**3GPP SA3 teleconference for ProSe security (2021.07.19)**

Meeting minutes:

SA3 Chair, Suresh Nair chaired the call, Wei Zhou (rapporteur) guided the discussions.

Participants: About 26 SA3 delegates.

3 documents were discussed:

1) CATT (Rapporteur) input, <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Email_Discussions/SA3/TSGS3_104e/ProSe%20Security/ProSe%20Security%20conference%20call%20agenda%20and%20report%20(20210719).docx>

Document contains Summary of KIs, security requirements and proposed solutions to address them. Wei presented the initial conclusions also.

Qualcomm general comment: On the need for all solutions to be aligned with SA2 and introducing new NFs, Soo Bum observed that SA2 didn’t consider the security requirements. So whether SA3 can rule out security solutions which may have some architecture impact (new NF)?

InterDigital: On KI#10 using 5GDDNMF, Samir observed that this is a new NF and solutions are dependent on this new NF.

Chair suggested to discuss the suggested decisions in the document, after discussing the two other input contributions.

2) Inter Digital contribution, <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Email_Discussions/SA3/TSGS3_104e/ProSe%20Security/S3-21xxxx_U2N%20relay%20authorization%20security%20solutions%20analysis.doc>

Recommend solutions that are compatible with SA2 architecture. Solution #19 with N3IWF as a baseline to support Remote UE services with end-to-end security requirements. Selected baseline solutions for relay/remote UE authorization and PC5 security need to accommodate solutions for secondary and slice-specific authentication and authorization support. Reply LS to SA2 (S3-211401) may be necessary for SA3 to be able to reach a final agreement.

InterDigital thinks that it is necessary to set criteria for the selection of UE-to-network relay solutions.

3) Huawei contribution, <https://www.3gpp.org/ftp/Email_Discussions/SA3/TSGS3_104e/ProSe%20Security/S3-21xxxx_Analyse%20of%20the%20necessity%20to%20set%20two%20security%20requirements%20as%20high%20priority%20security%20requirements.doc>

For KI #12 (Security of one-to-one communication over PC5), if eV2X solution is adopted as the baseline solution, there is possibility of bidding down attack by a MitM. Propose enhanced solutions to address this vulnerability.

4) KI#1

LG agreed not to consider the 4th requirement listed in clause 5.1.3 of TR 33.847

CATT thinks Sol#27 and Sol#28 could be considered in KI#12. QC agree with CATT’s view

Huawei: Sol#3, Sol#4, Sol#27, Sol#28 can work together, and need to explore merging possibility.

5) KI#2

HW: SA3 can develop new network function in 5G.

InterDigital: 5GDDNMF is a new NF in 5G. It concerns that it does not support out of coverage.

QC does not agree with InterDigtal.

Preliminary conclusion: Sol#35 is the baseline with come clarification.

6) KI#11

KPN will provide a new evaluation in the upcoming meeting.

7) KI#12

interDigital agrees with the view of rapporteur.

HW emphasized the bidding down attack in eV2X.

QC’s view is different from HW. The bidding-down attack has been resolved in eV2X.

HW requires a mark for resolving bidding-down attack in 5G ProSe.

8) KI#5

InterDigital: Even there are no solutions for the KI#5, it is good to keep it for evaluating UE-to-network solutions

9) KI#13

LG: This KI and corresponding solution are FFS.

10) KI#16

HW: Sol#26 is L2 solution. Propose Sol#26 is the baseline for L2.

Sol#32 is the baseline for L3 is FFS.

11) Part5: UE-to-UE Relay

It is clear that 5G ProSe does not support UE-to-UE Relay in R-17, therefore UE-to-UE Relay will be out of scope in SA3.

Preliminary decisions: Group discussed and arrived at preliminary decisions based on CATT input document. These are captured in a separate document.