:21.473","2019-03-05T01:21:27.193",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190837","Improvement to key issue #5","ZTE Corporation, Nubia","Jin PENG",49548,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8290,"available","2019-03-04T12:18:46.277","2019-03-04T12:28:24.067",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190655","Protection of UE configuration against false base station","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution proposes a new solution.",null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8300,"available","2019-03-03T09:17:46.583","2019-03-04T13:35:51.903",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190673","Handling of UE configuration update by a fake base station","NEC Europe Ltd","Kundan Tiwari",75778,"pCR","Approval","Protecting UE configuration from false base station.",null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8310,"available","2019-03-04T05:13:19.653","2019-03-04T05:28:59.657",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190734","New solution for Authentication relay attack","Huawei, Hisilicon","Bo Zhang",49401,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8320,"available","2019-03-04T09:32:21.490","2019-03-04T10:21:44.817",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190838","Detection of false relay base station by UE","ZTE Corporation, Nubia","Jin PENG",49548,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8330,"available","2019-03-04T12:18:46.277","2019-03-04T12:28:24.067",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190870","Solution on Authentication Relay Attack","Lenovo, Motorola Mobility","Andreas Kunz",72589,"pCR","Approval","This paper provides a solution on key issue Key Issue #5: Mitigation against the authentication relay attack.",null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8340,"available","2019-03-04T13:52:07.583","2019-03-04T14:29:22.967",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190663","Propose a new KI and security requirement for spoofing paging messages","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8350,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.810","2019-03-04T12:33:33.767",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190664","Protection for Incoming Paging Message Based on Stored Security Context","Huawei, Hisilicon","Longhua Guo",80179,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8370,"available","2019-03-04T02:43:14.827","2019-03-04T12:33:33.767",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190675","Key Issue for Fake Base Station","Intel Mobile Communications","Abhijeet Kolekar",66157,"pCR",null,null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8380,"available","2019-03-04T06:28:21.697","2019-03-04T11:31:18.907",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190793","Protection against Man-in-the-Middle false base station attacks","Qualcomm Incorporated","Adrian Escott",24089,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8650,"available","2019-03-04T11:30:16.367","2019-03-04T14:20:18.450","S3-190381",null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190830","New annex in TR 33.809 - summary of PWS security study","Ericsson","Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi",76183,"pCR","Approval",null,null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8660,"available","2019-03-04T11:59:10.130","2019-03-04T13:10:00.747",null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190636","Solution for preventing UE camping on false base station during Idle mode","NEC Europe Ltd","Taka Yoshizawa",40702,"pCR","Approval","This contribution proposes a solution for preventing UE from camping on false base station.",null,null,"5.9","Study on 5G security enhancement against false base stations (FS_5GFBS) (Rel-16)",8700,"withdrawn","2019-03-03T08:29:45.457",null,null,null,"Rel-16","33.809","0.2.0","FS_5GFBS"]
["S3-190612","Work Plan input from Rapporteurs","WG Vice Chairs","Mirko Cano Soveri",41957,"other",null,null,null,null,"6","Any Other Business",6120,"available","2019-02-25T02:19:43.087","2019-02-25T02:21:44.167"]

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["CR Pack TDoc","WG Tdoc","WG TDoc decision","CR Individual TSG decision","Spec","CR","CR revision","CR category","Release","Version","CR title"]

{"sheet":"Parameters","index":2,"n_rows":25,"n_cols":4,"rows_kept":25,"cut":false,"hidden":true,"merged":[]}
["Types of Tdocs","Possible statuses of Tdocs","Categories"]
[]
["agenda","reserved","A","Decision"]
["Work Plan","available","B","Agreement"]
["LS in","revised","C","Approval"]
["LS out","agreed","D","Information"]
["pCR","conditionally agreed","E","Discussion"]
["draftCR","approved","F","Action"]
["CR","conditionally approved",null,"Endorsement"]
["CR pack","partially approved",null,"Presentation"]
["ToR","treated"]
["WID new","endorsed"]
["WID revised","replied to"]
["SID new","merged"]
["SID revised","not pursued"]
["WI status report","postponed"]
["WI exception request","noted"]
["TS or TR cover","not concluded"]
["draft TS","withdrawn"]
["draft TR","reissued"]
["report","not treated"]
["discussion"]
["response"]
["other"]
["WI summary"]